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**Gender Comparisons.
Northern and Western Europe
in the 20th Century**



COMPARATIV

Leipziger Beiträge zur Universalgeschichte und vergleichenden Gesellschaftsforschung

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**Gender Comparisons.
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in the 20th Century**

**Herausgegeben von
Wiebke Kolbe und Iris Rittenhofer**



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Comparative Gender History. Northern and Western Europe in the 20th Century: An Introduction

This issue of *Comparativ* contributes to the comparative history of Europe in the 20th century. It contains a collection of international contributions on *Gender Comparisons* between Northern and Western European countries. The articles presented here have a twofold aim: First, as regards content, to bridge the gap between Northern and Western European historical research; and second, as regards methodology and theory, to make a contribution to the comparative study of history and of gender, as well as to the overall understanding of gender in European contemporary history. For the purpose of pursuing both aims, and in what could be considered very rare for a collection of articles, all authors apply a genuine comparative approach, i.e. they use the comparison of two countries, based on source material, as a method to gain further insights into how modern societies work.

Context

Today, the majority of the Nordic countries are members of the EU. This makes it an urgent matter to arrive at both a revised and broader international understanding of this part of Europe. Even more important, it makes it necessary to challenge the widespread preconception of the Nordic countries as differing decisively from the rest of Europe – an idea, which has proved to be very influential within gender research, especially in studies working on the premise of an outstanding ‘Nordic gender model’.

Both, in research as well as in politics, the Nordic countries are often regarded as having the world’s best and most developed ‘welfare state model’¹ as well as ‘gender model’². However a ‘Nordic gender model’ only exists as

1 Cf. e.g. Gøsta Esping-Andersen, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Cambridge 1990; Stephan Leibfried, *Towards a European Welfare State?*, in: Catherine Jones (ed.), *New Perspectives on the Welfare State in Europe*, London, New York 1993, pp. 133-156.

2 For more detailed information: Swedish Secretariat for Social Research (ed.), *Genus*, no. 1 (2001) (Special issue on gender equality research). On the Beijing Women’s Conference in 1995, e.g., the UN declared Sweden to be the “most gender equal country in the world”. Cf. Mimmi Palm, *Sweden best at gender equality?*, in: *ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

a political ideal. As societal reality, it is non-existent. To continue with the notion of a 'Nordic gender model' placed at the top of international rankings is problematic for two main reasons. Firstly, a particular 'gender model' is the result of a specific historical development. Regarding it as a utopian goal for Europe, neglects historically diverse developments and their interrelations. Moreover, positive aspects of existing other 'gender models' are likely to be overlooked, as are gender problems within the Nordic countries.³ Quotation, e.g., is a political practice in the US, Western Europe and in Sweden. However, up to the present day, it is not considered a legitimate equal opportunity tool in Denmark. Moreover, women's share in management positions in France and their share in professorships in Turkey are significantly higher than in the Nordic countries. Such examples illustrate that there is no point in clinging to the dichotomy of a 'progressive' North and a 'latecomer' Middle Europe, when we talk about equal opportunities in terms of gender. Rather, examples like these suggest the necessity of drawing a more differentiated picture. Secondly, the notion of a 'Nordic gender model' transfers the idea of the nation state to a supranational level. The fact that neither the 'North' nor nation states are natural, hegemonic entities but rather historical constructions, and as such 'imagined communities' (Benedict Anderson), is not taken into consideration. 'The North' is no cultural or political unit, though this is often stressed within the Nordic countries themselves as part of a self-awareness which dissociates itself from 'Europe'.⁴ This is not to say that differences within the Nordic countries are not acknowledged. So does recent Scandinavian research, for instance, document a higher level of gender equality in Sweden and Norway than in Denmark and Finland.⁵ How-

3 Cf. Kaj Fölster, Vorbild für die Europäische Union? Frauenpolitik in Schweden, in: Melanie Piepenschneider (ed.), Frauenpolitik in der Europäischen Union. Beiträge einer Tagung des Arbeitskreises Europäische Integration e.V. und der Vertretung der Europäischen Kommission in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 6. bis 7. April 1995 in Bonn, Baden-Baden 1995, pp. 101-105.

4 Cf. Bernd Henningsen, Mentalität, Identität, Nationalität. Die Skandinavier auf der Suche nach dem, was sie sind, in: Hans Schottmann (ed.), Arbeiten zur Skandinavistik. II. Arbeitstagung der deutschsprachigen Skandinavistik, Münster 1994, pp. 400-416; Nordic Council (ed.), Norden är död. Länge leve Norden! En debattbok om de nordiska länderna som „megaregion“ i Europa, Copenhagen 1994; Øystein Sørensen/Bo Stråth (eds.), The Cultural Construction of Norden, Oslo 1997; Bo Stråth, Folkhemmet mot Europa. Ett historiskt perspektiv på 90-talet, Stockholm 1992. This collective Nordic self-image is also demonstrated in the common embassy building of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden in Berlin.

5 Solveig Bergmann (ed.), Equal Democracies? Gender and Politics in the Nordic Countries, Oslo 1999; Kirsten Gomard/Anne Krogstad (eds.), Instead of the ideal de-

ever, this does not result in a principal revision of the dichotomous notion of a Nordic versus a middle European 'gender model'. Nevertheless, until the mid 1980s, Norwegian child care and family politics, for instance, show a greater resemblance to (West) German politics than to the politics of other Nordic countries.⁶ Findings like these make the notion of a Nordic "mega-region"⁷ appeal even more questionable.

Therefore, instead of continuing with the notion of a cultural unit 'North', the following *Gender Comparisons* emphasise both, the differences and similarities *between* Northern and Western European countries as well as the diversity *within* both groups. By applying a historical perspective, they show clearly that the contrast between 'progressive' Northern European and 'conservative' or 'late comer' Western European countries appears even less true when we look back at the long-term development of these countries during the last century. Instead, the *diversity* of historical developments in Europe becomes evident, as it does both within Northern and Western Europe. Our aim is not at least to enlarge the empirical knowledge about the history of North European countries in Germany and elsewhere and to bridge the gap between North and West European research and researchers.

Method

The studies presented here have two essential approaches in common: the historical perspective on Northern and Western Europe in the 20th century, and a genuine comparison as a method of analysis. A genuine comparative approach uses the comparison of two or more countries (or regions) as a means to gain further insights into how societies function. Hence, taking a certain research question as a point of departure, source material from the respective countries is collected, investigated and put into equivalent contexts.

Comparative approaches have been adopted by historians from the social sciences, which try to develop typologies and methods of comparison,⁸ while

bate. Doing politics and doing gender in Nordic political campaign discourse, Århus 2001.

6 On Norway: Tora Korsvold, *Profesjonalisert barndom. Statlige intensjoner og kvinnelig praksis på barnehagens arena 1945-90*, Trondheim 1997. On West Germany: Wiebke Kolbe, *Elternschaft im Wohlfahrtsstaat. Schweden und die Bundesrepublik im Vergleich 1945-2000*, Frankfurt/Main, New York 2002.

7 Nordic Council, *Norden* (note 4).

8 See e.g. Klaus von Beyme, *Der Vergleich in der Politikwissenschaft*, München 1988; Jürgen Hartmann, *Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft. Ein Lehrbuch*, Frankfurt a. M. 1995; Stefan Immerfall, *Einführung in den europäischen Gesellschaftsvergleich. Ansätze, Problemstellungen, Befunde*. Passau 1994; Birgit Pfau-Effinger, *Kultur und*

historians usually tend to a more heuristic but still theoretically and methodologically reflected use of comparisons.⁹ Another approach, originating from literary critics and cultural studies, has gained increasing attention in European historical research during the last decade, when we have faced the 'cultural turn' in history: the cultural transfer approach. It deals with *processes* of transfer, i.e. the adoption, adaptation ('Aneignung') or even restriction of cultural goods, knowledge, ideas, practices, and their actors, beyond national and cultural borders.¹⁰ Some advocates of the transfer approach criticise comparative research for confirming existing frontiers and supposedly national (and supranational) 'Sonderwege' rather than deconstructing them. Only if comparative research includes aspects of a cultural transfer approach, they argue, this danger may be avoided.¹¹ However, in recent research, both approaches have been combined more often, partly due to a growing awareness of this methodological problem, partly due to the increasing impact of cultural history.

Frauenenerwerbstätigkeit in Europa. Theorie und Empirie des internationalen Vergleichs, Opladen 2000.

- 9 E.g. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt/Jürgen Kocka (eds.), *Geschichte und Vergleich. Ansätze und Ergebnisse international vergleichender Geschichtsschreibung*, Frankfurt/Main, New York 1996; Hartmut Kaelble, *Der historische Vergleich. Eine Einführung zum 19. und 20. Jahrhundert*, Frankfurt a. M./New York 1999; Jürgen Osterhammel, *Sozialgeschichte im Zivilisationsvergleich. Zu künftigen Möglichkeiten komparativer Geschichtswissenschaft*, in: *Geschichte und Gesellschaft* 22 (1996), pp. 143-164. For an early approach see the 'classic' Marc Bloch, *For a comparative history of European societies*, in: *Revue de synthèse*, 1928, no. 46, pp. 15-50. For interdisciplinary approaches cf. Hartmut Kaelble/Jürgen Schriewer (eds.), *Diskurse und Entwicklungspfade. Der Gesellschaftsvergleich in den Geschichts- und Sozialwissenschaften*, Frankfurt/Main 1999.
- 10 E.g. Michel Espagne/Michael Werner, *Deutsch-französischer Kulturtransfer im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert. Zu einem neuem Forschungsprogramm des C.N.R.S.*, in: *Francia* 13 (1985), pp. 502-512; Lothar Jordan/Bernd Kortländer (eds.), *Nationale Grenzen und internationaler Austausch. Studien zum Kultur- und Wissenschaftstransfer in Europa*, Tübingen 1995; Rudolf Muhs/Johannes Paulmann/Willibald Steinmetz (eds.), *Aneignung und Abwehr. Interkultureller Transfer zwischen Deutschland und Großbritannien im 19. Jahrhundert*, Bodenheim 1998.
- 11 Michel Espagne, *Sur les limites du comparatisme en histoire culturelle*, in: *Genèses* 17 (1994), pp. 112-121; Johannes Paulmann, *Internationaler Vergleich und interkultureller Transfer. Zwei Forschungsansätze zur europäischen Geschichte des 18. bis 20. Jahrhunderts*, in: *Historische Zeitschrift* 267 (1998), pp. 649-685, esp. pp. 667 ff. For the debate between the two approaches see also Hartmut Kaelble, *Die interdisziplinären Debatten über Vergleich und Transfer*, in: H. Kaelble/Jürgen Schriewer (eds.), *Vergleich und Transfer. Komparatistik in den Sozial-, Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften*, Frankfurt a. M./New York 2003, pp. 469-495.

Although the mentioned critique is certainly justified, it has to be emphasised that comparative research nevertheless has an enormous potential. In spite of the wide-spread conviction about its theoretical and empirical values, there is still too little comparative research done in history. This holds even more true for gender history, where the number of respective empirical studies is still rather limited, and a methodological discussion about the epistemological and empirical advantages and pitfalls of comparative and transfer research has not even started. However, comparative gender history gives us a better understanding of both the gendered construction of societies and of concepts of gender.¹² It contributes to transgressing essentialist ideas of gender, since it makes particularly clear that gender is a culturally constructed category, and sheds light on the mechanisms and contexts of this construction.

The four contributions will exemplify the empirical insights gained from comparative gender history. This issue of *Comparativ* is edited with the objective of providing new insights into the development and variety of contents and meanings of gender concepts and of gendered structures in society on the one hand, and into a sample of European countries on the other. This common aim is pursued in different ways by the respective authors. Methodologists of comparative history use to distinguish between two types of comparative research: contrasting approaches, shedding light upon national differences and particularities, and generalising approaches, stressing similarities and improving the understanding of general developments applying to a majority of societies.¹³ Most comparative studies contain aspects of both approaches, although often stressing one above the other. Of the gender comparisons presented here, the contributions of Johanna Kantola, Elisabeth Elgán and Maren Wichmann use a clearly contrasting perspective, though with the latter two stressing some striking similarities between the respective countries. Iris Rittenhofer applies a more generalising perspective in her article. In spite of their different approaches, all contributions reveal the processes by which modern European societies are gendered, and the different or similar meanings gender can take on in European history.

12 The term 'gender' is used here according to the classic definition of Joan W. Scott, *Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis*, in: J. W. Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History*, New York 1988, pp. 28-50.

13 Cf. Heinz-Gerhard Haupt/Jürgen Kocka, *Historischer Vergleich: Methoden, Aufgaben, Probleme. Eine Einleitung*, in: Haupt/Kocka (eds.), *Geschichte und Vergleich* (note 9), pp. 9-45, here p. 11; Kaelble, *Der historische Vergleich* (note 9), pp. 26-35.

Contributions

The editors and authors are younger scholars from Germany and the Nordic Countries. The subjects cover a variety of themes reconsidered from the perspective of genuine comparisons: tax politics, leadership and the 'glass ceiling', the gendered access to the state as well as abortion and contraception politics. A fruitful combination of both a cultural transfer and a genuine comparative approach is used in Iris Rittenhofer's contribution. The cultural representations of gender in West Germany, Denmark, Britain and Finland are covered by Iris Rittenhofer and Johanna Kantola. Elisabeth Elgán and Maren Wichmann deal with the gendering welfare states in Sweden, France, (West) Germany and Denmark.

In *Abortion and Contraception Politics*, the faith in medical science as a guideline for social measures and as a social rescue were present in both *Sweden and France*. Elisabeth Elgán presents a comparative study on how these measures gained different meanings. Due to those countries' widely differing political cultures, abortion politics were shaped in quite different ways at the dawn of the French and Swedish welfare states. However different the politics and their contexts were, though: they were based on similar concepts of gender (relations).

Maren Wichmann performs a comparison of how *Tax Politics and Women's Equality* are related in *Denmark and Germany*. Since the 1920s and until today, tax laws not only served the needs of the labour market. Tax law reforms empowered as well images of the morally acceptable ways of living a family life. In both countries, married women were reputed to be the manoeuvrable mass and the target of amending laws. Wichmann addresses the question as to why the principle of individual taxation eventually succeeded in Denmark, but not in Germany. She shows that tax politics were used in both countries as an instrument for the regulation not only of the labour market, but also of gender relations and family living. Her study challenges the notion of a 'progressive' Danish and a 'conservative' German policy.

Johanna Kantola's comparative study on *Britain and Finland* not only gives important insights into the self-images of these countries. Moreover, her study on *Gender and the Discursive Construction of the Access to the State* challenges influential international theories on the strategies of contemporary women's movements. She shows how dominant discourses about the state actually shape women's access to and engagement in these states. Women's activists' strategies cannot be reduced to either integration or autonomy. Rather, Kantola reveals how dominant perceptions of these states either limit or create the space for the empowerment of women. Moreover,

she makes a strong case for the fact that dominant theories, in this case those of feminist oriented political scientists, are themselves cultural representations. Thus, she challenges well established scientific 'truths'.

Iris Rittenhofer focuses on contemporary *West Germany and Denmark as Centered Societies*. However, Rittenhofer does not limit the concept of transfer to the study of nation but applies it to other categories as well. In the case of her study on the making and the transformations of equal opportunities in the post war economies of both countries, she does not treat 'man' and 'woman', 'entrepreneur' and 'manager' as distinct and differing categories. Instead, she introduces the concepts 'gender' and 'leader' as 'parallel categories'. Rittenhofer offers an original re-think of the widely and self-evidently used terms 'mass education' and 'the glass ceiling'.

Conclusion

The *Gender Comparisons* presented direct our scholarly attention towards the differences between Northern and Western European countries. However, they direct it at least as much towards the diversities among the Nordic countries on the one hand, and the Western European ones on the other. They advise us to focus on the diversities of these countries as well as on their contextual similarities. This suggests a more careful use of the framework of the 'Nordic gender model'.

Historicizing and contextualising gender in genuine comparative research may serve as an eye opener for our understanding of the EU-member states. One question for future research in gender and the history of Europe in the 20th century might be whether, and in what respects, we could speak of a 'European gender model'. The social sciences have asked this question, but by applying a historical perspective, we would come to different conclusions and shed light on the long-term-development, as well as on the question of a possible path dependency of European gender conditions.¹⁴ Thus, this issue of *Comparativ* contributes to a vivid debate, within research on the EU, as well as in EU-politics: whether and to what degree the politics and the organisations of one society may be transferred to other countries. Equally important, it raises the question whether this would be desirable.

With these *Gender Comparisons*, we also want to encourage future research that is not limited by concepts of national or supranational units as pre-established, distinct entities; a research which transgresses a priori concepts such as gender or nation.

14 On the concept of path dependency see Pfau-Effinger, Kultur (note 8).

Gender Construction in Swedish and French Abortion and Contraception Policies, 1900–1940

What is the nature of the link between politics and gender, that is, the social construction of sexual difference in the case of abortion and contraception policies? My objective is to use a comparative study to shed light on this question. I will also address the choice of a comparative study and why I decided to compare Sweden and France.

This study covers the period from the beginning of the 20th century to the Second World War, when most Western countries had, in one way or another, put in place reproduction policies that included sections on abortion and contraception. These policies would be developed until they came under scrutiny in the 1960s and were revised in the 1970s. They are integrated into other political domains, in particular, that of the family, which did not change nearly as radically as did the policies of abortion and contraception after the 1960s.

By analyzing the discourses on which the policies of abortion and contraception are based, we can shed light on the terms of the social construction of gender and the reproduction of male domination, to restate Pierre Bourdieu's terminology, as far as the nature of the relations between the sexes is concerned. Gender construction and the reproduction of male domination happen in the long term; they are present implicitly and explicitly in institutions, such as laws, social practices, and in public discourse. They do not evolve without widespread and radical criticism and rarely in an abrupt and complete manner. The sexual order formulated in the first half of the 19th century was severely criticized by the feminist movement in the 1970s, but some of its principles still structure the way we live and think.

1 Abortion and Contraception: A Political and Social History

My point of departure in this study of abortion and contraception policies was Michel Foucault's hypothesis, now considered a classic: that the history of sexuality cannot be written as a history of centuries of repression followed by enlightenment and humanism. Thus, we have approached sexuality as a social construction whose very regulations are essential to its existence; we have understood the politics of sexuality and its related domains to be a game that is more subtle than a simple matter of the absence or presence of repression.

The next step was to grant policy another status than that of an epiphenomenon, that is, a simple function of economic and social history. On the contrary, in my view policy represents a very real power struggle, one of principles, interpretations, and symbols that structure social relationships. This struggle is waged at different levels of society; some of its outcomes are measured in terms of laws, norms, and institutions. Policy, included herein, plays a fundamental role in the reproduction and evolution of a society. As an element in a process of signification, politics lead a partly autonomous existence.

The politicization of a fact or an event is not the simple reflection of a new state of affairs. The sudden appearance of a political issue and its formulation as a problem are at stake. It is the very essence of politics. Abortion and contraception were not new phenomena when, at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th, they became a severe social problem for politicians, one requiring a new policy. This study is based on the printed proceedings of debates in the bicameral Swedish and French parliaments, as well as on government bills, parliamentary bills, opinions of parliamentary commissions, texts of the laws themselves, and reports of official committees of inquiry appointed by the governments or parliaments.¹

1.1 The case in France

In France, the modern policy governing abortion and contraception took shape during the 1910s and, unlike Sweden's, would hardly change during the subsequent fifty years. The political context was that of a parliamentary republican regime that had been firmly established for some thirty years. However, this democracy was a male democracy in which women were not permitted either to vote or be elected to office. They were absent as subjects of debates and official inquiries, which are among the primary sources for this current study.

France's attention to the matter of abortion and contraception as a political problem at the beginning of the 20th century was in keeping with a way of thinking that focused on the issue of the relative decrease of the French population compared to that of other countries, in particular Germany. An

1 Except in rare instances, it is impossible for me to cite every source on which this analysis and its exposition are based. For this reason, reference to the appropriate sections of my thesis, where the sources are presented and analyzed systematically, will be made: Elisabeth Elgán, *Genus och politik: En jämförelse mellan svensk och fransk abort- och preventivmedelspolitik från sekelskiftet till andra världskriget*, Uppsala 1994, p. 176. When sources, French or Swedish, are cited their titles are not, for obvious reasons, translated into English.

inseparable couple in the French geopolitical vision, France and Germany represented two opposite poles in which the power of one was, of necessity, the weakness of the other.² For a brief period during the Third Republic, this duality seemed so intense that people spoke of a “German crisis” in French intellectual life.³

The demographic obsession, and more particularly pronatalism – the desire to see the birth rate increase in France – is very much present in the period we are studying here. It is possible to link this obsession with medical science, which became the paradigm for understanding and guiding the development of societies on the road to modernization.⁴

Pronatalism penetrated almost all political trends and united Catholics and Republicans under the same conviction.⁵ Its unifying aspect explains its success, which can also be measured in terms of the tentative reactions of the left. During the entire 1910–1920 period, when new legislation on abortion and contraception was debated, only two Socialist members of parliament voiced opposition with regard to the omnipresent pronatalism.⁶

In 1920, France’s elected representatives adopted a policy aimed at putting a halt to all information, public debates, and advertising surrounding contraceptives and abortion, as well as to the public sale of contraceptives and abortifacients. The penalties specified for individuals who did not obey these interdictions ranged from fines to prison.⁷

In 1923, the system put into place in 1920 was reinforced by a law whose aim was to make the judicial repression of abortion more effective by transferring the abortion trials from populist juries who, it was felt were too quick to pardon, to professional judges. The punishments were shortened; by doing so, the legislature hoped to encourage the judges to waver less in their abortion convictions.⁸

However, it would be wrong to view the Third Republic’s abortion and contraception policy as solely an issue of repression. Its full meaning can

2 Elgán, *Genus* (note 1), pp. 188–191.

3 Claude Digeon, *La crise allemande de la pensée française: 1870–1914*, Paris 1959.

4 For the connection between medicine, the medical profession, and French society, see Léonard, Jacques, *La médecine entre les savoirs et les pouvoirs: Histoire intellectuelle et politique de la médecine française au XIXe siècle*, Paris 1981, p. 149f.

5 Elgán, *Genus* (note 1), pp. 184–188, 191f.

6 *Journaux Officiels, Débats parlementaires, Chambre des Députés, Compte rendu in extenso*, 23 juillet 1920, André Berthon; *Journaux Officiels, Débats parlementaires, Chambre des Députés, Compte rendu in extenso*, 23 juillet 1920, Paul Morucci.

7 *Loi réprimant la provocation à l’avortement et à la propagande anticonceptionnelle*, in: *Journal Officiel de la République française*, 1 août 1920; Elgán, *Genus* (note 1), pp. 82–91.

only be derived in relation to other family and social policy measures that contributed just as actively in the creation of a climate favorable to a higher birth rate. An active French family policy began before the First World War, which meant that, early on, France provided for different types of family allowances.

This method of dealing with what was believed to be harmful to the birth rate, abortion and contraception, and with what were regarded as material obstacles to the creation of large families came to fruition in 1939, in a series of pronatalist legislative texts known as the *code of the family* (*code de la famille*). This "code" included reforms that had been debated for a long time, as well as updates and co-ordination of several reforms already in effect. The repression of abortion, for example, was reinforced on this occasion.⁹

The application of the 1920 law appears to have been somewhat tentative: contraceptives were still being sold, and the effect of the legislation on the number of trials and convictions was very weak.¹⁰ For example, in relative numbers, there were fewer convictions in France than in Sweden for infractions of the law prohibiting the propagation of contraceptives.¹¹ I believe, therefore, that it is necessary to bring up the issue of the normative and discursive aspects of the French legislation as regards matters of abortion and contraception. Perhaps its aim was, above all else, to affirm, loud and clear, the consensus of opinion among Catholics and Republicans regarding their desire to see the birth rate increase.

Another goal voiced by the legislature as it adopted the 1920 law was to put an end to the neo-Malthusian agitation that France had been experiencing since before the First World War.¹² This movement, backed by powerful an-

8 Loi modifiant les dispositions de l'article 317 du Code pénal sur l'avortement, in: Journal Officiel de la République française, 29 mars 1923; Elgán, *Genus* (note 1), pp. 82-83, 92.

9 Décret relatif à la famille et à la natalité françaises, in: Journal Officiel de la République française, 30 juillet 1939, pp. 9607-9626.

10 On the application of the 1920 law, see Jeanne Pagès, *Le contrôle des naissances en France et à l'étranger*, Paris 1971, pp. 56f., 175 ff.; D.V. Glass, *The effectiveness of abortion legislation in six countries*, in: *The Modern Law Review*, 1938, pp. 97-125; Roger-Henri Guerrand/Francis Ronsin, *Le sexe apprivoisé: Jeanne Humbert et la lutte pour le contrôle des naissances*, Paris 1990, passim; Francis Ronsin, *La grève des ventres: Propagande néo-malthusienne et baisse de la natalité française, XIXe-XXe siècle*, Paris 1980, passim; Angus McLaren, *Sexuality and Social Order: The debate over fertility of women and workers in France 1770-1920*, New York 1983, pp. 182; Elgán, *Genus* (note 1), pp. 88-92.

11 Elgán, *Genus* (note 1), pp. 90-92.

12 This movement has been the subject of many studies in France. See in particular Ronsin, *La grève des ventres* (note 10); Guerrand/Ronsin, *Le sexe apprivoisé* (note

archist and labor-revolutionary forces, disappeared at just about the same time as the 1920 law appeared on the scene. Nevertheless, one would be justified in asking if the cause and effect link between these two phenomena is as obvious as one might have thought. It is true that the legislature was openly pleased to see the neo-Malthusians, who opposed pronatalism, disappear. However, except for a couple of shows of force against some symbolic figureheads of the Malthusian movement, we cannot refer to this as mass repression.¹³ Of course, it is possible that some self-censorship was imposed by the neo-Malthusians after passage of the 1920 law, however I believe that their disappearance from the French political scene can be explained first and foremost by the general evolution of the balance of political power between the right and the left and between leftist trends, of which large segments felt some compassion for pronatalism.

1.2 *The case in Sweden*

If the term *pronatalist* best characterizes the French abortion and contraception policy during the period we are studying, than the term *medicalization* summarizes the direction in which Swedish policy in this area evolved. The Swedish abortion and contraception policy went through several phases from the turn of the century to the Second World War and seems to have paralleled the country's political history. In the 1910s, when the questions that interest us came before parliament for the first time, the country was on the road to democratization. Old institutions, inherited from an authoritarian and hierarchical society, had only recently been abrogated.

Thus, the corporate monopoly and corporatist regulation of professions disappeared between 1846 and 1864 and the work obligation in 1865. Between 1858 and 1884, civil rights were granted progressively to single

10); Roger-Henri Guerrand, *La libre maternité*, Tournai 1971; Roger-Henri Guerrand, *Socialisme et néo-malthusianisme dans l'entre-deux-guerres*, in: Antoinette Fauve-Chamoux (ed.), *Malthus hier et aujourd'hui: Congrès international de démographie historique*, Paris, 1984, pp.387-392; André Béjin, *Condorcet, précurseur du néo-malthusianisme*, in: *Histoire, économie et société*, 1988, pp. 347-354; André Béjin, *Néo-malthusianisme, populationisme et eugénisme en France de 1870-1914*, in: Jacques Dupâquier (ed.), *Histoire de la population française*, vol. 3, Paris 1988, pp. 481-497; André Armengaud, *Les Français et Malthus*, Paris 1975; André Armengaud, *Mouvement ouvrier et néo-malthusianisme au début du XXe siècle*, in: *Annales de la démographie historique*, 1966, pp. 7-19; Michelle Perrot, *Malthusianisme et socialisme*, in: Antoinette Fauve-Chamoux (ed.), *Malthus hier et aujourd'hui: Congrès international de démographie historique*, Paris 1984, pp. 357-370.

13 On the suppression of the neo-Malthusian movement, see primarily Guerrand Ronsin. *Le sexe apprivoisé* (note 10).

women; in 1866, two chambers elected through direct or indirect suffrage based on tax quotas replaced state representation to the parliament, on the model of the Ancien Régime; and in 1901, a modern army, using the draft, was created.

Little by little, suffrage was expanded, and by 1910 it included all adult males, with a few exceptions. The idea of true universal suffrage, however, had not yet been accepted. It was not until 1921 that the first elections with true universal suffrage for both men and women were held.

In 1910, the Swedish parliamentary system was still in its infancy: the principle that the government should reflect the majority of the Parliament and not the will of the king was making inroads. In 1914, the king made one last attempt to assert his authority on the government's policies, after which his real power was curtailed.

The spring of 1910 ushered in the first phase of the Swedish policy in matters of abortion and contraception, when the Conservative government quickly passed a law prohibiting the *public* sale of and information on contraceptive methods.¹⁴ However, the law barely passed in the lower house, since it was in the hands of the Swedish left of the times, a coalition of Liberals and Social Democrats united in the struggle for a democratic system.

In Sweden, the primary motive invoked in 1910 for wanting to curtail the distribution of contraceptives was not the pressing need to sustain the birth rate but the belief that contraceptives encouraged moral corruption.¹⁵ This argument arose from the desire to channel sexuality in society. It corresponds very well with a conservative political outlook that is based on an organic, rather than an individualistic view of society and on distrust regarding the ability of men to govern themselves. Therefore, most of the individuals who supported this line of thinking were recruited from among the Conservatives. The desire to supervise sexuality, however, was not restricted to conservative reasoning. Later on, we will see the same inability to leave sexuality "alone" among other political groups.

Although the medical discourse of the period also emphasized the medical and physiological dangers of unbridled sexuality, it was, above all, its social consequences that were debated in Sweden in 1910. Free love, the term used by some participants to the debate, ran the risk of shaking the very foundations of society, primarily the family. Sexuality, understood as a pressing physical need, a force of nature, must allow itself to be repressed by a powerful morality. In the belief that the distribution of advice on daily hygiene and moderation proposed by those opposed to this policy was not sufficient,

14 Svensk Författningssamling 1910:51.

15 Elgán, *Genus* (note 1), pp. 101-104.

the majority passed the Swedish law prohibiting the diffusion of contraceptives in 1910.¹⁶

The left, which opposed the 1910 law, did so in the name of humanism. It accused the law on contraceptives of conflicting with the principles of freedom of expression. However, these humanists also supported the fight against moral corruption, claiming that they shared its objectives but not the means of accomplishing them.¹⁷

This first period of the Swedish policy on contraception and abortion also sees the enactment, in 1921, of a modern abortion law.¹⁸ This new law decreased the penalties for abortions. As opposed to France, the purpose of the law was not to make the pursuit of abortion offences more efficient. The Swedish abortion law of 1921 was part of a general evolution of the theory of criminal law in which the signification and the length of the punishment evolved.¹⁹ It is precisely this evolution that can be linked to the liberal humanism just mentioned; the new law was planned during a period in which the Liberals came to power through a coalition with the Social Democrats. The conservatives opposed this reform in the name of the fight against moral corruption, while its supporters defended it easily, saying they were protecting a vulnerable being, at the limit of judicial incapacity, namely, woman, whose nature required that she be treated gently.²⁰

The second period of the Swedish policy on abortion and contraception begins in 1922, when Arthur Engberg, a well-known Social Democrat and member of parliament who later became minister of education and ecclesiastical affairs, proposed a bill to reform the law on contraceptives.²¹ His words heralded a new method, one that could be described as hygienist in nature, to tackle the issues of abortion and contraceptives. This line of reasoning would result in the supersession of the conservative position regarding the fight against moral corruption with repressive measures. By hygienist, I mean the development of social reforms based on a permanent and prevailing concern for public health. The proponents of public hygiene in the Swedish parliament, primarily Social Democrats, demanded the repeal of, or at least, restrictions on the 1910 law, so that doctors would be allowed to freely conduct a campaign against venereal diseases and mention the use of condoms

16 *Ibid.*, pp. 113-116.

17 *Ibid.*, pp. 107-112.

18 *Svensk Författningssamling* 1921:298.

19 Göran Inger, *Svensk rättshistoria*, 3rd edition, Lund 1986, pp. 235-250.

20 Elgán, *Genus* (note 1), pp. 111-113.

21 *Riksdagstryck, Bihang till riksdagens protokoll, Motioner väckta inom Andra kammaren, Nr. 141, 1922*. See also: *Riksdagstryck, Bihang till riksdagens protokoll, Motioner väckta inom Andra kammaren, Nr. 144, 1923*.

as a means of protection.²² As far as abortion is concerned, the demands from the members of parliament for reform were less pressing, but the matter was still debated, not only in parliament but also in leftist organizations. The demand for reform was centered on the need to allow some exceptions to the ban on abortions.²³

During this period, abortion in Sweden and in France was permitted in those cases in which the mother's health was in grave danger. The supporters of public hygiene wanted to extend this concession to permit doctors to carry out abortions for eugenic or humanitarian reasons, this latter category to include victims of rape and individuals suffering from psychological disorders. In the mid-1930s, many Swedish women's organizations fought for abortion rights for women who, on their doctor's advice, needed abortions because they had large families and serious social problems.²⁴

For its part, the leftist Swedish Communist party submitted to parliament several bills with a vague feminist point of view to parliament. These bills could be construed as meaning that a woman should have the right to decide whether she wanted an abortion or not. However, when other members of parliament questioned the intent of these bills, the Communists denied that they wanted women to have this right.²⁵

From 1925 to around 1935, the supporters of the fight against moral corruption lost ground to hygienism, which represented a victory for a particular concept of medicine related to social progress, a concept that pleased the left. Without denying the dangers of moral corruption and free love, the victorious hygienists advanced social prevention and education as solutions to the problem. If living conditions, from both a cultural and material standpoint, were improved, unbridled sexuality would disappear on its own. The victory of hygienism also reflected Sweden's political history in the 1920s and 1930s when, little by little, leftist forces triumphed over conservative ones. It is also important to note that with women's suffrage, the voices of women often made themselves heard in parliamentary debates and official inquiries

22 Elgán, *Genus* (note 1), pp. 123-126.

23 *Ibid.*, pp. 75-76, 129.

24 *Ibid.*, pp. 63-64.

25 Riksdagstryck, *Bihang till riksdagens protokoll, Motioner väckta inom Andra kammaren*, Nr. 241, 1927; Riksdagstryck, *Bihang till riksdagens protokoll, Motioner väckta inom Andra kammaren*, Nr. 292, 1928; Riksdagstryck, *Bihang till riksdagens protokoll, Motioner väckta inom Andra kammaren*, Nr. 347, 1930; Riksdagstryck, *Bihang till riksdagens protokoll, Motioner väckta inom Andra kammaren*, Nr. 291, 1931; Elgán, *Genus* (note 1), pp. 136-138.

into abortion and contraception. The majority, but by no means all, were members of the progressive camp.²⁶

The second phase of the history of Swedish policies governing abortion and contraception ended in the 1930s, when hygienism evolved towards a more general social reform, one that was less fixated on public health. In the name of medical science, the proponents of public hygiene were fighting a society that, in their eyes, was archaic, authoritarian, and socially unjust. The new reformists, generally described as social engineers in Sweden, designed a new society and participated in the development of institutions that assured its implementation.²⁷ The best representatives of this way of thinking, and probably those who enjoyed the largest audience in the 1930s and 1940s, were the husband and wife team of Gunnar and Alva Myrdal. Closely aligned with the Social Democratic party, these social scientists became a public sensation in 1934 when they published a book in which they used pronatalist arguments to promote social reforms.²⁸ According to their reasoning, it was necessary to raise the Swedish birth rate with an innovative family and social policy bill comprising a number of reforms intended to change the entire society. These reforms ranged from the transformation of production in order to free the means necessary for putting the reforms into place, to the creation of nursery schools and housing similar to that proposed by Le Corbusier in France after the war. The ideas of Alva and Gunnar Myrdal achieved great success in Sweden very quickly and their dissemination corresponds to the period in which the Social Democrats, separated from their former liberal allies, became the primary political power in Sweden and took the reins of government in their hands.

This reformist trend changed the course of Swedish abortion policy in a restrictive sense. In 1934, a reform was being developed as the Myrdals were publishing their book. This reform, based on principles of hygienism, would

26 Elgán, *Genus* (note 1), pp. 146-150, 158-169.

27 In her research, the Swedish historian Yvonne Hirdman emphasizes the utopian heritage in the view of these specialists on social life. Yvonne Hirdman, *Att lägga livet till rätta: Studier i svensk folkhemspolitik*, Stockholm 1989.

28 Alva Myrdal/Gunnar Myrdal, *Kris i befolkningsfrågan*, Stockholm 1934.

For Alva and Gunnar Myrdal and family policy, see, among others: Allan Carlsson, *The Swedish experiment in family politics*, New Brunswick 1990, *passim*; Hirdman, *Att lägga livet till rätta* (note 27), pp. 98-127; Yvonne Hirdman, Alva Myrdal: En studie i feminism, in: *Kvinnovetenskaplig tidskrift*, 1988, no. 4, pp. 15-30; Ulf Cervin, *Makarna Myrdal och befolkningsfrågan*, Lund 1976; Staffan Källström, *Den gode nihilisten: Axel Hägerström och striderna kring Uppslalafilosofin*, Stockholm 1984, pp. 101-139; Ann-Katrin Hatje, *Befolkningsfrågan och välfärden: Debatten om familjepolitik och nativitetökning under 1930- och 1940-talen*, Stockholm 1974, *passim*.

authorize abortions in cases of rape, psychological disorders, mental disabilities, and any risk of transmitting a handicap or other hereditary illness, as well as in cases of serious social or economic problems. Following the debate set in motion by the pronatalist Myrdal book, this last point regarding new abortion legislation disappeared with the argument that in the new society it would no longer be necessary to authorize abortions for social and economic reasons because these reasons would disappear.²⁹

The contraception policy was one of the cornerstones of the reformist edifice. The concept of contraception was to be disseminated in the framework of sex education designed to improve conjugal life and prevent unwanted pregnancies. Citizens were to be made to understand that it was their duty to give to their country and people as many children as their economic, social and physical situation permitted, no more, no less.

In 1938, the successive efforts of the supporters of public hygiene and the social reformists led to a reform of the entire Swedish abortion and contraception policy. Simultaneously, the reform comprised a degree of liberalization, as well as more restrictions. Abortion and the public sale of contraceptives was to be permitted in certain cases. However, the sale of contraceptives and information on their existence and use was subject to numerous controls and regulations. Abortions were permitted in those instances mentioned above, with the exception of the socio-economic clause. The decision to abort would rest with the doctors, not with the pregnant woman in question.³⁰ In reality, it appears that the new abortion policy merely formalized what was already being practiced in hospitals.³¹

In all likelihood, the consequence of the 1938 reform of the Swedish policy on abortion and contraception was increased medicalization regarding sexual and reproductive matters. In addition to deciding on abortions for their patients, the medical establishment also had the power to approve or deny the sale of various contraceptives.

Even before the reform, some major cities had already opened offices in hospitals for the dissemination of information on sexuality and contraception, often with the explicit aim of undermining the Swedish *birth control* movement, which was booming at the time.³²

29 Elgán, *Genus* (note 1), pp. 167-169, 175.

30 *Svensk Författningssamling* 1938:318-319, pp. 566-572.

31 Hatje *Befolkningsfrågan* (note 28), p. 138; *Statens offentliga Utredningar* 1944:51, pp. 54 ff.

32 For the Swedish birth control movement, see Lena Lennerhed, *Sex i folkhemmet: RFSU:s tidiga historia*, Hedemora et al. 2002; *40 år med RFSU*, Stockholm 1973; Elise Ottesen-Jensen, *Livet skrev*, Stockholm 1986.

Eugenics was also part of this medicalization. For a number of years, all sorts of eugenic ideas had been very popular in Sweden, and in addition to eugenic abortions, the hospitals performed – within a completely legal framework – quasi-obligatory sterilizations on people considered simple-minded, mentally ill, or asocial.³³ Abortions as a result of rape or incest were also part of eugenic practices because the experts emphasized the poor genetic material passed on by at least one of the parents.

In my opinion, however, it would be wrong to view this medicalization as the result of a conscientious strategy on the part of the sole medical establishment to take away from women, or any other social group, the control of their own fertility. Assigning the medical establishment the role of final arbiter in matters of reproduction and sexuality was the strategy of all those who, in the 1920s and 1930s, fought for a reform of the abortion and contraception policy, including the Swedish *birth control* movement.³⁴

2 Abortion and Contraception: A Comparative History

2.1 Why compare them?

In spite of the very convincing plea by Marc Bloch at the International Congress of Historians in 1928 in support of comparative history, European historians do not generally compare countries and nations.³⁵

33 In recent years, numerous books and articles have appeared on the sterilizations in Sweden. Among the most important Swedish studies, the following deserve mention: Gunnar Broberg/Mattias Tydén, *Oönskade i folkhemmet: Rasygien och sterilisering i Sverige*, Stockholm 2000; Majja Runcis, *Steriliseringar i folkhemmet*, Stockholm 1998; Gunnar Broberg (ed.), *Fem uppsatser om steriliseringen i Sverige*, Lund 2000; Mattias Tydén, *Från politik till praktik: De svenska steriliseringslagarna 1935–1975. Rapport till 1997 års steriliseringsutredning*, Stockholm 2000, and 2nd, enlarged edition Stockholm 2002.

34 For the fascination with medical science and doctors in the Swedish political discourse, see Elgán, *Genus* (note 1), pp. 123–183.

35 Afterwards, Bloch's account was published under the title "For a comparative history of European societies" in: *Revue de synthèse*, 1928, no. 46, pp. 15–50. For the Scandinavian countries and the issue of comparative history, see Torkel Jansson, *Agrarsamhällets förändring och landskommunal organisation: En konturteckning av 1800-talets Norden*, Uppsala 1987; Ulf Jonsson, *Komparation: en strategi för att fånga breda samhällsliga förändringsmönster och processer*, in: Ulf Jonsson/Johan Söderberg (eds.), *Från vida fält: Festskrift till Rolf Adamson 25.10.1987*, Stockholm 1987, pp. 125–143; Magnus Mörner, *Komparation: Att vidga historiska perspektiv*, in: *Scandia*, 1981, pp. 225–243; *Syntese, analys, komparasjon. Konferensrapport från Nordiska fackkonferensen i historisk metodlära 1970*; Eva Österberg, *Forskning om det äldre svenska samhället: I dag, i går, i morgon?*, in: *Historisk Tidskrift*, 1980, pp. 483–499.

For Marc Bloch, comparison is not a method that follows from a specific theory on the evolution of societies or the bonds between them; it is a tool. Comparisons permit researchers to discover phenomena that at first go unnoticed because the possibility of their existence is not addressed. The differences and similarities observed in the course of a comparison generate new questions. Similarities can also raise the issue of possible influences. With a better grasp of the research objective, one can advance general explanatory hypotheses with greater confidence.

Using a systematic and theoretical approach, two American sociologists, Theda Skocpol and Margaret Somers, propose the classification of comparative studies into three categories. They call the first “parallel comparison”, in which a comparison offers more examples to illustrate a theory than the study of one single country or region could possibly do. The second, “a contrasting comparison”, deals with the specificity of each case studied in order to outline a potential theory. The third category, known as “macroanalytic”, tests explanatory hypotheses and, taking into account the differences, similarities, limits, and possibilities of proposed hypotheses, improves them.³⁶

In this research on the first policies regarding abortion and contraception, I attempted to implement Marc Bloch’s suggestions. Thus, I needed a subject and countries capable of providing a rich and justifiable comparison.

I thought it would be interesting to compare abortion and contraception policies in Sweden and France from the point of view of the social construction of the difference between the sexes and the social inequalities of the sexes. The question of the nature of the gender system and its reproduction is just such an area in which comparison allows fundamental hypotheses or generalizations that go beyond the subject being studied.

The decision to compare France and Sweden is linked to my own university trajectory. In order to undertake a comparison, one must be very familiar with the history, languages, and archives of the two countries. It is therefore rather common for the question of comparison to be reversed, that is, the countries to be compared are often fixed from the start and it is the subject matter that must be chosen from within a given field of research. Thus, the essential question becomes: how to conduct a comparison that conveys new knowledge, not only on factual and descriptive levels, by the elucidation of differences and similarities, but also on the level of hypotheses or historical generalizations? As I explained, it seemed possible to follow these requirements by choosing – in the area of research on the social relations of the

36 Theda Skocpol/Margaret Somers, *The uses of comparative history in macrosocial inquiry*, in: *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol. 22 (1980), pp. 174-197.

sexes – the issue of the social construction of sexual differences between the sexes in the framework of abortion and contraception policies.

I could have chosen other countries instead of Sweden and France, as long as they had political activities surrounding the issues of abortion and contraception. But the choice of France and Sweden as points of comparison is a valid one. In fact, the French policy regarding abortion and contraception during the period in question seems to be sufficiently distanced from the Swedish one to make this fruitful “face-to-face” possible, which is in itself the process of comparison. Moreover, France was in the European vanguard regarding voluntary restrictions on births. In the Swedish debate at the beginning of the 20th century, France is often cited as leading the way when it comes to both the distribution of contraceptives and contraception policy.³⁷

2.2 *What does the comparison teach us?*

Up to this point we have described the French and Swedish abortion and contraception policies from the point of view of social and political history. We have been able to appraise the role that the medical discourse played, in various guises, in both France and Sweden. Public hygiene and social reformism played predominant roles in the Swedish abortion and contraception policy, most notably in its evolution from a repressive policy, comparatively similar to the one practiced in France during this period, to one of medical normalization and supervised liberalization. On the other hand, it appears that the omnipresence of pronatalist preoccupations explains the form taken by France’s abortion and contraception policy.

Thus, two questions arise: why did the public hygiene movement have such a deep influence in Sweden, while we find no trace of it in the French abortion and contraception policy? Why was pronatalism such an important factor in France but so marginal in Sweden until the mid-1930s?

I believe that the limited influence of hygienism in France can be explained by the importance placed on pronatalism. Yet, concerns regarding venereal diseases were also present in France and, according to Alain Corbin, the campaigns around these questions were very important.³⁸ However, in the French debate on the suppression of contraceptives, we do not see any mention of their prophylactic use to prevent venereal disease. This is proba-

37 We can also underline the fact that the first British neo-Malthusians, as well as the founders of the American *birth control* movement, claimed to be inspired by the French example on the use of contraceptive methods and means. Cf. Linda Gordon, *Woman’s Body, Woman’s Rights: Birth Control in America*, 2nd edition. New York 1990, p. 2f.; McLaren, *Sexuality* (note 10), pp. 98, 154, 166; Angus McLaren, *A History of Contraception: From antiquity to the present*, Oxford 1990, p. 216.

bly due to the fact that in France, the fear of venereal diseases, just like the fear of moral corruption, was integrated into a broader view concerning the degeneration of society and individuals, of which a decreased birth rate was considered one of its primary signs.³⁹ However, I believe it would be a mistake to view French pronatalism as being the opposite of hygienism, even if, in the Swedish context, the latter inspires a different policy. The two are close to each other in their preoccupation – the relationship between sexuality and society – and they both developed out of the medical discourse.⁴⁰

The French demographic doctrine, the importance of which for pronatalist ideas cannot be underestimated, is the creation of several doctors, most notably Louis-Adolphe Bertillon. His son, Jacques, extended the work with demographic and pronatalist tracts intended for the general public and the creation of *The National Alliance for the Growth of the French Population*, at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century.⁴¹ This current research has permitted me to observe the very active role played in parliament by French doctors, obviously all men, who opposed abortion and contraception. Together with their legal colleagues, they dominated the debates and enacted policy in this domain.⁴² According to other researchers, French doctors also played an important and active role in spreading a pronatalist message outside of parliament, one that opposed contraceptives and abortion.⁴³

38 Alain Corbin, *Le péril vénérien au début du siècle: prophylaxie sanitaire et prophylaxie morale*, Recherches 1977, pp. 245-284; Robert A. Nye, *Crime, Madness and Politics in Modern France*, Princeton 1984, pp. 161 ff.

39 On the subject of the connection between the fear of degeneration and a declining birth rate, see Nye, *Crime* (note 38), pp. 63 ff.

40 Cf. Jacques Léonard who, in *La médecine entre les savoirs et les pouvoirs*, Paris 1981, pp. 149-169, underscores the existence of a strong current of hygienism among French doctors in the 19th century.

41 On this subject, see, for example, Béjin, *Neo-malthusianisme* (note 12); Léonard, *La médecine* (note 40), pp. 159 ff.; Alain Becchia, *Les milieux parlementaires et la dépopulation de 1900 à 1914*, in: *Communications*, 1986, no. 44, pp. 201-246. On the way in which pronatalism used and abused demographic indicators, see Hervé Le Bras, *Marianne et les lapins: L'obsession démographique*, Paris 1991, passim; Michael S. Teitelbaum/Jay M. Winter, *The Fear of Population Decline*, Orlando 1985, pp. 4-11.

42 Elgán, *Genus* (note 1), pp. 82-87, 184-217, 226-229.

43 Léonard, *La médecine* (note 40), pp. 160 ff., 319 ff.; McLaren, *Sexuality* (note 10); Karen Offen, *Depopulation, Nationalism and Feminism in Fin-de-Siècle France*, in: *American Historical Review*, 1984, pp. 648-676; Jacques Dupâquier, *Combien d'avortements en France avant 1914?*, in: *Communications*, 1986, no. 44, pp. 87-106; Jacques Léonard, *Les origines et les conséquences de l'eugénisme en France*, in: *Annales de démographie historique*, 1985, pp. 203-214.

It is important to emphasize the progressive aspect of certain political practices in the medical discourse. Confidence in science and in a social policy that would be inspired by their principles was a characteristic common to proponents of both hygienism and pronatalism. This positivism was as much a part of the ideology of France's Third Republic, as it was of the Swedish leftist liberal and social democratic ideology in the 1920s. We have here one of the reasons for the success of both pronatalism and hygienism; however, it does not explain why this biological view of the world, biopolitics to go back to Michel Foucault's term, adopts the form of hygienism in Sweden and pronatalism in France.

France's Third Republic was a construction that is the result of hope born out of the French Revolution and of a century of subsequent confrontations between the defenders of egalitarian ideals, justice, and democracy, and the defenders of organic authoritarianism. Finally achieved at the end of the 19th century, and after the first conflicts were over, the longed-for Republic was in danger of splitting apart under the contradictory hopes and interests of its supporters. However, the republican ideology was sufficiently strong to support this structure until the Second World War. In my opinion, pronatalism represented one way of revitalizing the vacillating republicanism. In effect, it gave substance, in the strict as well as the figurative sense, to the nation and created alliances around this project with powers that, while not republican, were nevertheless nationalist in character. The geopolitical vision of a France menaced by a much stronger Germany was essential for forging French national unity, and pronatalism made it possible to explain France's weakness: not enough men were being born because the citizens, in their selfishness, refused to put collective interests before personal ones.⁴⁴

In Sweden, the left was struggling to get rid of the remains of the old regime and, as the country rapidly became industrialized and modernized, sought to put issues of democracy, social justice, and equality on the agenda. In this context, it was pointless to look for national cohesion among contradictory interests or to give substance to a national unifying project. This confrontation is also evident in the policy of abortion and contraception, in which the organic vision of the conservative right that emphasized the role of interdictions to contain moral corruption and support the nuclear family was in opposition to the progressive leftist vision for whom medicine must, at all costs, apply the benefits of its knowledge to everyone. In this frame-

44A Iain Becchia, in his study of pronatalism in parliament at the turn of the century, outlines the same hypothesis. Becchia speaks of "a new nationalism", which would make the success of pronatalism understandable in these surroundings. Becchia, *Les milieux* (note 41).

work, undesirable behavior should be contained by education and culture, not by repression.

In conclusion, it appears that the very different political histories of Sweden and France constitute a possible explanation for the success of the public hygiene movement in Sweden and the development of pronatalism in France. Yet, pronatalism aroused considerable interest in Sweden beginning in the mid-1930s, a phenomenon that can be explained by the new political situation in the country, which, at the time, resembled more closely France's state of affairs during the Third Republic. In the mid-1930s, with the dominance of the Social Democratic party, one could, in effect, consider the battle between the Conservatives and the Progressives to be over. In this modern and largely industrialized country, the Social Democratic victory was, at the same time, a victory for the labor movement. But since the Social Democrats could not really govern with only the support of the labor movement, they performed an ideological and pragmatic about-face that translated into the adoption of a new language and the promotion of social reforms.⁴⁵ In my opinion, pronatalism is part of this new language, and its acceptance by the Social Democratic party gave it an air of modernity through the intermediary of ties to the group of young intellectuals that included Alva and Gunnar Myrdal. This about-face permitted the Social Democratic party to turn to the middle classes and ally itself with the Agrarian party, both of which were still rather conservative and anti-modern. Thus, as was the case in France, Swedish pronatalism seems to have permitted different political currents to come together in a nationalist and progressive consensus.⁴⁶

Swedish pronatalism does bear a striking resemblance to French pronatalism; nationalism is omnipresent in both movements. The nation was understood to be a biological unity, represented in France by the use of the term *race* and in Sweden by the use of the term *people*.⁴⁷ Just as in France, Swedish pronatalism was very interested in age pyramids. A population consisting of a few young people and many old people would bring about devastating physical, moral, and economic repercussions for the future of the *people*. Like in France, a rise in the birth rate was presented as the only remedy for

45 On this subject, see, for example, Bengt Schüllerqvist, *Från kosackval till kohandel: SAP:s väg till makten (1928-33)*, Stockholm 1992.

46 The Swedish historian Ann-Katrin Hatje, in her thesis on the Swedish pronatalist and family policy in the 1930s and 1940s, also emphasizes the federative aspect, beyond political boundaries, of Swedish pronatalism. Hatje, *Befolkningsfrågan* (note 28), p. 165.

47 On the political use of the term *people* in Sweden during this period, see Lars Trägårdh, *Varieties of Volkish ideologies*, in: Bo Stråth (ed.), *Language and the Construction of Class Identities*, Göteborg 1990, pp. 25-54.

all of these dangers. Growth itself was considered beneficial, an engine of progress, proof of the nation's vitality, while a constant birth rate already signaled the beginning of the end: stagnation equaled retreat. The theory of communicating vessels was used in both countries to describe the inevitable consequences of a fall in the birth rate. The peaceful or warlike invasion by neighboring countries or distant people would inevitably result in a total decrease in population density. The tone of Swedish pronatalism was just as alarmist as that of French pronatalism. If energetic measures were not taken immediately, the Swedish nation was in danger to disappear. Only by bringing children into the world or supporting the pronatalist policy could people demonstrate that they still possessed a *life force*.⁴⁸

However, Swedish pronatalism differs from the French model in one very important respect, which explains why it did not produce the same repressive policy as that of France in the matter of abortion and contraception. In actual fact, Swedish pronatalism, through the expedient of reformism and social engineering, was the heir to hygienism, which, as we have seen, accorded a significant place to eugenics, an extreme version of public hygiene.

There was great concern in Sweden for what were called *inferior human elements*. Swedish pronatalism continually emphasized its belief that the quality of the population was as important as its quantity. Quality, as well as covering the moral and physical living conditions of the citizens, also flushed out those who were likely to pass on hereditary defects by preventing them from having children. These defects included illnesses, such as blindness, but also certain forms of asocial behavior linked to hereditary flaws that were considered to be dangerous to society. According to this reasoning, these individuals actually profited inappropriately from social policy by reproducing more quickly than the sane population, a situation that could result in a dangerous imbalance that favored mental defectives.⁴⁹

Thus, I believe that the place of eugenics in Swedish pronatalism explains why, in the 1930s, its abortion and contraception policy did not have the same consequences as those in France. Concerned about both quality and quantity, Swedish pronatalism, including social reform, sought to influence all aspects of reproduction in its citizens. It was not merely a question of convincing people to have more children. Births should occur in healthy families, with the number of children corresponding to their standards of living. Which explains supervised liberty and enlightened civic education in the policy of contraception. It also explains the abortion policy that gave doctors the right to end pregnancies whose consequences could be harmful from the

48 Elgán, *Genus* (note 1), pp. 240-241.

49 *Ibid.*, pp. 166-169.

point of view of public health, in the sense of the people's health as a biological unity.

In France, the issues of who should be allowed to bring children into the world and under what circumstances were rarely broached in debates on abortion and contraception. Rather, the aim of the French pronatalist policy was to remove all of the obstacles that were said to be preventing citizens from giving free reign to a form of procreative instinct, the sign of strength and self-sacrifice.⁵⁰

One could question the limited success of eugenics in France. In his historical study of French medicine and doctors, Jacques Léonard emphasized the persistent influence of Lamarckism in France, i.e., of the theory about the inheritance of acquired characteristics, which stands opposed to Darwinism. As Léonard notes, the idea of a ruthless and beneficial struggle for life is hardly compatible with the confidence of the Third Republic and the medical establishment, that supports it in opportunities for improving the "race" – the word used at the time to designate the French population – through education and social progress.⁵¹ French pronatalism shared this idea of progress, of the nation's revitalization and solidarity, and therefore constituted one of the obstacles to the introduction of eugenics into France.⁵² However, outside of scientific circles, social Darwinism was fairly popular before and around the turn to the 20th century. As we have seen, it appeared in the parliamentary debates on population in the concept that nations are subjected to constant struggles, in which those who are stronger inevitably attack those who are

50 *Ibid.*, pp. 184-231.

51 Léonard, *La médecine* (note 40), pp. 270 ff., 323f. See also Linda Clark, *Social Darwinism in France*, Tuscaloosa, Al. 1984.

52 Léonard, *Les origines* (note 43); *Le Bras*, Marianne (note 41), p. 207f. However, France also had a theoretician on eugenics and social Darwinism in the person of Vacher de Lapouge, whom the Israeli historian Zeev Sternhell cites for his importance in giving birth to a modern, extreme right-wing theory in France; Clark, *Social Darwinism* (note 51). On the subject of Vacher de Lapouge and eugenics in France, see also Béjin, *Neo-malthusianisme* (note 12); André Béjin, *Le sang, le sens et le travail: Georges Vacher de Lapouge, darwiniste social, fondateur de l'anthroposociologie*, in: *Cahiers internationaux de sociologie*, 1982, pp. 323-343, and the works of Pierre-André Taguie ff. On the subject of eugenics in France, see also the works of the French historian Alain Drouard, in particular: Alain Drouard, *L'eugénisme en question: l'exemple de l'eugénisme "français"*, Paris 1999; Alain Drouard, *Herman Lundborg et les eugénistes français*, in: *Gesnerus*, vol. 56 (1999), no. 3/4, pp. 241-259; Alain Drouard, *Alexis Carrel 1873-1944: De la mémoire à l'histoire*, Paris 1995.

weaker. However, it was not able to push itself past the progressive and egalitarian optimism of the Third Republic.⁵³

3 Abortion and Contraception: History of the Social Construction of Gender

At this juncture, with a better understanding of the abortion and contraception policies afforded by the comparison, we should approach them from the point of view of their interaction with the social relations of the sexes and their consequences for the social construction of sexual difference.

A widespread historical generalization emerges from the new field of research that the social relations of the sexes has occupied for the past thirty years: the existence of two sexes is a social construction, a component of all known societies, and not a stable, natural, or biological reality on which a logical social role – that of a woman or a man – can be modeled. In order to clarify this hypothesis, English-speaking historians arrived at the use of the term *gender*, a term that, little by little, imposed itself on academic environments in both Sweden and France. The use of this word, which has become more and more common, also demonstrates that the historians' interest moved from the question of "why is there inequality between the sexes" to "how does it happen?" Where do sexual inequalities stand? How do they evolve while changing and transforming themselves? What justifies male domination in different historical and contemporary societies? With this perspective, biology, instead of being the proof of the existence of the sexes, becomes a domain invested in the production and reproduction of sexual difference. The American historian Joan Scott proposes the study of the social construction of sexual inequality on four levels: the symbolic, the normative (religion, the sciences, education, law); the institutional (the family, the labor market, politics); and the personal.⁵⁴ Inevitably, these four levels are neither homogeneous nor consistent; they may very well contain contradictions.

According to Scott, sexual difference is also of particular interest as an analytical category in political history. Because it is one way of making rela-

53 Clark, *Social Darwinism* (note 51). Nevertheless, there was a eugenics society in France that was not entirely without influence. But this society advocated a type of eugenics inspired by Lamarckism and it worked in concert with the pronatalists. As its goal, it wanted to eradicate alcoholism, tuberculosis, and syphilis, all of which it believed were hereditary if they were not treated, and proposed reforms that supported a general increase in public health by means of social reforms. Cf. William H. Schneider, *Towards the Improvement of the Human Race*, in: *Journal of Modern History*, 1982, pp. 268-291.

54 Joan W. Scott, *Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis*, in: Joan W. Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History*, New York 1988, pp. 28-50.

tionships of subordination comprehensible and acceptable, the reference to sexual difference represents one way of understanding the political stakes.

In the course of this particular research, the metaphorical use of sexual difference in political language has appeared across the geopolitical spectrum, with the rapport between France and Germany being described as a rapport between woman and man. France regarded itself to be the gentle female – spiritual, cultivated, and full of charm – and it was just these charms that fueled the male desires of a strong and brutal Germany even more. If the purpose of the French abortion and contraception policy was to help raise the birth rate, this birth rate was understood to be the sign of a virile nation.⁵⁵

The social construction of gender in the Swedish and French policies of abortion and contraception is simultaneously shaped on a normative level and an institutional one: institutional, because abortion and contraception policies gave rise to specific administrative and institutional practices; normative, because a public policy affirms, explicitly or implicitly, a specific social ideal. However, these two levels are not easy to separate in the case of abortion and contraception policies.

The comparison between Sweden and France in the matter of these policies reveals a number of similarities. Behind policies that differ at times, there is, nevertheless, a similar notion of the place of women and men in modern society and a similar opinion regarding their differences. This means that the institutions – in the broad sense of the term – that these policies established, participated in the social construction of similar social relations between the sexes. At this juncture, I will set forth the most striking similarities and attempt to evaluate their meaning in terms of the social construction of gender.

During the period studied herein, the abortion policies, both in France and Sweden, made a sharper distinction between women who had an abortion and those who performed the abortions. In relative terms, the penalties prescribed became more severe for the latter.⁵⁶ This distinction must be understood in a context in which the irresponsibility of the woman who had an abortion was emphasized to an ever greater extent: both in Sweden and France, she was considered more and more as a victim of forces superior to her own. This “victimization” of the woman is also present elsewhere in French legislation. In actual fact, the 1920 law provided for stronger punishments for those accused of encouraging an abortion than for the women who had an abortion.

55 Elgán, *Genus* (note 1), pp. 188-191, 217.

56 *Ibid.*, pp. 205-217.

In French and Swedish parliamentary debates on abortion, the protagonists also emphasized that a woman did not want to have an abortion but she was often forced to do so. Among those elements cited as being responsible for this situation, men and their selfishness were singled out in particular. It could be a question of an individual man, accused of abandoning a pregnant woman, or of collective male behavior, as in France, where all male citizens were accused of not wanting children and therefore, of being responsible for the low birth rate. Propaganda and so-called "insidious publicity" in favor of abortion, the existence of which in France was given particular emphasis, were also singled out as being responsible for women's difficulties.⁵⁷

The federative character of the different political currents of the pronatalist discourse can explain this search for a scapegoat in the French debates. Swedish hygienism and its successor, social reformism, were more likely to blame the existence of abortions on a poorly functioning society and its social inequalities.⁵⁸

Only the Swedish Conservatives proposed a different view of the relationship of women to abortion. For them, the woman was not the victim of the man, social circumstances or abortion conspirators; rather, she was the victim of her own bad instincts, for the same reason as men were. Like men, women were tempted by moral corruption, and there had to be norms and laws to remind a woman of her social responsibility to bring children into the world.⁵⁹

It is precisely a certain view of sexual difference that explains why a woman who had an abortion was presented as the victim. A woman's nature, as understood by the majority of protagonists, was conditioned by her ability to bear children. This emphasis on women's ability to have children could be called the naturalization of women or the feminization of reproduction. The American historian Thomas Laqueur advances the hypothesis that before the Age of Enlightenment sexual difference was perceived in a different way. Laqueur believes that this difference appeared as a *de facto* difference, a sociological difference like that between lords and peasants, and not a difference based on the important role a woman plays in reproduction.⁶⁰ In his book, *Making Sex: Body & Gender from the Greeks to Freud*, Laqueur demonstrates in a very convincing fashion that, prior to the Age of Enlightenment, no essential distinction was made between male and female genitalia.

57 *Ibid.*, pp. 211-215.

58 *Ibid.*, pp. 140-150, 168, 176-179.

59 *Ibid.*, pp. 116-119; 144-145.

60 Thomas Laqueur, *Making Sex: Body, and Gender from the Greeks to Freud*, Cambridge, Mass. 1990.

One was a man or a woman depending on one's place in society but one was not perceived to have a body that was fundamentally different from that of the opposite sex. The question was left open as to the respective role and importance of a man and a woman for the reproduction of the race.

The policies of abortion and contraception that we are studying can easily be interpreted as a sign of the advent of a biological view of the sexes, in which the latter were primarily differentiated by their roles in the reproduction of the race and in which each aspect of feminine behavior was brought back to women's so-called reproductive objective. For this reason, the participants of the contemporary debates were able to maintain that a woman never wanted to undergo an abortion, that she was only a victim. Opponents of these arguments may have been reasoning from the point of view of an older perception of sexual difference, which explains why they emphasized that a man and a woman exhibited the same behavior in the face of moral corruption. For them, childbirth was not part of women's nature; it was a social duty that a woman must be induced to carry out if an appropriate policy required it. If we accept that this view of sexual difference corresponds to the view that predominated before the Enlightenment, then it is logical to find it again among the Swedish Conservatives, whose ideas prescribed a hierarchical and authoritarian society.

The view of reproduction as basically a female concern is also the basis of the more radical propositions that favored abortion. These propositions stressed abortion as being a specifically female right, but not as we understand it today. The argument of the period was that because childbirth was an innate part of a woman's nature, the right to use it, if one accepted this right as being within an individual's province, inevitably belonged to women. The argument against those who feared that abortions would increase if one allowed women to decide whether to have them or not was also based precisely on this idea of the female nature: since the essence of woman was childbirth, she would never thoughtlessly go against it.⁶¹

Thus, the view that a woman who had an abortion was a victim characterized both Swedish and French abortion policies. As these policies continued to maintain and update the normative ban on abortions, it was completely logical for them to also attack the factors considered likely to make a woman have an abortion.

In Sweden, the intermediary of a social and family policy was proposed to relieve the supposed economic and social distress of women who wanted abortions. However, abortion was accepted in Sweden in certain cases, in

61 Elgán, *Genus* (note 1), pp. 142, 177-178, 214.

particular, when the overriding interest of the country, understood most often as the biological quality of its "human material", made it necessary.

In France, an attempt was made to put a stop to the activities of those believed to be inciting women to have abortions, primarily, the "male and female abortionists", and the sale of instruments that could be used for abortions was prohibited. This does not mean that France did not also have a social and family policy, but no connection between these policies and the policy against abortion was made during the debates.

In these two cases, the study of the social construction of gender in the area of contraception policies in France and Sweden highlights the other important concept of the sexual sphere: man.

Pronatalists systematically viewed France's decreased birth rate as an indication of the country's loss of virility, particularly where Germany was concerned. On the other hand, a high birth rate was considered as an indication of a nation's strength, of its "virility". According to this view, it was the men, not the women, who were to blame for the decreased birth rate – along with the neo-Malthusians, the vendors of contraceptives, and the "abortionists". As for women, they wanted nothing more than to fulfill the function nature had assigned to them.⁶² This explains why almost all of the measures that France put in place to stimulate the birth rate and the family during this period were addressed to men, while we have observed that coercive measures were primarily directed against women.

In the beginning, the Swedish policy on contraception was also a question that primarily concerned masculine behavior, but for other reasons. By prohibiting advertising for contraceptives, the policy was intended to protect young men from moral corruption, which, it was felt, also encompassed the knowledge of and access to contraceptives. As we have seen, the opponents of the repressive policy against contraception blamed it for impeding the prevention of venereal diseases. Thus, until the 1930s, the debate on contraceptives in Sweden eliminated, in large part, the birth control aspects of contraceptives and focused instead on teaching young men to protect themselves from venereal diseases. At the same time, women were also eliminated from the debate. Based on this fact, we can conclude that, according to the Swedish proponents of public hygiene, women were not endowed with sexuality outside of reproduction, which our analysis of the view of the female nature, as it emerged from the study of the policy on abortion, confirms. Therefore, both in Sweden and France, the debates and policies on contraceptives or on

62 Cf. Offen, *Depopulation* (43) and Karen Offen, *The sexual politics of republican nationalism*, in: Robert Tombs (ed.), *Nationhood and nationalism in France: From Boulangerism to the Great War*, London 1991, pp. 195-209.

the decline of the birth rate caused the active side of male behavior to emerge in a positive sense in France and in a negative sense in Sweden. At the same time, the debates and policies on abortion in the two countries emphasized the passivity of woman, as a victim of abortion. For men, it was a question of effective sexuality, necessitating a particular social framework; for women, it was the fate of a reproductive function.

But here too, in the 1910s and 1920s, some Swedish conservative voices took issue with the dominant discourse on sexual difference. For the Conservatives, the predispositions with regard to sexuality were the same for women as they were for men. A repressive policy, intended to prevent the two sexes from abandoning themselves to moral corruption, was deemed to be as necessary in the area of abortion as it was in that of contraception.⁶³

As for concrete political measures – “institutionalization” – in the area of contraceptives and abortion, we can make the same observation for Sweden as we did for France: coercive measures were applied to women through abortion policies, while more general provisions accompanied the policies of contraception and family, of which men were among the primary targets. Thus, the use of contraceptives was never banned the way abortion was. Is it possible that these different policies on abortion and contraception reflect and confirm a subconscious respect for men, the dominant sex socially, and a lack of respect, also subconscious, for women, who are socially dominated beings?⁶⁴ A subconscious respect or lack of respect refers to an internal attitude whose terms are not explicit. In other political domains, for example, in the areas of suffrage or salary differences based on gender, this distinction between men and women as citizens was conscious and explicit.

On a normative level, as well as an institutional one – using a broad definition of the word “institution” – the Swedish and French policies on abortion and contraception appear to have participated in the same process regarding a social construction of gender, one in which the man was confirmed as an active citizen and the woman as an organ of reproduction.

This differentiation between the sexes derives the whole of its import from the larger perspective of building Western democracies on the basis of the values of equality, liberty, and fraternity. Because in a modern and liberal system of government, sexual inequality can no longer be justified on the basis of tradition or an established fact, biology and reproduction become the justification for the differences in how people are treated and for various

63 Elgán, *Genus* (note 1), pp. 116-119, 144-145.

64 The fact that the vast majority of eugenic sterilizations in Sweden from the 1930s to the 1960s were performed on female victims, with or without their consent, follows this reasoning. For more on Swedish sterilizations, see note 33.

types of discrimination, whether they be negative or positive. However, there is no doubt that the policies of abortion and contraception are not the only ones involved in the permanent process of gender construction. This process has been taking place, more or less explicitly, in all areas of economic, social, cultural and political life, beginning with war and continuing with the construction of national identity by way of urbanization, industrialization, and the “welfare state”.

Tax Politics and Women's Equality in West Germany and Denmark – with a Focus on the 1950s

Tax systems have a significant influence on the division of labour – this applies especially with regard to gender.¹ The potential for controlling employment through tax politics was very familiar to the political actors of the 20th century. In tax law, rules concerning marriage or family are generally formulated as neutral where gender is concerned, as the principles of subjective liability to tax or the degree of tax burden. However, as with any other law, tax law does not function regardless of sex. The taxation of married couples or households has been deliberately used to exclude a section of the population that was seen as a reserve for the labour market: women and especially married women. My thesis is therefore that in both countries, Germany and Denmark, tax politics were also labour market politics. Furthermore, tax politics were to fulfil another function. They were used to put through certain social norms: the housewife marriage, the assistant wife marriage (the woman earning a small additional income) and finally the double income marriage. The main question of this article is to what extent tax law met these socio-political expectations and if it could indeed absorb or turn social changes and developments.

In the 1950s, despite great differences on the legal level in respect to the equalisation of legitimate and illegitimate children, family and marriage, there were comparable standard attitudes towards marriage, sexuality and the family in Denmark and in West Germany. Analogous to the Federal Re-

1 Per H. Jensen, *Komparative velfærdssystemer: Kvinders reproduktionsstrategier mellem familien, velfærdsstaten og arbejdsmarkedet*, Copenhagen 1996, pp. 133-143, here p. 136. See also Maren Wichmann-Siegfried, *Mellem offentlighedens søgelys og velfærdspolitikens skygge. Familien i Danmark og Vesttyskland i 1950'erne*, in: Hilda Romer Christensen/Urban Lundberg /Klaus Petersen (eds.), *Frihed, lighed og tryghed. Velfærdspolitik i Norden*, Skrifter udgivet af Jysk Selskab for Historie (2001), no. 48, pp. 241-235; *Arbejderbevægelsen og familien. Special issue. Arbejderhistorie* (2000), no. 4; Merith Niehuss, *Familie, Frau und Gesellschaft. Studien zur Strukturgeschichte der Familie in Westdeutschland 1945-1960*, Göttingen 2001; Robert G. Moeller, *Protecting Motherhood. Women and the Family in the Politics of Postwar West Germany*, Berkeley et. al. 1993; Kari Melby/Anu Pylkkänen/Bente Rosenbeck/Christina Carlsson Wetterberg (eds.), *The Nordic Model of Marriage and the Welfare State*, Copenhagen 2000.

public of Germany, Denmark also described the 1950s as the "golden years of the family". The reasons, however, were different: whereas the nuclear family and the one breadwinner-model or "housewife marriage" were becoming standard institutions in Denmark, they had already become so in Germany in the 1930s and represented a postulate which was to be upheld.

The comparison bases on the debates in the Danish and German Parliament as on pieces and statements of the women's organisations.

This investigation focuses, in the main, on the 1950s. They are a good starting point because there were similarities in both labour market structures and way of life or family organisation in both countries. The crisis of the family, women in gainful employment and the general structure of state welfare were discussed in both countries and those discussions were of great public interest. The discussion about the tax system actually represents the debate about "woman's place in society". It will be shown that the similarities of argumentation, as well as the differences in the results, were larger than one would expect.

The situation of married or unmarried, employed or unemployed women will serve as an example for gender-specific differences of taxation in this article. There can be different criteria for taxation: either taxation of the individual or taxation of the family, or rather the household. Taxation depends on income, family status (married, single, divorced or widowed), the number of children amongst other criteria. Therefore, there is an educational effect in tax law, as it "subsidises" personal decisions such as marriage, or as it taxes different types of income with higher or no taxes or offers the opportunity to claim deduction. Forms of taxation have an influence on mutual commitment and dependence² and on individual decisions: What would be best for family economics? Live together as a married or unmarried couple? Gainful employment of both spouses or the wife's limitation to housework and caring for husband, children and elderly people in need of attention?

When estimating the taxation of married couples, we generally differentiate between two possibilities: joint taxation or taxation of the household, and individual or separate taxation. Joint taxation means adding up both incomes, and from that sum estimating the income tax to be paid. In separate or individual taxation, the tax levels of husband and wife are estimated independently from each other. The difference has a great effect especially on the employment of wives and is used in tax legislative to regulate female labour.³

2 Jensen, *Komparative velfærdssystemer* (note 1), p. 137.

1. Taxation of Married Women in the Federal Republic of Germany⁴

1.1 *Tax politics as a regulating agent on the labour market*

Since the late 19th century, conjugal tax law was built on the principle of household taxation. The income of a household was seen as a joint product of all its members. With the rise of salaried employment, individual income gained significance. Since the year 1900 the salary of children had already been separated from the taxation of households.

It is not the case that tax politics were only used to establish moral ideas of family life and to meet the needs of labour market after the Second World War. In the 1920s, married women were already subject to according measures. Whenever the situation in the labour market eased, the discrediting slogan of the "double-income family" appeared. If a larger work force was needed, the married woman was happily employed. It was also in the 1920s that the individual taxation of spouses became possible, if both were in gainful employment. Due to this extension in tax law, an increasing number of employed wives were taxed individually from 1925 onwards.

However, this social acceptance of married women in gainful employment came to a temporary end in 1934. The National Socialists reintroduced the general joint taxation of married couples. As the "additional" income of the wife led to a higher progression, the gainful employment of married women was less attractive from then on.⁵ It was to be welcomed that most married women would give up working, as this relieved the labour market and also corresponded to the national socialistic idea of women as housewives. However this principle of tax politics proved to be ineffective during the war. The government was trying to win married women as badly needed work forces in the armaments industry. Married women's income out of salaried employment was thus taxed separately again in 1941. This of course meant that most of the working wives were no longer subject to joint tax-

3 Astrid Joosten, *Die Frau, das "segenspendende Herz der Familie"*, Pfaffenweiler 1990, p. 58.

4 For the current situation in Germany: Aneemarie Mennel, *Frauen, Steuern, Staatsausgaben. Subventionen für das Patriarchat*, in: Ute Gerhard/Alice Schwarzer/Vera Slupik (eds.), *Auf Kosten der Frauen. Frauenrechte im Sozialstaat*, Weinheim/Basel 1988, pp. 79-116.

5 See also Christine von Oertzen, *Teilzeitarbeit und die Lust am Zuverdienern. Geschlechterpolitik und gesellschaftlicher Wandel in Westdeutschland 1948-1969*, Göttingen 1999, pp. 187-209; Ines Reich-Hilweg, *Männer und Frauen sind gleichberechtigt. Der Gleichheitsgrundsatz (Art.3 Abs.2 GG) in der parlamentarischen Auseinandersetzung 1948-1957 und in der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichtes 1953-1975*, Frankfurt/Main 1979; Joosten, *Frau* (note 3), p. 58 note 66.

tion. As the Allies confirmed this exemption in tax law, the general rule in 1950 was joint taxation, but wage-earning married women were taxed separately and independently.

1.2 Equal rights versus protection of the family in the 1950s

In the 1950s, the formation of tax law became a severely disputed subject where conservatives (CDU), who had been governing the country since 1949, had to face a lot of opposition. The taxation of women was, like the reform of family law (1949-1958), a very delicate subject, in which the equality of men and women stood in supposed or actual conflict with the protection of the family. Both principles had gained constitutional status in the constitution (*Grundgesetz*) of the newly founded Federal Republic of Germany (1949).

The conservative government tried to confirm their idea of household taxation and housewife marriage in tax law throughout the 1950s. Changing ministers of Finance tried with clockwork regularity to abolish the ill-favoured separate assessment. Motives of government parties were however different. The minister of Family Issues and some conservative members of parliament, supported by the church, regarded joint taxation of spouses as an appropriate means to fight employment of married women and especially of mothers. They saw household taxation as if it were a penalty tax for working wives and mothers. Other conservatives however argued that a family had to be seen as a productive unit and that its members could not be taxed individually. Ministers of Finance of course had always primarily associated household taxation with higher tax income.

The conservative government tried to abolish the exemption of 1941 and to reintroduce joint taxation with an income tax bill first launched in March 1951. Apart from the expected positive effect on the labour market (unemployment numbers were high), the minister of Finance expected an additional tax income of 100 million DM. But even the steering committee, led by CDU-members, recommended continuing taxing spouses individually.⁶

The opposition and nearly all women's associations doubted that a joint taxation rule could be reintroduced without conflicting with the principle of equality stated in the constitution. A female social democratic member of parliament called these thoughts an "attack on the legal means to establish equality of women, which according to the constitution had to be completed

6 Neuburger (CDU), *Verhandlungen des Deutschen Bundestages (Verh. BT)*, (Negotiations of the Federal Republic Parliament), 1st election period (EP), 142nd session, p. 5612.

by 31 March 1953".⁷ Apart from the unjust tax treatment of women, she believed this plan would be like a punishment for marriage and suspected that the Conservatives were trying to artificially keep alive the vanishing housewife who was already a relict of the past.⁸ Time and again the joint taxation was called "marriage punishment tax" and was accordingly seen as an obstacle to marriage. This argument bore some weight which should not be underestimated.⁹ Just like the equality of sexes, the protection of marriage and family also desired that the exemption of 1941 remain valid – according to the opposition. Opponents to joint taxation suspected that young couples could choose to live in common law marriage for tax reasons. The results of such a decision would mean a dramatic change in or loss of morality. It was stated: "Practically, the household taxation will lead to the habit of marrying very late, which is not desirable for reasons of population policy, or people will chose to live together without being married which cannot be desirable for reasons of morality."¹⁰ Social democrats shared these fears: "People would prefer to cohabit in a cheaper way than as a married couple, that is the form of cohabitation which is generally called common law marriage. [...] A second effect could be that for tax reasons people would decide on a sham divorce in times of financial crisis. A pretence that would indeed be worthwhile after a couple of months."¹¹

Supporters of the exemption raised another point that referred to the difficult financial situation of many families that had worsened during the war. The married woman's income was economically necessary in many families and could therefore not be taxed highly. Rather the opposite should be the case: government should be happy about and support the women's engagement.¹² Facing the strong resentments, representatives of government had a hard time trying to find convincing arguments for general household taxation. The later minister of Family Issues, Franz-Josef Wuermeling, tried to trigger off the fight against "double income marriages", but was not very convincing in light of the generally bad financial situation of many families. Nevertheless, the Conservatives passed the general joint taxation of married spouses with a slim majority. They then had to withdraw this law shortly

7 Lockmann (SPD), Verh. BT, 1st EP, 142nd session, p. 5634f.

8 Lockmann (SPD), Verh. BT, 1st election period, 142nd session, p. 5635.

9 Heinz Paulick, *Der Einfluss des Steuerrechtes auf Eheschließung und Ehescheidung*, in: *Ehe und Familie im privaten und öffentlichen Recht*, vol. 12 (1955), no. 12, pp. 46-348, here p. 346.

10 Verh. BT, 1st EP, 145th session, p. 5723.

11 Lockmann (SPD), Verh. BT, 1st EP, 145th session, p. 724.

12 Wessel (Zentrum), Verh. BT, 1st EP, 145th session, p. 5722f.

afterwards, due to the massive protests of women's associations and workers' unions. The status quo thus remained untouched: households were still generally taxed as one union, *with* the exemption of the wife's income from salaried work.

In spring 1953, the minister of Finance, Fritz Schäffer, again proposed the abolition of individual taxation. Against better judgement, he associated individual taxation with national socialistic legislation. The "unjust and illogical regulation §43 EKStG [...] originates from the time of Hitler's government where women were drawn into the munitions factories without consideration of family or family life".¹³ This regulation was only favourable to the employed woman herself and the "childless double income families".¹⁴ However, even the taxpayers' union discredited the catchy slogan of "double income families" as being outdated in terms of the labour market. The data on which the minister of Finance based his arguments was wrong, the economy could not manage without female work force. As a matter of fact, childless married women stayed more often at home, whereas mothers were forced to seek employment for economic reasons. Indeed the taxpayers' lobby reached the conclusion that "§26 EKStG was based on an outdated concept of family, where the female spouse is seen economically as an addition to her husband."¹⁵ Thus only a separate taxation of spouses would be possible concluded the taxpayers' statement.

The Liberals favoured, with regard to all positive reaction to separate taxation, a model following the American example.¹⁶ A comprehensive solution was worked out in combination with the planned tax reform. Even CDU-members did not regard the government's proposal as a sufficient basis for a "social solution that met the needs of families".¹⁷ The government therefore retreated from fundamental changes for the time being. The community of individually taxed women was even widened within a tax reform of autumn 1954. From now on, also married women who had an income from self-employed work or trade were taxed individually. Until then households in which the female spouse earned money from being self-employed belonged to such a high rate of taxation that the woman's income was taxed at 40 percent and more. After the reform of 1954, only the helping members of family were subject to household taxation.

13 Minister of Finance Schäffer, Verh. BT, 1st EP, 247th session, p. 11794; Statement of Bund der Steuerzahler, in: Informationen, 1953, no. 4, p. 1

14 Minister of Finance Schäffer, Verh. BT 1st EP, 25th session, p.12117.

15 Statement of Bund der Steuerzahler, in: Informationen (1953), no. 4, p. 3.

16 Verh. BT, 1st EP, 252nd session, p. 12116 ff., and 264th session, p. 12906 ff.

17 Verh. BT, 1st EP, 264th session.

The line of opponents to a joint taxation of spouses was long and remained united. The women's associations agreed that a joint taxation would lead to dissolution of marriages and strengthen illegitimate couples.¹⁸ The union of female lawyers and economists emphasised that "it is impossible to find arguments for the tax burden of working women and mothers in the general inequality of economic circumstances".¹⁹ The German Salaried Employees' Union stressed that a lot of tasks were to be mastered in the following years that required a full work force, no matter if it be male or female or both. "Its principle should not only be accepted in times of war or in times of armament boom. [...] We know from experience that the employment of housewives leads to a considerable rise of house keeping costs. Through the tax surplus of common taxation the housewife's work becomes senseless in most of the cases."²⁰ The German Housewives Association meanwhile supported a complaint against the unconstitutional joint assessment because it promoted "concubinage".²¹ Despite the discussions in parliament, the objections of several lobbies and even scientific studies that doubted joint taxation to be in accordance with the constitution, the minister of Finance in 1955, with an essay on "spouse taxation,"²² attempted for the third time within a few years to establish joint taxation. In future, the income of spouses should be added up with granted allowances. The question was raised as to whether the state had the right to support, with tax allowances, the gainful employment of a married woman in a business that was not her husband's. This would, according to Family minister Wuermeling's prejudices, result in a tendency to support those powers in society that erode family and marriage values.²³ He claimed in a TV discussion that eight out of marriages ended in a divorce due to the wife's occupational activities. The union of female lawyers and economists however drew a completely different conclusion from their analysis. According to their findings, most divorces could be traced back to the husband's adultery. Wuermeling did not

18 Resolutions of the central associations and organisations from 26 January 1953, in: *Informationen* (1953), no. 2, enclosure D, pp. 1-2. Letter of Deutscher Verband berufstätiger Frauen, in: *Informationen* (1953), no. 2, pp. 3-4.

19 Letter of Vereinigung weiblicher Juristen und Volkswirte from 2 February 1953, in: *Informationen* (1953), no. 2, pp. 4-6, here p. 5.

20 Statement of Deutsche Angestellten Gewerkschaft (DAG), in: *Informationen* (1953), no. 2, pp. 2-3.

21 *Informationen*, 1953, no. 4, enclosure C, p. 11.

22 „Ehegattenbesteuerung“. Bundesdrucksache II/1866.

23 See correspondence of Wuermeling to Vereinigung weiblicher Juristen und Volkswirte from July 1955 until February 1956, in: *Informationen* (1956), no. 3, pp. 4-7.

alter his views on this issue and he had to face severe criticism: "We agree that it would be more desirable, by improving the social conditions, to enable married women to concentrate on their duties as housewives and mothers, better than carrying the double load of home and work. But as long as this change is not realised and as long as nearly half of all married working women support their disabled husbands with an admirable courage, the minister of Family Issues should not be allowed publicly to bring discredit upon these brave women."²⁴

The causes for divorce were also of interest for the Danish authorities in 1955. There seemed to be a significant connection between the economic situation and the durability of marriages. Marriages where women earned their own income seemed to have more stability than those in which there was only one economic provider. 41 percent of the marriages with housewives or "assistant" wives were dissolved in comparison with 19 percent of those marriages in which the woman was working part time and 16 percent of marriages with fully employed women.²⁵ These results of the Danish survey also formed part of the German discussion.

The protests against the government's plans continued after the minister of Finance's essay and the tone became more aggressive.²⁶ The German Association of Female Academics feared a two-class system for married women.²⁷ As long as the woman's earning was considerably low, there were no objections to it and it did not conflict with family interests. But as soon as the joint income of both spouses exceeded 12,000 DM a year there would be doubts towards the value of the wife's earning. "They are thus especially directed to the middle class woman who has had a longer education."²⁸ The union suspected that the minister "aims to edge out the women mostly from higher professions and so to deprive them from the ruling class which is small anyway."²⁹ But before there were further parliamentary conferences, the Federal Constitutional Court passed judgement on its view of the issue.

24 Letter from 16 December 1955 to Minister of Family Issues Wuermeling, in: *Informationen* (1956), no. 3, p. 6

25 Inga Dahlsgaard, in: *Kvinden og Samfundet*, September 1956.

26 See Statements of DAG, DGB, Frauenverband Hessen, Verband weiblicher Angestellter, in: *Informationen* (1956), no. 1; Statement of Vereinigung weiblicher Juristen und Volkswirte from 9 April 1956, in: *Informationen*, 1956, no. 4; Letter of DGB dated 25 April 1956, in: *Informationen* (1956), no. 4; Bund der Steuerzahler, in: *Informationen* (1956), no. 7-8.

27 Deutscher Akademikerinnenbund, Statement to the memorandum from 9 March 1956, in: *Informationen* (1956), no. 3, pp. 3-4.

28 *Informationen* (1956), no. 4, p. 5.

1.3 The Federal High Court's verdict

The Federal High Court passed a verdict in January 1957 which declared that §26 EKStG, the regulation of joint taxation, conflicted with the constitution. The joint taxation of spouses meant a discriminatory exemption against married couples, and therefore it was a violation of the constitution, which guaranteed special protection for marriage and the family. In addition, the "educational effect" of joint taxation, the return of working women to the household, was an intention that could not be combined with the constitution. Women should have the same legal chances to earn an economically worthwhile income. To judge married women's gainful employment negatively from the start contradicted the constitutional principle of equality.³⁰

This verdict completely took the wind out of the Conservatives' sails. However they seized upon a side comment in the verdict, which provided a lifeline. It stated that the court might consider American splitting as a suitable solution for the conflict. It is remarkable, how then a marital taxation was passed that actually met the first claim of the Federal High Court, the protection of family, but totally ignored and thus intensified the conflict with the constitutional principle of equality.

1.4 The putative compromise – introduction of splitting

The government was now forced to review the tax law immediately. It did so in June 1958.³¹ The main issue of the new proposal was the introduction of tax splitting according to the American model. Social Democrats however were critical that the benefit of splitting would at first only be effective from a certain high level of income onwards and thus create much social injustice. As a matter of fact, it would be working women who stood to suffer from this new method of progression.³² Women's associations claimed that there would also be disadvantages for unmarried and single tax payers.³³ The Workers' Union demanded tax deductions for working married women.³⁴

29 Informationen (1956) no. 4, p. 5.

30 BVerfGE, vol. 6, p. 55. See also Anna Endres, *Der Entscheid des Bundesverfassungsgerichtes*, in: Informationen, 1957, no. 5, pp. 8-9.

31 Verh. BT: 3rd EP: 1st discussion, 17th session, 13 March 1958, pp. 799-819; 2nd discussion, 32nd session, 19 June 1958, pp. 1756-1795; 3rd discussion, 33rd session, 20 June 1958, pp. 1820-1831.

32 Harms (SPD), Verh. BT, 3rd EP, 2nd discussion, 32nd session, p. 1762.

33 Statements documented in: Informationen für die Frau, 1958, no. 1, pp. 5-6.

34 Statement of DGB from March 1958, documented in: Informationen für die Frau (1958), no. 3, p. 4.

This corresponded to the tax politics in Denmark, which was attempting to relieve working, joint taxed couples. But the suggestion did not gain any significance. In April, the German Association of Female Academics, the German Women's Ring, and the Association for Educating Girls and Women, filed an extensive petition along with detailed reasons. They expressed severe socio-political doubts about the reform because it gave a subvention for the wealthy single provider of a family: "The wealthy husband of the childless homemaker is extremely and one-sidedly favoured in comparison with all other taxpayers, especially in comparison with the family man."³⁵

The sociologist Gerhard Mackenroth had already in 1953 called for a tax policy that supported families. He emphasised that there was no reason why a non-working, childless married woman should benefit from any taxation policy.³⁶ He thought it very curious that single persons and couples where both spouses were working should finance the non-working wife of a childless husband and thus providing him succour and comfort. Women's associations demanded a general individual taxation of spouses and a continuing progression as had been provided for in the interim regulation. During a conference with representatives of the ministry of finance, women's associations repeated and reinforced their opinion that splitting should be rejected for legal and social reasons.³⁷ From a legal point of view the individual taxation of spouses would meet the current understanding of justice. From a social point of view they regarded splitting as unjust, as the higher the income the greater was the benefit from it. Furthermore the tax advantage would rise, the greater the difference between the spouses' income. The greatest benefit would then result for families in which one spouse – and most of the time that meant the woman – had no income at all.

In the second and third discussion of the law many petitions dealt with the incorporation of so-called "half-families" into the splitting rule. How was it to deal with widowed, divorced and single mothers? Representatives tried hard to put forth that "left alone mothers" could not be additionally punished for their fate by the government.³⁸ The Conservatives' objection, that a single or divorced mother received aliments or maintenance was not convincing as many fathers failed to fulfil their obligation. Still, a majority rejected the equal treatment of these women in terms of taxation.

35 Informationen für die Frau (1958), no. 4, pp. 6-12, here p. 6.

36 Gerhard Mackenroth, in: Zeitschrift für sozialen Fortschritt (1953), p. 109

37 Report on the Meeting from 6.5.1958 in: Informationen (1958), no. 6, pp. 6-8.

38 Kalinke (Deutsche Partei), Verh. BT, 3rd EP, 32nd session, p. 1794.

The German Families' Association suspected that the legislative body would rather subsidise the childless married woman than extremely needy mothers with children. The promotion of children, and hence of the family instead of merely promoting marriage would have been more easily achieved with considerably higher child allowances. Here was a very basic conflict: The CDU claimed to promote families with many children but did indeed subsidise marriage only with the splitting system. The Social Democrats refused to vote for the new tax law, however the splitting system was introduced on the strength of the Conservatives' votes alone.

Spouses could now choose between separate and joint assessment. At the same time the splitting system according to the American model was promoted as a new taxation principle. The split taxation meant that income of "not permanently separated" living spouses would be treated as if each of them earned half of the joint income. Marriages with two full incomes thus did not achieve any tax relief. The splitting regulation had maximum effect on single-provider marriages or housewife marriages. Progression was slowed down, allowances and flat rates were doubled, which also meant a smaller tax burden.³⁹ Whereas the former regulation meant a disadvantage for married couples compared to unmarried couples living together, this disadvantage was now transferred to working wives and singles.⁴⁰ The minister of Family still praised the splitting concept: "If we establish the splitting system, we do so especially to the benefit of the non working housewife and mother, for the benefit of those mothers, who find their most beautiful and most important duty in carrying the home, the family, the children and the household [...] That is a very nice way to create equal rights for the non working woman and mother."⁴¹

As a matter of fact the preferential treatment of housewife marriages was now even more evident. The splitting model was an incentive to get married, not as was often and incorrectly stated for the building of a family. Other forms of family life were not subject to the benefits of these tax reforms. The not inconsiderable tax advantages for married couples compared to single people obstructed the development and increase of other modes of family life that developed out of necessity after the war. The law had a conserving effect on families in the sense of conserving traditional bourgeois roles in

39 See Angela Delille/Andrea Grohn, *Blick zurück aufs Glück. Frauenleben und Familienpolitik in den 50er Jahren*, Berlin 1985, p. 158 note 21.

40 See also *ibid.*, pp. 136-137; Jutta Akrami-Göhren, *Die Familienpolitik im Rahmen der Sozialpolitik mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Vorstellungen und praktischen Tätigkeiten der CDU*, Bonn 1974, p. 307.

41 Minister of Family Issues Wuermeling, *Verh. BT, 3rd EP, 25th session*, p. 1374 f.

marriage and family. The splitting model's benefits were highest when the woman was not working at all and the tax relief was low to non-existing if both spouses earned a full income. The higher the husband's income, the higher was the indirect subsidy of his wife's household and family work. As this increase in value was linked to the husband's salary, the dependence of the wife also increased and thus promoted "family work" even in higher social classes. In this way, the regulation had a clear effect on the labour market and social-political norms. This system of marital taxation was indeed a good argument against the gainful employment of the woman in the marital struggle about the division of labour.

In addition to that, different tax groups had a different progression. If the married woman in spite of it all thought about working part or full time, the couple immediately discovered that it was not at all worthwhile. The husband was normally, as main provider of the family, subject to the lowest tax group, whereas his wife in her tax group would be subject to the highest progression. Half of her salary from her job would thus end directly in the fiscal treasury. Therefore, the state, in spite of its contradicting statements, directly regulated the private life of its citizens.

Nevertheless, the total "domestication" of housewives, which is how most scholars view developments of the 1950s, was at no times a social reality let alone a socio-political agreement.⁴²

The Conservatives, with the introduction of splitting and progressive taxation, for the first time, did not take labour market necessities into consideration but put through a socio-political model in tax politics.

2. Taxation of Women in Gainful Employment in Denmark

Since 1880, married women in Denmark had the right to have their own income at their disposal. Yet it was the husband who had to declare income to the fiscal authorities. In the first Danish income tax law of 1903, the joint assessment of married spouses was lawfully fixed. The consequence of this was that the wife's possible income was added to the main provider's – the husband's – income. Because of the progressive scale, woman's income was taxed at an extremely high rate.⁴³ The head of the family was liable for tax.⁴⁴ The wife did not have her own tax code and was officially not a taxpayer.

42 Compare von Oertzen, *Teilzeitarbeit* (note 5), p. 190.

43 For the Danish tax laws see Anna Birte Ravn, *Gender, Taxation and Welfare State in Denmark 1903-1963*(83), in: Kari Melby et al., *The Nordic Model of Marriage* (note 1), pp. 113-127.

44 *Lov om Indkomst- og Formueskat til Staten af 15. Mai 1903*, §7.

She did not even have to undersign, certifying that the tax declaration her husband made was correct. However, if the head of the family did not fulfil his taxpaying duty, financial administration could not only seize the man's but also his wife's salary. There was an allowance granted for children under the age of 15.

2.1 Allowances in family taxation policy

In 1912, a so-called, "wife-deduction" (*hustruafdrag*)⁴⁵ was introduced. If the woman's income was not based on her husband's property or their joint property, but on a gainful employment for an independent employer, the husband could claim this deduction. It should compensate the extra costs that a man would have to pay when his wife was working and not being able to look after the household completely.⁴⁶ This tax relief was granted to the husband and was at its utmost half of his own allowance. In the tax law of 1922, the wife deduction was again granted to the "family provider", but it was now graded and only granted up to a certain income. The lower the income, the higher the allowance. However, facing price rises and general development of salaries, the wife-deduction began to lose more and more significance because it could hardly ever be claimed.

In the law of tax assessment of 1947/48 the wife-deduction was therefore separated from the husband's salary and set to half of the wife's salary but at maximum value of 2000 Crowns. This sum represented the legislature's supposed minimum wage for a domestic help. This rule was kept until the law of tax assessment of 1958/59. The significant group of self-employed, with a smaller income, first benefited from the tax regulation in 1959/60.⁴⁷

Apart from the so-called wife-deduction, there were many other tax allowances. First, of course, the personal allowance, which depended on income, place of residence and provision of duties, tax deductions for children and, since 1950, child benefits. The government started to differentiate between providers and non-providers when it introduced the new tax law in 1922.⁴⁸ The reformed marital laws spoke of mutual provision. There was *one* taxation rate, just as before, but providers were granted a higher allowance (graded according to their income) than non-providers. Providers were, according to the law, all married men and widowers, widows and divorced

45 Lov om Indkomst- og Formueskat til Staten af 8. Juni 1912.

46 Lov om Indkomst- og Formueskat, §8.

47 Betænkning om ægtefællers beskatning. Afgivet af det af finansministeren den 8. marts nedsatte udvalg. Betænkning nr. 327, 1963, p. 19.

48 Lov om Indkomst- og Formueskat til Staten af 10. April 1922.

people with their own household or with a duty of maintenance. Single parents, who lived with their parents, were not providers in terms of the regulation.⁴⁹ In 1956/57 two different taxation rating scales were developed: one for providers of a family and one for non-providers. Hence the allowance for family providers was redundant thereafter.

Child allowances and benefits were offset against tax liability until 1967. Since 1903, there had been tax deductions for children under the age of 15, even for illegitimate children. This rule was a disadvantage for workers with lower incomes, as tax deductions had a greater effect on higher incomes. Since 1950, when the first child benefit law was passed, the benefit was offset against tax liability. Since 1951, under certain circumstances, this benefit could be paid to the mother. Not until the child benefit law of 1967, child benefits were no longer part of tax law but of social law.⁵⁰

2.2 *The positions of women's associations*

The Danish women's associations realised very early how significant tax law was in their context. The activities of the Danish Women's Association (*Dansk Kvindesamfund*) concerning tax politics can be separated into four main phases, each with a different emphasis. The first in and directly after the First World War, the second in the 1930s then again directly after the Second World War, and finally at the beginning of the 1960s. The women's association claimed separate taxation of spouses for the first time in 1913. This very central demand from time to time gave way to other seemingly more practical demands. The association had to face the dilemma of trying to balance working women's interests with that of housewives.

In 1915 the Danish Women's Association sent their first statement to the Danish parliament, demanding that spouses should be taxed individually. Their argument was firstly, that it was humiliating that a formerly politically responsible citizen was put on the same level as an immature child after marrying. Secondly, it was unjust that a woman should lose her right to vote in local elections if her husband did not pay his taxes.⁵¹

When the dreams of a housewife salary were shattered, during the discussion about marital law in the 1920s, the general demand for separate marital

49 Kirsten Geertsen, *Arbejderkvinder i Danmark. Vilkår og kamp 1924–1939*, Copenhagen 1982, p. 279.

50 Hanne Rimmen Nilsen, *Livets Lighed. Lis Groes og familiepolitikken i 1950'erne*, in: *Kvinden og samfundet, Jubilæumsskrift 1996*.

51 Eva Hemmer Hansen, *Blåstrømper, rødstrømper, uldstrømper. Dansk kvindesamfunds historie i 100 år*, Aarhus 1970, p. 86f.

taxation was raised again. However, the association's activities concentrated first on criticising the definition of "provider".⁵² The public law definition of provider was derived from the civil servants law of 1919. According to this, a man was defined as a provider just because of his marital status, regardless of whether there were children to support or not. The provider status was also independent of his wife's income. The married woman however did not attain provider status as a rule. She was only granted the provider status in exceptions, if the man could not earn a salary due to illness while there were children to maintain. Indeed if the man did not have an income at all, he was still regarded as the provider and head of the family and thus the only person liable to pay tax.⁵³ The women's associations demanded that the provider bonus should only be granted to persons that had children to provide for. They believed it to be an underestimation of wives' economic capability if they were as a rule defined to be in need of provision.

When a new tax commission in 1936 was to work out reform proposals and the representatives of the women's associations were not granted access to the committee, some associations⁵⁴ produced independent statements on the issue.⁵⁵ They restricted themselves to developing pragmatic procedures. Tax declaration should thus feature both spouses' names and should only be valid if signed by both. Married women should be granted their own tax code if necessary and hence be able to pay their tax independently. Unmarried providers should also be granted the provider's allowances. Finally the judicial consequences of not paying tax should only have an impact on the person who did not pay it.⁵⁶

2.3 Excursus: The effects on the right to vote in local elections

The husband's reliability in taxpaying could indeed have a negative effect on the woman's position in society and especially on her political rights. Until 1953 suffrage and eligibility was tied to the condition that one was registered as a taxpayer in one's home community and that one had paid the taxes of the last two years including the current year. As only the "head of the family" was responsible for paying tax, his wife lost her right to vote if he

52 See Ravn, *Gender* (note 43), p. 117.

53 Inger Margrete Pedersen, *Forsørgerbegrebet. Studier i familiens retlige problemer*. Betænkning nr. 440, Copenhagen 1966, p. 112.

54 Dansk Kvindesamfund, Danske Kvinders Nationalråd, "Open Door" and Københavns Husmoderforening.

55 Cf. Hemmer Hansen, *Blåstrømper* (note 51), p. 87; Ravn, *Gender* (note 43), p. 117.

56 Pedersen, *Forsørgerbegrebet* (note 53), p. 15.

did not pay. This was a problem especially in situations of separation.⁵⁷ Yet it was first in 1957 that these regulations were relaxed and exceptions were made in case of death, divorce or separation. In lawful marriages, however, they were still valid concerning suffrage and eligibility. The minister of the Interior showed no understanding whatsoever: "As far as I remember, it is said in the wedding ceremony, that the couple should follow one another in good times and in bad times, and this alone is recognised here. I am about to say that if a woman has not enough influence on her husband to make him pay his taxes if she wants to be a candidate in local election, then her influence in the district council will not be very strong either."⁵⁸

2.4 *The discussion after 1945*

A new impetus was brought to the discussion by Erik Ib Schmidt and Inga Dahlsgaard with the essay "Tax and marriage",⁵⁹ published by *Dansk Kvindesamfund* in autumn 1945. The authors showed that the transition to modern forms of production with an extended division and specialisation of labour had brought significant changes to the economic unit "family". Still the woman's housework conditions improved, according to the article, in turn improving the economic situation of the family and thus raising family income. The housewife's work was taxed at a very low rate, the authors stated. First of all there were less indirect consumption taxes, as food and clothes could be produced in the house, whereas working mothers had to buy such items and secondly, the income of housework was not subject to taxation at all.⁶⁰ Apart from the taxation privileges of housework, the essay criticised the fact that gainful employment of married women was taxed at a much higher rate than any other employee's income. In tax law the wife was seen as an appendix to her husband, but the sanctions would have the same impact on her as on him. The authors' proposal was to abolish joint taxation as the most sound and best solution. They also implied that provider, wife, and child deductions should be cut in favour of child benefits and other social security payments.

The publication of this essay had a thunderbolt's effect on the feminist debate. It had become apparent that housewives could, as a "work force reserve", assist with the post-war reconstruction, for which a larger work force

57 *Ibid.*, p. 15.

58 Folketingstidende 1957/58, p. 473.

59 Inga Dahlsgaard/Erik Ib Schmidt, *Skat og Ægteskab. Aktuelle skatteproblemer*. Ed. by Dansk Kvindesamfund, Copenhagen 1945.

60 Dahlsgaard/Schmidt, *Skat* (note 59), p. 19.

was badly needed. Therefore the Danish Women's Association took the offensive and demanded the separate taxation of spouses: "Because it is in our opinion of great importance for economy that the female work force is also used, we venture to draw your attention to our earlier petitions all based on the idea that husband and wife – in one form or the other – are taxed separately, or that a considerably higher allowance on their joint income is granted instead."⁶¹

The correlation of joint assessment, progressive taxation and the accordingly high rate of taxation for married working women, the low wages for women and the shortages in the work force were topics for lively discussions in the post-war years. Newspapers ran such headings as "Can one save money through companionate marriage?", or "Marriage divorced for tax reasons", and thus intensified the conflict. Even the minister of Finance tried to find incentives for the employment of women.⁶² After consultations with the financial department about a new tax law in 1948, *Dansk Kvindesamfund* (DK) and its umbrella organisation *Danske Kvinders Nationalråd* (DKN) emphasised their demands for gender equality in taxation in principle, and especially for the abolition of joint assessment and taxation.⁶³ However, as the situation on the labour market eased again, public interest in this issue also seemed to calm down.

The results of the official commission on taxation, which had already been established in 1936, though first publishing its results in 1948 and 1950, were distinctly lacking in innovation.⁶⁴ Most of the commission's members, who were all men, had neither understanding nor concern for women's demands and issues whatsoever. The commission's majority explicitly justified the joint assessment and even tried to abolish the wife deduction.⁶⁵ The report's tone not only displayed a lack of concern, but also reflected a considerable arrogance, especially as the "childless wife" was used as the most deterrent example. The argumentation constructed an artificial conflict of interests between the married woman and the single mother.

61 Kvindehistorisk Arkiv, Aarhus, material tax system. Letter of Dansk Kvindesamfund to tax commission from 2 September 1946.

62 Kvindehistorisk Arkiv, Aarhus, a collection of articles about taxation from the years 1946-48.

63 Kvindehistorisk Arkiv, Aarhus, DKN and DKS to Generaldirektør Knud Kost, August 1948.

64 Betænkningen om Beskatningen af Indkomst og Formue m.v. Afgivet af Skatte-
lovkommissionen. I. del, Copenhagen 1948; Skattelovkommissionens Betænkning.
II. del, Copenhagen 1950.

65 Betænkning 1948 pp. 66-71.

It was asked again and again why the single mother was not granted the wife-deduction, and, in response to the rhetorical question, it was decided to cut the deduction altogether. The women's associations, DKN and DK protested severely against the abolition of the allowance and drew attention to the effects of such a "marriage penalty". They feared a drop of women's employment with negative consequences for reconstruction, an increase in divorces for tax reasons and a diminution in marriages. At the same time, they agreed to the alteration of the "provider" definition, which should in future be extended to unmarried people supporting their children, elderly or sick relatives, and thus let them also benefit from family allowances.⁶⁶

In the second part of the 1950 report the official commission defended the continuation of joint assessment with the argument of "technical necessity in tax", though it did now develop proposals to augment the wife deduction which clearly contrasted with former statements. The female representatives' criticism was clear: The investigation of marital taxation was superficial, and carried through without statistic material or thorough enquiry.⁶⁷ Probably as a response, the Danish Women's Association itself now started an investigation on the taxation of married women.⁶⁸ The result was remarkable. Not only did it not at all refer to the essay published eight years earlier, there was also a drastic change of direction and argumentation. The demand for separate or individual taxation did not appear at all, instead the tax policy committee demanded different taxation scales for families with two working providers and families with a working man and his housewife. The abolition of the "provider"⁶⁹ definition was no longer a point of discussion. The definition was sharpened as it no longer referred to the support of children but should only apply to jointly assessed, married persons. "It would be sensible to apply the 'provider' definition only to married, jointly assessed couples and that only to them a family allowance as granted because families have a much higher subsistence level than unmarried people."⁷⁰ This surprising change of direction was definitely in conflict with the

66 Kvindehistorisk Arkiv. See Letters of DKN and DK to the government and parliament from 30 November 1948; *Kvinden og samfundet*, 1948, p. 176, "Til regering og rigsdag".

67 Kirsten Gloerfelt-Tarp (Radikale Venstre), *Folketingstidende*, 13. November 1951, pp. 953-956.

68 Dansk Kvindesamfund (ed.), *Gifte kvinders beskatning. En undersøgelse over virkninger af de gældende love samt retningslinier for ændringer*, Copenhagen 1954.

69 See Lissie Masgård, *Hvad er en "forsørger"?*, in: *Kvinden og samfundet* (1951), p. 36f.

70 *Kvinden og samfundet* (1954), p. 118.

original positions of the women's association, however it reflected the spirit of the times with its strong emphasis on legal marriage. One therefore can only agree with the historian Anna Birte Ravn, who holds the years 1945 to 1953 to have been the most turbulent period in terms of political discussions and statements of the Danish Women's Association on tax policy.⁷¹

Marital taxation kept the *Folketing* busy for regular periods of time. This was due firstly to the evident necessity of a tax reform but with none of the parties daring to launch sweeping reforms. The result was instead the passing of a series of small, partial reforms. In the annual budget and in finance laws small adjustments were made. In May 1954, the minister of Finance, Viggo Kampmann (S) came up with an eagerly awaited tax reform proposal.⁷² According to this, spouses should be taxed separately up to a certain income, thus enabling the so-called assistant wives to be assessed individually, too. From an income of 22,000-30,000 Danish crowns onwards, married couples were to be taxed progressively and jointly and thus to face augmentation of their tax burden. The missing wife and provider allowances were to be compensated by a general allowance for the subsistence level of every adult. For the first time, a proposal showed concern for the explicit support of the family instead of supporting marriage, as a representative stated: "The result is that before and after marriage, the tax situation will be exactly the same for the couple if they do not have any children. If children are born, the circumstances will change and then the so-called family policy, that is, the special concern for families will be taken into account. Therefore families with children will be favoured and special concern will be shown towards those families where the mother is working, too."⁷³

New regulations for child benefits should also be settled with this reform. The proposal to pay these benefits to the mother and augment the mother's gainful employment was not met with enthusiasm everywhere. Conservatives ridiculed the proposal by asking if the state was to pay a nanny for each and every family in the country.⁷⁴ The abolition of wife deduction was also quite controversial. From the women's side, the continued use of the word "head of family" was criticised. However in the following year, the proposal was not passed by the *Folketing*.

71 Ravn, *Gender* (note 43).

72 See *Kvinden og samfundet* (1954), p. 118.

73 Hans Knudsen (Socialdemokratiet), *Folketingstidende*, 20 May 1954, p. 5471.

74 Poul Møller (Konservative Folkeparti), *Folketingstidende*, 20. May 1954, p. 5519.

2.5 The tax reform of 1958

There was a limited reform in 1956/57 when, instead of the one rating scale with the provider allowances, two taxation scales were introduced: one for providers and one for non-providers.⁷⁵ The following year, most of the injustices concerning the “provider” definition had been resolved. Divorced or widowed men without current providing duties were no longer subject to the taxation privileges (as a matter of fact, this applied to 165,000 men) and single parents were to gain easier access to the lower taxation. The right-wing liberal party *Venstre* tried to treat housework as an equivalent to employment and called for the expenses for housemaids to be made tax-deductible. According to *Venstre*, the number of kindergarten places needed could thus be limited to a “reasonable” amount and one could also provide support for the elderly and would not have to subsidise the “many and too expensive” elderly homes. Families in need of help would sort out their problems more independently⁷⁶ and government could therefore reduce claims for communal domestic help or other public support. The Social Democrats, of course, objected to these ideas.

As the different taxation scales led to a higher taxation of spouses who were both working, the women’s association discussed separate taxation again. The valid regulations led in most cases to a higher tax burden if two working people got married. Regardless of the fact that both had been taxed high as non-providers before the marriage, the marriage could have a negative effect on family economics in spite of the husband’s provider benefit. If a man on the other hand married a non-working woman, the tax burden grew smaller because in this case the provider bonus came fully into effect. Little had changed for couples with a relatively low income and a working wife (about 70 percent of the married couples in Denmark). For the remaining 30 percent of couples, those with a higher income, the tax burden increased noticeably. If two teachers decided to marry, then their taxation was 15 percent higher than before the wedding. If the woman only worked part-time, the burden nevertheless increased by 15 percent.⁷⁷ The income of an unmarried woman was generally taxed lower compared to a married woman’s income whose husband was working. The head of the household was still accountable to the tax authorities. Yet Jytte Christensen, the tax specialist of the Danish Women’s Association did not revise her agreement to joint assess-

75 Discussions in Folketing, 7 December 1956.

76 Foged (Venstre), Folketingstidende, 10 December 1957, pp. 1459-1460.

77 Examples in: *Betænkning om Ægtefællers Beskatning*, Afgivet af det af finansministeren den 8. marts 1961 nedsatte udvalg, Copenhagen, 327/1963, pp. 57ff.

ment.⁷⁸ Christensen did indeed register the German Federal High Court's decision against joint marital taxation. But instead of using the Supreme Court's verdict, which also corresponded to UN philosophy, for her own campaign, she strictly denied a similarity of the German and Danish situation. Denmark, unlike the Federal Republic of Germany, did not have UN human rights embedded in its constitution and therefore the German decision was not relevant, she stated. A little later the tax expert repeatedly claimed that the actual "incapacitation" was the fact that married women could not file and be responsible for their own tax declaration, nor sign their husbands'. Joint or separate assessments were only techniques of taxation and neither implied a negative nor a positive judgement, she declared. DK in 1960 only partly demanded the abolition of joint taxation because, according to Christensen, most of the married women in independent employment enjoyed tax reduction by means of the wife-deduction.⁷⁹

The conservative and right wing parties' plans of 1960, to introduce the splitting system in order to "bring a clear family policy into Danish tax law" were not successful.⁸⁰ The DK representatives rejected the proposal at once because they held the splitting system to be not neutral, but supportive of housework and housewife marriage.

14 years had passed since the end of the war and, in spite of many proposals, Denmark had not seen a significant change let alone concrete steps towards the equality of married women and men in tax law. As in previous years, the tax coding was only given to the man, the head of family. The tax declaration was valid even if his wife had not signed it. However, if the family owed tax, government could seize both spouses' salaries. Even the women's associations were unsure about the best strategy to continue the discussion. Another ministry of Finance committee was commissioned to investigate the social, legal and economic effects of the current tax law. That committee proposed three different models for future taxation in 1963.⁸¹ There was broad agreement on the necessity of changes, not at least because a threatened shortage of work force demanded other approaches to the problem. The committee assumed that the high taxation of the female spouse's income noticeably reduced the likeliness of her seeking gainful employment. This fact now had a counter-productive effect regarding the shortage of

78 *Kvinden og samfundet* (1958), pp. 137 ff.

79 *Kvinden og samfundet* (1960), pp. 34-35.

80 *Folketingstidende*, Poul Møller (Konservative Folkeparti), 9 February 1960, pp. 2785ff.

81 *Betænkning om Ægtefællers Beskatning*, Afgivet af det af finansministeren den 8. marts 1961 nedsatte udvalg, nr. 327, Copenhagen 1963.

teachers, doctors, dentists, technicians and hospital staff.⁸² If a teacher's wife started to work in a similar position, the joint income was taxed at a rate that was 41.5 percent higher than if she remained a housewife. A part-time job meant a higher rate of 38.2 percent. For a factory worker, the wife's independent employment meant a higher taxation of 21.8 percent.⁸³ Therefore, the official committee recommended reforms. It took on board the women's associations' arguments, that the current tax law kept couples from getting married or even implied a divorce for financial reasons. This had been a strong objection. German women's organisations and Social Democrats used similar arguments in the discussion in the Federal Republic of Germany, during the 1950s, and finally succeeded. The alternatives were to impose individual taxation in general or at least for the majority of marriages, or to reform the wife deduction and raise it. The report concluded that if a simple and thorough reform was desired and if one wished to leave the decision between independent employment and housework entirely to the married couple, one could only support the slow change towards total separate or individual taxation.⁸⁴ However, in the reform bill the government presented in January 1965, there was little left of the committee's ideas.⁸⁵ It was the first bill concerning tax that included significant changes,⁸⁶ yet even in this paper the marital status had a direct effect on the tax burden. Inger Margrete Pedersen concluded in 1966 with an air of resignation that "it seems to be characteristic for our century that individualism is assumed to be something granted between partners and not something that has an effect on and significance for public demands."⁸⁷

Another regulation in tax law had clearly normative motives: the so-called newly-weds regulation.⁸⁸ If the newly married woman chose to stop working in the first three months of her marriage, the family could claim considerable tax reduction, regardless of the probable pregnancy of the woman. If circumstances changed for a single mother because of childbirth, there were no tax reductions at all. It is remarkable that these tax reductions

82 *Betænkning* 1963, p. 62.

83 *Ibid.*, p. 59.

84 *Ibid.*, p. 73. See discussions in *Folketing*, 1 October 1963.

85 Pedersen, *Forsørgerbegrebet* (note 53), p. 26f. See also 1st discussion of finanslov, *Folketing*, 22 October 1965.

86 See *Ibid.*, p. 56.

87 Thøger Nielsen, *Indkomstbeskatning I*, 1965, p.331, cit. after Pedersen, *Forsørgerbegrebet* (note 53), p. 31.

88 Pedersen, *Forsørgerbegrebet* (note 53), p. 123.

with their transparent educational intention were not criticised or even mentioned in any of the contemporary investigations and statements.

2.6 The introduction of individual taxation

Despite the fact that tax reform was an important subject for most parties in the 1964 election campaign, it took the government until 1970 before it finally introduced individual taxation. Conservatives, Radicals and Social Democrats had all stated that joint taxation should be abolished in their opinion, and all the other parties also desired tax reform.⁸⁹ On 31 March 1967 the so-called tax at source law⁹⁰ was passed with the votes of the Social Democrats, the Liberals and the Socialists. The most important changes were the abolition of joint taxation and the standardisation of allowances and deductions. The wife's income was taxed separately if she was self-employed or independently employed or was granted social welfare, sickness benefit or pension. The provider definition was abolished. The family status should be taken into account via allowances per person. The man could claim his as well as his wife's allowance on his tax liability. In 1970, when the Conservatives were in power, the law came into force. From then on, tax deductions purely for marital status became a relic of the past.

3. West Germany and Denmark in Comparison

The changes within the tax law have to be interpreted in the light of the different socio-political circumstances that implicitly or explicitly were taken into account. Such circumstances were the situation on the labour market, juridical fixation and social acceptance of gender equality and finally the significance that was granted to marriage and especially to housewife marriage.

In both countries, tax law played an important role in the parliamentary discussions about women's role. There were comparable origins – the so-called household taxation. In the Weimar Republic, quite a large group of married women were granted individual taxation while the main principle of joint taxation was kept. This exemption survived different modifications and

89 Randi Markussen, *Socialdemokratiets kvindeopfattelse og -politik fra 1960-1973*, in: *Den jyske historiker*, special issue: *Socialdemokratiet, velfærdsstaten og kvinderne*, vol. 18 (1980), pp. 15-168, here pp. 59-70.

90 *Lov om ændring af lov om opkrævning af indkomst- og formueskat for personer m.v. (Kildeskat)*, in: *Folketingsårbogen 1967-68*, pp. 176-186; *Lov om ikrafttræden af lov om opkrævning af indkomst- og formueskat for personer m.v. (Kildeskat)*, in: *Folketingsårbogen 1967-68*, pp. 186 ff.

stayed valid until 1958 – the year of the general tax law reform. The household taxation without exemption had been impossible to put through in the face of socio-political protests, apart from the period 1934 to 1941. In Denmark, the so-called wife deduction was introduced in 1912. It was granted to men whose wives were in independent gainful employment, to cover the husband's expenses for home help in the household. And yet only the husband was liable to pay tax.

In both countries, married women were seen as a work force reserve and as a means to regulate the labour market. It was clear to contemporary politicians that a high taxation of married women's gainful employment would serve as a motivation against seeking independent employment. According to the labour market situation, tax policy could then be used as a regulation. In Denmark, the women's associations tried for the first time in an immediately after the First World War to achieve separate assessment with this argument, though without success. The ministry of Finance's tax committee picked up this argument not before the beginning of the 1960s, when a lack of work force was noticeable in certain professions. But even this knowledge still had no political consequences. General individual taxation finally became reality with the great tax reform of 1967 and came into force in 1970. In Germany meanwhile, the labour market situation very often brought direct changes to tax policy, at least regarding the reforms of 1934, 1941, 1951, 1958 and finally also for the tax compromise in 1965.

Especially in the case of Denmark, the ambivalences between marital and family law on the one hand and tax law on the other are very apparent. Whereas marital law since the 1920s declared the mutual obligation to provide, tax law continued, until the late 1960s, to speak of one provider respectively, in marriages, of a male provider. In the middle of the 1950s this system was broadened within a specific provider scale. The Danish tax law was thus a direct contradiction to the attempts at establishing equality in the 1920s. Flexibility comparable to that in the Federal Republic of Germany, or even in the German Democratic Republic (where general individual taxation had already been introduced in the 1950s), had not developed. This was not least due to the fact that Danish women's organisations did not argue either vigorously enough or as one voice against household taxation until the 1960s.

In Federal German family law, or rather in the regulations of the Civil Code (*Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch*) from 1900 concerning the family, no intention of gender equality was visible at all. Nevertheless, the individual taxation of the working, independently employed married woman was incorporated into tax law in the 1920s. At the beginning of the 1950s, those

exemption regulations were extended to include other groups of working female spouses. Although the German government fixed the woman's responsibility for the household in the so-called equality law of 1957, it still had to make individual taxation the basis for tax law, especially after the High Court's verdict. Yet it is still remarkable that from the introduction of the splitting model onwards, and again with the creation of different taxation rates for married and unmarried people. German tax law still subsidises the housewife marriage. Thus, not *de jure*, but *de facto* household taxation won through against individual taxation.

Ideas about how the state should intervene or act in order to support marriages or a certain type of family life – that marriage and family were to be supported was out of question both in Denmark and in Germany – differed a lot. Opponents to joint taxation or household assessment stated in both countries that such taxation would dissuade couples from getting married, or even support divorces as the joint taxation put working spouses at a disadvantage against non-married couples. Defenders of household taxation generally wanted to see and treat marriage as a union, as a closed institution, so that in Germany the male head of the family, and in Denmark the male provider, was solely liable to pay tax. Neither the wife's deduction nor the exemption rules for working wives in Germany corresponded with the goals of opponents to household taxation.

Tax policy was both a delicate and vividly discussed issue in 1950's Germany. It was seen in connection with the shortly before passed constitutional article of gender equality and the article to protect marriage and family. That the ultimate reform and especially the splitting model finally subsidised housewife marriage more than anything before was not only surprising to the contemporary spectators. As a matter of fact, the splitting model put marriage itself in a better position in tax terms, though the married woman was personally at a much worse position, which remains remarkable even from today's point of view.

In Denmark the judicial questions of gender equality were not so relevant in the 1950s. Social questions were much more important. This might explain why the subject was not seriously discussed until the 1960s, although there had been attempts to reform tax law in the 1930s. That it was then picked up again was also due to shortages in the work force in certain fields of employment. It is remarkable how much the women's organisations were engaged in the tax law discussion and how resolutely they demanded a general tax reform in the 1950s. Much clearer than ever before and clearer than the second feminist movement in the 1970s, they realised the gender component in tax law.

Centered societies. Business Leadership in Denmark and West Germany, 1960–1989.

1 Introduction

1.1 Keywords

The 22. April in 1960, the theologian and personnel-social consultant, *Dr. Dirk Cattepoel*, contributes to the lecture series of the *Deutsches Industrieinstitut* at the spring meeting of the association *Wirtschaftsring e. V.*¹ He gave a talk outlining developments in West-German post war society and their expected consequences for both, future leadership styles and future organization of businesses and industrial enterprises.² Those future developments are framed by the keywords “*Bildungs-*” and “*Ausbildungsgesellschaft*”. Both terms – the society of the educated and the society of the trained – proved to be constitutive for perceptions of industrial leadership.³ They are constitutive for the published debates on leadership of the three decades to follow. Also *Cattepoel's* outline of developments explicitly characterizes a future German society, similar trends are to be found in other European countries, as is the case in Denmark. *Cattepoel* performs this new society by defining it. Thus, this is not a description, but a future, which is achieved, a version of society, which proves to be hegemonic until the early nineteen-eighties, when the educated and trained managers in employment turn from successful career men into dependants and social clients.

1.2 Directing the future

For the decades to come, the categories of nation, gender and time give direction to the formation of this society, structure them and offer orientations within them. Moreover, they legitimate what I am going to name ‘the social changes of no change’ – differing perceptions of career and leadership imag-

¹ Dirk Cattepoel, Auf dem Weg zu einem neuen Führungsstil im Unternehmen. Vortragsreihe des Deutschen Industrieinstituts, Nr. 28, 12/07 (1960).

² Unless explicitly differentiated, the term leader and leadership will in the following cover both, entrepreneurs, business as well as industrial leaders.

³ For an extensive discussion on the source materials, please see: Iris Rittenhofer, Diskurs und Konstruktion. Die dänischen und deutschen Medienpräsentationen der Führungsdebatten 1960–1990. Eine vergleichende geschlechterhistorische Analyse, Ph.D.-thesis, Aalborg University 1998.

ine social change. Nationed, gendered and timed interpretations of leader- and career concepts do move. Progress is created by timed (difference between decades or years), nationed (difference in terms of the imagined communities named nations) or gendered (difference of men's and women's career) difference. This has important consequences for the conduct of a historical comparison: By looking at how leadership careers are narrated in different spatial and temporary dimensions, with different genders and in different national publications, it is possible to gather a various aspects of what constitutes our cultural knowledge, and how meanings differ.

1.3 Cultural knowledge, creata and presentation

The term 'cultural knowledge' defines what comes forward in my sources, that is words 'put at the service of the visible', words situated and positioned put at the service of what can be seen within the discursive framework which is our culture.⁴ Thus, sources do not bring forward new knowledge. Rather, they make statements on what we already know, what we take for granted. Sources are about what we want to explain, what we want to produce knowledge about. The statements in the sources reveal a system of ideas, concepts and ways of thought and behavior which are shapes within a specific context. This is true, whether I look at the sources within their own time, or as a historian using them years after they came into being. In this sense, my approach to comparison is that of a 'cultural comparison'. This approach to comparison is informed by deconstruction.

The cultural comparison I want to offer will not result into the reproduction of two different nations or genders, nor draw borderlines between different decades. It is an analysis of mediated leadership in the Danish and German material, looked at not as separated by nation, but as two sides of the same coin: the promises incorporated in the modern. I read the sources from the point of view of cultural analysis, which means across national divides and decades, and across gender. Similar trends in both, Denmark and Germany, are not mediated in the same way. Therefore, the categories of my interest obtain differing meanings in the context of varying perceptions both within Denmark and Germany, and across the two nations.

I created my sources out of printed media, published debates on business and industrial leadership. Media as collective and multi-voiced deeds are achieving leaderships and gender. Like all other actions, they are informed by their culture. What is interesting to me is to study media in order to understand, with what lenses societies were looked at a certain time period,

⁴ Joan W. Scott, *The Evidence of Experience*, in: *Critical Inquiry* no. 17 (1991), pp. 774-797.

how they organized perceptions of leadership, and which perceptions were hegemonic at the time? To which extent was gender a paradigm, influencing and supporting those views? My sources do not constitute a sample of data. The sources, collected and sampled by me and with outset in my own interests, are "creata".⁵ *Creata* embody both engendered and not engendered material on leadership issues from Germany and Denmark for the time period of 1960–1989. *Creata* are treated as 'presentations'.⁶ *Presentation* is an analytical concept ensuring the awareness that language use does not reflect or mirror – as suggested by the widely used term 'represent' – text-external realities. Instead, language use creates a reality of itself, mediating and at the same time constituting the categories at play. The sources were read as texts of cultural memory and remembered culture, that is as discourses constituting in language what seemingly is discovered and brought forward as news. They reveal collective patterns of thought to be brought forward and independent of the boundaries of two European countries. Also my approach might remind of a conception of gender as performativity, as suggested by Judith Butler (1993), it differs in several points. Two of them are crucial: One, I decentralize gender, yet keep my analytic interest in gender; two, gender is not unique, but a nexus, embodying the same discursive relations as do contextual conceptions of leadership.

1.4 Content

The major themes constitutive for Danish and German industrial leadership are presented in *Self-made Societies*. A comparative aspect is an integrated part of all paragraphs. In *Continuity – denied, invisible, appreciated* I discuss competing leadership concepts in relation to the discourses at play. In *Cultural versus historical comparison* I outline my approach, where I combine methods of cultural analysis and historical comparison. The meanings constituted by the achievements of gender in the sources are discussed in the last

⁵ Wendy Stainton-Rogers, Unpublished paper, in: Eva Bendix/Dorthe Staunæs (eds.), *Overskridende Metoder [Transgressing methods]*, in: *Kvinder, Køn & Forskning* vol. 9, no. 4 (2000) 4, Copenhagen, pp. 3-16.

⁶ Rittenhofer, *Diskurs und Konstruktion* (note 3). This chapter is based on the rethinking and reinterpretations of the results of my Ph.D.-thesis, in the illuminating light of two more recent projects. I refer here especially to the concept of 'parallel category' in: Iris Rittenhofer, *Aftermath. A scientist's tales on self and present*. *Forum: Qualitative Social Research [On-line Journal]*, vol. 3, no. 3(2003). Access: <http://www.qualitative-research.net/fqs/fqs.htm> (ISSN 1438-5627). Special issue: *Subjectivity and Reflections on the Self in the Qualitative Research Process*, and: Iris Rittenhofer, *Voices past? The twitching and twisting bodies of gender*, in: *NORA. Nordic Journal of Women's Studies*, vol. 9 no. 3 (2000), pp. 182-191.

paragraph *Engender – indicator of change and origin*. I conclude this chapter by *Comparative remarks*.

2 Self-made Societies

The future German society, *Cattepoel* claims in 1960, was not continuing to be a '*Bildungsgesellschaft*', a literate society of the educated. Rather, *Cattepoel* argued, the future society was going to be an *Ausbildungsgesellschaft*, a society of the trained. This would put new demands to society in terms of the need for a decrease in not specialized work and an increase of jobs demanding specific training. In the nineteen-sixties, education was perceived as a class privilege. Like luxury and wealth – as related to tradition and upper-class – it had a bad reputation. Opposed to that, training was thought to be the means that would unite a split post-war Germany. As a trained society, Germany would be an *Einheitsgesellschaft der Mitte*, a society neither divided by classes nor privileges. Instead, it would be a society organized around a new center, which yet was to be built: a growing group of trained employees was to be in the middle of this society. Training and participatory employment are the unifying aspects and thus the heart of this society. It mediates a space between classes, careers, employers and employees. Training was conceived as a mediator between classes, employers and employees, capitalists and workers. It is training, which as the common lowest denominator was embodied in the widely used term 'the middle class'. This class of the trained employees incorporates the level of the blue and white collar worker as well as various degrees of leader positions.

The 'employed leader', as opposed to the 'borne leader', constituted the new middle within industrial organizations; the Anglo-Saxon term 'manager' was not used until the nineteen-eighties. Thus, by turning it into paid work and employment, leadership was purified of politically illegitimate associations like (old) elite, (family) tradition, authority, patriarchy, and inheritance, the links back to an unwanted past. Accordingly not inheritance, but training is put at the center of as the precondition of a successful leader career. The will to accomplish counts now as a prior means of success. The ideology of a career into the middle of societal and organizational power structures constitutes mediocrity as the new society's predominant characteristic. An image of an unitary society was actually accomplished by centering exclusive attention on those key themes like training for every body and employed leadership on every level, making elites and unskilled labor invisible.

In the material of the nineteen-sixties a picture emerges: that of old elites and lower class people having vanished from post war Germany. A picture of post-war Germany is constituted, which gained the meaning of a factual

representation of this center as a predominant social structure at the core of power relations. In the nineteen-sixties, the educated and employed leader – manager – was explicitly marked off against the entrepreneur characterized by inheritance both, of capital, enterprise and a powerful corporate position. While employed leader and entrepreneur in the nineteen-sixties mediate a bipolar and hierarchical opposition, in the nineteen-eighties they merge. In the nineteen-eighties, the meanings of the manager were expanded and transferred on the emerging educated entrepreneurs successfully starting their own self-employment by founding an expanding enterprise.

Cattepoel had predicted, that this forthcoming united society would lead to the withering of the class-conscious blue-collar worker's Marxist ideology, since untrained blue-collar workers would be elevated into executive type of trained positions. In order to obtain this, Cattepoel pointed out that the thus elevated blue-collar worker would have to be as close to the grandeurs of the executive employee as possible, especially as it comes to giving titles of employed leadership to various degrees of training, experience and responsibilities. Thus, employed leadership-titles embraced both, foremen of minor working units, and managers in huge corporations, and everything in between. In Denmark, this theme is only marginally surfacing the media, and exclusively narrated as woman, when for example, housewives and 'office girls' are presented as woman who made a career or even as 'leaders'.

For the purpose of my argument, however, it is important to retain that the image of this society, centered around educational training and career, is a meaning constituted by the merging of blue-collar workers with white-collar workers – training being the binding agent filling the gap of the in-between. Blue-collar work on the one hand and leadership on the grounds of inheritance on the other hand vanish from the published centered images. At the same time, a differentiation, which extends a multitude of positions categorized as white-collar work, is gaining increasing importance. Cattepoel had explicated this development when stressing the importance of matching these developments by assigning titles and honors to blue collar worker positions formerly restricted to the designation of those of white-collar workers, thus changing the meaning of their jobs and positions and increasing their symbolic social status.

Educational training is established as means to break away from descent, either in terms of class, in terms of family or of feudal traditions. Equal chances qua educational training become one of the central themes of the nineteen-sixties and nineteen-seventies, centering training as a core meaning of democratization. Equal changes qua educational training, which materialized the will to accomplish, is a post-war fairy-tale built on the narrative of

modernity: the promise given to the individual subject to be able constantly to create her-/himself. The self-made-society is a society in permanent transition, and a transitional society between feudalism and modern marked economy.

The play of gender in the constitution of transitions in German and Danish postwar societies is one of the concerns of this paper. The comparative analysis of the engendering of transitions points at that gender itself is a transitional and thus a temporary category. The term 'to engender' is used here as an analytical concept and means 'to mediate with gender'. Inscribing key-transition points on gender achieves the effect of those points being the temporary entity or 'the being' of gender. This concept implicates an analytical decentralization of gender, leading to the question: If it does, when and where does gender emerge, and how does it mediate the patterns of leadership thoughts at play? Mediating with gender and as gender will be an integrated argumentation in this contribution.

Mediated leadership is a social practice embedded in the images of changing or transitional societies. Apart from gender, the categories of time and nation are further mediators. They all create a distance, which makes the simultaneity of coexisting conditions for success other than trained accomplishment invisible. Heredity and wealth are not only decentered, but no longer talked about in terms of successful career. Dichotomies like past/present or woman/man mediate the distance to traditions, which is crucial to the making of a German transition and a Danish continuity. Both images are centered around an intermediate class, but in their own ways. While the image of a modern Germany is centered around the middle by making elites/owners and under class/workers invisible, the focused image of Denmark is centered around community, seemingly embracing all classes and backgrounds without difference. In the Danish material, tradition continues to be a crucial, though secondary merit in the making of a meritocracy and therefore egalitarian Danish top elite.

2.1 A modern narrative

The modern narrative on social equality through educational training is known in both countries at the time. Educational training was the crucial tool and major device for social upwards mobility. The role, however, educational training did play for the continuity of the very top of industrial organizations and therefore in society, was positioned in a de-center and invisible in published discussions. Until the early nineteen-eighties, educational training in itself counted as an accomplishment in Germany. In the course of the nineteen-eighties, this meaning changed; it now was no longer a success-

guaranteeing device in itself, but turned into a mere precondition for getting access to the opportunity or the chance to get a successful career. In Denmark, training in terms of higher education was approached differently; it did not mean an accomplishment, but rather denoted a merit. This merit put achieved equal means to social elevation at the focus of attention. With regard to the reproduction of the top in industry and society, the merit of educational training only had a secondary and therefore minor impact. It is secondary to the merit of personal relations, like family ties or networks. Both, accomplishment in Germany, and merit in Denmark, legitimate leaders.

Those patterns continue into the nineteen-eighties. Here, changing chances on the labor market entail the necessity to keep up the modern narrative on entirely self-made careers and legitimating the limits of career possibilities. Until then, this major narrative on equal opportunity through education was held up by two main focuses. One of these focuses is a pattern already to be found in Cattepoel's speech; everything mediated as improvements of the future society was related to non upper-class people. In effect, transition was created and centered. The other major focus lies on employed leadership, meaning both, doing leadership (as opposed to being a borne leader in terms of either family descent or of personality), and leadership legitimated on the grounds of accomplishments like educational training (as opposed to heredity and ownership). Questions of capital ownership in enterprises and privileged family descent are not brought up when discussing these leaders as unbound and entirely self-made successful new career men. In Denmark, apart from a single piece in the style of a critique of capitalism, questions of capital ownership as connected to leadership do not surface at all.

These main focuses eclipse that education and training not only legitimate the new post-war leaders of not privileged descent; also not outspokenly, they also legitimate the access and the leadership of any manager in general, and this includes those of privileged descent and/or capital owners. While this is made explicit in the Danish material, where a tradition of influential and privileged family ties counted as a merit and even a primary one, it is totally excluded in the German material. Here, the exclusive focus on both, educational training as the access giving accomplishment or as a merit, and on leaders employment, creates a transitory society and delimitation to an illegitimate past. In Germany, this past is characterized by both ongoing capital and business ownership, the inheritance of leader positions, and by the continuity of feudal elites. This becomes quite literal when the fusion of business owner and leader in the same person means authoritarian 'lord of the manner' leadership styles of patriarchs, associated with feudal luxuries.

Accomplishment in terms of training, combined with employment, mediates the 'new leaders'. The relationship between both, inherited and employed leaders, not legitimate and legitimate leadership, authoritarian leadership and democratic co-work is organized by the systems of difference. Those bipolar hierarchical oppositions create clear boundaries and, by focusing on the positive poles, their exclusiveness. They organize an ambivalent relationship to a past and make continuities in the post- and cold war society unthinkable. Constitutive for the image of the society of the middle, the effects of these bi-polarizations are strengthened in the mediation with gender. As part of the centering of accomplishments, business owner- and leadership vanishes in the nineteen-sixties from the material, for then to re-emerge in the nineteen-eighties, however, with a slight change of focus. Focus shifts from business heirs towards educated business founders, legitimating the until then silenced unification of owner- and leadership. The new society is also created by another major focus, namely a focus on the career opportunities of those explicitly not being of privileged descent. Accomplishments like educational training became signs of successfully overcome backgrounds and thus signs of the meaninglessness of descent for the achievement of positions of power. This is repeated in the exclusion of every leader's social background from published debates. Combined with focus on achievements, the meaninglessness of family and class-descent for the assignment of positions of power is established. Powerful positions in industry emerge as independent of traditions, that is of any kind of historical continuity. This is an essential part of the general discourses on the successful transition and democratization of German post-war society.

In Denmark, those elements are not split up in heredity and accomplishment, but peacefully coexist as various kinds of merit. Continuity in terms of family lines or family traditions for the occupation of leader positions is not marginalized, but even merits its representative. Top leaders are double merited, when old family ties are combined with the modern merit of accomplishments, like training. Continuity in the shape of family lines of tradition is something worthy. Educational training, meaning social elevator both, in terms of society, and in terms of individual top leadership, unites both models for legitimate top careers. Highlighted in the media, it creates the image of a homogeneous and modern society of equals. Trained blue-collar workers gained new meanings when disappearing into depictions of white-collar employees and managing executives of various kinds. Broader access to higher education added to the forming of a center, when it became the sign of a legitimate, broad and inclusive elite, resembling both, the people and the elite, and expanding the elitist touch of university in the stories on the

masses transformed into elites with the help of enlightening university education. This center replaces the notion of elites as old and exclusive, elites primarily by the virtue of descent alone, in the oblivion of invisibility and forgetfulness.

In the Danish sources, not employed leaders, but employees are centered, employees including leaders at various levels. In the nineteen-seventies, employed leaders, directors included, are being enunciated co-workers and wage-earners. However, focus does not shift away from the old elites. Rather, they are integrated into collective categories. Privileged family descent means an inherited family tradition of serving society well. As such, it is a primary and exclusive merit, not obtainable for everyone, differentiating the collectives like the merit of education. Educational training doubles the merit of these descendants from family traditions; they are exclusively inscribed on man. Thus, a continuity of elite signified as patriarchy is told as a national or organizational unity of equal wage earning, educated or trained people. Set up as binaries, employment explicitly combined with either double merit or simple accomplishment, legitimates (top-)leaders in respectively Denmark and Germany. What makes the difference is the centering and de-centering of family ties as either primary merit, or illegitimate continuity for positions of social power, illegitimate because of connecting society to an unwanted past.

2.2 The demarcation with gender

The demarcation with gender, however, goes along slightly different lines. In the German sources there is an explicit distinction made between leaders, their co-workers and a mass of the people. Though they all have in common that accomplishment legitimates their positions and their living standards, they are distinguished by the degree of their risks and responsibilities. Personal fortunes of individuals in positions of power are hardly mentioned in either country; the presentation as salaried employees is an uniting aspect, which, however, is of minor importance in the German sources. In the years to come, in Denmark the image of a merited communitarian society of wage earners was created. Wage earning, set up as common denominator, became the symbol of egalitarian equality. This makes it hard to point at the lack of equal pay for equal work. In Germany, the image of the accomplished and centered society mediated unity; the effect is the achievement of equality by uplifting everyone into elite and luxury. In the German sources, unity is mediated by losing sight of the differing preconditions for accomplishments and among trained and educated employed leaders. In Denmark, this effect is obtained by making favorable conditions prior to education and employ-

ment a sign of a special merit. In the Danish material, merit explicitly legitimates and thus confirms the continuity of old elites in an egalitarian language of collective categories.

In Germany of the nineteen-sixties, the entrepreneur especially of family enterprises turns into the modeling image of an unwanted past without legitimacy for continuing existence in post war Germany. Uniting the ownership and leadership of an enterprise in one person, the entrepreneur of typically small and medium scale enterprises becomes the symbol of both, elite positions by virtue of birth, authoritarian leadership styles, and the leader type of the absolutist patriarch: all signs of outmoded and illegitimate leadership. Family thus signals continuity from a past, tight ties, bonds and therefore an unwanted and illegitimate continuity. Family owned enterprises, that is often small or medium sized enterprises, became the modeling image of all that which was to be left behind. Vanishing from the material from the middle of the nineteen-sixties, they are re-centered when they continue to be mediated as woman-specific ways of accomplishing a career and doing leadership at the top of an enterprise.

The negative meanings of family as a symbol for unwanted continuity became quite literal when family turned into explicit barriers for the career mobility of young men promising to enter the ranks of the successful new self-made-man. They are mediated in stories on young men who have not yet reached the potential top of their careers, putting their career opportunities at risk by an early marriage. Early means before they have reached the top of their career. Embodied in man, family and top career become mutually exclusive before this family-owned leadership was exclusively embodied in woman. Actually, being stationary is a negative trait in a society defined by transition and change. Being settled even presents a patriarchal trait exclusively handed down from grandmother to mother and to daughter. But family ties as opposed to the new successful self-made-man is nothing but an image of a society divided between continuity and the independence of its history. Thus, woman symbolizes the embodied endangerment of the new society, wife the embodied endangerment of the new man. The purchase of homesteads early in their career lives is another barrier. Mobility places transition, independence and the overcoming of connections to the past in terms of descent in geography and physical space. Its opposite, embodied in an immobile homestead inhabited by a woman, literally turns into chains when related to the new man. These themes are not to be found in the Danish material of the nineteen-sixties.

Independence became a characteristic trait of the new man. Until the early nineteen-eighties, every trained and educated body turned into self-

made-managers of their lives and in their jobs, holding the dignities of accomplished leadership and participating in corporate decision-making processes on various levels and degrees of responsibilities. The exclusive focus turned upon them strengthens the image of middle management as a successfully accomplished top career. Middle management thus placed at the center of success, the self-made-man's top career stands out as the very top of career, success and society. When the ceilings between class differences in success as well as between middle and top management enter the surface of explicitness in the nineteen-eighties, top leadership and the limitations of educational training become acknowledged. It is only then that middle manager positions eventually begin to mediate a corporate top career of woman.

In Germany, the educated generalist and top-leader of at the least large-scale enterprises vanished from the general picture from the mid nineteen-sixties and left the published space for the trained expert and specialist until the beginning of the nineteen-eighties. There, the regained visibility of the educated generalist has his revival, placing the trained managers on the middle level as explicit experts, dependants lacking a disposition for risk-taking, and subordinates. The generalist reemerges as the one at the very top. Once centered, employed middle managers now stand out as a glut of an affluent mass. The replacement of managers in the middle or at the margins of corporations is narrated as a lacking ability to compete. If engendered, this lack is inscribed on woman. Again, gender is placed successfully at the center for explanation. It legitimates the limitations of trained social mobility as well as the limitations of success – not to be able to make it to the very top of society – in 'being'. Accordingly, independence gained new meanings: autonomy from social security systems, bosses and dependant employment are now to be found in business foundations. Engendered, business foundation in the nineteen-eighties is narrated as women's opportunity for emancipation from patriarchal society, that is to gain independence and economic autonomy from men: bosses and husbands. The exemption from patriarchy, in the nineteen-sixties still a theme of national importance, is in the nineteen-eighties re-inscribed on woman and told as women's way into both, total independence and top management. In the Danish material, in the same period, an eye-catching number of 'women directors' emerge on the surface. The mere quantity mediates progress and successful emancipation of a gender into the powerful top of industry and society; all of them, however, turn out to be one-woman operations.

The processes of centering and de-centering denote not only categories of leadership, but also of gender. Engendering is a central means for the mediation of social progress and change. If engendered, the most valued career

paths and leader positions are in both countries always and exclusively embodied in man. Man signifies what at different times and within specific contexts is at the center of societal self-understanding and self-definition. The embodying of these changing focuses in man is a cultural activity, which in two movements establishes both, managers as valuable symbols for worthiness and therefore for legitimate social recognition, status and personal position, and man as their modeling image. Accordingly, the manager embodies legitimacy, democracy, independence, self-made etc., becoming the modeling image of the successful new man.

Strikingly, the successful self-made-man continues to be faceless, a non-person without a name. In Germany, this is also true for the generalists and for top leaders. Quite opposed to that, in Denmark, explicit focus is directed towards individual leaders merited by family traditions of serving society, by training and by results right from the beginning of the time period for this investigation. Already in 1961 there was an entire series in favor of the 'Men at the top'.⁷ Continuity in terms of merit in the Danish material is both, an openly expressed barrier for the new man, and a cherished value at the center of society, while it in Germany is devalued, de-centered, silenced, inscribed on woman or mediated as non-existing until the nineteen-eighties. The central role given to industry and economy in the German material right from the nineteen-sixties is due to the illegitimacy of political leadership and a declared lack of key positions in post-war society. From this emerges a lack due to the de-centering of any historical continuity, and the constitution of industry and economic leadership as the legitimate key positions in society. One mode of narration is the story of a changing character of legitimate leadership within enterprises. The 'concrete ceiling' (Cattepoel) of inheritance forms in the early nineteen-sixties a metaphor for the barrier to the uprising trained and therefore legitimate self-made-leaders, that is heirs to the business and the respective leader positions at the top of the enterprise. What is claimed to be the achievements of the old leaderships – the reconstruction of German economy and enterprises after the war – is overcome by the centering on the accomplishment of educational training, legitimating business leadership. Thus, not only the modern discourses of enlightenment and the victory of a certain kind of scientific rationality are at play, but also the modern discourse on the individual's emancipation from gender, class or family background, mediated in the centering on successful self-made-man. Respectively, and following Adorno's attempt of outlining leader types, bossy lord of the manor leadership styles are considered to be out-timed by more democratic and co-operative styles adjusted to the centered society,

⁷ Series: Mænd i toppen. Vendsyssel Tidende, 1961.

which integrates economic leaders and the new key positions in post-war society.

The cultural practice of engendering, of inscribing leader on gender and gender on leader, contributes to the notion of break in the German material. So does the fact that political, military and intellectual elites are not part of the centered society, on the contrary. In Germany of the early nineteen-sixties, these traditional elites are explicitly said not to have any legitimacy left. Legitimated not by resurrection, but by the *Wirtschaftswunder* mediated as societal accomplishment, the industry not only mediates a new, democratic and legitimate leadership of society – the only legitimate leadership said to be left. They are also explicitly to fill in this vacuum of political leadership, which is to take on responsibility for the establishment of a free social market economy and thus the molding of a new society built on competing accomplishments. Industry, not politics is to be the most important sector responsible for society as a whole. Such needs and developments were not expressed in the Danish materials in the same way.

Here, politics and military experiences are not de-centered, the unification of public and industrial interests with heredity do not illegitimate, but merit leaders. This might serve as an explanation for why the one and only woman leader visible in the Danish material – Dagmar Andreassen – in the nineteen-sixties gets at the center of published interests, namely at the time when she is elected MP to the *Folketing*. This may be explained by the fact that the intertwining of politics and industry is not only not silenced, as is the case in the German material, but even signifies a special credit distinguishing top from other leaders. Moreover, the story on her success and expansion of an agrarian family enterprise into industry tells the story of the transition of Danish society from an agrarian to a manufacturing, but not an industrial society. She has no published attention when she transforms the family owned enterprise into an industrial corporation with a board. Though embodying the merit of family tradition in terms of both parents being successful entrepreneurs independently of each other, she is lacking the accomplishment of educational training. However, being a politician, too, she is double, yet traditionally merited, not embodying the ingredients of the modern self-made-leader, despite the fact that she expanded a small manufacture and enterprise into a huge industrialized company.

As in the German material, the categorization woman serves to create transition, either embodying what is de-centered and left behind, or what does not fit into the narrative on progressing societies. The lack of success (despite accomplishments) is centered in being, inscribed on woman as a sex and as a gender. Success, on the other hand, is centered in doing and engen-

dered with man. Thus, doing is inscribed on men as a sex and as a gender. Woman is an indicator for what is to be considered as left behind, of what is contextually de-centered and therefore either is non-existent, out-dated or illegitimate. In the German material, woman exists right from the beginning and throughout the period of my investigation. Until the nineteen-eighties, woman almost exclusively is perceived as related to the leadership of family owned enterprises, including the luxury of old and the wealth of new family fortunes. Heredity and exceptional wealth is inscribed on woman; the effect is that heredity counts as woman-specific and woman-only access to business leadership: first, exclusively as inheritance of business owner- and leadership, later on as well as the psychological or social inheritance of specific traits – both bequest from man.

The self-made-leadership of industry embodies the virtues of the *Leistungsgesellschaft*, the performance oriented society, directed towards achievement. Exclusively inscribed on man, man appears to be the gender at the center of the new society. Self-made-leader accordingly embodies the opposite to old elites, their fortunes and societal structures, literally pictured as feudal left-over. Danish patterns of thinking industrial leadership are characterized not only by continuity of merit. In Denmark, industrial leadership was hardly a subject of published critical discussions in the nineteen-sixties.⁸ Moreover, neither the legitimacy of leaders and leadership, nor the continuity of old elites were problematic. As opposed to the German material, neither is the linkage between industrial and political or other forms for public leadership a problem in need for neither discussion nor legitimatization. Only one Danish source does mention at all the new self-made men. Different from Germany before the nineteen-eighties, the Danish published sources openly address these men's troubles with entering the old elites, not even in the late nineteen-sixties interrupting continuity of elite families in powerful positions. In the German material, the 'concrete-ceiling' is exclusively enunciated in relation to family owned enterprises, thus stressing the symbolic value of family as linkage, limitation and unwanted relation to the past. Thus, family owned enterprises become the symbol for being not modern. In 1987, this pattern is confirmed by a published analysis on the recruitment to powerful positions in Danish society.⁹ In the German sources, the limitations of career prospects despite performed accomplishments and

⁸ Compared amount of published newspaper articles. Germany 1960–1972: 111/67 in the 1960s and 44 between 1970 and 1972. Denmark: 1960–1974: 61/34 between 1960 and 1969, 27 between 1970 and 1974.

⁹ Mogens Nygaard Christoffersen, *Magtens mænd – om rekrutteringen til magtfulde poster*, in: *Samfundsøkonomen*, no. 5 (1987), pp. 4-9.

the willingness to take on responsibilities outside family owned businesses was not explicitly acknowledged before the first half of the nineteen-eighties. A World-War II kind of past is neither existent in the German nor in the Danish sources. 'Past' is reduced to the First World War and the 'feudal' times before then.

3 Cultural versus Historical Comparison

Compared across decades, Cattepoel's implicit distinction between borne and designated leaders equals the distinction between *Bildung* (education) with its connotations of breeding, upbringing, ways of behaving, and *Ausbildung* (training). Training is less deep and enfolding, stays on the surface, and basically means education with a certain predefined purpose. Education, on the other hand, signals lines of tradition and a general direction. This distinction is parallel to the distinction between manager and leader or management and leadership. It is mediated in the difference between the generalist and the specialized expert. In the nineteen-eighties, it becomes apparent that this distinction is analogue to the middle manager and the top director. This difference surfaces in the German material in the nineteen-eighties.

Investigating across decades, nations and categories apparently very far apart from each other, the generalist and the specialist parallels the earlier distinctions between the borne leader and socialized leader behavior, between traits and training, between descent or family inheritance and accomplishment, between talent and education, between woman and man, between past and present, between continuity and a break with the past, between single and double merit. All those binaries are contextual metamorphoses of the basic modern dichotomy nature versus culture, body versus mind, constituted by the clash of discourses which becomes visible in the change of hegemonic perceptions of societal barriers: ceilings, in the nineteen-sixties made of concrete, in the nineteen-eighties made of glass. Metaphors for barriers towards action, they make the schism of modernity visible. Despite the ideologies of equality and education for every body, performance is not enough to overcome being – who and what every body is. The past lives in the presence of the material, that feminine leadership and woman leader – embody what is devalued and counts as outmoded. As a consequence, if the analysis is not organized along well-established divides like decades, it turns out that masculinities parallel femininities. This re-gendering suggests that there is original content neither may be designated to only one of the two genders, nor to the decades explored or the nations compared.

The goal of this comparison is neither to trace down empirical differences between the developments of nations, times or genders, nor to analyze the

causes for their differing origins. Origins being an effect, the goal of cultural comparison rather is to assemble what it is that has been split apart by categories organized as both, hierarchies and dichotomies. 'Discursive knowledge' does not know of spatial or temporary frontiers or various sites of knowledge production, like different media houses.¹⁰ Comparisons on the level of cultural theories are always genuine comparisons. Nation and chronology are only analytical tools for organizing the source material and as such not causal, but secondary to the questions at stake. The crisscrossing search for parallelisms reveals a line of silenced continuity in the German material, which actually matches the outspokenly cherished continuities in the Danish one. This line of continuity is the one of unchangeable, social or biological, traits, either inscribed to gender, or to various categories of leader, in terms of heredity. The match of a double or additional nature, that is that of man and top leader, is an effect brought forward in discursive language use. The concepts of the top leader are either molded as the borne leader with traits prior to and therefore independent of accomplishments, or as merited family descent, or as 'being' in terms of vocation, the social and 'doing'-oriented version of which is the non-stop work for 24 hours a day. All three concepts signify and legitimate the chosen few; when hegemonic, they are embodied in man alone. The effect of a gendered nature establishes a line of legitimate continuity, which coexists in both countries, though it is of larger importance in Germany than in Denmark. This is due to difference in language use, that is collective versus polarized categories in respectively Denmark and Germany.

While the use of collective expressions creates hegemony and equality, polarized language use achieves major divides. The open discussions of leader specific traits vanished in the second half of the nineteen-sixties from the German material, they returned in the nineteen-eighties shaped as talent. The discourses of meritocracy, governing those of borne elites, clash at that time. The will to take risks now openly divides those educated and willing to achieve from those successfully entering top leadership. Thus, paid employment, highly trained employees metamorphosed into social dependant masses with no disposition for risk-taking. There lack of top success is therefore legitimized as a lack of being, of not being able to compete successfully. Risk-taking, however, has been a designated leader trait right since the upcoming of leader theories in the 19th century.

In the nineteen-eighties, the center of society moved; employed leaders turn into dependent employees, dependency means social dependency in terms of a monthly salary, pension and unemployment benefits. As such,

¹⁰ Rittenhofer, Aftermath (note 6).

they are opposed to a lack of autonomy, a willingness to take risks, and social and economic independence. The nineteen-eighties are the decade where the image of the centered German society is disintegrated. The highly trained signified as successful elites metamorphose into academic masses, symbolizing a luxury surplus. Symbolizing luxury, the possibility emerges for criticizing public higher education for not being a social benefit, thus not legitimately being funded by a strained welfare system. The stories on limited corporate success are not only told as woman, but are the general tone in the nineteen-eighties, when higher education loses its status as a key to a successful career and instead turns into a precondition to a career access position. The trait of talent is explicitly reintroduced when highly educated people gain the status of masses dependently employed; the heritable possession and social position metamorphosed into the inheritable talent, legitimating the top success of the few in a meritocracy despite the accomplishments of the many. Closed elites openly emerge on the published scene once again, this time not limited to family owned enterprises.¹¹ Unequal preconditions due to descent in terms of family, class and gender reenter the stage; talent, what people are, or the lack of the same divides the trained into those with legitimately successful and unsuccessful careers. In the nineteen-eighties, higher educational training turns into an outspoken career possibility for especially women at a point of time, when it no longer counts as neither sufficient preconditions nor a guarantee for a successful career into a leadership or top leader position. Higher education, in the nineteen-sixties still a means to escape family descent and class ties, is in the nineteen-seventies and nineteen-eighties denounced as mass education. In the nineteen-eighties, it surfaced as a newly discovered means for woman to overcome her gender and to enter into a successful career. This new inscription on career woman is made at a time when formal qualifications decrease from guarantee of a successful career to the ticket for at best a career start position.

The trait 'talent' turns into the explicit legitimacy for the limits or possibilities of a career despite of accomplishments and the will to achieve. This, too, indicates that leader conceptions rooted in 19th century leader theories still have influence in post war Europe. The basic concept is that there exist certain traits, which distinguish a leader from the bulk of most other fellow persons. This development is actually similar to the conceptions of sex or gender, gender based on the limitations of sex, a fact usually overlooked when research in gender and leadership is done. Besides mass, woman, too, signifies the limitations of corporate careers of highly trained people. Since hierarchies in society in the Danish material are incorporated into collective

¹¹ Rittenhofer, *Diskurs und Konstruktion* (note 3).

categories like merit, the clear-cut polarizations between mass and elite are not in operation here. Merit, however, in terms of family line, transports the concept of exclusive and exclusionary traits. Gender is, with the exception of Dagmar Andreason at play from the late nineteen-seventies and increasingly throughout the nineteen-eighties. This is a change in the application of another system of difference. These phenomena are shifts in explicit published focus and such of cultural lenses, and as such indicators of changing social conditions demanding new legitimacies. As thus, they coexist in both set of materials and in the respective decades.

The general believes in the blessings of meritocracy, of every man willing to achieve also being able to make a career, were in the nineteen-eighties openly countered. Talent, as does woman, directs meanings towards unchangeable traits written into the body and creates limitations of success despite public education programs, gender equality laws and other means supporting an understanding of societies centered round the belief in educational meritocracy of measurable qualifications. In Germany, talent reintroduces traits as legitimate limitations for degrees of success, openly differentiating the highly trained and not by name, but by virtue introducing a legitimating system on the surface of the Danish material throughout the period of investigation. They now legitimate the limitations of social change with regard to elite positions despite accomplishments. These beliefs may go on and may not be challenged, since aspects for social inequality and limited social change are rooted in the essences of those at question. This continuity or reminiscence of 'old times', said to be left behind in the dark ages of elitist class society, is blurred by metamorphoses of the systems of difference and changing meanings.

From the first half of the nineteen-eighties woman and talent, gender and leader forth drive a theme earlier openly discussed in the nineteen-sixties. That top-elites are out of published German focus for two decades is constitutive for that both, the new class performing the middle, and corporate middle management, may perform the new elite, creating the effect of a top. Middle management positions being the highest leader positions visible until the early nineteen-eighties, these positions became important as symbols for the achievement of the new man's top-career, for top-management, thus constituting the new and democratic elites and a totally new society. The refocusing on those on the very top in the first half of the nineteen-eighties causes the effect of an apparent replacement of the new man in changed career possibilities now openly acknowledged as limited. Thus, it is in the nineteen-eighties when woman in both countries visibly emerges on the published corporate scene; woman is a the metaphor or symbol for being gradu-

ally less, and for a gradually less (like talented) being. As such, the modern schism between doing and being appears in various forms or embodiments, among them those top-leader/manager, man/woman.

4 EnGender: Indicator of change and origin

When in both countries in the nineteen-eighties woman visibly emerge on the published corporate scene, they engender barriers known as the 'glass-ceiling'. The 'glass-ceiling' is today widely known as a problem specific for woman as a gender and located in her gendered being. However, as this analysis indicates, apparently gender specific findings are not exclusive for gender. Therefore, I suggest to define explicit 'gender' as a nexus. Those finding should not be referred to as a characteristic of neither woman nor man.

The reconfigurations of both, privileges, criteria for success, and of criteria for legitimate leadership in the nineteen-sixties and then again in the nineteen-eighties, are mediated by their re-engendering, and thus an achieved effect. In Germany, right from the beginning of the time period for my investigation, women in business or industrial leadership positions get published attention, though slightly differing from that of their male counterparts. While the new self-made man is a corporate man, corporate woman is not visible before the nineteen-eighties, where she embodies the lacks of competitiveness, success and independence of the by then devalued self-made-managers. Looking at gender as the nexus of patterns of thought, considering the variety of aspects constitutive for the leadership debates, the question is what it is that is embodied in narratives on woman.

What is it that is told as a woman's specific way of being or of doing career or leadership? It is remarkable that the heredity of positions of power, in the nineteen-sixties demonized as symbol of a not legitimate continuity of a past, is the only access to leadership visiblized as woman in that decade: the image of woman, heir, business owner and leader in one and the same person. One reason for that woman in leadership positions do enjoy published attention in Germany at that time is, that they in 1954 became the organized members of an international lobby organization for women entrepreneurs. Woman managers do not have a lobby in the nineteen-sixties. A further factor is the constitutionally guaranteed equality of woman and man in Germany, which is not achieved in Denmark until today. This explains why there is a vast amount of pieces on this group of leaders in Germany right

from the nineteen-sixties, but not how the theme of woman and leadership is dealt with or what kind of knowledge it is that is put forward that way.¹²

Social dependency, in the nineteen-sixties meaning heredity as opposed to meritocracy, is in the nineteen-eighties transferred to dependant employment. The ownership and leadership of businesses and enterprises, mainly as a result of family tradition and heredity, emerges as being the exclusive path for a woman successfully heading towards leadership positions during the nineteen-sixties and nineteen-seventies. It is not, however, woman's success, as opposed to men's success, but different nexuses of gender, which are at play. If we take a look at where woman and man surface exclusively, woman is the nexus of what is less valuable or prestigious, man is the other. Thus, there is a change from man to woman, achieving the effect that woman always is one step behind men, that gender destiny is reversed. This effect is repeated by not surfacing woman in respective most prestigious top positions. As such, gender functions as a boundary in exactly the same way as the differentiation of time into present and past.

A surface different to the Danish material, reverse gender creates a boundary between education and socially privileged descent. A gender effect is the clear separation of both, political and economical positions of power, and of social privileges and accomplishments as means of a successful career. Woman not only appears to be lacking the virtues of industrial and democratic post-war societies, which highlights are modeled in the image of man. Woman becomes the symbol of forever being a back number, of always being one step behind. In the nineteen-nineties, this aspect has become a self-evident truth, as the still widely used term 'the glass-ceiling' does indicate. It's widely overlooked, that this terms has it's roots back in the nineteen-sixties, when dependency turned into a gender specific trait for success and the concrete ceilings of family succession into a gender specific protection against competition, at a time when leader traits or "being leader" versus "doing leader" and accomplishing a career stamp the published debates on leadership. Remains of this engendered tale are in the nineteen-eighties the need of a supporting husband in order to be able to accomplish a career, or the need of being a daughter in order to make it into successful leadership. Accomplishment, independence and the ability to make it to the top by them selves are inscribed on and embodied in man. The concrete ceiling of the nineteen-sixties and the glass ceiling of the nineteen-eighties illustrate the change in focus from relationships to educational training as access giving

¹² Compared amount of newspaper articles on women in leader positions. Germany: 1960–1970:67. Denmark: 1960–1970:46, the majority of them are written on Dagmar Andreassen. 1977–1989:188/31 between 1977–1979.

devices, the change in focus from society as a whole to woman in particular, solving the clash between discourses on equal opportunities qua education and those on personal relations privileging the chosen few by locating it in the achieved differences of two genders. It is this clash, which demarcates the publishable space in which leadership-careers and their genders are achieved.

Dependency as a parameter of woman's success into leadership is embodied in quite a number of features. In the nineteen-sixties, it is embodied in family heredity. In the nineteen-eighties, the social has won over the heritable when successful woman's dependency is seen as a social relation, that is in terms of special corporate or public measurements, meeting woman's published needs for support in order to be able – as a gender – to accomplish a career. Interestingly, the accomplishment of a career counts itself as major success, if it is related to woman. Therefore, the nineteen-eighties revival of the boss and business owner in the shape of a founder of small or medium scale enterprises also is mediated as a women-specific way of gaining autonomy from patriarchy, that is either from (male) bosses sabotaging their career success, or from economic dependency in terms of a patriarchal structured society. The enlightening tale is that of being your own boss, either in terms of independence from man, or in terms of social independence, of not being a client of social securities offered by employment.

In both countries, woman becomes the published modeling image of the educated and trained founders of small businesses, which do not expand. This is mediated in different ways in respectively the German and the Danish material. In the Danish material, stories on woman general directors emerge in the nineteen-eighties, suggesting progress as the equal opportunities scene expands into top leadership of private industry. However, while the woman top directors embody the leadership of one-woman businesses, the general managers of corporate enterprises are embodied in man. This is yet another example which illustrates that categories like general manager are collective categories in the Danish material, while it is an exclusive category in the German material. Thus, in the Danish material gender is used to establish and to legitimate collective differentiations and hierarchies within the same, while it serves in Germany to deepen and to legitimate polarizations and hierarchies.

Looking for patterns across decades, and differentiating between what is told with gender, that is the contextual multi-relations in the nexus woman or man, and what is told as gender, that is as gender-specific, a pattern emerges which brings forward a story different from the master narratives on realized emancipation or equal opportunities. With talents, traits are reintroduced in

order to explicitly legitimate what now is openly acknowledged, namely that not everybody who is highly trained also automatically has a successful top career. Said in other words, that despite educational training, the top leadership positions are always restricted to the chosen few. And the top leaders are reemerging, depriving the educated broad middle of managers their touch of top elitism. The re-entrance of an elite on the published scene is re-mitting them into masses, thus explicitly reintroducing the modern theme of the outstanding few silhouetting against a bulk. The top leaders are created as the providers of both, their employees and society. Thus, dependency equals the corporate employees and managers with the masses, transforming them from employed leaders into dependants not taking social risks. Patriarchy, then, is not about male power over women; before the New Women's Movement turned patriarchy into an inherent male characteristic, certain hierarchy structures in feudal societies and in enterprises and a certain authoritarian leadership style were discussed under this name. It too has its female counterpart, when for example the styles of woman entrepreneurs mediated as being authoritarian are discussed as "matriarchal" or motherly leadership of childlike co-workers.

In Denmark, the fiction of the enlightening truth is that of a successful collective equalization. A variety of degrees are embodied in gender, thus clearly held apart, legitimated and frozen. While the unsuccessful equalization of those of differently merited origins first was a theme embodied in class and man, equalization turns successful when narrated as the theme of gender, embodied in the story of woman top leader in the nineteen-eighties. Traits are reintroduced, too and legitimate the top leader, yet in a way different from the German material. They emerge in the shape of womanly and manly traits to be combined in the collective category of the holistic leader. The holistic leader is a concept made famous in a Danish context by the former SAS top leader Jan Carlzon in 1985. However, the holistic leader is embodied in man, making the so-called manly traits the primary and essential ones, the womanly ones secondary and supplemental. This pattern also emerges in the competing top leader, modeled by the general manager and embodied in man, cooperating with a team of directors. Team-members are inscribed on both genders. The team tasks embodied in woman match the so-called womanly traits, regarded as useful, but neither necessary nor sufficient for leading entire enterprises. In 1989, at the end of the period of my investigation, both models for top leadership were still competing.

Not family and class, but massed and sexed mediations offer in the nineteen-eighties the body once again as natural origin of unequal opportunities and reintroduces unequal preconditions for career and success. While the

“will to accomplish” was the mantra guaranteeing every body’s success from the nineteen-sixties, by the nineteen-eighties unchangeable limits reappeared in the guise of not trainable traits to individual subject’s success when trying to climb the corporate ladders, despite the access-giving possession of educational training. Silenced ambivalences were thus given a natural explanation. The reintroducing of the modern body by talent turns the highly educated, even if a minority in numbers, into a mass. This not only displaces education as means of social equality. It also has the effect of a pre-social barrier to social measurements, however, preferably told as woman. This is quite apparent in the emerging theme of family business leadership as emancipation of women from economy and patriarchal dependencies in the nineteen-eighties is constitutive for both, the notion of the successful emancipation from class differences through equal access to society’s elites qua education, and the notion of the natural individual limitations for the access to those elites despite education. My readings not only suggest that despite all promises it is not educational training, which ever decided on the professional successes of a life time. Rather, educational training appears to be a mere addition, a supplement, but not a necessity. In this regard, a cultural comparative history of leadership debates is a study of how this fact was given quite opposite meanings for almost two decades.

5 Comparative Remarks

Engendering as a cultural policy did not occur on the same scale in the Danish and in the German debates. Apart for the reasons already mentioned one reason for that certainly is that the categories of equality characterizing the Danish mediations of leadership neatly fit the absence of expounding in depth the problems of elites in Danish societies, whether of economical or of intellectual elites.¹³

However, when interpreting these facts, three important observations have to be taken into account. First, the legitimacy of leadership, access to and the composition of the leader community, as well as the interweaving of politics and private industry is as compared to the German material neither in quality nor in quantity an important subject for published discussion in the Denmark of the nineteen-sixties at all. Quite the contrary, merited top leaders in the Danish material all have merit in some type of public, sometimes political office. That there is only one woman in a leader position visible in Denmark in the nineteen-sixties, has to be seen in relation to this – business

¹³ I found similar patterns in the mediation of intellectual or economical elites in Denmark between 1970–1990.

leaders in general do not appear on the published scene. This also explains that Dagmar Andreassen and her factory only got published attention at the time where she had become a member of the Danish Parliament and thus a figure of published attention. This comparison on the nominal and thematic phenomenology of gender also indicates that gendered interpretations do appear due to certain contexts; they are neither at play constantly, nor are they central to the mediation of all subjects of business leadership. The more extensive material on women and leadership in Germany has several causes. One of them is most certainly the constitutional guarantee of the equality of women and men, the other the Association of Women Entrepreneurs, founded in 1954, which launched public and published attention towards women in leadership positions. Third, while the legitimacy of leadership in general and of business owner leadership in particular is a subject of major discussion in Germany already in the nineteen-sixties, this is not the case in Denmark at all. Neither is the structure of and the access to the leadership group a subject in Denmark in the nineteen-sixties; there is but one single piece of text discussing the composition of Danish business and industrial elites. In other words, while these themes are widely discussed and extensively engendered in the German material right from the beginning of the period of my investigation, they are hardly discussed and hardly engendered in the Danish material before the late nineteen-seventies and early nineteen-eighties. In Denmark, gender emerges comparatively late on the published scene, since there has not been the need to create the enlightening fiction of a new society and therefore not the same need for symbolic boundaries.

Mediated leadership is part of a discursive formation designating the modern. The discourse of the modern subject, this ambivalent and ambiguous 'discourse of the modern human being', that is "the image of an individual who creates h/er/im self"[my translation], is inscribed on man and creates among others the 'independent new man' of the German sources.¹⁴ This discourse competes against other understandings of humans and creates the published worlds with language. Gender is one nexus, pointing to the coexistence of symbolic demarcations of places in society, and a deterministic body. Leader is another nexus, as the coexistence of concepts of heredity and inheritance do show. In other words, the modern subject is in this context told as both, the fiction of the respective top leader, and the fiction of man. In this, a pre-modern way of designating orders of precedence is at play. It is the coexistence or combination with the modern 'two-sex model' of different

¹⁴ The quote is from Magnus Berg "Ikke uden min datter". Analyse af populær-orientalisme i vestlige medier, in: Kvinder, Køn & Forskning, vol. 9, no. 3 (2000), p. 12.

natural bodies and sexes that leader is embodied in man and the hegemonic tales on business leadership are told as those of men. At various social occasions, these embodiments may be, if I here follow Judith Butler, 'inscribed on the surface of bodies', societies or organizations. But they are read as male being and in effect legitimating choices and orders. However, my readings suggest that this double feature or coexistence of modern and pre-modern understandings is neither specific nor limited to the double understanding of sex and gender; it also is to be found in other categories like for instance descent or social class, leader or manager.¹⁵ In this, those categories serve as signifiers of the modern subject.

The self-made-career, on the other hand, either in terms of the employed leader employing democratic and co-working leadership styles, or in terms of the self-employed founder of a successfully expanding enterprise, is the image of the modern subject not hold back by, to follow Berg, either "traditions, God, class background", authoritarian bosses or other circumstances subjecting the individual despite its own will.¹⁶ Gender is one means to split off aspects of society not recognizable in a respective context. And gender, as is 'the (born or talented) leader', is a way of re-introducing non-social limitations, the body. As Lyotard has pointed out, modernity and its values never really came true. The fiction of those modern societies investigated in this chapter centers round the space created by the conflicting modern and pre-modern elements, linked by nexuses like gender or the augmented concept of leader.

As social structures and the systems of modern organizations indicate, published discourses and publicly available discourses might differ in degree, but not in kind.¹⁷ The open acknowledgement of bias in contemporary post war societies, here the Northern European Denmark and the Western European Germany, and their organizations, was no longer opportune. The clash of discourses in the 1980s once again added gender to the surface of organizational careers. As double metaphor, gender legitimately links both,

¹⁵ I quote Magnus Berg, "Ikke uden min datter" (note 12), p. 13.

¹⁶ Gareth Morgan makes a strong case for the idea that organization always has been class -based. Morgan suggests that the first types of formal organizations arose in hierarchical societies. Both formed "an intermediate class of people between the ruling class and the peasants or slaves involved in the actual production of goods. We find the same system reproduced in modern organization in terms of the distinctions between owners, managers, and workers." Gareth Morgan, *Images of Organization*, Thousand Oaks, Calif. 1997, pp. 308-309.

¹⁷ Thomas Laqueur, *Making Sex. Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud*, Cambridge, Mass. 1990; Genevieve Lloyd, *The Man of Reason. 'Male' and 'Female' in Western Philosophy*, London 1984.

hierarchies and continuing pre-given biases in a European world clinging to the belief in unbiased new societies and equal opportunities.

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Gender and the Discursive Construction of the State: Comparisons on Finland and Britain, 1960s to 1990s

Introduction

There is a considerable amount of feminist theorising on state and gender to date. Traditional categorisations of the feminist understandings of the state tend to reduce feminist strategies in dealing with the state into two: either integration (inside the state) or autonomy (outside the state). In particular, feminist academics have focused on the impact that states have on women, gender and gender relations.¹ There is less theorising, however, on the question of how feminist understandings of the state shape feminist engagements with the state, which in turn impact on the state and shape gender relations. The aim of this article is to analyse how dominant feminist discourses about the state shape women's engagements with it. In particular, the goal is to challenge the dichotomy between the strategies of working within or outside of the state.

The article is a comparative study of Finland and Britain.² Finland represents the Nordic tradition of a woman-friendly welfare state, while Britain is a more liberal, top-down democracy. Nordic feminist understandings of the state have been dominant in Finland and the state is viewed in positive terms as a woman-friendly welfare state. In Britain, in contrast, radical and Marxist feminist ideas have been more influential and the impact of the state has been understood as negative. There is a tendency in the comparative feminist literature to represent these two cases stereotypically. At the same time as this article challenges the dichotomy between in and out of the state, it also questions the stereotypical portrayals of Finland and Britain.

In order to show dominant discourses at work, the article analyses one important feminist debate in each country. The two debates stem from the two different contexts. Whilst childcare was a key concern for Finnish feminists in the 1970s, violence against women was an important issue for feminists in Britain. The choice of the debates shows how both feminist dis-

1 Nira Yuval-Davis/Floya Anthias (eds.), *Woman – Nation – State*, London 1989; Diane Sainsbury, *Gender, Equality and the Welfare State*, Cambridge 1996.

2 The focus will be on England and the policies of Westminster. It is notable that the political traditions of Scotland, as well as the history of the feminist movement in Scotland, are different from England.

courses and feminist issues are context specific. Conversely, until the 1990s, domestic violence was a hidden problem among feminists in Finland, and childcare was not regarded as a feminist concern in Britain. Examining the debates conversely, domestic violence in Finland and childcare in Britain, is an important and interesting project, but beyond the scope of this article.³ Despite this, the broader theoretical aim in this article is to avoid the construction of a binary between the two countries and instead to emphasise diversity within them. A close examination shows that there were feminist discourses on both topics in both countries. At present feminist discourses on violence against women in Finland and on childcare in Britain are proliferating, which indicates the importance of temporal comparisons. Feminist discourses appear at different times in different contexts and are influenced by past discourses in complex ways.

1 Theoretical and Methodological Underpinnings

Theoretically, the article draws upon poststructural feminist insights. Methodologically, it conducts discourse analysis and uses some of the insights of the comparative method. Both methods are useful in avoiding some of the pitfalls of traditional feminist perspectives on the state. The feminist approaches to the state are frequently characterised by a dichotomy between integration (inside the state) and autonomy (outside the state). The categorisations are archetypes and theoretical simplifications that aim to capture the essence of the feminist state theory. In the typology, radical and Marxist feminist accounts represent a position where the state is theorised as essentially patriarchal or capitalist.⁴ Consequently, the concept of the state is rejected as an agent for progressive social transformation. Liberal and Scandinavian feminists represent the opposite strategy, where the state is recognised as a means to achieve equality. Liberal feminists argue for state legislation against sex discrimination as a way forward. Scandinavian feminism, in turn, is grounded in a historical and cultural experience of a 'woman-friendly society'.⁵

3 See, however, Johanna Kantola, *Doing Feminist Discourse Analysis: Domestic Violence in the Women-Friendly Welfare State of Finland*, in: *European Political Science*, vol. 4 (2004), no. 3, pp. 85-96.

4 Catherine Mackinnon, *Towards a Feminist Theory of the State*, London 1989; Mary McIntosh, *Mary, The State and the Oppression of Women*, in: Annette Kuhn/AnnMarie Wolpe (eds.), *Feminism and Materialism: Women and Modes of Production*, London 1978, pp. 254-289.

5 Helga Maria Hernes, *Welfare State and Woman Power*, Oslo 1987.

Marxist and radical feminist on the one hand, and liberal and Scandinavian approaches on the other, have become increasingly untenable. They have resulted in rigid essentials (of the categories of women, men and the state) and dichotomies which have unnecessarily reduced the options available for feminists in engaging with the state. Poststructural feminism aims at a more sophisticated analysis of the state. It is not the state that is too homogeneous but the feminist analyses of the state. The poststructural approaches have contributed greatly to feminist debates on the state by highlighting the differentiated nature of the state and by questioning the unity of state response.⁶ The analyses allow the complex, multidimensional and differentiated relations between the state and gender to be taken into account. They recognise that the state can be a positive as well as a negative resource for feminists and challenge the meaningfulness of the 'in' and 'out' of the state dichotomy that emerged from previous feminist work on the state.

Whilst emphasising the gendered nature of concepts such as the welfare state or citizenship, poststructural feminists also take into account national variations. Helpfully, the approaches turn away from the theorisation of relations between gender and the state in general terms, and focus, instead, on the construction of gender within specific state discourses and practices.⁷ Within a framework of diverse discourses and power relations, gender diversity and differences in women's experiences come to the fore. Poststructural feminist theorising has made it imperative for any analysis to draw attention to the gendered diversity and multiple identities of women and men. As such, poststructural feminist theory provides a starting point for this article.

Methodologically, the article employs discourse analysis to deconstruct feminist understanding of the state and its impact on feminist engagements with the state. Discourses are historically variable ways of specifying knowledge and truth. They are structured ways of knowing which are both produced by, and at the same time shapers of, culture.⁸ It follows that discourses constitute what they claim to have discovered. Therefore, feminist theorising on the state is not merely describing the object of study but is also constitutive of it. For example, feminists who argue that the state is essentially patriarchal add to its patriarchal powers by refusing to engage with it. Alternatively, arguments about the women-friendliness of states can blind feminist

6 Rosemary Pringle/Sophie Watson, *Women's Interests and the Post-Structuralist State*, in: Michele Barrett/Anne Phillips (eds.), *Destabilizing Theory*, Cambridge 1992, pp. 53-73.

7 Veronique Mottier, *Feminist Political Theory*, in: *European Political Science*, vol. 4 (2004), no. 3, pp. 79-84.

8 Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977* by Michel Foucault, London 1980.

analysis to key problems associated with turning to the state. Discourses are constituted by power and institutionalised as practices. Power is relational, dispersed and everywhere: there is no one central source of power and there is no outside of power relations. A problematic attempt to remain outside power relations has characterised some feminist engagements with the state, which has diverted attention away from actually engaging with the state.

Discourse analysis problematises women as subjects. The juridical formation of language and politics that represents women as 'the subject' of feminism is itself a discursive formation and an effect of a given version of representational politics. Thus, it is not enough to inquire into how women might become more fully represented in language and politics. Feminist critique ought also to understand how the category of 'women' is produced and restrained by the very structures of power through which emancipation is sought.⁹ 'Real' women are as much an effect of women's discourses as men's. The dividing line between feminist discourses and patriarchal ones cannot be drawn with any a priori certainty.¹⁰

The article also employs the comparative method, which places abstract feminist theories of the state in specific contexts. While mainstream political science worries about 'concept stretching',¹¹ the fact that apparently similar concepts, such as feminism and state, have different meanings in different contexts serves as an interesting starting point for this study. Comparisons give rise to new, perhaps surprising, questions that would not be asked otherwise. On the institutional level, comparisons allow the mechanisms at work in each society to emerge more clearly, challenging what is often taken for granted. On the discursive level, comparisons reveal silences. They force the researcher to consider discourses that are dominant in one context but perhaps cannot be articulated in another. This, in turn, has the potential to expose the limits of the discursive. At best comparative research is a process, a dialogue, where new questions are posed throughout the research.¹²

The concept of mapping applied in this analysis exposes the differences between more traditional comparisons and those inspired more by discourse analysis. The purpose of mapping is not to provide a complete or coherent picture of each society, represent a found world, or produce a map in the tra-

9 Judith Butler, *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*, London 1990.

10 Elizabeth Grosz, *Space, Time and Perversion*, London 1995.

11 T. Mackie/David Marsh, *The Comparative Method*, in: David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (eds.), *Theory and Methods in Political Science*, London 1995, pp. 173-188.

12 Linda Briskin/Mona Eliasson, *Preface: Collaboration and Comparison*, in: Linda Briskin/Mona Eliasson (eds.), *Women's Organizing and Public Policy in Canada and Sweden*, Montreal, Kingston 1999, pp. vii-xiv.

ditional sense. Rather it resists the somewhat inevitable tendency, especially in a comparative text, to produce 'ideal types' in order to contrast, for example Finland and Britain, and to set up a binary opposition between the two. Instead of a seamless picture of each country, what emerges from discourse analysis inspired comparisons is a 'map' of contradictions, tensions and interrelationships.¹³

2 Finland

The case studies focus on Finnish childcare policy and on British domestic violence policy. The two case studies have been selected because they have been the most dominant concerns of the women's movements in the two countries. Finnish feminists and the women's movement have emphasised childcare issues and ignored domestic violence, while the British feminists and women's movement have concentrated on domestic violence and seen childcare as a less pertinent concern for women. In the case studies, the focus will be first on feminist activist discourses and then on the state level discourses to see the ways in which feminist discourses have filtered through to the state level.

Four discourses have informed Finnish feminist engagements with the state on the issue of childcare: (i) working mother discourse, (ii) benign state discourse, (iii) state responsibility discourse, and (iv) choice discourse. In what follows, these will be explored among the feminists in the women's movement and in the parliament.

Association 9, formed between 1965 and 1966, was the first feminist movement in Finland to stress that childcare plays a central role in achieving gender equality. It promoted a new emancipatory concept of a woman based on the demand to combine family and work, and accepted only one model: the working mother. Association 9 actively formulated a working mother discourse which it promoted by appealing to gender equality: "Women's participation in the labour market furthers gender equality and therefore, it also furthers mutual respect between the spouses and other family members."¹⁴ For Association 9, the place of the woman was in the labour market and labour market participation was fundamental for gender equality. Equality in the other spheres, such as politics, would follow equal participation in

13 Linda Briskin, Mapping Women's Organizing in Sweden and Canada: Some Thematic Considerations, in: Linda Briskin/Mona Eliasson (eds.), *Women's Organizing and Public Policy in Canada and Sweden*, Montreal, Kingston 1999, pp. 3-47.

14 Association 9, Alustus keskusteluun ns. "äidinpalkkiosta" t. "äidinpalkasta". *Yhdistys 9:n syyskokoukseen 3.12.1967*. Ritva Majuri. (A paper prepared for a discussion on mother's wage for the Association 9 autumn meeting).

the labour market. Well organised childcare, in turn, was the only way to make women's labour market participation possible.

According to Association 9, the state was responsible for organising childcare. The movement criticised the state for its lack of a coherent policy and co-ordination on the issue in the 1960s. Also childcare in private families was to be subjected to state regulation: "Family day care has so far been outside the regulation of social services. This is extremely unfortunate, especially when we know the problems that are associated with private childcare. [...] Organised family day care has to be the responsibility of municipalities. The goal should be that all children are given a safe and monitored childcare place."¹⁵

Association 9 articulated a benign state discourse, where the state was a vehicle for achieving equality and women could turn to the state with their demands. Here Association 9's arguments resembled liberal feminist arguments about the state, and, indeed, the activists were influenced by the writings of Betty Friedan, a leading liberal feminist. They considered the state to be in the wrong hands, but in the hands of the radicals it would become an active defender of equal rights. Patriarchy was associated with the society rather than with the state. The state became a benevolent instrument for turning against patriarchy, both private patriarchy in the family and public patriarchy in society.¹⁶

According to Association 9, the responsibility for organising childcare lay with the state, a discourse which is labelled here the state responsibility discourse: "The starting point for the new family policy is that in a modern industrialised society it is not for the benefit of the nation if parents alone are responsible for the education and upbringing of the children. Similarly, as the society has taken the responsibility for securing income and living for elderly and sick people, it has to participate in taking care of the generation which is growing up."¹⁷ It was not families alone, and certainly not women alone, who were responsible for childcare, but also the state had to actively participate in the provision of childcare. Association 9 made no distinction between the concepts 'state' and 'society' but used them interchangeably, which is typical for the Nordic political discourses in general.¹⁸

15 Association 9, Lasten päivähoidon raportti, 21.2.1967. (A Report on child day care).

16 Anne Maria Holli, Why Politics: Reflections on the Finnish Equality Movement Association 9, in: Marja Keränen, (ed.), Finnish Undemocracy, Helsinki 1990, pp. 69-88.

17 Association 9, Yhdistys 9: kannanotto lapsenhoitolisän puolesta. Sosiaaliministeri Juho Partaselle. 9.11.1969/LR/hk. (Association 9's statement on childcare benefits).

18 Pauli Kettunen, Mitä yhteiskunta tekee Pohjoismaissa? In: Tiede & Edistys vol. 4 (2001), pp. 257-269. (What does the society do in the Nordic countries?)

The previous quote also illustrates that Association 9 had more confidence in the public sector in providing childcare than in the private sector. Privately organised childcare was considered dubious and had to be closely monitored by the state. The impartial and 'good' state set the standards, the rules and the regulations for all childcare arrangements. Despite recognising the need and the usefulness of the family day care, the movement stressed that 'organised family day care must not thwart the establishment of new municipal kindergartens'. The status of the persons employed in family day care, mostly women, was to be made 'as professional as possible, for example, they could be employed by the municipality'.¹⁹

Nevertheless, the views on childcare were deeply polarised in Finland. The debates were also shaped by a competing discourse, the choice discourse. For the women's sections of the parties on the right, Centre Party and National Coalition Party, women were primarily mothers, not workers. For these women, the family not the state was responsible for care.²⁰ The choice discourse was most evident in the support of the right-wing party's female members for the mother's wage. They argued that it would protect the emotional bond between the mother and the child and that child welfare was best realised at home. Mother's wage would also be a signal of the way the society appreciated the work done by mothers. And finally, practically, it would be cheaper to support childcare at home than in municipal kindergartens.²¹

In conclusion to the section on early feminist discourses, there was an emerging consensus among some women about childcare and the state in Finland. Association 9, the Committee on the Status of Women, the Council for Equality, and the women's sections of the left-wing parties all promoted the working mother and state responsibility discourses. They also argued that municipal childcare was of good quality and good for the children. However, the positions on childcare were still polarised between the female activists on both sides of the political spectrum. Mother's wage in particular was being debated heatedly and the women in the right-wing parties supported it strongly. For them, childcare was still the responsibility of the family and the primary place for mothers was at home.

In the 1980s, the two approaches were institutionalised in two childcare systems supported by the state: the municipal day care system and the Home

19 Association 9, Lasten päivähoidon raportti (note 15), p. 9.

20 Riitta Alanen, Päivähoidon yhteyksistä naisen asemaan ja perheeseen – Päivähoitokeskustelun piirteitä 1970-luvun Suomessa. Sosiaalipolitiikan pro gradu-tutkielma, Helsingin yliopisto, University of Helsinki 1981. (The implications of childcare arrangements to women's position and family – Characteristics of the childcare debates in 1970s Finland).

21 Alanen, Päivähoidon (note 20), p. 28.

Care Allowance, which offered parents the choice for either being paid to take care of the child at home, to pay someone else to come and take care of the child, or to use the municipal childcare. In 1991, it became the duty of municipalities to ensure that all children under the age of seven were guaranteed a place in a kindergarten. The law was to come into being in August 1995. In addition, the Home Care Allowance was extended from all parents of children under three to include parents of children under the age of four. This was scheduled to become law at the beginning of 1993 but was later delayed until 1995.

In 1994, a heated debate took place in the parliament under the right wing government. The government proposal aimed to delay both the law on municipal childcare and the Home Care Allowance. The argument for the delay was financial: it would save money for the state and the municipalities. Unemployment had reached a 20 percent peak and there were cuts in all sectors of the welfare state. The panic surrounding the increasing national debt created a consensus that it was legitimate and necessary to cut down welfare spending in all sectors. Also, the government argued that as a result of the dramatic increase in unemployment the need for childcare places had declined and the municipalities were able to deal with the demand without a change in the legislation.

The working mother discourse, which had not been emerging until the beginning of 1970s, was by 1994 the dominant discourse in Finland. Childcare was generally accepted as pivotal in enabling women's labour market participation. This is seen for example in the Social Affairs and Health Committee's report which criticised the government proposal to delay the childcare act.²² The report argued that childcare had a great meaning, first, for the social skills of the child and, second, for the parents' ability to work: "Childcare, in addition to free meals at school, is perhaps the most important factor in influencing equality in the labour market because the responsibility for care still lies with the mother. Childcare gives both parents the chance to work. Municipal childcare is also a safe care method. The work is done by qualified personnel and care is guided and balanced."²³

22 Report number 47, STVHE211.M94. Committee's chairman was Jouko Skinnari (SDP), vice chairman Anneli Taina (National Coalition Party). 14 out of 17 members of the Committee were women. The Social Affairs and Health Committee is responsible for handling matters related to social services and healthcare, social insurance, pension legislation, alcohol and temperance work, occupational and environmental healthcare. The committee also reviews the annual report on substance abuse and the annual report of the Commissioners of the Social Insurance Institution.

23 STVHE211.M94.

The parliamentary cross party Women's Network, in particular, drew on the working mothers discourse and was very active in the debate.²⁴ The network, which had members from all political parties, both left and right, was able to agree on the importance of the issue and to formulate a common position on it. The Women's Network wrote an open letter to the parliament on 15 December 1994, which was read out aloud in the parliamentary session by Outi Ojala (Left-Wing Alliance). The Women's Network was ready to accept a delay in the extension of the Home Care Allowance as long as there were no delays to the extension of the statutory right for municipal childcare for all children under the age of seven.

The MPs from both left and right appealed to the working mother discourse in the parliamentary debate. The recession had increased women's unemployment but it had not challenged the norm of the working mother. Therefore, many MPs who supported the extension of childcare rights to all children under the age of seven based their arguments on the fact that proper childcare would decrease women's unemployment: "In research done in 1991, 69 per cent of under seven year old children's mothers were working and 55 percent of under three year old children's parents. Parents', specifically women's, participation in the labour market would be higher, if childcare arrangements were better." (Sinikka Hurskainen, Social Democratic Party, 17 December 1994) Maija Perho-Santala from the National Coalition Party argued similarly: "In my opinion, it is important to enact the law. Then the municipalities are not indirectly given the right to bring down the existing service structures. What has already been constructed in the municipalities has to be maintained for many reasons, not least, because childcare services are the most central prerequisite for the equality of working women." (Maija Perho-Santala, National Coalition Party, 4 October 1994) Again, as was evident already in the Association 9 statements, women's labour force participation is closely linked to gender equality in other spheres of life.

24 The Women's Network of the Finnish parliament was founded in 1991 when the biggest amount of female MPs ever, 77 all together, (38.5 percent – also a world record at the time) were elected to the parliament, 14 more than in the previous elections. The aim of the network is to influence legislation. It acts across party lines and has no official tasks. It is an informal and voluntary discussion forum and all its decisions are based on consensus. The core of the network consists of MPs from both government and opposition parties. One of the achievements of the network has been to reduce the late night parliamentary sessions. Also, Leena Harkimo (National Coalition Party), the current chairperson, argues that one of the most significant achievements of the network was exactly this debate on childcare: managing to bring forward the enforcement of the childcare act (Helsingin Sanomat 10 October 2001).

The state responsibility discourse was well established by 1994 and all MPs shared the view that the state carried a big part of the responsibility for childcare. In this state responsibility discourse, the state, not the family, was responsible for care arrangements. Furthermore, it was the state's responsibility to realise the equal opportunities for care for all children (see below for a discussion on regional inequalities). For example, Eva Biaudet from the Swedish People's Party²⁵ argued: "In my opinion, if children's equality is not realised, the responsibility lies with the state. The state enacts laws, so that we can protect the realisation of equality. If the municipalities would realise fully their responsibility, we would not, of course, have this problem. But currently children are in an unequal position depending on where they live." (17 December 1994) Therefore, in the Finnish parliament, the state and state led childcare were regarded to have positive and necessary functions in realising the equality between children from different regions.

Whilst in 1973 some sections of the society were still suspicious about the quality of the municipal childcare, in 1994, public childcare was universally seen as good quality childcare: "In a Swedish research, which is the most extensive research done in this field, and which researched children from birth until the age of sixteen, the conclusion was that the children, who had been in municipal childcare, were the best ones at school, particularly so that those, who had gone to the kindergarten under the age of one, did especially well. The worst performance at school was by those who had been at home all the time before going to school." (Tuulikki Hämäläinen, SDP, 20 December 1994) This view was shared in stronger and weaker versions across the political spectrum.

The earlier benign state discourse had been consolidated as a women-friendly welfare state discourse, which was widely shared in Finland.²⁶ Childcare, in turn, was considered to be the key to the Nordic women

25 The Swedish People's Party is the Finnish Swedish people's party in Finland. Finland has a 5 percent Swedish speaking minority and the support for the party has traditionally been around 5 percent. It has been an important coalition government partner in post-war Finland. For example, Eva Biaudet was appointed Social Affairs and Health minister in 1999.

26 For feminist analyses, see for example, Liisa Rantalaiho, Sukupuolisopimus ja Suomen malli, in: Anneli Anttonen et. al. (eds.), Naisten hyvinvointivaltio, Tampere 1994, pp. 9-30. (Gender contract and the Finnish model, in: Women's welfare state); Raija Julkunen/Liisa Rantalaiho (eds.), Hyvinvointivaltion sukupuolijärjestelmä, Department of Social Policy, University of Jyväskylä, working papers number 56/1989. (The gender system of the welfare state); Raija Julkunen, Suomalainen sukupuolimalli – 1960-luku käänteenä (The Finnish gender contract – 1960s as a turning point), in: Anneli Anttonen et. al. (eds.), Naisten hyvinvointivaltio, Tampere 1994, pp. 179-202.

friendly social democracy. For example, Erkki Tuomioja (SDP) argued: "In the Social Democratic Parliamentary Group, we have all, regardless of our gender, held to the point that the childcare act and the services that it requires are the basic service of any welfare society, and we cannot question this even at the times of difficult economic decisions and cuts in the public expenditure." (17 December 1994)

Finland was about to join the European Union when the debate took place, which was reflected in the arguments. The MPs understood childcare issues as fundamental to the Finnish identity as a woman friendly welfare state: "To a great extent now, when after a few weeks we become members of the European Union, the question is about equality, the question is about our basic pillars: childcare, free school meals, workplace meals, issues, that we are proudly taking with the other Nordic countries to the EU, and even before we become members, we'd be slowing down and destroying these." (Virpa Puisto, SDP, 17 December 1994) According to this discourse, women had a vital interest in the childcare system and childcare was seen as an issue which united all women. This was also seen in the co-operation and consensus that enabled the cross party Women's Network to function and to make a shared decision about a policy recommendation on childcare.

In the 1973 parliamentary debate, the feminist discourses on working mothers and state responsibility for childcare were opposed by more conservative views on mothers' place at home and families' responsibility for childcare. In 1994, no one suggested that the mothers' place would be at home or that the family alone should take care of the children. Instead, the government appealed to an economic reality to counter the demands for childcare. For example, Martti Tiuri (National Coalition Party) claimed: "The expenses of the state are 70 billion bigger than its income. If we go on like this, soon we can't guarantee any of these [welfare services] because Finland is given no more loans." (20 December 1994) Vesa Laukkanen (Christian Democratic League) argued: "The issue is so that market forces have a determining role in this society. Governments are totally subjected to the market forces. Thus it does not matter who is in the government." (4 October 1994)

During this period a right-wing coalition government consisting of the Centre Party and the National Coalition Party was in power. The policies of the government were characterised by a constant need to save in all sectors in order to bring Finland out of the recession. Another actor, which opposed the legislation, was the Central Association for the Local and Regional Authorities in Finland. Especially the municipalities who had failed to increase municipal childcare places (Espoo and Vantaa in South Finland) made loud

complaints. The municipalities argued that the legislation was attacking their self-governmental rights.

The choice discourse played an important role in the parliamentary debate. In the end, it divided the female MPs of the Women's Network and resulted in a breakdown of the consensus among the women. The parliamentary debate illustrates the depth of the division between the municipal childcare and Home Care Allowance arrangements, which were constructed as two opposing strategies (see also Anttonen 1999). The female MPs of the right wing parties, who endorsed the choice discourse, did not want to accept that the two would be developed separately and the municipal childcare arrangements would be prioritised, as was suggested by the Women's Network initially.

The women from the Centre Party and the parties affiliated to it (for example the Agrarian Party SMP) appealed strongly to the choice discourse: "In my opinion, equality means that the families should have the freedom to choose whether children are taken to municipal day care or if they are given the possibility for Home Care Allowance." (Lea Mäkipää, SMP, 17 December 1994) And: "The starting point for the Centre Party has been that the municipalities have to take care of their responsibilities, the ones that have been set for them, and that on the other hand childcare has to be developed on the basis of freedom of choice." (Maria Kaisa Aula, Centre Party, 17 December 1994)

The choice discourse was closely related to the regional inequalities. In the north/south divide, the Centre Party represented the farmers of North Finland who did not benefit from the municipal childcare network to the same extent as families in the cities. The Home Care Allowance was stigmatised as a farmers' welfare benefit. The Centre Party MPs constantly referred to the fact that it was also widely used by small income families in South Finland.

The coalition government of the Centre Party and the National Coalition Party compromised on the issue and proposed that both the childcare act and the Home Care Allowance come into effect on 1.1.1996 (during the next government) instead of being delayed until autumn 1997. The Centre Party women opted for this compromise because it did not separate the Home Care Allowance from municipal childcare arrangements. Also the National Coalition Party women voted for the new compromise. The women on the left (Green Party, Left-Wing Alliance, SDP) were furious. During the third round of the parliamentary debate, they suggested that the whole government proposal should be rejected. They saw this as the only way to ensure that the childcare act would come into force already in the autumn of 1995. In the

final vote, 109 votes were cast for the government compromise and 71 against it.

The debate illustrates the discourses, which construct the Finnish state as women-friendly and accessible for women, at operation. The state has been defined as a legitimate actor in questions of gender equality and the discourses have made it possible for the Finnish feminists to engage with the state and to become part of its structures. The discursive construction coincides with that of the early women's movement, Association 9. Women from all parties shared the first discourse that childcare was the responsibility of the state and, therefore, the responsibility for care did not lie with the parents alone. Childcare services were explained to be the backbone of the Finnish welfare society and crucial for equality between women and men. However, the choice discourse shows the existence of divisions and conflicts among women. The female MPs in the parties on the right provided alternative understandings of the relationship between the state and childcare arrangement and placed more emphasis on private care at home.

3 Britain

Unlike in Finland, in Britain, violence against women became a key concern for some parts of the women's movement from the 1970s onwards. Three discourses can be discerned from the British feminist debates on violence against women: (i) universal domestic violence discourse, (ii) autonomy discourse, and (iii) crime discourse. The British refuge movement, Women's Aid, grew out of and drew upon radical feminist ideas. It became the most prominent actor of the women's movement on the issue of domestic violence and started setting up a network of refuges for battered women in the 1970s. Women's Aid articulated a universal domestic violence discourse. In this discourse, any woman could experience domestic violence – it was not a problem of working class families or alcoholic men only: "Until men no longer see women as their possessions, but as people with equal status and rights, women will always be beaten. We are fighting not only to stop battering, but also to change the position of women in our violent society."²⁷ Women's Aid's feminist explanation saw domestic violence as a reflection of unequal power relations both in society and in personal relationships, and as a symptom of the more general male violence and domination over women.²⁸ In other words, for Women's Aid, domestic violence was a serious

27 National Women's Aid Federation, *Women! You Don't Have to Put Up with Being Battered: How to Get an Injunction*, London, Manchester 1978.

28 Gill Hague Ellen Malos, *Domestic Violence: Action For Change*, Bristol, Cheltenham 1993.

societal problem and its root causes could be tackled only by making the general position of women in society better.²⁹

In relation to the state, these feminists drew upon an autonomy discourse that was underpinned by distrust towards the state as an institution and a belief in the autonomy of the women's movement. Autonomy from the state was important in order to maintain and discover feminist ways of working. Women were made strong through self-help and through sharing experiences with other women in similar life situations.³⁰ Women's Aid was both for women and run by women, and its feminism was inspired by a 'women only' strategy. Women were treated not as victims but as survivors in order to both challenge victim-blame and to make visible women's resistance strategies. The organisation was non-hierarchical and it was based on democratic functioning. Conflict was dealt with collectively and distinctions between helper and helped were overturned. In the autonomy discourse, every engagement with the state had its price. For example a turn to the state might result in compromising on societal critique and feminist practice.³¹

Over time, a third discourse, a crime discourse, emerged as an important feminist strategy to highlight the seriousness of domestic violence. The crime discourse articulated domestic violence as a serious crime that equalled beatings by strangers on the street. The aim of the crime discourse was to push for more police intervention and involvement in domestic violence cases: "When a man is found guilty of domestic assault, he should receive an effective sanction which recognises domestic violence as a serious crime."³² The discourse was based on the recognition that the police was the first institution to which most women in need turned to, but the police tended to refuse to get involved in cases of domestic violence.³³ The discourse was not so prominent in the early statements of Women's Aid's but became more so towards the end of 1980s and 1990s. The discourse coincided with

29 Anna Coote/Tess Gill (with Jo Richardson), *Battered Women and the Law*, London 1977; Angela Weir, *Battered Women: Some Perspectives and Problems*, in: Marjorie Mayo (ed.), *Women in the Community*, London 1977, pp. 109-120.

30 National Women's Aid Federation, *Battered Women, Refuges and Women's Aid*, 1977.

31 Hilary Rose, *Women's Refuges: Creating New Forms of Welfare?*, in: Clare Unger-son (ed.), *Women and Social Policy: A Reader*, London 1985, pp. 243-259.

32 Women's Aid Federation England, *Written Evidence to the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee Inquiry into Domestic Violence*, Bristol 1992.

33 Jalna Hanmer/Jill Radford/Elizabeth A. Stanko, *Policing, Men's Violence: An Introduction*, in: Jalna Hanmer/Jill Radford/Elizabeth A. Stanko (eds.), *Women, Policing and Male Violence: International Perspectives*, London, New York 1989, pp. 1-12.

Conservative governments' rhetoric to be tough on crime and was therefore an important strategy to push for recognition of the issue and for police action.

In Britain, the discourses on domestic violence were diverse. Competing discourses explained domestic violence in terms of individual pathology and emphasised that also women were violent.³⁴ The parliamentary debates in the 1970s demonstrate that there was deep unease among Conservative male MPs about the appropriate means to deal with domestic violence.³⁵ They were particularly worried about the role of the police in surpassing the public/private distinction and intervening in 'domestic disputes'. They argued that the police should respect the unity of the family, and questioned whether it was justified to increase the burden on the police. Courts, in turn, stressed men's property rights. These ideas are extremely important in explaining resistance to feminist discourses.

Diversity existed also within feminists. Black feminist theorising highlighted black women's different experience of 'universal' domestic violence.³⁶ Women's Aid in England had to confront questions about the oppressive racist patriarchal state. The black feminist discourses about the state and state policies were often more radical than Women's Aid's discourses. For instance, in the 1980s, the Southall Black Sisters systematically rejected multi-agency approaches, which were becoming increasingly popular in dealing with domestic violence and required voluntary sector collaboration with different state sectors. They argued that the multi-agency approach "serves to extend the net of corporate policing".³⁷ Because of the different experiences black women had when dealing with domestic violence and their deep distrust towards the police, the feminist discourses of empowerment and autonomy had special value for black feminists. Also non-feminist actors, such as the Women's National Commission, Victim Support, the Home Office, and the Law Commission, started to contribute to the debates. Their arguments, in turn, impacted upon and shaped Women's Aid's feminist discourses.

Despite its distrust towards the state as a patriarchal institution, Women's Aid's autonomy discourse was always informed by a pragmatic need to turn to the state for support. In the 1970s, Women's Aid campaigned for domes-

34 For a classification of different explanations see Hague/Malos, *Domestic Violence* (note 28).

35 See for example the debate in the House of Commons 13 February 1976.

36 Southall Black Sisters, *Two Struggles: Challenging Male Violence and the Police*, in: Christina Dunhill (ed.), *The Boys in Blue: Women's Challenge to the Police*, London 1989, pp. 38-44.

37 Southall Black Sisters, *Two Struggles*, p. 44.

tic violence legislation and demanded state recognition of domestic violence as a crime. In 1976, the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act (1976) was passed. The Act permitted non-molestation and exclusion injunctions independent of any other proceedings before the court, and without the need to undertake such proceedings. Also, powers of arrest could be attached to any order thus ensuring that the police had responsibility should the order be breached.³⁸ Disappointingly for feminists and other campaigners, the judiciary in general favoured a restrictive interpretation of the Act which served to undermine much of its political improvements and thereby hardened feminist attitudes towards the state in Britain.

The de-radicalisation of the legislation had a significant impact on feminist discourses on domestic violence and the state. Feminists in academia not only endorsed Women's Aid's discourses on domestic violence and the state but also radicalised them and provided academic research and theories to back up the arguments. Liz Kelly employed the concept of the *continuum of sexual violence* which emphasised that sexual violence existed in most women's lives and only the form sexual violence took, how women defined events and the impact of the events on them at the time and over time varied.³⁹ Feminist academics confirmed the importance of autonomy and empowerment as strategies to deal with domestic violence and warned against tokenistic and divisive reforms: "In the context of demanding reforms from the police, it is essential to recognise that we are dealing with an institution known for its sexism, racism and 'cult of masculinity'".⁴⁰

The autonomy discourse had its cost in Britain. The refuge network had been established in accordance with the ideas of empowerment and autonomy, which also came to mean that they received no national funding and faced severe funding problems. Many commentators described how physical conditions in refuge centres 'vary between shabby or scruffy'⁴¹ and there were great regional variations. This became an unresolved, core campaigning issue for Women's Aid in the 1980s and 1990s. Police practice was another target and here some positive changes were achieved with the Home

38 Susan Maidment, *Domestic Violence and the Law: The 1976 Act and its Aftermath*, in: Norman Johnson (ed.), *Marital Violence*, London 1985, pp. 4-26; Kathryn McCann, *Battered Women and the Law: The Limits of the Legislation*, in: Julia Brophy/Carol Smart (eds.), *Women-In-Law: Explorations in Law, Family and Sexuality*, London 1985.

39 Liz Kelly, *The Continuum of Sexual Violence*, in: Jalna Hanmer/Mary Maynard (eds.), *Women, Violence and Social Control*, London 1987, pp. 46-60.

40 Hanmer/Radford/Stanko, *Policing* (note 33), p. 11.

41 Rose, *Women's Refuges* (note 31), p. 254.

Office issuing guidelines for better practice.⁴² Multi-agency work, where different bodies work together to confront domestic violence, became the key government approach to domestic violence in the 1990s. It grew out of the fact that domestic violence was not the responsibility of any particular statutory agency or government department, but could be the responsibility of many, or, as feminists pointed out, none at all.⁴³ Multi-agency approaches received a cautious welcome from some feminists and were rejected by others.⁴⁴

How are the feminist discourses about domestic violence and state played out in the parliament? What are the continuities and the differences between the feminists' and the parliamentarians' discourses? The women's movement endorsed the autonomy discourse but fought to secure more funding from the government for the refuge centres and campaigned for better police practice. Here the focus will be on one parliamentary debate that took place in July 1993. The long Conservative rule had had a lasting impact on British politics. The rule had been particularly detrimental for feminist struggles.⁴⁵

The 1993 parliamentary debate on domestic violence followed the publishing of the Home Affairs Select Committee's inquiry into domestic violence 1993. The Home Affairs Select Committee consisted of six Conservative and four Labour members and it made 42 specific recommendations for tackling domestic violence in society. The committee had consulted Victim's Support and the Women's Aid Federations from different parts of the country. In what was seen as an exceptional process, the members from the two main parties had reached a unanimous conclusion about the seriousness of the problem and the need to tackle it. Therefore, the government's half-hearted response was particularly disappointing.

Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the feminist universal domestic violence discourse had had an impact on MP's statements in parliament. Like Women's Aid, the government portrayed domestic violence as a universal problem, which was not restricted to certain social groups or classes only: "Domestic violence is not limited to any particular social group or class, but, as has already been said, occurs across the social spectrum." (The Minister of State, Home Office, David Maclean, Conservative Party, 29

42 Home Office, Domestic Violence, Home Office Circular No. 60, London 1990.

43 Ellen Malos, *Supping with the Devil?: Multi-Agency Initiatives on Domestic Violence*, in: Jill Radford/Melissa Friedbergand/Lynne Harné (eds.), *Women, Violence and Strategies for Action*, Buckingham, Philadelphia 2000, pp. 120-135.

44 Compare Malos, *Supping* (note 43); Southall Black Sisters, *Two Struggles* (note 36).

45 Joni Lovenduski/Vicky Randall, *Contemporary Feminist Politics: Women and Power in Britain*, Oxford 1993.

March 1995) To clarify this had been one of the key feminist aims and the discourse had clearly filtered through to the parliamentary debates.

Although all the MPs in the main parties agreed upon the seriousness of the issue, there were significant differences in explaining its causes. The MPs on the left related domestic violence to the wider socio-economic frame and the female Labour MPs shared the feminist understanding of domestic violence as a symptom of male dominance over women: "Domestic violence is a part of a wider social problem of womens' unequal position in society. Too often still, women are dependent on men socially and economically. Attempts by women to assert their independence and leave the marital home when necessary are constrained by that basic inequality." (Joan Ruddock, Labour MP for Lewisham, Deptford, 21 July 1993) The female MPs acknowledged the institutionalised dependency relations between men and women and the ways in which these related to domestic violence.

The Conservative male MPs, in contrast, saw domestic violence as a moral problem resulting from alcoholism, "wrong kind of men" and women who were unable to leave their partners: "There are many cases where a woman, probably unwisely, has taken a man in or formed a liaison with him, and then discovered to her cost that he is a violent type because of drink, or is naturally violent, she then has the utmost difficulty in getting rid of him." (Dudley Smith, MP for Warwick and Leamington, 21 July 1993) These interpretations on the causes of domestic violence drew upon ideas about men as 'naturally violent' and were in direct contrast to feminist discourses. The emphasis was placed on individuals, in contrast to societal structures, and the woman was found responsible for being in a violent relationship.

The second feminist discourse identified above was the autonomy discourse, which framed the ways that domestic violence should be dealt with. The funding problem that related to the autonomous status of the refugees was recognised in the parliament: "As the report points out, and as has already been said, the present number of refuge places is less than one third of the number, recommended as an initial target by the Select Committee on Violence in the Family which reported in 1975, of one family place per 10,000 of the population." (Barbara Roche, Labour MP for Hornsey and Wood Green, 21 July 1993)

The Committee's report, the government and the MPs shared the view that the refugees were in funding crisis. However, the party divisions emerged early on in the debate, with the Conservative government resisting far-reaching commitments: "The whole thrust of the Government's response is that all funding issues are for local authorities. At the end of the day, local authorities are largely funded by the Government, so there must be role for

central government finance. If the Government are putting all this emphasis on local authorities, why cannot we have ring-fenced money specifically for refuges?" (Malcolm Chisholm, Edinburgh, Leith, 21 July 1993) Also, Baroness Cumberlege (Conservative, House of Lords) was quoted as stating when asked whether the Government had any plans to encourage the provision and funding of women's refuges: "The provision of funding for women's refuges is primarily a matter for local agencies."⁴⁶

Labour MPs, by contrast, advocated a bigger role for the state in solving the funding crisis and emphasised government responsibility on the issue: "Local authorities cannot be expected to bear the entire financial burden. It is clearly the responsibility of central Government to put resources into a network of women's refuges." (Joan Ruddock, Labour MP for Lewisham, Deptford, 21 July 1993)

The committee report not only recognised the lack of funding but also the lack of both a central body and a co-ordinated response to domestic violence. Accordingly, the Committee recommended in the report mentioned above that "the first priority of Government action on domestic violence should be the establishment of a central, co-ordinated policy for refuge provision throughout the country". This could also be seen in the Labour MPs statements: "Local authorities are responsible for refuges, of which there are very few. [...] Part of the problem is the fact that a range of Departments must deal with domestic violence." (Liz Lynne, MP for Rochdale, 21 July 1993) And: "We should have a proper refuge network throughout the country, centrally co-ordinated and funded by the Government." (Harry Cohen, MP for Leyton 21 July 1993). The lack of central authority dealing with domestic violence is reflected in the lack of central legislation: "The law is spread among different Acts of Parliament [...] That means that a woman has to deal with a maze of legislation." (Jean Corston, Labour MP for Bristol East 21 July 1993)

Despite the Labour MPs' attempts to highlight the importance of a co-ordinated national policy on domestic violence, the Conservative government remained resistant and emphasised the role of local actors: "However, in principle we maintain the view that effective local support services, including refuges, are best provided at local level. Such provision can be based on an assessment of local needs and take into account the wider local response. The Government have a role in encouraging local action and in disseminating good practice." (Minister of State, Home Office, David Maclean, Conservative Party, 21 July 1993)

46 Official report, House of Lords, 29 April 1993, quoted by Barbara Roche, Labour MP for Hornsey and Wood Green, 21 July 1993

The Conservative government was willing to recognise only a very limited role for the state in confronting domestic violence. The focus on funding and a co-ordinated government response reflect the parameters of legitimate state action. For Labour MPs, funding and co-ordination were the issues that the state could associate with and the Labour MPs shared this frame with the women's movement. For Conservative MPs, the role of the state was even more restricted, but it could be regarded as reflecting the Women's Aid's concern for autonomy from the state.

The parliamentary debate was dominated by the crime discourse, which was shared by the MPs from all parties. The police were not required separately to identify domestic violence incidents in their statistical returns to the Home Office or to record the relationship between victim and offender. This was seen as a major problem requiring remedy by the parliament in the form of legislative change: "Domestic violence is a crime – it is that message that we have to get across. We have to change the culture of our society from an early stage." (Barbara Roche, Labour MP for Hornsey and Wood Green, 21 July 1993) And: "Of all crimes, it is perhaps the hardest for the Government to tackle. We can put more police on the streets, try to make houses burglar proof, and encourage neighbourhood watch schemes, but none of that will protect a woman or a child from domestic violence." (Ray Michie, MP for Argyll and Bute, 29 March 1995) This discourse was shared by MPs from both political left and political right. In addition, Women's Aid articulated the crime discourse, and it was an important tool for highlighting the seriousness of the issue. Other feminists cautioned that to use the crime discourse represented an attempt to locate feminist definitions into man-made legal categories.⁴⁷ Feminist definitions should rather be based on women's experience and they should not necessarily be forced into the state discourse on crime.

Diversity and the different concerns and experiences that black and ethnic minority women encountered when experiencing domestic violence did not occupy a prominent position in the parliamentary debate. The specific problems of immigrant women were referred to and kept on the agenda by female Labour MPs but they did not receive government attention.

In conclusion, the government's response to the progressive Home Affairs Committee's report was disappointing. Feminist discourses had informed the work of the Committee and were reflected in some of its recommendations. In parliament, feminist discourses were mainly employed by

47 Jill Radford/Elizabeth Stanko, *Violence Against Women and Children: The Contradictions of Crime Control Under Patriarchy*, in: Marianne Hester/Liz Kelly/Jill Radford (eds.), *Violence and Male Power*, Buckingham, Philadelphia 1996, here 68f.

female MPs in the Labour Party. These discourses had less impact on the work of the government. Two discourses, the universal domestic violence discourse and the crime discourse, had filtered through to the parliamentary debate. All MPs taking part in the debate recognised domestic violence as a prevalent and serious crime. However, unlike feminists, many MPs placed the emphasis on the individual and not on the societal structures when explaining the causes of domestic violence.

The combination of emphasising the crime discourse but downplaying the wider social inequalities impacted upon the ways in which solutions to the problem were sought. The government did not react to the arguments that the general position of women in the society needed to be made better and their economic, social and political rights secured. Instead, they emphasised in a public awareness campaign that domestic violence was a crime and urged the police to act against it.⁴⁸ Furthermore, arguments about scarce resources resulted in the outcome whereby the refuges continued to receive inadequate funding. As a consequence of the traditionally strong position of the feminist autonomy discourse, it was relatively easy for the government to refuse to take full responsibility for funding the refuge network. Despite the ministerial working group, national co-ordination of domestic violence policy remained patchy and the government placed its rhetorical emphasis on the perceived need to act on a local level.

4 Conclusion

The state is heterogeneous and often contradictory in its processes and policies. This article has discussed two different feminist discourses about the state, one positive and the other negative, and their consequences for feminist engagements with the state. The article has not attempted to draw causal links between discourses and state institutions, but suggests that discourses set powerful parameters for feminist and state actions.

In Finland, Association 9's discourse on the state was very positive: the state was seen as the guarantor of equality. The movement was integrated into the state structures at the beginning of 1970s. Its discourses on childcare were institutionalised into the woman-friendly welfare state policies. The

48 The government established a ministerial working group to co-ordinate the government response to domestic violence, which was led by the Home Office. It launched a public awareness campaign in October 1994 with the slogan "Domestic Violence is a Crime – Don't Stand for It". The campaign consisted of 500 000 guidance leaflets and 100 000 indoor posters that were distributed to voluntary and statutory agencies. A short public information film was shown in 350 cinemas for a period of six weeks.

continuities between the parliamentarians' and the feminist discourses on the beneficial nature of state responsibility for childcare and the woman-friendly welfare state were clear. However, also a second approach existed in Finland exemplified by the choice discourse. The choice discourse emphasised the parents' right to stay at home and look after their children. It represented a competing discourse that placed limits on government interference.

The British women's movement in general and Women's Aid in particular valued their perceived autonomy and attempted to stay out of the state. A negative construction of the state informed the movement's attempt to remain outside. However, the analysis in this article shows that the autonomy discourse was compromised and Women's Aid depended on the state for funding, police action and legislative changes. The state response was positive in some areas, such as a national campaign against domestic violence in 1995 and increase in state funding for the refuges. Some feminist discourses, such as the crime discourse and the universal domestic violence discourse, had filtered through to the debates in parliament.

The analysis, therefore, challenges accounts where Finland is thought to represent an uncontroversial integrationist feminist strategy (inside the state) and Britain an autonomous strategy (outside the state). The choice discourse debate illustrates that the idea of functioning outside the state is also a powerful one in Finland. The crime discourse, in turn, points to the importance of the idea of working inside the state in Britain. Furthermore, the discussion in this article has challenged the whole dichotomy between the in- and out of state approach. The article has shown that being 'inside' makes 'outside' possible, as in the case of the Finnish Home Care Allowance, which allows parents to stay at home to look after their children. Similarly, being outside is illusionary as the case of Britain demonstrates.

Such comparisons suggest that it is important not to create ideal types or stereotypical accounts of Finland and Britain, where Finland represents pro-state and Britain anti-state strategies. Unfortunately there has been no space in this article to concentrate on differences within states and to point to diversity within countries. Such analysis would be important to reveal the differences and discontinuities within state policies in different fields and their differentiated impact upon women. However, this article does conclude that rather than assuming a universal analysis of the state, there is a need to place analyses within specific contexts. The analysis indicates the benefits for feminist analyses of turning away from the theorisation of relations between gender and state in general terms and focusing instead on constructions within specific state discourses and practices.

Buchbesprechungen

Peter Bender: Weltmacht Amerika. Das neue Rom, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 2003, 295 S.

Der Vergleich, den *Bender* hier vorlegt, ist einerseits hochaktuell – nämlich in der analytischen Sicht auf die Stellung der derzeit letzten, verbleibenden Weltmacht, andererseits sehr konventionell – nämlich in der Vorstellung, die Entstehung des römischen Weltreichs im Kontext moderner Weltmächtsphantasien nutzbar machen zu können, ein Ansatz, der seit Gibbons großem Werk über den *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire* nicht ganz unüblich ist. Das Buch ist anregend, flüssig geschrieben und vermeidet jegliche, den üblicherweise strengen Blick des althistorischen Fachkollegen irritierende Ungenauigkeit im Umgang mit den antiken Quellen.

Im chronologischen Durchgang werden der erste punische Krieg (264–241 v. Chr.) mit dem ersten Weltkrieg verglichen und als „Zwei Kriege wider Willen“ (S. 71 ff.) klassifiziert, der zweite punische Krieg (218–201 v. Chr.) mit dem zweiten Weltkrieg, das römische Ausgreifen nach Griechenland und Kleinasien im 2. Jh. mit der amerikanischen Einflußnahme in Westeuropa und Ostasien sowie der Phase des Kalten Krieges mit dem Ergebnis, daß dem geneigten Leser die Entstehung zweier sehr ähnlicher Weltmächte vor Augen steht.

Die Unterschiede beider ‚Reiche‘ werden unter der interessanten Über-

schrift „Parallelstraßen“ in einer Art mentalitätshistorischen Synopse dargestellt: die Amerikaner als Händler und Seefahrer, Zivilisten und religiös inspirierte Ideologen gegenüber den expansionistische Politikern der ewigen Landmacht Rom mit ihren gutausgebildeten Lebenszeit-Milizionären, die in reiner Machtpolitik ohne ideologischen Anspruch ein Weltreich eroberten. Diesem Abstand stellt er dann die ‚starke Ähnlichkeit‘ (S. 191 ff.) in Selbstgenügsamkeit, Eigenschaften und Eigenheiten wie Energie und Selbstbewußtsein, Moral und formaler Religiosität gegenüber, vor allem eine beiden gemeinsame Neigung zu vermeidbaren Kriegen. So folgt schließlich, unter dem Titel „Neurotische Riesen“, ein Vergleich der 146 v. Chr. erfolgten, vollständigen Zerstörung Karthagos und Korinths sowie derjenigen, nicht ganz in diesen Kontext passende, Numantias (133 v. Chr.) mit dem Krieg Amerikas in Afghanistan und im Irak.

In einem kurzen Ausblick stellt er dann abschließend die sich aus diesem Vergleich ergebende Frage, ob Amerika nun ein Empire oder zumindest ein gerade entstehendes Empire sei. Diese Frage verneint *Bender* und kommt dann über einen kleinen Umweg, der wenig mit dem vorangegangenen Vergleich zu tun hat, nämlich der aus der griechisch-römischen Tradition erwachsenen Vorstellung einer gemeinsamen Kultur (einer Art griechisch-römischer Symbiose, S. 263) zu folgendem Schluß: „Amerika würde zu

einem neuen Rom – nicht durch ein Rom-ähnliches Empire, das es nicht schaffen kann und wohl auch nicht will, sondern weil es die Zivilisation des Abendlandes schützt und gemeinsam mit Europa bewahren will.“ (S. 264)

Das Problem solcher Vergleiche ist weniger die große Zeitspanne, die zwischen den beschriebenen Entwicklungen liegt, als dasjenige des zugrunde liegenden tertium comparationis. Hierbei hat sich *Bender* für das Konzept der „Insel“ bzw. eines daraus abgeleiteten Bildes von ‚insularer Sicherheit‘, ‚insularer Selbstbeschränkung‘ und ‚insularer Machtentfaltung‘ entschieden. Das mag vom geographischen Äußeren her für beide vielleicht gerechtfertigt sein, aber es trifft für Rom ansonsten nicht zu. Ein Selbstverständnis dieser Art, das den von *Bender* immer wieder hier genannten isolationistischen Ursprüngen zugrunde liegen würde, ist für seine Analyse Amerikas wohl zutreffend, für eine antike Polis doch kaum vorstellbar, auch und gerade nicht für Rom, das von seinen Anfängen her in der gesamten republikanischen Zeit darauf ausgerichtet war, an die griechische Welt Anschluß zu finden, ja sich dort Gleiche unter Gleichen zu präsentieren. Das schlägt sich nieder in frühen Verträgen (u. a. auch mit Karthago 508/7 v. Chr.), in einer an den griechischen Mythos anknüpfende Gründungslegende (Abstammung von den Trojanern) und vor allem in der römischen Praxis griechischer Kulte seit archaischer Zeit.

Für den von *Bender* verfolgten komparativen Ansatz wäre vielleicht ein ganz anderes Charakteristikum Roms interessanter gewesen: Sehr typisch für Rom ist die Negation von

Niederlagen und, darauf aufbauend, die permanente Neukonstruktion der eigenen Geschichte ohne Niederlagen. Für die römische Geschichte in republikanischer Zeit mindestens ebenso wichtig wie die Überwindung Karthagos (im ersten punischen Krieg wie *Bender* ja richtig feststellt ohne einen wirklichen Sieg in einer oder mehreren Entscheidungsschlachten errungen zu haben) sind die großen Niederlagen gegen den Etruskerkönig Porsenna (508/7 v. Chr.), gegen die Gallier (390-387/6 v. Chr.) und gegen die Samniten bei Caudium (321/20 v. Chr.), wobei der Etruskerkönig und die Gallier auch die Stadt Rom für einige Zeit erobert hielten. In den Konfliktbewältigungsritualen, die man in Rom entwickelte, fehlen entscheidende Elemente: Auffällig ist, daß es in Rom weder eine rituelle Gefallenenbestattung gegeben, noch daß das Schicksal der Kriegsgefangenen in irgendeiner Weise rituell in die Gemeinschaft eingebunden gewesen wäre, oder daß es Kriegsrückkehrrituale gegeben hat. Dies verweist auf einen ungewöhnlich ideosynkratischen Umgang mit militärischen Niederlagen und stellt sicher einen wesentlichen Faktor in dieser Entwicklung zur Weltmacht der Antike dar.

Im Gegensatz zu den üblichen Sichtweisen hätte man dies soz. als Kontrapunkt an den Ausgang eines solchen Vergleiches stellen können: Nicht die Siege oder großartigen Eroberungen, sondern die Niederlagen waren konstitutiv für den Konstruktionsprozeß der römischen Eigengeschichte – läßt sich dies nicht viel eher als tertium comparationis eines Vergleichs zwischen Rom und Amerika verwenden, wenn man die Auswirkungen des 11. Septembers mit den daran

anschließenden Kriegen in Afghanistan und im Irak vor Augen hat?

Charlotte Schubert

Michael Mitterauer: Warum Europa? Mittelalterliche Grundlagen eines Sonderweges, C. H. Beck, München 2003, 352 S.

Die Frage nach den Ursachen für den so genannten europäischen „Sonderweg“ beschäftigt verschiedene Wissenschaftsdisziplinen bereits geraume Zeit. Seit Max Weber in der Einleitung zu seinen „Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie“ bereits 1920 von einer „okzidentalen Sonderentwicklung“ in dem Sinne sprach, daß es hier über eine „Verkettung von Umständen“ zu „Kulturerscheinungen“ kam, die von universeller Bedeutung und Gültigkeit werden sollten¹, wurde diese Frage in den Wissenschaften immer wieder aufgeworfen und unterschiedlich beantwortet. So etwa vom einflußreichen französischen Historiker Fernand Braudel² und vom Soziologen Immanuel Wallerstein³, indem sie auf die Herausbildung einer spätmittelalterlichen und frühneuzeitlichen europäischen „Weltwirtschaft“ verwiesen. Der Soziologe Michael Mann pocht in seiner historisch-soziologischen „Geschichte der Macht“ nachdrücklich darauf, daß die entsprechende Machtkonfiguration, die in den späteren Sonderweg münden sollte, bereits um das Jahr 1000 gegeben war – und zwar begrenzt auf das nordwestliche und zentrale Europa.⁴ Während die beiden ersteren eine ökonomistische Erklärung bevorzugen, betont letzterer die unintendierte

Überlappung von politisch, militärisch, ökonomisch und ideologisch verdichteten Machtnetzwerken; dabei komme keinem Priorität gegenüber dem anderen zu.

Der Wiener Mediävist und Sozialhistoriker, dessen bisheriges wissenschaftliches Œuvre der historischen Komparatistik verschrieben war,⁵ greift in seinem neuen Werk, das er (glücklicherweise) nicht als sein „abschließendes Lebenswerk“ (S. 15) betrachtet, die Thematik des Sonderweges aus neuen Blickwinkeln auf. Er kann dabei auf eine Reihe von eigenen Vorstudien aus den vergangenen Jahrzehnten zurückgreifen, die von der Suche nach „Erklärungen“ spezifischer Entwicklungen („Europa ‚erklären‘ und nicht ‚bauen‘“) geprägt sind. Mitterauer legt ein mutiges Buch vor – erstens, weil er sich auf eine weltumspannende Komparatistik einläßt, und zweitens, weil er, wie keiner vor ihm, zuerst einzelne Entwicklungsanstöße – dem Anstoß einer Billardpartie ähnlich – identifiziert und dann deren Wirkungen weiterverfolgt. Dabei zeigt er, wie die Folgewirkungen einzelner Anstöße sich in einer Art und Weise miteinander vernetzen und eine Dynamik entfalten, die den europäischen Sonderweg ausmachen sollten. Das Buch vermittelt durch das Verknüpfungspotential des Autors eine Reihe überraschender Einsichten. Dies ist auch darauf zurückzuführen, daß er weder eine unauffaltssame, irreversible und monokausale Entwicklungslinie konstruiert, noch dem Gedanken des Zufälligen von historischen Prozessen frönt. Sein primäres Erklärungsmodell ist Webers Ansatz der „Verkettung von Umständen“, dessen Potential er großartig zu nutzen weiß. Die Komparatistik dient ihm da-

zu zu demonstrieren, daß es in der islamischen Welt, in China oder Persien sowie innerhalb des europäischen Kontinents während des Mittelalters ebenfalls dynamische Entwicklungspotentiale gab, die zum Teil erst viel später von „Europa“ übernommen wurden, deren Verkettung mit anderen „Umständen“ sich jedoch vielfach nicht so weit verdichteten, daß es zu analogen Entwicklungssprüngen kam.

Von besonderem Interesse ist dabei *Mitterauers* komparatistischer Zugang in Form des interkulturellen Partialvergleichs (S. 14). Wohl um die Gefahren wissend, die im Vergleich hinsichtlich der Konstruktion des Anderen lauern, überwiegt für ihn das positive Erklärungspotential des Partialvergleichs. Er greift dabei in anderen Kulturen nur jenes Kulturphänomen heraus, dessen europäisches Gegenstück er zu analysieren beabsichtigt. Diese Beschränkung erweist sich für den Autor als arbeitstechnisch notwendig, da er in den Vergleich gewöhnlich gleich mehrere europäische und außereuropäische Kulturen einbezieht. Zur Komparatistik dienen ihm sieben Hauptphänomene, die für die europäische Sonderentwicklung, nicht jedoch für die Vergleichskultur charakteristisch sind. Dem entsprechend gliedert sich seine Analyse in sieben Kapitel, in denen der Autor die entscheidenden „Knotenpunkte“ in umfassenden Netzwerken an Bedingungsbeziehungen sowie deren Verkettungen mit anderen „Umständen“ herausarbeitet.

Das erste Kapitel „Roggen und Hafer. Die Agrarrevolution des Frühmittelalters“ ist insofern grundlegend, als die Einführung der beiden Kulturpflanzen, die etwa im mediterranen

Europa nur sehr ungünstige klimatische und ökologische Voraussetzungen vorfinden, laut *Mitterauer* im Zusammenwirken mit der Dreifelderwirtschaft, dem schweren Pflug, dem Kummel und der Wassermühle zum Schlüsselfaktor für die europäische Wirtschaftsentwicklung wurden. Im Unterschied zur etwa gleichzeitig verlaufenden Agrarrevolution im islamischen Bereich gehen von dieser Art des Ackerbaus weitere Innovationen für den sekundären und tertiären Erwerbssektor aus.

Das zweite Kapitel „Vilifikation und Hufenverfassung. Grundherrschaftliche Wurzeln europäischer Sozialformen“ analysiert das Entstehen eines im interkulturellen Vergleich einmaligen Systems der Agrarverfassung, nämlich der Grundherrschaft. Dieser Schlüsselfaktor entfaltete sich im Übergang der älteren Vilifikations- zur Hufenverfassung, also zur zweigeteilten Grundherrschaft mit ihren Abgaben und Diensten sowie ihrem Konzept des grundherrschaftlichen Personenverbandes als „familia“.

Die „Gattenzentrierte Familie und bilaterale Verwandtschaft. Gesellschaftliche Flexibilität durch gelockerte Abstammungsbeziehungen“ stellt für den Autor den dritten Schlüsselfaktor dar. Auch die gattenzentrierte Kernfamilie, die in ein bilaterales Verwandtschaftssystem eingebettet war, stellt ein einzigartiges Phänomen dar – im Vergleich zur beinahe universalen ahnenzentrierten, komplex strukturierten Familie, die ihren typischen Kontext in einem patrilinear strukturierten Verwandtschaftssystem hatte. Während das „intervenierende“ Hufensystem über neue Formen der Arbeitsorganisation für den Übergang zur Kernfamilie

verantwortlich zeichnet, war es das „intervenierende“ Christentum, dessen Ideologie dem patrilinearen System entgegenwirkte und zur Lockerung der Abstammungsbeziehungen führte. Beides hatte eine Lockerung familialer und verwandtschaftlicher Bindungen zur Folge und eröffnete Möglichkeiten zur Entfaltung neuer Sozialformen.

Den vierten Schlüsselfaktor stellen für den Autor „Lehenswesen und Ständeversammlung“ dar, weil dieser „europäische Sonderweg des Feudalismus“ hin zur parlamentarischen Demokratie führen sollte. Den fünften Kristallisationskern für einen europäischen Sonderweg bilden für *Mitterauer* die „Papstkirche und universale Ordensgemeinschaften“ dar. *Mitterauer* erkennt darin das weitaus umfangreichste, für den europäischen Sonderweg relevante Faktorenbündel. Die überregionalen Ordensgemeinschaften mit dem Lateinischen als gemeinsamem Kommunikationsmedium schufen einen weit gestreckten Kommunikationsraum, der die Grundlage für eine erste europäische „Medienrevolution“ im späten Mittelalter abgeben sollte. Diesem Schlüsselfaktor widmet sich *Mitterauer* im siebten Kapitel („Predigt und Buchdruck. Frühformen der Massenkommunikation“), der auf der „Trias“ von Predigt (Oralität), Buchdruck (Literalität) und Holzschnitt (Visualität) beruhte. Hinter den Kreuzzügen in Verbindung mit dem „Protokolonialismus“ der italienischen Seerepubliken (6. Kapitel) vermutet der Autor ein weiteres Charakteristikum des europäischen Sonderwegs, nämlich eine Frühform des späteren transatlantischen Expansionismus.

Dies waren die sieben Kugeln des Billards, die mehr oder weniger

gleichzeitig los gestoßen wurden, dabei aufeinander trafen, dadurch ihre Richtung veränderten, auf weitere „Bewirkungskugeln“ stießen und jene komplexe „Verkettung von Umständen“ bewirkten, die in den europäischen Sonderweg münden sollte. *Mitterauer* stellt solche Geflechte von möglichen Verkettungen und Wirkzusammenhänge im Schlußkapitel dar. Zwei von ihnen seien hier, von der frühmittelalterlichen Agrarrevolution ausgehend, angedeutet: Die „Vergetreidung“ des fränkischen Agrarsystems (über Roggen und Hafer) stand in einem engen Zusammenhang mit dem Hufensystem bzw. mit der Grundherrschaft, die einen bestimmten bäuerlichen Familientypus verstärkte. Auf der Grundherrschaft beruhte die Lehensordnung, in die die Reichskirche eingeordnet wurde. Über die im 11. Jh. entstandene Papstkirche führt ein Entwicklungsstrang zu der von ihr initiierten Kreuzzugsbewegung, die wiederum die Kreuzzugspredigt als Frühform der Massenkommunikation hervorbrachte. Eine ähnliche Brücke führte von den universalen Ordensgemeinschaften zu den frühen Predigtkampagnen des 13. und 14. Jh.s. Ein anderer Wirkzusammenhang ist nach *Mitterauer* zwischen der frühmittelalterlichen Agrarrevolution und der in ihrer Folge entwickelten und von einem vertikalen Rad angetriebenen Wassermühle hin zur Weiterentwicklung des Gewerbes und vor allem des Bergbaus (der Vertikalantrieb wurde für den Antrieb des Blasebalges oder für den Betrieb der Hammermühle eingesetzt) zu erkennen; dies habe bereits im Spätmittelalter „industriell-technische Hochleistungen“ erbracht, die in einem weltweiten Vergleich ohne Parallele seien (S. 278-280).

In einer sich stark verdichtenden Welt der historischen Wissenschaften ist es schwierig geworden, einen wirklich „großen Wurf“ zu landen. *Mitterauers* Werk zählt zweifellos dazu, und es deutet auch die dafür essentiellen Rahmenbedingungen an: konzeptionelle Kreativität, hartnäckiges Verfolgen scheinbar aussichtsloser Spuren, Komparatistik über Zeit und Raum und schließlich eine inspirierende Gemeinschaft von Lehrenden und Lernenden, der er dieses Buch auch gewidmet hat.

Karl Kaser

- 1 Max Weber: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, Bd. 1, Tübingen 1988, S. 1.
- 2 Fernand Braudel: Sozialgeschichte des 15.-18. Jahrhunderts: Aufbruch zur Weltwirtschaft, München 1986.
- 3 Immanuel Wallerstein: Das moderne Weltssystem – Die Anfänge kapitalistischer Landwirtschaft und die europäische Weltökonomie im 16. Jahrhundert, Frankfurt a. M. 1986.
- 4 Michael Mann: Geschichte der Macht, Bd. 2, Frankfurt a. M./New York 1991.
- 5 Insbesondere Michael Mitterauer: Historisch-anthropologische Familienforschung. Fragestellungen und Zugangsweisen, Wien-Köln 1990.

Peter Feldbauer: Estado das India. Die Portugiesen in Asien 1498–1620, (Expansion, Interaktion, Akkulturation. Historische Skizzen zur Europäisierung Europas und der Welt, Bd. 3), Mandelbaum, Wien 2003, 224 S.

Das vorliegende Buch beschreibt den Beginn der Zeit der Portugiesen im indischen Kulturraum. Es erschien in

der Reihe „Expansion, Interaktion, Akkulturation“ der Universität Wien, deren bibliographische Schlagwörter auch den thematischen Rahmen der Darstellung *Feldbauers* bilden. Der Autor betont die Prozeßhaftigkeit des historischen Geschehens und rückt die Interaktion verschiedener Gruppen von historischen Akteuren in den Vordergrund der Darstellung. Der zeitliche Rahmen der Untersuchung erstreckt sich auf die Jahre zwischen der Ankunft Vasco da Gamas im Mai 1498 an der Malabarküste einige Kilometer südlich von Kozhikode (Calicut) und dem Jahr 1620, das vom Autor als Beginn der Zeit der Auseinandersetzungen mit den britischen und niederländischen Ostindienkompanien definiert wird (S. 173).

Zunächst führt der Autor die Leser in die historischen Hintergründe der Seefahrt Vasco da Gamas nach Indien, die Geschichte Indiens und Südasiens vor dem 15. Jh. und den innerasiatischen Handel vor Ankunft der Portugiesen ein (Kapitel 1-3). Dann schreitet er zur Beschreibung und Analyse der portugiesischen Seeherrschaft und ihres Handelsmonopols im Indischen Ozean, gefolgt von der Entwicklung und Struktur des Estado da India, des portugiesischen ‚Herrschaftsraums‘ in Südasien (Kapitel 4-5). Anschließend werden in Kapitel 6 die Situation der Portugiesen im Asienhandel des 16. Jh.s sowie ihre Rolle im westlichen Indischen Ozean entlang der Kaproute geschildert (Kapitel 7). In einem abschließenden Kapitel diskutiert *Feldbauer* die Frage, ob Süd- und Südostasien Handelspartner der Portugiesen waren oder sich im Sinne Wallersteins an der Peripherie Europas befanden (Kapitel 8).

Die vorliegende Untersuchung ist als eine historische Skizze des portugiesischen Asienimperiums konzipiert. Sie soll insbesondere die Diskussion über die atlantische Expansion und die globalgeschichtliche Positionierung Eurasiens 1498–1620 anregen. Dabei setzt der Autor seinen Schwerpunkt auf die Untersuchung sozial- und wirtschaftshistorischer Aspekte mit deutlicher Betonung von Interaktions- und Kommunikationsprozessen.

Feldbauer betrachtet die Expansion der Portugiesen in Südasien eher als einen Austausch der Beteiligten denn als militärische Überwältigung des Schwächeren durch den Stärkeren (S. 58). Er erklärt dies mit dem Hinweis auf zeitgenössische europäische Vorstellungen, daß Kooperation vorteilhafter für die Entwicklung von Handelsbeziehungen gewesen sei. Als Ziel der portugiesischen Unternehmungen nennt der Autor die Etablierung eines Handelsmonopols auf Kosten der asiatischen Kaufleute und der Händler auf der Levanteroute, die mit der politischen Kontrolle des Überseehandels einherging. An anderer Stelle kommt er auch auf die Gewaltmaßnahmen der Portugiesen zu sprechen, die angewandt wurden, um Handels- und Missionsziele durchzusetzen und, so *Feldbauer*, die Zusammenarbeit zwischen Hindus und Muslimen zu brechen. Hier von einem wahrscheinlich „gezielten Terror gegen den Islam“ (S. 59) zu sprechen oder den „Kreuzzug gegen Islam“ mit einem „Kreuzzug um Pfeffer und Gewürze“ (S. 60) gleichzusetzen, ist möglicherweise etwas gewagt. Über diesen Aspekt hätte der Leser gerne noch mehr erfahren.

Die zentrale Frage, die sich als roter Faden durch das Werk zieht, ist das Problem, „inwieweit die portugiesischen Aktivitäten im Rahmen des Estado bereits eine folgenreiche Vorstufe für die [...] imperialistischen Herrschaftsverhältnisse“ (S. 11) des späten 18. und folgender Jahrhunderte waren. Diese Frage wird im Abschlußkapitel mit der Überlegung verknüpft, ob die Länder Süd- und Südasiens für Europa lediglich eine Peripherie darstellten oder aber als Handelspartner fungierten. Hier setzt er sich deutlich von der Beurteilung Wallersteins ab, der Asien als eine externe Arena der Weltwirtschaft betrachtet. *Feldbauer* plädiert statt dessen dafür, daß es sich bei der portugiesischen Expansion im 16. Jh. um ein „Zeitalter kontinuierlich zunehmender, folgenreicher Interaktionen“ handele, „die die Integration von Welthandel und Weltökonomie vorantrieben und – zumindest langfristig – Technologietransfer, Akkulturation sowie internationale Arbeitsteilung beförderten“ (S. 203). Eine Dominanz und/oder privilegierte Stellung der Europäer im Rahmen der Weltwirtschaft sei zu jenem Zeitpunkt noch nicht vorhersehbar gewesen.

Nach *Feldbauers* Einschätzung war der Estado da India ein ausgewogenes Netz an Knoten- und Handelsstützpunkten, das sowohl geographisch als auch in der Handels- und Administrationsstruktur einem ständigen Wandel unterworfen war. Das schließliche Scheitern des Unternehmens führt er auf „fehlende kommerzielle Überlegenheit“ (S. 68) zurück, betont aber zugleich die bemerkenswerte geographische Ausdehnung (S. 75). Ein oft übersehenes Kennzeichen des Estado

sei seine finanzielle Autonomie gewesen.

Insgesamt ist es dem Autor gelungen, die komplexen Handels- und Wirtschaftsbeziehungen des 16. Jh.s übersichtlich darzustellen sowie die deutsch-, englisch-, französisch- und portugiesischsprachige Fachliteratur thesenartig und kontrastierend vorzustellen. Besonders hervorzuheben ist, daß der Estado da India nicht nur in seinen Auswirkungen auf den indischen Subkontinent, sondern auch mit seinen zahlreichen Verflechtungen sowohl innerhalb des westlichen Indischen Ozeans als auch Südasiens bis hin zu den Handelsrouten nach Japan und China gleichermaßen in den Blick genommen wird. Dem Erkenntnisinteresse des Autors entsprechend, liegt der Schwerpunkt in der Darstellung auf wirtschaftshistorischen Fragestellungen, während Entwicklungen im kulturellen, religiösen oder sozialen Bereich nur in komprimierter Form behandelt werden.

Das Buch ist ein wichtiger Beitrag zu einer Geschichte der kommunikativen Wechselbeziehungen in der außereuropäischen Welt. Diese kann aber nur dann wirklich umfassend geschrieben werden, wenn erheblich mehr über die Wahrnehmungen und Handlungsstrategien der Menschen in eben jener außereuropäischen Welt bekannt ist. An dieser Stelle regt das Buch zu weiterer Forschung an. Das Buch hätte durch einen Index und eine etwas gehobenere kartographische Darstellung erheblich gewonnen.

Margret Frenz

Kersten Krüger: Die landständische Verfassung (=Enzyklopädie deutscher Geschichte. 67), R. Oldenbourg Verlag, München 2003, XII + 148 S.

Die Aufgaben eines Lehrbuchs erfüllt der Band in fast idealer Weise. *Krüger* besitzt einen dezidierten Begriff seines Gegenstands: „Die Landständische Verfassung gehört zum europäischen Frühparlamentarismus, der – welthistorisch singular – auf allen Ebenen gesellschaftlicher Organisation den Regierten politische Mitbestimmung an den Aktivitäten der Regierenden einräumte.“ (S. 1); immer behält er damit dessen Gegenwartsbedeutung im Blick. Deshalb kann er sich angenehm kurz fassen. Mit sicherem Strich zeichnet er „Entstehung und Aufstieg“ ständischer Mitbestimmung im Mittelalter; beschreibt ihre „Struktur und Funktionen“; hebt er die „Folgen der Reformation“ hervor; schildert er einen „Modell-Landtag“; gibt er eine „Übersicht über Landstände 1769“; diskutiert er ihre „Schwächung und Verdrängung nach dem Dreißigjährigen Krieg“. Geschickt werden diachrone und systematische Hinsichten verschränkt, klar treten die großen Linien hervor. *Krüger* beherrscht (was selten geworden ist) einen zupackenden, durchsichtigen Stil; souverän sind Anschauung und Reflexion zum Ausgleich gebracht. Ein umfangreiches, nach Regionen und Territorien gegliedertes Literaturverzeichnis öffnet den Weg vom knappen Resümee in die Spezialforschung. All dies läßt das Buch rundum empfehlenswert erscheinen.

Zugleich treibt es handfeste Geschichtspolitik. Die Beschäftigung mit der landständischen Verfassung ist für

Krüger ein „historische[r] Rückblick“ auf die „Vorformen“, „Gewinne“ und „Risiken“ des Parlamentarismus (S. XI). Gezeigt werden soll erstens, daß es eine durchgehende Kontinuität gab in der Entwicklung vom „Frühparlamentarismus“ des Mittelalters (S. 1) über die landständische Verfassung hin zum modernen Parlamentarismus; zweitens, daß die landständische Verfassung in den Territorien des Reichs ein Analogon und Äquivalent darstellt zu den parlamentarischen Traditionen anderer europäischer Länder (S. 1 f., 81 f. u. ö.). Freigelegt werden soll eine deutsche Traditionslinie, die, als Teil einer europäischen, aber als solche „welthistorisch singulär“ (S. 1), auf den Parlamentarismus der Gegenwart zustrebt und „seit dem Ende sozialistischer Diktatur eine beträchtliche Expansion erlebt“ (S. XI), einen neuen Höhepunkt erklommen hat. Traditionspflege heißt das Ziel, als Legitimation der Gegenwart wird Geschichtswissenschaft hier betrieben.

Natürlich kann man einen solchen Standpunkt einnehmen. Allerdings sollte man sich damit, zumal in einem Lehrbuch, zur Disposition stellen. *Krüger* geht einen anderen Weg. Seine Gegner: die Anwälte einer Unterscheidung zwischen Landständen und modernen Parlamenten, kommen in seinem Forschungsbericht nur als historische vor. Und ihre Sicht wird als politisch-instrumentelle diskreditiert. Nur um das Versprechen der Bundesakte von 1815 unterlaufen zu können, habe Friedrich Gentz „die ältere Landständische Verfassung scharf von der modernen Repräsentativverfassung abgegrenzt“ (S. 37). Nur weil die preußischen Provinzialstände ihnen als Relikt der altständischen Verfassung

erschieden, hätten Marx und Engels den Partikularismus der Landstände und deren prinzipielle Vorstaatlichkeit betont (S. 44). Nirgendwo nimmt *Krüger* solche Positionen ernst, nirgendwo diskutiert er systematisch die alten und neuen Einwände gegen seine *invention of tradition*. Im Gegenteil, wo immer es geht, hebt er in seinem Forschungsbericht Argumente für die Kontinuitätsthese hervor – so daß selbst Otto von Gierkes Absage daran hinter sein Zugeständnis zurücktritt, die Landstände hätten die „Volksüberzeugung von der Nothwendigkeit eines Beteiligungs des Volkes am Staatswesen“ befestigt und vertieft (S. 42).

Im Ergebnis entsteht so ein einseitiges, um nicht zu sagen, tendenziöses Bild der Forschung. Selbst ein scharfer Kritiker an der hemmenden, retardierenden, herrschaftsteilenden Rolle der Stände wie Gerhard Oestreich wird von *Krüger* eingemeindet. Kein Wort ist ihm der Revisionismus der angelsächsischen Geschichtswissenschaft wert, der immerhin das Muster aller Parlamente völlig neu bewertet hat. Auch daß die universalhistorische Einzigartigkeit des europäischen Parlamentarismus längst infragegestellt wird, quittiert *Krüger* mit Schweigen; auf die Forschung zu den Territorien im Reich bleibt sein Blick beschränkt. Am gravierendsten jedoch scheint, daß er die wichtigste neuere einschlägige Studie zu seinem Gegenstand nicht referiert: Barbara Stollberg-Rilingers „Vormünder des Volkes“ (Berlin 1999). In ihr wäre *Krüger* ein neuer, kulturalistischer Ansatz der Ständeforschung begegnet (anstelle des sozialhistorisch-verfassungsgeschichtlichen, der seinen eigenen Blick bestimmt), vor allem hätte er sich mit dem gescheiterten

Einspruch auseinandersetzen müssen, der seit langem gegen die Kontinuitätsthese formuliert worden ist. Daß Krüger dazu die Größe nicht aufbrachte, mindert die Empfehlbarkeit seines Buches doch erheblich.

Johannes Süßmann

Jean Nicolas: La Rébellion française. Mouvements populaires et conscience sociale 1661–1789, Seuil, Paris 2002, 507 S.

Jean Nicolas hat mit diesem Band vollendet, was ein ähnlich gewichtiges Buch im Jahre 1988 angekündigt und auf dem Niveau der Forschungshypothesen und verwendeten Kategorien ausprobiert hatte: eine Gesamtschau der gewaltförmigen Konflikte und Erhebungen über mehr als ein Jahrhundert zwischen dem Beginn der persönlichen Herrschaft Ludwigs XIV. 1661 und dem Ausbruch der Revolution 1789. Mehr als 8500 Rebellionen hat der Verfasser mit Hilfe von 57 Kolleginnen und Kollegen, die ihre Regionalexpertise bereitwillig zur Verfügung gestellt haben, identifiziert. Frankreichs durch die Revolution vereinheitlichte Archivlandschaft macht solche nach gemeinsamen Standards durchgeführte Untersuchungen überhaupt theoretisch möglich, aber für ihre Realisierung wird eine enorme organisatorische Kraft und Disziplin benötigt. Nur selten gelingt es auch im Land der „Enquêtes“, für die Marc Bloch und Lucien Febvre schon in den 1930er Jahren heftig warben, ein solches Vorhaben zu vollenden und zu verhindern, daß es im Stadium beeindruckender, aber inkommensurabler Regionalmonographien stecken bleibt.

Nicolas hat mit der Formulierung eines Fragebogens begonnen¹ und die darin postulierten 72 Typen von Konflikten (die sich zu 15 Gruppen zusammenfassen lassen – vgl. die Übersicht S. 548–550) zunächst an bereits einigermaßen erforschten Gegenständen getestet. Nun legt er einen Gesamtüberblick vor, der alle mit physischer Gewaltanwendung verbundenen Auseinandersetzungen von Volksbewegungen (gegen Kirche, Staat, Municipalität und Grundherren sowie weitere Notabeln) und das gesamte Spektrum der Konflikte in der Arbeitswelt von Streitigkeiten über die Bezahlung bis zu größeren Streiks umfaßt. Im letzteren Bereich bezieht der Verfasser auch nicht gewaltförmige Proteste mit ein, während er sich sonst auf die registrierte Übertretung des Gewaltverbotes gegen Personen und gegen Sachen konzentriert.

Die geographische Verteilung zeigt bestimmte Zonen Frankreichs, die auf lange Sicht besonders anfällig für Erhebungen waren: Paris und seine Umgebung, Maine und Anjou, das Artois und die Picardie, das Bas-Languedoc, das Roussillon und Korsika. Dagegen blieben die Bretagne, Savoyen und die Provinzen des östlichen und mittleren Frankreich (mit Ausnahme des Elsaß und Lothringens) sowie die Normandie, das Orléanais und der Südwesten verhältnismäßig ruhig, wenn man die teilweise durchaus beträchtlichen Zahlen für rebellische Akte zur Bevölkerungszahl ins Verhältnis setzt (Karte S. 33).

Auf der Zeitachse erkennt man ein relativ niedriges Niveau bis um die Wende vom 17. zum 18. Jh., in dessen erstem Jahrzehnt ein Höhepunkt unverkennbar hervorsticht, gefolgt von

einem Abschwung bis zum Ende der 1730er Jahre, nach einem erneuten Anstieg bis Mitte der 1750er Jahre folgt noch einmal ein kurzer zehnjähriger Rückgang und danach ein kontinuierlicher Anstieg der Zahl von Erhebungen und sozialen Protestbewegungen bis zum Ende des Ancien Régime, so daß die Revolution auch vor diesem Hintergrund nicht als eruptiv in die Geschichte getretene neue Tendenz erscheint, sondern vielmehr als Fortsetzung eines Trends, der sich schon seit den 1770er Jahren abzeichnete.

Hinsichtlich der Größe der Orte, die sich als besonders anfällig für Erhebungen erwiesen, liegen die Dörfer mit weniger als 500 Einwohnern und die Städte mit mehr als 2000 Einwohnern gleichauf: jeweils reichlich 40% aller Erhebungen fanden hier statt, während in den nach der Bevölkerungszahl dazwischen liegenden *bourgs* signifikant weniger Unruhen ihren Ausgangspunkt nahmen.

Unter den Anlässen dominieren die Erhebungen gegen den Fiskus und hier vor allem gegen die Kassierung indirekter Steuern mit 39,1% aller von *Nicolas* und seinen Mitarbeitern registrierten Fälle, während rund ein Sechstel aller Unruhen (17,6%) auf den Streit um Lebensmittel und ihre Preise entfiel. 14,1% der Ausschreitungen richteten sich gegen repressive Akte des staatlichen Apparates. Nur 5,1% der Rebellionen waren direkt gegen die Grundherrschaft gerichtet, während es sich in 5,2% der Fälle um Protestbewegungen wegen der Löhne oder der Arbeitsbedingungen im Handwerk handelte. In den 3,1% der Unruhen, die auf religiöse Gründe zurückgeführt werden können, sind

Auseinandersetzungen um den Protestantismus, um den Status der Janse-nisten, aber auch um die Anhänglichkeit zu lokalen Kulturen enthalten. In weniger als zwei Prozent der Fälle wurden municipale Autoritäten direkt attackiert, und in reichlich einem Prozent der Fälle spielten regionalistische Motive in den neu annektierten Gegenden wie dem Roussillon, dem Franche-Comté und auf Korsika eine Rolle. Nur gering war der Anteil jener Emeuten, die sich gegen öffentlich breit und strittig erörterte Reformideen des Staates richteten, und nur zwölf (von 8528) Erhebungen wandten sich gegen den Adel und seine Privilegien.

Diese wenige Daten resümieren in dürren Angaben den enormen materialen Reichtum der Studie von *Nicolas*, der sich zunächst den Akteuren auf beiden Seiten der Konflikte, den Vertretern der Staatsmacht und der niederen Gerichtsbarkeit, aber auch den organisierten Schmugglern und kriminellen Banden zuwendet und danach einzelne Typen von Erhebungen und diverse Anlässe für Unruhen Revue passieren läßt. Den Blick von oben, den die Quellen vorgeben, indem sie über den Tabubruch der Untertanen und die Strafverfolgung Auskunft geben, korrigiert der Verfasser immer wieder eindrucksvoll, wenn er die Folgen von Steuererhöhungen oder Einlagerungen von Militär für ein einzelnes Dorf anschaulich beschreibt und die Verletzung hergebrachter Normen durch die staatlichen Eingriffe schildert. Er kann sich dafür auf eine stattliche Bibliothek sozialgeschichtlicher Studien zur regionalen Agrargeschichte des Ancien Régime stützen, die vor 15-20 Jahren im Bewußtsein des Faches noch als bemerkenswerte Leistungen

und Grundlage des internationalen Erfolges der französischen Historiographie fest verankert waren, heute jedoch durch manchen *cultural turn* hinfort gespült scheinen. So ist es nicht das mindeste Verdienst von *Nicolas*, diesen ungeheuren Fundus an Wissen für eine Gesellschaftsgeschichte Frankreichs aus der Sicht der sozialen Erhebungen zu nutzen und damit auch neu zu erinnern (S. 551-585).

Insgesamt ein vorzügliches Buch, dem eine breite Rezeption zu wünschen ist, auch wenn sein Umfang auf diejenigen abschreckend wirken mag, die sich an die Darstellung komplexer historischer Vorgänge auf kaum mehr als 100 Seiten zu gewöhnen beginnen.

Matthias Middell

- 1 Zum Analyseraster vgl. J. Nicolas (Hrsg.), *Mouvement populaires et conscience sociale XVIe–XIXe siècles*, Paris 1985.

Philippe Castellano: Enciclopedia Espasa – Historia de un aventura editorial, Editorial Espasa Calpe, Madrid 2000, 582 S.

Das 19. Jh. gilt als das Zeitalter der Enzyklopädien. Gegenstand von *Philippe Castellanos* Werk ist die *Enciclopedia Universal Ilustrada Europeo Americana*, die erst im ersten Drittel des 20. Jh.s entstanden ist, jedoch hinsichtlich ihrer Entstehung noch im kulturellen Kontext des ausgehenden 19. Jh.s verankert ist. Die Frage, inwieweit die Enzyklopädien auch als die Kathedralen des 19. Jh.s betrachtet werden können, scheint dem Rezensenten gleichwohl interessant, wird

jedoch in der Studie nicht gestellt. Dabei scheint ein solch monströses Bauwerk wie die *Enciclopedia Universal Ilustrada*, die das gesamte Wissen der Welt abzubilden versucht und unter der kulturellen Hegemonie der katalanischen Kleriker entstanden ist, durchaus Anlaß zu einer solchen Überlegung zu bieten. Unzählige, oftmals anonym gebliebene Menschen haben teilweise über Jahrzehnte hinweg an der Entstehung dieses Kollektivkunstwerks zusammengewirkt – sowohl bei dem intellektuellen Schaffensprozeß in der Redaktions-Bauhütte als auch bei den Arbeiten in den Druckereien. Auch den unfreien Maurern dieses spanischen Monuments war die Komplizität von Wissen und Macht zutiefst bewußt; ihre Enzyklopädie sollte aber nicht als Einleitungskapitel für eine Revolution dienen, sondern vielmehr die traditionellen Werte der Kirche bestätigen und stabilisieren.

Die in Schweinsleder gebundene und bibliophil mit zahlreichen Illustrationen ausgestattete Ausgabe von *Castellanos* Arbeit ist in den 1990er Jahren in Rennes als Dissertation bei dem Spezialisten des spanischen Verlagslebens, Jean-François Botrel, entstanden. Bei der Arbeit handelt es sich nicht ausschließlich um eine Unternehmens- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte des spanischen Verlagslebens, sondern gleichzeitig auch um eine Regional- und Sozialgeschichte Kataloniens, die auch das intellektuelle Leben im ersten Drittel des 20. Jh.s untersucht.

Der aus der katalanischen Provinz Lleida stammende Autodidakt José Espasa Anguera (1839–1911) gründete 1860 in Barcelona zusammen mit seinem Bruder Pablo Espasa einen Verlag, der sich im 20. Jh. zu einem der

wichtigsten Verlage der spanischsprachigen Welt entwickelt hat. Der Erfolg des Verlags basierte auf José Espasas Konzept einer Enzyklopädie wie es sie bis dato auf dem spanischsprachigen Markt nicht gegeben hatte. Die Leistung José Espasas bestand darin, daß er von der bislang vorherrschenden Orientierung an französischen Vorbildern Abstand nahm und die erfolgreichen deutschen Konversationslexika als Vorlage für die Konzipierung seiner geplanten Enzyklopädie nahm. Von den deutschen Verlagshäusern Brockhaus und Meyer erwarb er die Exklusivrechte, um den Textfundus der beiden deutschen Konversationslexika je nach Bedarf für sein geplantes Editionsprojekt verarbeiten zu können. *Espasa* entschied sich gegen das unhandliche Quartformat der französischen Enzyklopädien und übernahm von seinem deutschen Modell das kleinere Blattformat und das zweispaltige Seitenlayout. Außerdem wurden die einzelnen Artikel nicht wie bei dem *Grand Dictionnaire Universel* von Pierre Larousse mit Namen gezeichnet, da Espasa wie die deutschen Vorbilder auf einen objektiven Charakter des Gesamtwerks Wert legte. Eine der wichtigsten Innovationen, die von Anfang an die Unverwechselbarkeit der *Enciclopedia Universal Ilustrada* von den teilweise zeitgleich erscheinenden Bänden der katalanischen Konkurrenzunternehmen ausmachte, war die Fülle an Abbildungen, die die Artikel didaktisch und ästhetisch illustrieren und dem Leser eine möglichst reale und scheinbar objektive Anschauung bieten sollen. Einen Großteil des ikonographischen Dokumentationsmaterial kaufte der katalanische Verleger vom „Bibliographi-

schen Institut Meyer“ sowie vom Brockhaus-Verlag in Leipzig, der Hauptstadt des europäischen Buchhandels: Druckplatten für Kupfer- und Stahlstiche, Lithographien, Photogravüre und Karten. Die Farbdrucke sowie ganzseitige Schwarz-Weiß-Drucke ließ der katalanische Verleger, der in Barcelona bereits mit deutschen Druckmaschinen arbeitete, von seinen sächsischen Vertragspartnern herstellen, die aufgrund der technischen Entwicklungen deutscher Ingenieurskunst zu jener Zeit die Qualitätsstandards in der Welt setzten. Der Großteil der kleinformatigen Schwarz-Weiß-Illustrationen wurde später von den Mitarbeitern gesammelt und ohne Copyright aus spanischen bzw. anderen europäischen Büchern, Zeitschriften und Postkarten übernommen.

Castellano betont im ersten und zweiten Teil seiner Arbeit die Bedeutung der spanisch-deutschen Kooperation. Leider hat er den sächsisch-katalanischen Kulturtransfer jedoch nur aus einer Richtung beschreiben können, da er keinerlei deutschsprachige Quellen benutzt hat. *Castellano* bezieht sich vor allem auf Korrespondenz in katalanischen Provinzarchiven, Unterlagen des Madrider Firmenarchivs Espasa-Calpe sowie dem Textkorpus der durchschnittlich 1500 Seiten umfassenden 82 Bände der Enzyklopädie selbst. Nach einem Brand des Verlagshauses in Barcelona (1935) sind wertvolle Quellen über die Entstehung der *Enciclopedia Espasa* verloren gegangen. Im ersten Teil des Buches beschäftigt sich *Castellano* mit der Geschichte des Verlagsunternehmens der Espasa-Familie sowie des als Aktienunternehmen gegründeten Verlages *Calpe*, mit dem der Espasa-Verlag seit

1922 wegen finanzieller Engpässe kooperierte. Das Enzyklopädie-Projekt hatte seit 1907, als die ersten Faszikel erschienen waren, zum Stillstand aller anderen Verlagsaktivitäten geführt. 1926 waren die Söhne und Erben des Firmengründers, die das Enzyklopädie-Projekt weniger beharrlich verfolgten als ihr Vaters, schließlich zur Fusion mit dem Verlagshaus *Calpe* gezwungen, hinter dem der größte spanische Papierhersteller *La Papelera Española* sowie das baskische Kreditunternehmen *Banco de Bilbao* standen. Damit waren der riesige Papierbedarf und die finanziellen Ressourcen eines Editionsprojekts gesichert, dessen Produktion sich über mehr als ein Vierteljahrhundert erstreckte und das nicht mehr alleine von einem traditionellen Familienunternehmen gestemmt werden konnten.

Im zweiten und umfangreichsten Teil seines Werkes untersucht *Castellano* die einzelnen Aspekte der intellektuellen Entstehung sowie den Inhalt der Enzyklopädie. Die Rekonstruktion des sozialen Netzwerks der Redakteure und Mitarbeiter ist insbesondere für Barcelona als intellektuellem Feld sehr aufschlußreich: den Großteil der Mitarbeiter rekrutierte der Verlag aus der Universität, dem *Institut d'Estudis Catalans*, den verschiedenen Akademien sowie anderen semiprivaten Vereinigungen mit enzyklopädischem Aktivitäten: etwa dem *Centre Excursioniste de Barcelona* oder dem *Ateu Barcelonès*, ein Zentrum des kulturellen Lebens, das als Kontaktbörse fungierte und den Mitarbeitern der Enzyklopädie eine Bibliothek für ihre Arbeit bot. Doch so stark der katalanische Nationalismus und Optimismus angesichts der Niederlage der kastili-

schen Zentralregierung im Krieg gegen die USA (1898) auch gewesen ist: Das Projekt brauchte die Mitwirkung der Madrider Journalisten und Universitätsprofessoren sowie der Angehörigen der dort ansässigen Akademien, die dem Projekt den notwendigen institutionellen Rückhalt boten und einen Teil ihres Renommees verliehen. Leider erklärt *Castellano* nicht, warum keiner der unter den Madrider Universitätsprofessoren herausragenden Krausisten einen Artikel zu der Enzyklopädie beisteuerte. Quellensicher beschreibt *Castellano* die Gruppe, die sich am stärksten in das Projekt einbringen konnte: Auch wenn der Klerikeranteil nur ein Viertel der knapp 650 nachgewiesenen Mitarbeiter ausmachte, haben die Werte der katholischen Kirche den Inhalt der einzelnen Artikel und die ideologische Kohärenz des Gesamtwerks nachhaltig geprägt. Der hohe Anteil der Kleriker unterstreicht die kulturelle Hegemonie der Kirche über die spanische Gesellschaft. Aber auch die laizistischen Mitarbeiter waren in der Regel den traditionellen Werten der Kirche verhaftet. Einerseits dominierte unter den Angehörigen der katalanischen Bourgeoisie der Glaube an den technischen Fortschritt, der mir Akribie in der Enzyklopädie dokumentiert wird; andererseits wächst das Bedürfnis nach Ordnung und Wiederherstellung der auseinanderstrebenden Sinnzusammenhänge. In einer sorgfältigen Analyse des Textkorpus der ersten 15 Bände kommt *Castellano* zu dem Ergebnis, daß sich die mit der Urbanisierungswelle und der industriellen Revolution verbundenen gesellschaftlichen Spannungen und Fragen in den einzelnen Artikeln der Enzyklopädie widerspiegeln. Aber der Autor macht auch

auf die spannende Debatte innerhalb des Mitarbeiterpools aufmerksam, indem er wichtige Konfliktlinien herauspräpariert: zwar wird in dem *Zensur*-Artikel die paternalistischen Staatseingriffe gerechtfertigt oder unter dem Stichwort *Civilización* die Herrschaft des Europäers im Bündnis mit dem Christentum und die Auslöschung anderer Zivilisationsformen legitimiert; doch wird in anderen Einträgen, der Caciquismo und die damit verbundene Korruption kritisiert sowie unter dem Stichwort *Centralización* die Dezentralisierung des Landes propagiert. Ebenso gelingt es sowohl den Vertretern des Freihandels als auch den Befürwortern der Schutzzollpolitik ihre jeweiligen Argumente im „Espasa“ einzubringen.

Der dritte Teil und kürzeste Teil der Arbeit behandelt die technische Produktion; der 1. Weltkrieg unterbrach die Handelsverbindungen mit Deutschland und im Verlauf der 1920er Jahre, als die spanische Hauptstadt wieder an Bedeutung gewann, wurde der Druck der Enzyklopädie nach Madrid ausgelagert. *Castellano* beschreibt die Verkaufs- und Werbestrategien des Verlages für die unterschiedlichen Märkte und erklärt den ökonomischen Verkaufserfolg der in Spanien zum nationalen Prestigeobjekt gewordenen Enzyklopädie. Auch wenn die Verkaufsstrategen von vornherein davon ausgingen, daß auf dem spanischen Markt der größte Teil des Umsatzes erfolgte, hatten sie für den lateinamerikanischen Markt mit höheren Umsatzzahlen gerechnet als dann tatsächlich erreicht wurden. Ein Erklärungsversuch für die Zurückhaltung der lateinamerikanischen Käufer bietet *Castellano* leider nicht an und läßt den

Leser allein mit der vom Verlag angebotenen und wenig überzeugenden Erklärung, daß unfertige Werke im spanischsprachigen Amerika nur schwer zu verkaufen wären (S. 494). Möglicherweise wurde die Enzyklopädie, die im Titel mit *Americana* wirbt, in der lateinamerikanischen Presse kritischer beurteilt als in Spanien. Ob die starke Referenz auf Barcelona bei der Erklärung von Alltagsgegenständen sowie der in den Texten mitschwingende Eurozentrismus und die Ablehnung der indigenen Menschenrassen Amerikas beim lateinamerikanischen Publikum anders wahrgenommen wurde als in Spanien, bleibt offen. Vielleicht störte man sich in Lateinamerika aber auch nur am spanischen Nationalismus, der den Textkorpus nachhaltig prägte. Inwieweit sich die Mitarbeit der 17 Prozent Hispanoamerikaner im Inhalt des Werkes niederschlägt, wird ebenfalls nicht für wichtig erachtet. *Castellano* begnügt sich damit festzustellen, daß die Hispanoamerikaner die größte Gruppe unter den ausländischen Mitarbeitern stellten. Dabei hätte eine Einschätzung der Wirkung der Enzyklopädie auf das lateinamerikanische Publikum aufschlußreiche Antworten liefern können.

Wie ein roter Faden durchzieht *Castellanos* Arbeit das spanische Interesse an deutscher Kultur und Technik. Im „Espasa-Calpe“ dominieren in den Bibliographien zu den einzelnen Artikeln in der Regel deutsche Titel, die in *Castellanos* Buch oft mit Druckfehlern wiedergegeben werden. Die auf Kosten Frankreichs erfolgte geistige Öffnung für deutsche Geist- und Industrieproduktionen hängt für *Castellano* eng zusammen mit der neuen geopolitischen Lage nach dem Deutsch-

Französischen Krieg 1870/71 sowie den wissenschaftlichen Leistungen der deutschen Universitäten, die den Erfolg der deutschen Industrie erst ermöglichten. Es sollte jedoch nicht übersehen werden, daß das Interesse an deutscher Kultur und Technik insbesondere auch über den Krausismo und die Beschäftigung mit dem Denken des deutschen Philosophen Karl Krause vermittelt wurde.¹ Die führenden spanischen Krausisten tauchen interessanterweise in *Castellanos* Arbeit nicht auf, wie auch der Name Krause im Register nicht erscheint. Nur im Nebenersatz erwähnt werden die von Madrider Krausisten begründete und reformerisch wirkende Bildungsinstitution *Institución Libre de Enseñanza* sowie die wissenschaftliche Austauschorganisation *Junta para Ampliación de Estudios*.

Trotz dieser Anmerkungen, die das Buch nicht schlecht machen wollen, sondern vielmehr als Ergänzungen zu einer profunden Studie zu verstehen sind, sei *Castellanos* Buch nicht nur jedem empfohlen, der sich mit der spanischen Geschichte zwischen 1900 und 1930 beschäftigt, sondern bietet auch allen eine anregende Lektüre, die sich für die europäische Buch- und Verlagsgeschichte im ersten Drittel des 20. Jh.s interessieren.

Thomas Neuner

1 Vgl. Thomas Neuner, Karl Krause (1781–1832) in der spanischsprachigen Welt – Spanien, Argentinien, Kuba, Leipzig 2004.

Steffen Kaudelka: Rezeption im Zeitalter der Konfrontation. Französische Geschichtswissenschaft und Geschichte in Deutschland 1920–1940, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2003, 544 S.

In seiner am Göttinger Max-Planck-Institut für Geschichte entstandenen Dissertation untersucht *Steffen Kaudelka* den Umgang deutscher Historiker mit der französischen Geschichte und Geschichtswissenschaft in der Zwischenkriegszeit. Die Studie bedient sich eines rezeptionsgeschichtlichen Ansatzes, der in der deutschen Historiographiegeschichtsschreibung bisher noch kaum erprobt worden ist – wenngleich es gerade im Bereich der deutsch-französischen geschichtswissenschaftlichen Beziehungen einige Vorarbeiten gibt, auf die *Kaudelka* eingangs verweist. Die Frankreichrezeption deutscher Historiker untersucht *Kaudelka* dabei auf verschiedenen Ebenen, indem er die Interpretationen der französischen Geschichte, die Aufnahme und Vermittlung von Ergebnissen der französischen Historiographie und den kollegialen Dialog mit französischen Historikern in den Blick nimmt. Dafür bedient sich der Vf. ideengeschichtlicher wie sozialgeschichtlicher Verfahren und geht auf den biographischen Hintergrund der wichtigsten von ihm untersuchten Historiker(inn)en ein. Dem rezeptionshistorischen Erkenntnisinteresse entsprechend, bilden Rezensionen einen zentralen Quellenbestand der Studie. Damit zieht *Kaudelka* eine Quellengattung systematisch heran, die in historiographiegeschichtlichen Arbeiten herkömmlicherweise eher punktuell beachtet worden ist.

Die Untersuchung ist in vier relativ eigenständigen Strängen angelegt. Den Auftakt bildet die Analyse einer Abhandlung des Tübinger Historikers Johannes Haller über „Tausend Jahre deutsch-französischer Beziehungen“, die im Jahr 1930 erschien und sich als repräsentativ für das Frankreichbild der nationalkonservativen Historiker der Weimarer Republik verstehen läßt. Ausgehend von der traditionellen Vorstellung einer deutsch-französischen Erbfeindschaft zeichnete Haller in seiner Darstellung einen kontinuierlichen historischen Antagonismus zwischen den beiden Ländern und erteilte folgerichtig auch den Möglichkeiten einer gegenwärtigen Verständigung eine Absage. Daß dies nicht die einzige Deutungsmöglichkeit des historischen Verhältnisses zwischen Frankreich und Deutschland darstellte, zeigt *Kaudelka* an einem Buch des französischen Historikers Gaston Zeller, das er als einen impliziten Gegenentwurf zu den Ausführungen Hallers wertet. Auch Zeller argumentierte zwar durchaus von einem nationalen Standpunkt, richtete seine Geschichtsschreibung aber nicht konfrontativ aus, sondern betonte die Tradition der deutsch-französischen Freundschaft.

Den zweiten Analysestrang bildet die deutsche Rezeption der Geschichtsschreibung des berühmtesten französischen Annales-Historikers, Marc Bloch. Dabei untersucht *Kaudelka* weniger die historiographische Aneignung von Blochs Ansätzen, als vielmehr die expliziten Stellungnahmen deutscher Historiker zu dessen Publikationen. Anhand der Rezensionen zu Blochs Hauptwerken der zwanziger und dreißiger Jahre schildert *Kaudelka* eine relativ große

Bandbreite von Reaktionen, wobei der Mediävist Theodor Schieffer seine positiven Einschätzungen sogar noch in den Jahren 1939/40 öffentlich äußerte. Auf der anderen Seite manifestierte sich in einer vielfach detailversessenen Kritik die Hilflosigkeit des deutschen Faches im Umgang mit den innovativen theoretisch-methodischen Angeboten des französischen Kollegen. Insgesamt ergibt sich jedoch das Bild einer geringen Resonanz auf die Arbeiten des Annales-Historikers, die über einzelne Besprechungen hinaus nicht breit zur Kenntnis genommen wurden.

Den Kern des dritten Untersuchungsbereichs stellt die Frankreich-historiographie Hedwig Hintzes dar. Der Fokus der Studie ist in diesem Teil jedoch stark ausgeweitet, und der Autor zeichnet ein intellektuelles Porträt der Historikerin, in dem er insbesondere deren politisches Denken in der Weimarer Republik und den dreifachen Außenseiterstatus thematisiert, den Hintze als Frau, Jüdin und Sozialistin im Fach hatte. Auch in ihrer politischen und historiographischen Haltung gegenüber dem Nachbarland war Hintze untypisch für die deutsche Historikerschaft. So übte sie in den zwanziger Jahren zwar deutliche Kritik am französischen Nationalismus und an der französischen Deutschlandpolitik, setzte sich mit ihren Arbeiten aber gleichwohl für eine deutsch-französische Annäherung ein, die sie als integralen Bestandteil einer gesamteuropäischen Befriedung faßte. Geschichtswissenschaftlich drückte sich dies in ihrem Bemühen um die Vermittlung von Kenntnissen über die französische Historiographie aus. In Hintzes Deutung der Französischen Revolution schließlich, mit der sie sich insbesondere in

ihrer 1928 erschienenen Habilitationsschrift befaßte, verschmolzen politisches und historiographisches Engagement. So legt *Kaudelka* dar, daß Hintzes Eintreten für die soziale Demokratie in der Weimarer Zeit einerseits auf der Verinnerlichung der politischen Ideale von 1789 basierte, und daß der Historikerin die Französische Revolution andererseits wiederum zum Lehrstück für die Gegenwart wurde, mit dem sich die aktuellen politischen Forderungen abstützen ließen.

Im letzten Teil des Buches rekonstruiert der Vf. die Versuche des Historikers und Privatgelehrten Heinrich Sproemberg, den deutsch-französischen Wissenschaftsaustausch durch die Begründung einer „Deutschen Geschäftsstelle zur Verbreitung geschichtswissenschaftlicher Literatur im Ausland“ zu fördern. Mit Sproemberg rückt eine weitere untypische Figur in den Blick, die sich durch einen offenen und kooperationsbereiten Umgang mit der französischen Geschichtswissenschaft vom Gros der deutschen Kollegen unterschied. Das Projekt der „Geschäftsstelle“, mit dem eine systematische internationale Rezensionstätigkeit organisiert werden sollte, wurde Anfang der dreißiger Jahre auf den Weg gebracht und konnte auch nach dem nationalsozialistischen Machtantritt noch eine Zeitlang fortgeführt werden. Insgesamt blieb es jedoch weitgehend folgenlos. Die Ursache für das Scheitern lag in der skeptischen bis ablehnenden Haltung der nationalkonservativen Historikerschaft, die sich, wie *Kaudelka* betont, nach der Zäsur vom Januar 1933 zunehmend in eine bewußte Selbstisolierung begab. Sproemberg wurden Mitte

der dreißiger Jahre wegen seiner politischen Einstellung und seiner jüdischen Herkunft die institutionellen Ressourcen entzogen.

Steffen Kaudelka hat mit seiner Dissertation eine gut geschriebene und facettenreiche Untersuchung vorgelegt, die sich auf bisher wenig beachtete Aspekte der deutsch-französischen Wissenschaftsbeziehungen konzentriert. Indem er ein breites Spektrum von Reaktionsformen deutscher Historiker(inn)en aufzeigt, gelingt es ihm, ein differenziertes Bild von der deutschen Rezeption der französischen Geschichte und Geschichtswissenschaft in den zwanziger und dreißiger Jahren zu erarbeiten. Konzeptionell ist die Untersuchung allerdings nicht immer vollends geschlossen. Während sich einige Teile (wie etwa das politische Porträt Hedwig Hintzes) relativ weit von der zentralen Fragestellung entfernen, hätten sich aus anderen Befunden noch weitergehende interpretatorische Schlußfolgerungen ziehen lassen. So bleibt als zentrales Ergebnis der Untersuchung, daß die deutsche Fachauseinandersetzung mit der französischen Geschichtswissenschaft, von Ausnahmen wie Hintze und Sproemberg abgesehen, eine Geschichte der Nichtrezeption und der Ablehnung von Verständigungsversuchen darstellt. Die Erklärung dieser Rezeptionshaltung hätte ausführlicher ausfallen können. *Kaudelka* verweist zwar abschließend auf die wissenschaftlichen „Rezeptionsbarrieren“ (S. 474), deutet aber lediglich an, daß sie als Ausdruck eines nationalistischen Wissenschaftsverständnisses zu betrachten sind, dem zufolge der internationale Austausch der Selbstverständigung durch Abgrenzung diene. Die Tatsache, daß die do-

minierende Rezeptionsform der deutschen Historikerschaft in der Nicht-zurkenntnisnahme und der Verweigerung des Dialogs bestand, macht es zudem schwierig, die Frage nach „dem Transfer und der produktiven Umdeutung“ der französischen Historiographie bzw. Geschichte zu beantworten, die sich der Vf. eingangs gestellt hat (S. 29). Auch wenn in diesen Aspekten Fragen bestehen bleiben, hat *Kaudelkas* Studie mit ihrem rezeptionsgeschichtlichen Ansatz gleichwohl einen vielversprechenden Weg gewiesen, auf dem sich die Historiographiegeschichte an transnationale Forschungsperspektiven anschließen läßt, die in der Geschichtswissenschaft in den letzten Jahren ein verstärktes Interesse erfahren haben.

Jan Eckel

Norbert Götz: „Ungleiche Geschwister. Die Konstruktion von nationalsozialistischer Volksgemeinschaft und schwedischem Volksheim“, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2001, 598 S.

Norbert Götz vergleicht in seiner Doktorarbeit zwei ähnlich gelagerte Gesellschaftsmodelle: Die deutsche *Volksgemeinschaft* wird dem sogar bis in die 1980er Jahre hinein existenten und erst am Beginn der 1990er Jahre gescheiterten schwedischen *Volksheim* gegenübergestellt. Schon aufgrund ihrer fast analogen Entstehung, ihres phasenweisen Parallellaufens und wegen des stark gesellschaftstransformativen Ansatzes beider, bietet sich dieser Vergleich an.

Götz nähert sich dem auf verschiedenen Ebenen. Zunächst zeichnet er

die begriffsgeschichtlichen Verläufe nach und untersucht, wie und wann die Ideen dieser Modelle entstanden sind, um dann daraus vergleichend die gesellschaftliche Verankerung beider Begriffe zu erläutern.

Dabei stößt er auf Bemerkenswertes. Entgegen landläufiger Überzeugungen war die Volksgemeinschaft keine nationalsozialistische Erfindung, sondern schon weitaus früher Teil des politischen Standardrepertoires fast des gesamten Parteienspektrums. Von der Sozialdemokratie bis zu den Deutschnationalen hatte die Volksgemeinschaft in den Programmen einen festen Platz. Lediglich für die linksradikalen Parteien (KPD, USPD) war die Idee der Volksgemeinschaft nicht richtungweisend. Bei den Nationalsozialisten gab es zwar ebenfalls keine offiziell programmatisch festgeschriebene Volksgemeinschaftsoption, aber sie gehörte zu ihrem häufig genutzten Vokabular. Schließlich erlangte die Volksgemeinschaft ihre traurige Berühmtheit als „Vorstellung vom rassebestimmten Volk als Kampfkollektiv“ (S. 281) im Dritten Reich. Geboren wurde die Idee der Volksgemeinschaft aus dem „Geist von 1914“, wie es Verhey (2000) bezeichnet, als in der Kriegsbegeisterung der Massen eine Umkehr der egoistischen Gesellschaft in eine „idealistische, brüderliche Gemeinschaft“¹ proklamiert wurde. So wurde die Volksgemeinschaft in den dreißiger Jahren als eine Fortführung der „Frontgemeinschaft“ in den Schützengraben des ersten Weltkrieges verstanden. Eine besondere Anziehungs- und Prägekraft hatte die nationalsozialistische Volksgemeinschaft wohl auf junge Leute, denen, wie es damals in rechten Kreisen verbreitet gedacht wurde, das

Kriegserlebnis vorenthalten blieb. Sie suchten dann ihren Ersatz in einer Volksgemeinschaft nationalsozialistischer Provenienz, wie dies beispielsweise auch die Biographien führender HJ-Vertreter bezeugen.

Das schwedische Volksheim war – salopp gesagt – der demokratische Gegenentwurf zur nationalsozialistisch ausgestalteten Volksgemeinschaft. Der Begriff Volksheim tauchte zuerst in der Rhetorik der Konservativen und der Bürgerlichen auf und wurde dann von den Sozialdemokraten übernommen. Unter deren Führung wurde das Volksheim auch zu einem Synonym des schwedischen Staates und zum Modell für viele moderne Wohlfahrtsstaaten. Ein breiter gesellschaftlicher Konsens, der nahezu das gesamte politische Spektrum Schwedens umspannte, war der Schlüssel für die Langlebigkeit des schwedischen Volksheims und dessen starke Prägekraft auch über die Grenzen hinaus.

Nach der empirisch-begriffsgeschichtlichen Erfassung des Themas widmet sich *Götz* im zweiten Teil der Arbeit den programmatischen und politischen Merkmalen beider Gemeinschaftsmodelle. Welche Maßnahmen wurden ergriffen? Wo wurde der Hebel angesetzt, um die jeweiligen gesellschaftspolitischen Vorstellungen umzusetzen? *Götz* beschreibt die Charakteristika beider Systeme recht materialreich, wobei die jeweilige Ausrichtung des Staates erkennbar dargestellt wird.

Das deutsche System zog sich auf die rassische Komponente zurück und akzeptierte nur jene als Teil der Volksgemeinschaft, die „arisch“ waren. Die deutsche Volksgemeinschaft

versuchte ihre Existenzberechtigung durch Homogenität zu begründen, die allerdings nur durch Ausgrenzung zu schaffen war. Wobei auch dort teilweise Ausnahmen gemacht wurden, wie das prominente Beispiel des Luftwaffeninspektors Erhard Milch beweist. Milch war im Jargon des Dritten Reiches „Halbjude“ und wurde, aufgrund seiner Bedeutung für das deutsche Reich, mittels der so genannten „Deutschblütigkeitserklärung“ von Göring zum „Nichtjuden“ und damit zum Teil der deutschen Volksgemeinschaft erklärt.

In Schweden hingegen umschloß die Definition des Volksheims alle Bewohner des Landes. Es wird also deutlich, was bei der demokratischen Ausrichtung des schwedischen Staates auch nicht weiter verwundern dürfte, daß eine offene Zivilgesellschaft angestrebt wurde. Eine Gesellschaft, in der die Mitbürger (*medborgare*) solidarisch miteinander umgehen sollten. In Schweden gab es eben keine Unterteilung in Volksgenossen und „Minderwertige“.

Bei der Gegenüberstellung beider Staaten treten allerdings nicht nur Unterschiede zutage. *Götz* weist speziell auf Zwangssterilisierungen hin, die in den 1930er Jahren sowohl in Deutschland als auch in Schweden ein probates Mittel der Bevölkerungspolitik darstellten. Teils aus eugenischen, teils aus sozialen Gründen wurde von dieser Möglichkeit in beiden Ländern Gebrauch gemacht. Einschränkend muß erwähnt werden, daß derartige Maßnahmen im Dritten Reich aufgrund der rassisch ausgelegten Volksgemeinschaft weitaus rigider gehandhabt wurden, als dies in Schweden der Fall war, wo lediglich der gesetzliche Rahmen

für Zwangssterilisierungen geschaffen war, der freilich nur selten ausgeschöpft wurde.

Auch trotz einiger Gemeinsamkeiten, wie dem Streben nach einer grundlegenden Gesellschaftsumformung, überwogen die Unterschiede zwischen Volksheim und Volksgemeinschaft ganz eindeutig. Die Dissertation von *Norbert Götz* beschreitet zumindest in Teilen Neuland. Bisher waren Vergleiche zwischen beiden Modellen, wie es auch in der Einleitung zur Arbeit dargelegt wird, eher unterschwellig und sind nur „zwischen den Zeilen“ (S. 15) statuiert worden. Dies geschah sicherlich aus Furcht vor sich eventuell ergebenden Kongruenzen und Ähnlichkeiten beider Modelle, die durchaus vorhanden sind. Dadurch, daß beide Gemeinschaftsentwürfe in ihren Ländern eine intensive Prägekraft besaßen, ist ein solcher Vergleich durchaus sinnvoll und lohnenswert. Durch die Parallelität, die Ähnlichkeit und die dessen ungeachtet auftretenden gravierenden Unterschiede beider Typen, ist diese Arbeit kein sinnloses Unterfangen und geschweige denn ein Vergleich zwischen Äpfeln und Birnen. Sie trägt zum Verständnis der Zeit bei. Als alternative Bilanz seiner Arbeit bricht Götz eine Lanze für das skandinavische Modell, das seiner Ansicht nach weiterhin als Muster für die gesellschaftspolitische Ausgestaltung Europas dienen sollte, als ein Gegenentwurf zur angelsächsischen Gesellschaftskonstruktion.

Auch wenn die Metaphern, die Götz wählt, um die Verschiedenartigkeit beider Modelle zu unterstreichen, teilweise ungeschickt gewählt sind, wie der von „schwedischen Stachelbeeren und deutschem Giftgas“ (S.

532), ist sein Buch eine gelungene Studie zu zwei unterschiedlichen Gesellschaftstransformationsmodellen, wovon das eine aufgrund seiner ideologischen und rassischen Borniertheit auf dem Scherbenhaufen der Geschichte landete und das andere durch seine zivilgesellschaftliche und demokratische Anlage langfristig eine Vorbildfunktion für moderne Sozialstaaten einnahm.

Frank-Thoralf Günther

- 1 Verhey, Jeffrey, „Der Geist von 1914 und die Erfindung der Volksgemeinschaft“, Hamburg 2000, S. 374.

Hans-Jürgen Lüsebrink: La Conquête de l'espace public colonial. Prises de parole et formes de participation d'écrivains et d'intellectuels africains dans la presse à l'époque coloniale (1900–1960). (=Studien zu den frankophonen Literaturen außerhalb Europas 7), IKO-Verlag, Frankfurt a. M., 2003, 272 S.

Während bereits seit mehreren Jahren im Zuge der „postcolonial studies“ in den englischsprachigen Literatur- und Sozialwissenschaften eine Vielzahl von Studien erschienen sind, die sich in einer kritisch dekonstruktivistischen Perspektive (überwiegend) mit der britischen Kolonialzeit und ihren Folgen auseinandersetzen, steht die vergleichbare französischsprachige Diskussion in vielen Bereichen noch in den Anfängen. Wichtige Impulse gingen dabei von dem DFG-Sonderforschungsbereich „Identität in Afrika“ der Universität Bayreuth aus. Im Kontext der Bayreuther Arbeitsgruppe um János Riesz ist auch die vorliegende Publika-

tion von *Hans-Jürgen Lüsebrink* entstanden.

Ausgangspunkt der Studie ist die Feststellung, daß die etablierte Historiographie häufig auf dem gedruckten Buch als alleinige Analysebasis aufbaut. Wie *Bernard Mouralis*, französischer Literaturwissenschaftler und Spezialist für die frankophone Literatur aus dem subsaharischen Afrika, in seinem Vorwort festhält, besteht damit das Risiko, daß ein „vereinfachtes“ und „deformiertes“ Bild der Vergangenheit gezeichnet wird. Letztlich wird die Wahrnehmung damit auf die Werke beschränkt, die Zugang zu Verlagen gefunden haben und die einer vorgefaßten Idee von literarischen Genres entsprechen. *Lüsebrink* will diese Perspektive aufbrechen, in dem er den Fokus erweitert und die veröffentlichte Textproduktion afrikanischer Schriftsteller und Intellektuellen in der französischsprachigen Presse in Frankreich und den afrikanischen Kolonien für den Zeitraum 1900–1960 untersucht. Gleichzeitig möchte der Autor auf den „kulturellen und diskursiven Kontext“ berücksichtigen und auf diese Weise, die Hintergründe der jeweiligen publizistischen Aktivitäten erhellen. – Im ersten Teil des Buches, „enjeux“, stellt *Lüsebrink* seinen Ansatz vor. Unter der Überschrift „centre et périphérie“ diskutiert er im ersten Kapitel ausführlich die Orte der Presseproduktion: Zum ersten Periodika, die in Frankreich von Afrikanern gegründet worden waren, zum zweiten Periodika, die in den Kolonien erschienen und zum dritten weitere französische Periodika in denen Schwarzafrikaner publiziert haben. Darüber hinaus hinterfragt er die Rolle der Zensur und zeigt, daß die offene und

explizite Zensur fast inexistent war, daß sich aber viele Beispiele für subtilere Formen der Einflußnahme finden lassen (Paternalismus, gezielte finanzielle Unterstützung, Förderung der Publikation bestimmter Autoren etc.). Schließlich kann er zeigen, daß die Presse ein wichtiger Ort und Voraussetzung der frankophonen Literaturproduktion war: Alle frankophonen Autoren der ersten beiden Generationen haben ihre ersten Schriften in der Presse publiziert. Nach der Einschätzung des Autors hat sich die Presse der Kolonialzeit immer mehr zu einem Forum für die Diskussion über die soziale, politische und kulturelle Entwicklung der afrikanischen Gesellschaften entwickelt – insbesondere in der Periode nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg stehen sich dabei die Presseorgane gegenüber, welche politische Positionen vertreten, die der Kolonialmacht nahe stehen und Presseorgane, die Raum für die Artikulation „afrikanischer“ Positionen geben wollen. Anschließend stellt *Lüsebrink* die Frage nach den Zusammenhängen zwischen der mündlich überlieferten Literatur und der Kolonialpresse. Es gelingt ihm dabei zu zeigen, daß es vielfach die Kolonialmacht war, die ethnographische Schriften angeregt hat – vielfach mit dem Ziel, ein besseres Verständnis für die Bevölkerung der Kolonien zu erhalten, um letztlich das Erziehungs- und Verwaltungssystem entsprechend ausrichten zu können. *Lüsebrink* legt zudem dar, daß auch eine afrikanische Geschichtsschreibung schon in der Kolonialzeit entsteht und nicht erst, wie häufig dargestellt, in den Jahren der Unabhängigkeit (3. Kapitel). Diese Publikationen liegen dabei oft quer zu den in den westlichen Wissenschaften

etablierten Grenzen zwischen Historiographie, Ethnographie und Literatur. Nach *Lüsebrink* zeigen sich hier bereits die Wurzeln eines Konflikts um das Verhältnis zwischen einer afrikanischen Geschichtsschreibung und der Historio- und Ethnographie europäisch westlichen Zuschnitts.

Im zweiten Teil des Buches, den *Lüsebrink* „prises de parole“ nennt, kann er zunächst zeigen, daß auch die autobiographischen Schriften vielfach von einer „volonté de savoir“ der Kolonialmacht angeregt und begleitet wurden – wiederum mit dem Ziel, die indigene Bevölkerung besser zu verstehen und damit regieren zu können. Daneben entstehen autobiographische Reiseberichte, in denen Afrikaner von ihren Reisen im Kolonialreich sowie v. a. im französischen „Mutterland“ berichten – wie beispielsweise Berichte von Teilnehmern des Ersten Weltkriegs. Mit Aboulaye Sadjı, Fily Dabo Sissoko und Fodéba Keïta stellt *Lüsebrink* dann Lebenswege und publizistische Aktivitäten dreier von ihm als typisch erachteter afrikanischer Intellektueller dar.

Der dritte Abschnitt ist schließlich unter dem Titel „débats“ den inhaltlichen Auseinandersetzungen gewidmet. Hier stellt *Lüsebrink* zunächst sehr ausführlich und unter Rückgriff auf ältere Publikationen die Rolle der französischen Kolonialausstellungen zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts für die Stützung und Präsentation der Idee eines „Plus Grande France“ dar, um dann zu zeigen, wie die Kolonialausstellungen ab den 1930er Jahren auch zum Ausgangspunkt eines kolonialkritischen Diskurses wurden und zudem zum Kristallisationspunkt der Formung von protonationalistischen Iden-

titäten, in dem die Ausstellungen die kulturellen und ökonomischen Besonderheiten von Teilregionen der Kolonien herausarbeiteten. Unter dem Titel „Métissage et société coloniale“ zeichnet *Lüsebrink* dann die umfangreiche Diskussion um zum Teil die biologisch-rassistisch gedachte um Teil kulturell gedachte „métissage“ nach. Er macht dabei eine doppelte Verankerung dieser Diskussion fest: Zum einen wird die Gruppe der Mischlinge, die aus Beziehungen zwischen Afrikanern und Europäern hervorgegangen ist, zu einem Träger dieser Diskussion. Zum anderen setzt sich im französischen „Mutterland“ in den 1930er Jahren in Abgrenzung zu den rassistischen Ideologien des Nationalsozialismus eine „progressive“ Konzeption des Verhältnisses zu den Kolonien durch. Die Auseinandersetzungen im Zuge der Entkolonialisierung beenden diese Debatte dann in der Nachkriegszeit. Ab den 1930er Jahren entwickelte sich dann erstmals eine kontrovers geführte Debatte unter afrikanischen Intellektuellen über die kulturelle Entwicklung Afrikas. Wie *Lüsebrink* zeigen kann, werden die Konzepte von „assimilation“, „culture franco-africaine“, „individualité ethnique“ von Afrikanern und in Presseorganen für ein afrikanisches Publikum diskutiert. Die Wahrnehmung Frankreichs ist dabei zunehmend von einer Spaltung in „les deux France“ gekennzeichnet: einerseits einer Idealisierung der demokratischen und republikanischen Tradition Frankreichs – ein Bild das von der Kolonialverwaltung verbreitet wird. Andererseits beklagen ab den 1940er Jahren zunehmend viele afrikanische Intellektuelle die Widersprüche zwischen diesem Ideal und den politischen und sozialen

Verhältnissen in den Kolonien. Zensurmaßnahmen der Kolonialverwaltung wirken wie ein Katalysator für einen anticolonialistischen Diskurs.

Der Perspektivenwechsel, den *Lüsebrink* vornimmt, vom „Zentrum“ in die „Peripherie“, von der „großen“ kanonisierten Literatur zum „fragmentierten Feld“ der Publikationen in der Presse der Kolonialzeit, erweist sich als äußerst fruchtbar: Es gelingt ihm zum einen den sozialen Hintergrund der Literaturproduktion zu erhellen. So kann er zeigen, daß es häufig die Kolonialmacht war, die aus dem Bestreben, die afrikanischen Gesellschaften besser verstehen und regieren zu können, die publizistischen Aktivitäten afrikanischer Intellektueller anregte und förderte. Zum zweiten greift seine Studie weit über das Feld der Literaturwissenschaft hinaus, wenn *Lüsebrink* beispielsweise darlegt, daß die Kolonialmacht mit der Förderung der publizistischen Aktivitäten paradoxerweise auch die Foren geschaffen hat, die dann ab den 1930er Jahren zum Ort von anticolonialistischen Diskursen werden, umfaßt seine Analyse allgemeine sozialwissenschaftliche Fragestellungen. Gerade aus der Perspektive eines Sozialwissenschaftlers ist allerdings kritisch anzumerken, daß es *Lüsebrink* unterläßt, seinen theoretisch-konzeptionellen Ansatz zumindest kurz darzustellen – eine Klärung zentraler von ihm verwendeter Begriffe wie v. a. „Diskurs“ hätte der Arbeit mehr konzeptionelle Schärfe verleihen können. Sein methodisches Vorgehen läßt *Lüsebrink* leider ganz im Dunkeln – es bleibt daher unklar, wie er sein Korpus genau abgegrenzt hat und wie er dann die Diskurse in diesem Korpus analysiert hat

– beispielsweise mit welchen Hypothesen er an diesen Korpus herangetreten ist. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit den Konzepten einer „sozialwissenschaftlichen Diskursanalyse“ wie sie etwa im „Augsburger Arbeitskreis Sozialwissenschaftliche Diskursanalyse“ diskutiert werden (Keller et al. 2001, 2004) oder neuere konzeptionelle Überlegungen von französischen Sprachwissenschaftlern zur Diskursanalyse (insbesondere Maingueneau 1996, 2002) hätte die Anschlußfähigkeit der Arbeit und v. a. auch die konzeptionelle Klarheit erhöhen können.

Der kreative und gut durchdachte Perspektivenwechsel, die aufwendige Recherche und nicht zuletzt die interessanten Ergebnisse machen die Arbeit insgesamt aber höchst verdienstvoll. Sie ist über die Literaturwissenschaft hinaus für LeserInnen aus Ethnologie, Geographie und Politikwissenschaft mit Interessen an der Historiographie des „frankophonen Afrikas“ und Fragen des Postkolonialismus zu empfehlen.

Georg Glasze

Manuel Schramm: Konsum und regionale Identität in Sachsen 1880–2000. Die Regionalisierung von Konsumgütern im Spannungsfeld von Nationalisierung und Globalisierung (= Vierteljahrschrift für Sozial- und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, Beiheft 164), Steiner, Stuttgart 2002, 329 S.

Manuel Schramm hat mit „Konsum und regionale Identität in Sachsen 1880–2000. Die Regionalisierung von Konsumgütern im Spannungsfeld von Nationalisierung und Globalisierung“ eine geringfügig überarbeitete Fassung

seiner 2001 an der Universität Leipzig eingereichten Promotion vorgelegt. Es ist ihm – soviel vorweg – eine innovative Verbindung bisher weitgehend unverbundener Forschungsfelder und -themen in angenehmer Sprachführung sowohl für Wissenschaftler als auch interessierte Laien gelungen.

Schramm verbindet bereits im Titel die Wissenschaftsgebiete der Konsumgeschichte und der Regionalismus- und Identitätsforschung. Diesen Anspruch unterlegt er durch passende Theorieangebote. Seine weiter ausgreifenden Ambitionen einer Einordnung des Themas in Fragen von Nationalisierung und Globalisierung gelingt aber nur im Ansatz. Dieser verweist auf zentrale Fragestellungen zur neueren Gesellschaftsgeschichte, doch bleibt er in der Arbeit selbst ungelöst.

Dies hat zum einen sicher mit der Faßbarkeit des Phänomens in den konkreten Studien zu tun, zum anderen jedoch mit der schieren Bearbeitbarkeit dieses Feldes.

Bereits im verwirklichten Teil hat sich *Manuel Schramm* nämlich einiges vorgenommen. Die berücksichtigte Zeitperiode, immerhin etwa 120 Jahre, umfaßt mehrere politische Systeme. Bei jedem entsteht die Notwendigkeit einer konsumgeschichtlichen Aufarbeitung in Abhängigkeit von politischen, wirtschaftlichen und gesellschaftlichen Bedingungen. Diese Bearbeitung mußte zwangsläufig an der Oberfläche bleiben, um den Schwerpunkt auf der Frage nach Kontinuitäten und Brüchen von regional-typischen Produkten und Konsumgewohnheiten, dem Wert regionaler Labellierung und ebensolcher Identifikationsprozesse zu belassen.

Schramm stellt im ersten Kapitel der Arbeit Definitionen der wichtigsten Termini sowie theoretische Zugänge zum Themengebiet in anschaulicher Weise vor. Die in den nächsten vier Kapiteln folgenden Fallstudien analysieren Produktinszenierungen, geht es ihm doch in erster Linie um Bedeutungen und Bedeutungszuweisungen. Weist also der Gesamttitel noch auf einen makrohistorischen Ansatz, so sind die Fallstudien fein ausgearbeitete meso- und mikrohistorische Beiträge, die auch einzeln stehend interessante Anstöße für weitere Untersuchungen liefern können. Für die erwähnten Fallstudien-Kapitel wählt *Schramm* die Einteilung in „Inszenierungen regionaler Produktensembles“ im öffentlichen Raum am Beispiel von Industrieausstellungen und Regionalfesten (Kapitel 2), „Regionale Küche und Ernährungsgewohnheiten“ anhand von (angeblich) typischem Kaffee-, Gebäck- und Kartoffelspeisengenuß (Kapitel 3), „Volkskunst“ in weiter Begrifflichkeit als erzgebirgszentrierte Untersuchung von Holzspielzeugwaren, Weihnachtsdekorationen und Trachten (Kapitel 4) sowie international anerkannte Produktqualitäten aus Sachsen am Beispiel des Meissner Porzellans, der Plauener Spitze und der Autos aus Zwickau (Kapitel 5).

Schramm verweist hinsichtlich dieser Auswahl auf die Kriterien der Bedeutsamkeit sowie seine Bindung an das vergleichende Projekt C 1 „Konsum und Region. Sachsen und Bayern 1890-1995“ im Sonderforschungsbereich 417 der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft zu „Regionenbezogenen Identifikationsprozessen“ (besonders sichtbar in der Berücksichtigung von Trachten, die für Sachsen eine unter-

geordnete Rolle spielen, in Bayern aber zentrales Merkmal regionaler Kultur sind), kommt aber zu dem Schluß, daß dies vermutlich nicht zu „anderen systematischen Ergebnissen“ (S.12) geführt hätte.

Bereits diese Vielfalt in den Fallstudien legt eine breite Quellenbasis nahe, die sowohl aus gedruckten als auch archivalischen Materialien besteht und durch publizistische Veröffentlichungen gestützt wird.

Im abschließenden sechsten Kapitel kommt *Schramm* zu fünf Phasen der Regionalisierung, die er hinsichtlich der vorherrschenden Stereotype / Zuschreibungen und der multiplizierenden Akteure differenzierte. Es sind dies die „kulturelle Regionalisierung“ (S.275) in Reaktion auf Nationalisierungstendenzen zwischen 1880 und 1920 sowie in Reaktion auf ökonomische Globalisierungsprozesse um 1900, politisch gewollte Regionalisierungen aus propagandistischen Gründen zwischen dem Ende der 1920er Jahre und 1945, Tendenzen der „Entregionalisierung“ (S.278) durch die zentralen Leitungsambitionen zwischen 1945 und etwa 1970, Regionalförderung aufgrund konsumentenseitiger Nachfrage (Distinktionswünsche) in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren sowie ein erneuter Aufschwung von Regionalisierungen in den 1990er Jahren durch verbesserte Durchsetzungsmöglichkeiten und das Phänomen einer auch konsumgüterbasierten „Ostalgie“ (S.282). Schließlich fügt *Schramm* dem Kapitel eine Typisierung des regionalisierten Konsums hinzu, die – der historischen Forschung noch eher fremd – besonders Soziologen Ansätze zur wissenschaftlichen Auseinandersetzung bieten wird. Die vier ermit-

telten Typen sind: aus der traditionellen Volkskultur resultierender gemeinsame, genau festgelegter Gebrauch bestimmter Güter zu speziellen Anlässen; teure Qualitätsprodukte mit einer bestimmten Herkunftsangabe als Zeichen sozialer Distinktion; der historisch nachfolgende Typus regionalen Produktgebrauchs als Ausdruck eines schichtenübergreifenden, auf Stil und Geschmack hinweisenden Lebensstils sowie die bewußte Stützung einheimischer Produkte als Reaktion auf ökonomische Krisenzeiten.

Schramm versteht es hervorragend, einzelne Konsumgüter als Zeichen einer Region, eines Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühls sowie einer gleichzeitigen Vergesellschaftung des Einzelnen und Konstitution des Individuums zu erklären. Der Nachweis einer symbolischen und territorialen Abgrenzung von Produkten in einer Welt unüberschaubarer und oftmals beliebig austauschbarer Konsumgüter ist schlüssig. Das Manko der Untersuchung liegt in der Bearbeitung der Interaktionsmuster zwischen den am Prozeß der Bedeutungs- und Qualitätszuweisung der Produkte beteiligten Gruppen. Insbesondere der Einfluß des Konsumenten bleibt recht undeutlich.

Insgesamt ein Buch zur regionalen Konsumgeschichte, das zahlreiche Möglichkeiten weist, weitere Forschungen in dieser Richtung voranzutreiben.

Heike Wolter

Sphären von Öffentlichkeit in Gesellschaften sowjetischen Typs: Zwischen partei-staatlicher Selbstinszenierung und kirchlichen Gegenwelten/ Public Spheres in Soviet-Type Societies: Between the Great Show of the Party-State and Religious Counter-Cultures, hg. von Gábor T. Rittersporn, Malte Rolf und Jan C. Behrends (Komparatistische Bibliothek, Bd. 11), Peter Lang Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 2003, 457 S.

Was haben sowjetische Kommunalkas gemeinsam mit kirchlichen Organisationen in Ungarn oder Zeitungskorrespondenten in der Volksrepublik China? Alle drei – wie auch die anderen Beiträge in der zweisprachigen (deutschen und englischen), von Gábor T. Rittersporn, Malte Rolf und Jan C. Behrends herausgegebenen Artikelsammlung – beziehen sich auf eine Form von „Öffentlichkeit“, deren Existenz trotz des allgegenwärtigen und alldurchdringenden sozialistischen Staates behauptet wird, wenn sie sich in ihrer Ausprägung auch von der Öffentlichkeit westlicher Gesellschaften unterscheidet. Das in dem Band verwendete Konzept von Öffentlichkeit wird dabei losgelöst von dem Habermasschen, normativen Begriff und wird statt dessen definiert als potentielle Handlungsspielräume – außerhalb der staatlich definierten Öffentlichkeit, aber nicht unbedingt in Opposition zu ihr.

„Gesellschaften sowjetischen Typs“ verfügen in dem vorliegenden Band über unterschiedliche Öffentlichkeiten und erschöpfen sich nicht einfach in dem Gegensatz zwischen dem Privaten und dem Öffentlichen. Einige Autoren – wie z. B. *Ingrid Os-*

wald und *Viktor Voronkov* – sprechen von zwei unterschiedlichen Öffentlichkeiten: der offiziell-öffentlichen und der privat-öffentlichen (neben der tatsächlichen Privatsphäre). Andere verwenden die Idee einer „zwischen-geschalteten“ oder einer „schweigenden Öffentlichkeit“, etwa in Form von (teilweise offiziell sanktionierten) Versammlungen. In den Augen der Herausgeber kann dieses breit angelegte Konzept von Öffentlichkeit die Trennung zwischen Regierenden und Regierten aufweichen und damit die Bedeutung der Akteure auf beiden Seiten herausstreichen. In seinem Artikel über nationale Narrative und sozialistische Öffentlichkeit in Polen greift *José M. Faraldo* auf den Foucaultschen Begriff von Macht zurück als „currents surfacing at certain moments and disappearing at others“ (S. 305), um eine stereotype Einordnung von Staat und Bevölkerung in aktive Handlungsträger und passive Rezipienten zu vermeiden.

Geographisch reichen die hier versammelten Fallstudien vom Prototyp der Sowjetunion über die Satelliten Tschechoslowakei, Polen, Ungarn und DDR bis hin zur Volksrepublik China. Die Anordnung der einzelnen Kapitel folgt der jeweiligen geographischen Ausrichtung. Thematisch wird das Phänomen der Öffentlichkeit aus drei verschiedenen Richtungen angegangen: Erstens aus der Perspektive einer Opposition zwischen Parteiöffentlichkeit und alternativen Öffentlichkeiten (die im Untertitel des Bandes genannten „kirchlichen Gegenwelten“ sind dabei irreführend, weil es sich bei diesen Gegenwelten keinesfalls immer um kirchliche handelt); zweitens aus dem Blickwinkel der Öffentlichkeit als öffentlicher Raum; und drittens schließ-

lich aus der Sicht der Öffentlichkeit als ein zwar durch die Partei definierter, nicht aber unbedingt durch sie (vollständig) kontrollierter Handlungsraum. Die erste Perspektive – Parteiöffentlichkeit vs. alternative Öffentlichkeiten – hat die meisten Beiträge auf sich vereint und konzentriert sich hauptsächlich auf die Rolle der Kirche (DDR, Polen, Ungarn) und der Kunst (DDR, Tschechoslowakei). Dabei wird nicht nur untersucht, wie diese Gegenöffentlichkeiten gegen den Staat arbeiteten, sondern auch, wie sie mit dem Staat ihren Platz in der Gesellschaft aushandelten und wie der Staat wiederum diese potentiell gefährlichen Gegenwelten wahrnahm.

Die zweite Perspektive – Öffentlichkeit als öffentlicher Raum – beleuchtet die Interaktion zwischen Staat und Bevölkerung in Kommunalkas, Vergnügungsparks und sozialistischer Stadtplanung (alles Sowjetunion). Es wird der Frage nachgegangen, inwieweit der Staat seine Botschaft an die Bevölkerung, deren wirkungsmächtige Partizipation an der Öffentlichkeit mehrfach hervorgehoben wird, zu übermitteln vermochte, und es wird in diesem Zusammenhang gezeigt, daß diese Kommunikation nicht ohne Interferenzen seitens nicht-staatlicher Akteure und Transformationen der ursprünglichen Botschaft vonstatten ging.

Die dritte Perspektive führt ein weit engeres Konzept von Öffentlichkeit ein, nämlich Öffentlichkeit als Handlungsspielraum, der von vornherein durch die Partei definiert ist. Im Falle der Sowjetunion ist dies das Ritual der Kritik und Selbstkritik innerhalb der Partei während des Stalinismus; im Falle Chinas die Rekrutierung

von Zeitungskorrespondenten aus der Bevölkerung, welche die Partei als Vertreterin von Arbeitern und Bauern in ein glaubwürdiges Licht rücken sollen. Sowohl die sowjetischen als auch die chinesischen Öffentlichkeiten sind dabei zu dem Zweck eingerichtet worden, die Partei der Bevölkerung näher zu bringen (oder vielmehr andersherum: die Bevölkerung durch die Partei zu vereinnahmen), und beide Öffentlichkeiten zeichnen sich durch einen hoch ritualisierten Sprachgebrauch aus – genannt „Newspeak“ oder „officialese“ im chinesischen Fall.

Die vorliegende Sammlung von Fallstudien mit all ihrer Bandbreite an Gesellschaften und Themen zeigt, wie problematisch die Klassifizierung nach Zugehörigkeit zu einem angenommenen „sowjetischen Typ“ sein kann. Es ist die Meinung der Herausgeber, daß eine solche Klassifizierung die untersuchten Gesellschaften adäquater zu beschreiben vermag als die abgenutzte Bezeichnung „sozialistisch“. Es muß jedoch in Frage gestellt werden, ob nicht gerade die Mehrdeutigkeit und Offenheit des Begriffs „sozialistisch“ die Verschiedenartigkeit der untersuchten Gesellschaften viel akkurater erfassen kann, während der „sowjetische Typ“ eine Einheitlichkeit suggeriert (mit der Sowjetunion als zu befolgendem Modell), die, wenn überhaupt, nur oberflächlich existierte. Die in dem vorliegenden Band getroffene Klassifizierung ist dabei nicht einfach eine Frage der stilistisch korrekten Wortwahl, sondern sie wirft zugleich zwei weitere Probleme auf, denen sich der Leser angesichts der Fülle der Fallstudien ausgesetzt sieht und auf die im Folgenden kurz eingegangen werden soll.

Zum einen drängt sich die Frage auf, ob ein umfassenderes konzeptuelles Modell von Öffentlichkeit nicht hilfreicher gewesen wäre, um den Begriff von „Öffentlichkeit“ in den unterschiedlichen sozialen und kulturellen Kontexten zu verstehen. Sicherlich richtet sich das Habermassche Modell zu sehr an westlichen, weitgehend demokratischen Gesellschaften aus; aber stellt uns die Annahme eines „sowjetischen“ Modells nicht vor dasselbe Problem, nur vom entgegengesetzten Blickwinkel aus? Viele als „sowjetisch“ definierten Eigenschaften in dem vorliegenden Band – etwa die Annahme unterschiedlicher Akteursrollen in Abhängigkeit von der jeweiligen Öffentlichkeit, in der diese Rollen ausgeübt werden – sind zweifellos kein exklusives Merkmal „sowjetischer“ Gesellschaften. Eine komparativ angelegte Ausweitung der Fallstudien auf Gesellschaften „anderen Typs“ wäre in dieser Hinsicht vielversprechend und würde vermutlich zu allgemeineren Theorien von Öffentlichkeit führen.

Zum anderen vernachlässigt die Konzentration auf das „Sowjetische“ tendenziell solche Kräfte, die eine Gesellschaft eben mehr idiosynkratisch als sowjetisch machen. Was unterschied den sowjetischen Staatssozialismus von dem Polens, der DDR oder Chinas? (Man ist versucht, „sozialistische“ Staaten wie Nordkorea oder Kuba – die ebenso wenig wie China einen „sowjetischen Typ“ verkörpern – in eine imaginäre Länderliste mit aufzunehmen.) Welche Rolle spielten dabei die Tradition oder traditionelle Öffentlichkeiten in der Aushandlung von öffentlichen Räumen und Öffentlichkeiten? Wie wird der Sozialismus,

wie werden Öffentlichkeiten „sowjetischen Typs“ in anderen Kontexten angeeignet? Was heißt in diesem Zusammenhang genau „Bezugnahme auf das sowjetische Modell“: Welchen Ideen entspringt diese Bezugnahme, welchen Regeln folgt sie, wessen Interessen dient sie im Einzelfall? Solche im Ansatz skizzierte Fragen zeigen nur die Notwendigkeit einer sowohl empirischen als auch theoretischen Ausweitung der vorliegenden Fallstudien.

Barbara Schulte

Michael Maset: Diskurs, Macht und Geschichte. Foucaults Analysetechniken und die historische Forschung, Campus Verlag, Frankfurt a. M./New York 2002, 268 S.

„Ich bin ein Experimentator und kein Theoretiker“, sagte Michel Foucault in einem 1980 gegebenen Interview, „Experimentator in dem Sinne, daß ich schreibe, um mich selbst zu verändern und nicht mehr dasselbe zu denken wie zuvor.“ Diese Haltung des intellektuellen Experiments auch auf die Rezeption seiner Bücher zu übertragen und das Gedachte gegen den allgegenwärtigen Drang der Kristallisation flüssig zu halten, war sein Anliegen: „Das ist keine allgemeine Methode“, fügte er an, „die für andere ebenso wie für mich definitiv gültig wäre. Was ich geschrieben habe, sind keine Rezepte, weder für mich noch für sonst jemand. Es sind bestenfalls Werkzeuge – und Träume.“ (Der Mensch ist ein Erfahrungstier. Frankfurt/M. 1997, S. 24 f.). Die internationale Foucault-Rezeption teilt sich seit langem in zwei Gruppen: in diejenigen, die solche Worte für Ko-

ketterie halten, hinter denen sich ein intellektueller Schaumschläger versteckt, um sich nicht festlegen zu müssen; und in diejenigen, die sie für Gelassenheit halten, in welcher gerade die Fruchtbarkeit seines Werkes für die kulturhistorische Forschung gründet. Der Verf. der anzuzeigenden Arbeit, die als Dissertation an der Universität Kassel entstanden ist, gehört erkennbar zur zweiten Gruppe. Den möglichen Nutzen der foucaultschen Arbeiten für die historische Forschung auszuloten, ist das Anliegen seiner Arbeit. Er spricht dabei von „Analysetechniken“ und legt den Schwerpunkt damit erkennbar auf eine methodisch-epistemologische Reflexion und weniger auf eine inhaltliche Diskussion der Bücher Foucaults. Als Leitlinien seiner Argumentation dienen ihm, wie bereits im Titel erkennbar, zwei der drei zentralen Pole foucaultschen Denkens: Diskurs und Macht. Den dritten Pol, das Subjekt und seine Entstehungsweisen im modernen Gefüge der Humanwissenschaften, verfolgt er bestenfalls sporadisch. Durchgängig ist die Arbeit von dem Bestreben geprägt, Foucaults Arbeiten nicht nur gegen Entwürfe etwa der Historischen Sozialwissenschaft abzugrenzen und zu verteidigen. Vielmehr sollen sie nicht als Solitäre in einer intellektuellen Landschaft stehen gelassen, sondern ihre Verwandtschaft mit ähnlichen Fragestellungen aufgezeigt werden.

In der Einleitung verfolgt der Verf. noch einmal die Etappen der deutschen Foucaultrezeption in Philosophie, Soziologie und Geschichtswissenschaft und entwickelt aus ihr heraus seine Fragestellung, nämlich die bisher in der Forschung nicht sys-

tematisch wahrgenommenen methodischen Anregungen Foucaults für die Geschichtswissenschaft zu bestimmen (S. 42). Interaktion und soziale Struktur sowie Ideen- und Sozialgeschichte nicht mehr als Gegensatzpaare, sondern als fruchtbare Verschränkungen zu modellieren, darauf zielt sein Entwurf ab. In einem 1. Teil verfolgt er daher das Verhältnis von Struktur und Praxis und arbeitet vor allem Foucaults Konzeption von relationalen Machtverhältnissen noch einmal heraus (S. 88 ff. geht er dabei auch cursorisch auf die Frage des Subjekts ein). Am Beispiel der königlichen *Lettres de cachet* und ihrer Nutzung durch die Bevölkerung macht er darauf aufmerksam, daß Macht- und Herrschaftswirkungen gerade im historischen Alltag aufspürbar sind und sich damit der Vorwurf, die Alltagsgeschichte klammere den Herrschaftszusammenhang aus, entkräften läßt (S. 111). Im 2. Teil verfolgt der Verf. anhand der im *Fall Pierre Rivière* von Foucault unternommenen Untersuchung einer Formierung des psychiatrischen Diskurses die Potentiale der Diskursanalyse als historiographiegeschichtliche Methode. Um es sehr unakademisch auszudrücken: hier eiert die Argumentation heftig. Daß sich Foucaults Methode zur Untersuchung der „Formations-, Funktions- und Transformationsbedingungen wissenschaftlicher Diskurse“ (S. 151) eignet, läßt sich kaum noch bestreiten; daß sich mit ihr auch Historiographiegeschichte betreiben läßt, muß deshalb nicht mehr behauptet, sondern vor allem an einem konkreten Beispiel gezeigt werden! Im 3. Teil des Buches werden dann die begriffsgeschichtlichen Entwürfe Kosellecks und Reichardts gegen die Diskursanalyse ab-

gewogen. Hier wirkt *Maset* überzeugend, wenn er auf mangelnde linguistische Fähigkeiten bei Historiker/innen hinweist und in der Diskursanalyse eine fruchtbare Methode zur Aufspürung der sozialgeschichtlichen Wurzeln von Denk- und Sagbarem, von Wissenskonstruktionen sieht (S. 199 ff.). Im 4. Teil unternimmt der Verf. dann einen Überflug über aktuelle Arbeiten zur Geschlechtergeschichte und touchiert damit einen Forschungsbereich, der in Foucaults Arbeiten bestenfalls implizit angesprochen wird. Ihm ist dabei am Spannungsbogen zwischen gelebtem und normativem Geschlecht gelegen, ohne daß dieser noch unmittelbar an Foucaults Analyse gebunden bliebe. Im abschließenden Teil dann lotet *Maset* die Kategorie der Kritik als erkenntnisleitende Maxime historiographischen Arbeitens aus, nimmt noch einmal die Schlagworte des Foucault-Verrisses (Kryptonormativismus, postmoderner Irrationalismus) auseinander und plädiert für eine Übersetzung wissenschaftstheoretischer Überlegungen in die konkrete Forschungspraxis (S. 236). Sich immer wieder die Frage zu stellen, ob man anders denken könne, scheint dem Verf. wie Foucault eine Notwendigkeit, um überhaupt weiterzudenken; sie wird damit zum permanenten *memento mori* jeder/n Historiker/in und zur Grundlage einer kritischen und emanzipatorischen Haltung gegenüber der eigenen in Geschichtlichkeit verhafteten Geschichtsschreibung.

Daß *Masets* Buch eine die verschiedenen Teile synthetisch zusammenführende Zusammenfassung fehlt, ist nur ein äußeres Zeichen seiner problematischen Anlage. Diese liegt

zum einen in Foucaults Werk selbst, d. h. in seiner eingangs angesprochenen Hybridität, begründet. Mehr noch aber findet sie ihren Grund in einem Umstand, der weniger dem Verf. als den Betreuer/innen der vorliegenden Dissertation anzulasten ist. Ein solches Thema eignet sich nicht für eine Qualifizierungsarbeit. *Masets* Text ist ein sympathisches Buch. Es trägt eine Vielzahl von Argumenten zusammen, die auch dem letzten einigermaßen liberal eingestellten Historiker in Deutschland Foucault nahe zu bringen vermögen sollten. Aber sprechen wir es aus: Der Autor hat sich überhoben, der Gegenstand mit ihm Hase und Igel gespielt. Sein Text ist reflektiert, gründlich recherchiert, weitgehend sauber argumentiert, es steckt ohne Zweifel viel Arbeit in ihm. Das nützt ihm aber nicht viel: Bei Planung der Arbeit mögen Ansätze und Fragestellungen innovativ erschienen sein und eine produktive Erweiterung des Diskussionsstands versprochen haben. Mitunter aber entwickelt sich das Feld schneller, als man schreiben kann. Wehlers Totalverriß von Foucault liegt zwar erst sechs Jahre zurück, er erschien jedoch damals schon nur noch peinlich. Foucault gehört inzwischen zum Standardrepertoire kulturgeschichtlicher Reflexion. Ihn zu verteidigen, kann man getrost den Argumenten eigener, quellengestützter Geschichtsschreibung überlassen (an der er sich bewähren muß, wie auch immer). Also, wer soll dieses Buch lesen? Welche Wirkung soll es entfalten? (Daß es eine solche entfalten will, liegt in seinem Genre.) Obwohl in dieser Sparte noch am besten aufgehoben, ist es für eine Einführung in das historische Denken Foucaults und dessen

Anwendungsmöglichkeiten zu verzettelt und zu wenig didaktisch. Für eine Positionsbestimmung ist es zu stark an die Literatur gebunden und zu unsouverän im Urteil (den grandiosen Foucault-Kommentar „Jenseits von Strukturalismus und Hermeneutik“ von Dreyfus/Rabinow kann es nicht erreichen). Es bleibt eine verdienstvolle Zusammentragung zahlreicher Knotenpunkte zwischen Foucaults Denken und der sich lange Zeit in Quarantäne wählenden deutschen Geschichtswissenschaft. Als solche mag es hoffentlich weitere Leser/innen gewinnen. Von weiteren dergleichen Büchern aber sei dringend abgeraten. Foucaults *Ceuvre* ist eine Werkzeugkiste – so sah er es selbst. Es ist längst die Zeit gekommen, die in ihr enthaltenen Utensilien nicht mehr in der Hand zu wiegen, sondern sie forsch anzusetzen, um verrostete Schrauben der Geschichte mit ihnen zu lösen.

Falk Bretschneider

Ulrich Herbert (Hrsg.): Wandlungsprozesse in Westdeutschland. Belastung, Integration, Liberalisierung 1945–1980, Wallstein Verlag, Göttingen 2002, 587 S.

Der Sammelband will sich jenem Aspekt westdeutscher Geschichte bis zum Beginn der 1970er zuwenden, der bislang „eher als nachrangiges Problem wahrgenommen“ worden sei, nämlich der „kulturellen und mentalen Kontinuitäten“, die das Vierteljahrhundert nach dem Kriege prägten. Gegenstand sind also die – gewissermaßen ober- und unterirdisch verlaufenden – Ströme von Werten, Einstel-

lungen, die die Gesellschaft der frühen Bundesrepublik beeinflusst haben.

Unter dem Dach eines vom Hrsg. verfaßten Überblicks zu Beharrungs- und Wandlungsprozessen der westdeutschen Gesellschaft sind 13 Einzeldarstellungen gruppiert, die sich auf das Vierteljahrhundert nach 1945 konzentrieren. Hier finden sich Aufsätze zu den öffentlichen Diskursen zur Abwehr der deutschen Verantwortlichkeit an den NS-Verbrechen wie auch zu den Nachkriegskarrieren der einstigen SS-Kader. Wie die Generation der „45er“, die ihre professionelle Entwicklung nach dem Krieg begann, mit Ablösung der Vorgänger-Generation und einem neuen journalistischen Selbstverständnis den Weg für eine kritischere Öffentlichkeit bereitete, wird ebenso rekonstruiert wie politikwissenschaftliche und soziologische Diskussionen, die schließlich in der Forderung eines Bundeskanzlers, „mehr Demokratie“ zu wagen, mündeten. Sechs Aufsätze thematisieren, wie sich die herrschenden Werte in juristischen Normen spiegelten. Sie haben die Debatte um unehelich Geborene, den Umgang mit Homosexualität und mit der Schulzucht, die Deutungen von jugendlichen Normverstößen, die Jugendkriminalität und die Zwangseinweisungen in die Psychiatrie zum Gegenstand.

Der Umgang der Autorinnen und Autoren mit ihren zum Teil recht spezifischen Gegenständen wirkt sehr gründlich, detailliert und sachlich. Die Einordnung in größere Zusammenhänge bleibt allerdings sparsam, was aber durch den Überblicksessay des Hrsg. kompensiert wird. Der Band enthält ein Personenregister. In dem umfangreichen Anmerkungsapparat laufen allerdings

einige Verweise auf Literatur ins Leere, was sicherlich bemerkt worden wäre, wenn sich der Verlag dazu entschlossen hätten, dem Leser mittels Querverweisen die Handhabung des Apparats zu erleichtern.

Zu Beginn seines ausführlichen Überblicks essays bestimmt *Ulrich Herbert* die Spezifik der hier thematisierten Wandlungsprozesse. In Abgrenzung zu wirtschaftlich-technischer wie auch politischer und sozialer Modernisierung will er Prozesse der „Liberalisierung“ beschreiben, also „die Modernisierung der Lebensweisen und -normen, der politischen Einstellungen im Sinne von Partizipation, Pluralität und Abbau hierarchischer und autoritärer Strukturen“ (S. 12). Nach der Lektüre des Bandes mag sich der Leser fragen, ob die Beschreibung des hier verhandelten Gegenstandes wie auch die angestrebte Abgrenzung von den beiden anderen Modernisierungsprozessen durch den Begriff „Mentalitätswandel“ oder „mentale Modernisierung“ nicht besser geleistet werden könnte. *Herbert* stellt die Entwicklung der ersten beiden Jahrzehnte nach dem Kriegsende als Endphase einer längerfristigen Entwicklung, die in Deutschland etwa 1890 einsetzte, dar. Die Jahrhundertwende erscheint hier als „formative Phase derjenigen kulturellen und mentalen Dispositionen, die auch nach 1945 und bis in die 60er Jahre hinein als wirksam beobachtet wurden“ (S. 35). Das Neue dieser geschichtlichen Phase sei, daß nicht mehr nur einzelne gesellschaftliche Schichten „sondern das Leben nahezu aller Menschen ... durch Prozesse der Urbanisierung und Massenwanderung, der Elektrifizierung und bürokratischen Rationalisierung, des Auf-

schwungs der Wissenschaften und der Medizin, der technischen Erfindungen, der Massenöffentlichkeit und des Aufkommens der großen Massenbewegungen und -ideologien“ verwandelt wurden. Die Eliten im nationalstaatlich ungesicherten und traditionslosen Deutschland hätten die für sie bedrohlichen Effekte der Modernisierung durch die illiberale Verregelung und Kodifizierung der Lebensweisen einzudämmen versucht. „Die Festschreibung von patriarchalischen Strukturen, autoritären Dispositionen in der Erziehung, das strafbewehrte Festzurren von Normalität in diesen Jahren wurde so zum Kennzeichen einer politischen Haltung, die zwar die technische Moderne will, deren kulturelle Ausprägungen – vom Großstadtleben über das Frauenwahlrecht bis hin zur modernen Kunst – aber bekämpfte. Beides, die Suche nach Geborgenheit im Vertrauten, wie die politisch motivierte Abwehr autoritätsgefährdender Neuerungen, greift hier also ineinander“ (S. 38).

Ganz ähnlich habe man sich während der „konservativen Modernisierung“ der noch instabilen und als Provisorium empfundenen Bundesrepublik eingestellt. „Auf diese Weise hatte sich inmitten einer Phase außerordentlich dynamischer wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung ein Gesellschaftstyp erhalten, der sich in vielem an den Wertmaßstäben und Leitbildern der wilhelminischen Gesellschaft orientierte. Gesellschaftliche, kulturelle und strafrechtliche Normen im Verhältnis von Staat und Staatsbürger, von gesellschaftlichen Leitbildern und Individualität, in Bereichen wie Familie und Sexualität, Jugend und ‚Sittlichkeit‘, klassen-, geschlechts- und altersspezifischen Rol-

lenzuweisungen, Bildungschancen und Arbeitsethos entsprachen Mitte der 50er Jahre in offenbar hohem Maße nach wie vor eher den in der Zeit der Jahrhundertwende entwickelten Modellen...“ (S. 39 f.). Diese „schützende Verpanzerung“ (S. 40) der Einzelnen in den traditionellen Orientierungen sei schon in den 1940er Jahren in den USA, schließlich verzögert in Europa, noch mehr hinausgeschoben auch in Westdeutschland, überflüssig geworden. Politische Stabilität, wirtschaftliche Prosperität, die Vergrößerung sozialer Aufstiegschancen haben sie ebenso erübrigt, wie sie für die nun entstehende Konsumgesellschaft und die neu ermöglichte Lebensweise störend wurde. Als Protagonisten dieses Wandels in Westdeutschland macht *Herbert* die Generation der „45er“ oder, anders etikettiert, die „Flakhelfer-Generation“ aus, die ihren Kern in den um 1930 Geborenen hat. „Seit den 60er Jahren bereits rücken sie in die Führungsfunktionen ein, die sie zum Teil bis zur Jahrhundertwende beibehielten. Diese Generation war vermutlich die prägendste und einflußreichste Alterskohorte des 20. Jh.s. Aus diesem Blickwinkel erscheinen die in den 40er Jahren Geborenen – der Kern der späteren ‚68er‘ – eher als Epigonen, als fellow-traveller der Flakhelfer-Generation, deren Ansätze sie aufnahmen und weiterführten und von der sie sich durch Ausdehnung und Radikalisierung der Kritik zu emanzipieren versuchten“ (S. 45).

In seinem Resümee unterstreicht der Hrsg., daß in einer über die politikwissenschaftliche hinausgehenden kulturgeschichtlichen Perspektive die „relative Einheit“ der Jahrzehnte bis 1970 deutlich würde. Als ein „krisen-

hafter Anpassungsprozeß“ sei diese Phase als eine widersprüchliche Einheit der „vollständigen Durchsetzung der Hochmoderne“ mit der „rückversichernden Orientierung an den tradierten Normen“ zu verstehen. Die Liberalisierungsprozesse der Bundesrepublik seien als Teil dieses „Lern-, Anpassungs- und Optimierungsprozesses zu begreifen“ (S. 49). Freilich sind diese Prozesse ohne die Rekonstruktion des übermächtigen Erbes, mit dem die westdeutsche Gesellschaft begann, nicht zu schildern. Der Sammelband realisiert das, in dem er die Kontinuität jener Werte, Einstellungen und Ideologeme freilegt, die jenseits der offiziellen und normativen Abgrenzung zum NS wirkten. Was als nazistisch oder verwerflich galt, war (und ist) perspektivenabhängig. Schon in seiner Einleitung zeigt *Herbert*, daß nach 1945 die meisten Menschen nach wie vor jenen Werten und Einstellungen anhängen, die die Massenbasis für das Funktionieren der Nationalsozialismus gesichert hatten. Zugleich meinten sie nun aber, keine Anhänger nationalsozialistischer Werte und Einstellungen (mehr) zu sein. Während man lediglich die Judenverfolgung, die Rassenlehre, die Kirchenfeindlichkeit und die Machtentfaltung der Parteibonzen als wesentliche und verwerfliche Züge des NS verstand, wurde Anderes nicht als ‚nationalsozialistisch‘ angesehen: „der Krieg und die Art der Kriegsführung etwa, der Antibolschewismus, aber auch die Verfolgung bestimmter Minderheiten wie der Zigeuner, oder die Heranziehung von Millionen ausländischer Arbeitskräfte zur Zwangsarbeit“ (S. 17).

Auch in dem Aufsatz von *Patrick Wagner*, der die Resozialisierung der

NS-Kriminalisten rekonstruiert, kann man Verweise auf die Macht traditioneller, elitär-konservativer Bürgerlichkeit finden. Sie zeigt sich in den ideologischen und moralischen Maßstäben, die die ehemaligen Sipo-Kriminalisten, die einst zehntausende „Berufsverbrecher“ „vorbeugend“ in die KZs deportiert hatten und in den 1950ern in der BKA-Führungsebene integriert wurden, nach dem Kriege anlegten. Über die Wiedereinstellung „entschied die Funktionseleite der leitenden Kriminalbeamten letztlich selbst. ... Als untragbar galten nur jene Kollegen, die zuvor gegen den internen Kommentar der Funktionseleite verstoßen hatten; Verbrechen an Menschen, die selbst nicht der Funktionseleite angehört hatten, wurden als verzeihlich angesehen“ (S. 193).

Zu einem ähnlichen Befund kommt *Bernhard Brunner*. Er vollzog die Lebenswege der einstigen Sipo-Chefs nach, die als oberste SS-Kommandeure zwischen 1940 und 1943 in den 17 Regionalpräfekturen des okkupierten Frankreich geherrscht hatten. Bei etwa der Hälfte der rekonstruierbaren Karrieren hatten die Männer nach 1945 weiter ihre bereits in der Weimarer Zeit eingeschlagene traditionelle Laufbahn als Juristen im höheren Verwaltungs- oder Justizdienst verfolgt. Sie „erreichten in den sechziger Jahren die Positionen, die sie aller Wahrscheinlichkeit nach auch in der Weimarer Republik erlangt hätten. Generell galt: Je bürgerlicher und weniger offensichtlich mit diskreditierten Institutionen des NS-Staates verknüpft die bisherige Laufbahn gewesen war, desto besser waren die Chancen auf eine Fortsetzung der Karriere“ (S. 220).

In der Zusammenschau der Aufsätze wird dem Leser die enorme Relevanz der Generationen-Problematik beim Verständnis solcher Wandlungsprozesse deutlich. Man findet immer wieder Belege dafür, daß der Wandel von Mentalitäten und Werten vor allem an den Wechsel von Generationen gebunden ist. Ideologische Orientierungen verknüpfen sich dabei stets mit den Aufstiegs- und Etablierungsbedürfnissen von Generationen. So ist es kein Zufall, daß in der ÖTV-Kampagne von 1959 gegen die „fast alle Schlüsselstellungen“ beherrschenden SS-Führer in der Kripo auch davon die Rede ist, daß diese „anderen hochqualifizierten, politisch unbelasteten Kriminalbeamten den Aufstieg versperren“ (S. 197).

Christina von Hodenberg kommt in ihrem Beitrag zum Journalismus der 1950er zu dem Ergebnis, daß es die Journalisten der „45er-Generation“ gewesen seien, die kritische Berichte zur NS-Zeit oder zur Entnazifizierung schrieben – und sich dabei über die „Gratisangst der leitenden Herren“ und die „Berufskrankheit unserer Publizistik“, mokierten (S. 305). Diese 45er-Generation habe gute Erfahrungen mit den Alliierten gemacht, und für viele von ihnen galten die westlichen Demokratien und deren Werteordnung als Vorbild. Die Liberalisierung der politischen Kultur des Weststaates sei für sie wichtiger als die Entschuldungsdiskurse der Älteren gewesen. Mit Blick auf verbreitete Klischees fragt die Autorin, wie denn die angebliche „schlagartige“ Etablierung eines „kritischen Journalismus“ und einer „kritischen Öffentlichkeit“ mit der Spiegel-Affäre 1962 möglich gewesen war, wenn in den 1950er Jahren nur Restauration und Konformität gewaltet hätten. „Der Ge-

nerationswechsel in den Führungsetagen war ein wichtiger Faktor beim Übergang vom Konsensjournalismus zur ‚Zeitkritik‘. Das Nachrücken der 45er in die Chefesssel führte in den 60er Jahren zur Entwicklung eines neuen Berufsverständnisses“ (S. 279, 309). Doch zunächst waren die Vertreter dieser Generation diskursiv in der Minderheit. Denn der Konsens der Trägergeneration des NS war nicht nur defensiv und beschweigend, sondern auch offensiv stilisierend und aggressiv-wehleidig. Bis in die 1960er Jahre hinein waren die westdeutschen Eliten nicht bereit, den Opfern und Überwindern des NS zu verzeihen. Die „frühesten und mitunter auch lautesten Stimmen kamen dabei aus den Kirchen“ wie *Jan Friedmann* und *Jörg Später* in ihrem Aufsatz zur Kollektivschuld-Debatte konstatieren. Aus dem Selbstverständnis der Kirchen als „intakte Ordnungsmächte und ungebeugte Gegenspieler des NS-Regimes“ heraus warfen sie sich zum Subjekt von Vergebung von Schuld auf (S. 69). Die Erörterung von Verantwortlichkeiten und Haftbarkeit wurde durch eine ins Metaphysische gewendete Schuld-Debatte vernebelt und gegen die – im kirchlichen Verständnis lediglich weltlichen – Urteilen folgenden Entnazifizierungs- und Reeducations-Maßnahmen „agitiert.“ „Das deutsche Volk ist viel mehr Opfer als Träger dieser Greuelthaten gewesen“ postulierte der Kölner Kardinal Frings. Nun seien die Deutschen Opfer gleich zweier Ungerechtigkeiten, zunächst die der Nazis und dann die der Siegermächte (S. 73). Die Ursachen des Nationalsozialismus sah man in der Säkularisierung des Abendlandes und in der Moderne, was nun durch eine

Lebensführung im christlichen Sinne zu sühnen sei (S. 71 f.)

Auch im Aufsatz von *Nicolas Berg* zu den „Lesarten des Judenmords“ geht es um die Abwehr der Schuld. Anhand der Rezeptionsgeschichte der Holocaust-Bücher von Gerald Reitlinger (1953, dt. 1956), Raul Hilberg (1961, dt. 1990) und William S. Shirer (1960, dt. 1961) illustriert der Autor die Ignoranz, Häme und Selbstgerechtigkeit der damals tonangebenden Historiker und anderer Kritiker. Ein immer wieder vorgebrachtes Argument war, daß in den Büchern „der Kern der Problematik“, eben das „Wesen des Totalitarismus“, verfehlt würde (Buchheim 1957, Broszat 1963, zit. nach *Berg* S. 108, 118). Gerhard Ritter sah 1948 den Nationalsozialismus nicht mit seiner spezifischen deutschen Vorgeschichte verbunden, sondern als Ergebnis von Atheismus und Demokratismus, der das christliche Weltbild zerstört und totalitäre Systeme ermöglicht habe (*Friedmann/Später* S. 80). Diese Deutung des Wissenschaftlers ähnelt stark den bereits zitierten Deutungen der Kirchen. Und noch im Jahr 1961 raunte Golo Mann in einem relativierenden Vorwort zur Übersetzung zu Shirers „Aufstieg und Fall des Dritten Reiches“ von „verschuldet-unverschuldeter Ausweglosigkeit“ der Deutschen und „den Zwang zu irren, wo es den rechten Weg nicht gibt“ (*Berg*, S. 115).

Das Ausweichen des deutschen Bürgers in das diffuse Raisonement um das Dämonische, den Satan und das Schicksal illustriert auch *Jan Eckel* in seinem Aufsatz „Intellektuelle Transformationen im Spiegel der Widerstandsdeutungen.“ Er zeigt, wie im Diskurs um „den deutschen Widerstand“ (im Westdeutschland der 1950er

Jahre verstand man darunter ausschließlich die Verschwörer des 20. Juli 1944) den ehemaligen Volksgenossen eine völlig überdehnte Identifikations- und Projektionsfläche angeboten und eine die Nachkriegszeit einschließende deutsche Leidens- und Opfergeschichte konstruierte wurde. Der derart eingeeengte „deutsche Widerstand“ wurde zum Gründungsmythos der Westrepublik stilisiert. Hans Rotfels erklärte 1954, daß „nicht Fußballsiege und Mercedeswagen, sondern das Handeln und Sterben der Männer des 20. Juli die Ehre des Landes wiederhergestellt“ hätten (*Berg*, S. 161). Da diese Identifikationsfiguren (z. B. auch Rommel oder Canaris) den Nationalsozialismus zunächst begrüßt und ihm viele Jahre gedient hatten, stellte sich für historische Darstellungen und Biographien dieser Zeit die Frage nach der Umkehr der Protagonisten. *Eckel* beschreibt, daß diese „Umkehr-Modelle inhaltlich weitgehend unbestimmt bleiben, also nicht konkret faßbar wurde, welche Position die dargestellten Figuren überwunden hatten.“ (S. 151) Ein Komplement zu dieser diffusen Darstellung sind religiöse Verstehensformen bei Historikern. Gerhard Ritter, von 1949 bis 1953 Vorsitzender des deutschen Historikerverbandes, spricht 1954 in seinem Goerdeler-Buch von der Weltgeschichte als beständigem Ringen „Gottes mit dem Satan“ (ebd. S. 161 f.), der Publizist Rudolf Pechel schrieb 1947 von der „satanischen Raffiniertheit“ des Nationalsozialismus. Aus seiner Sicht glich „ganz Deutschland ... einem besetzten Land.“

Die geistige Spannung der 1950er und 1960er Jahre wird deutlich, wenn man diese Diskurse über die NS-Zeit

mit den Diskursen in Beziehung setzt, die *Moritz Scheibes* in seiner Studie „Auf der Suche nach einer demokratischen Gesellschaft“ rekonstruiert. Denn direkte Zeitgenossen jener so vormodern wirkenden Rede von der satanischen Raffiniertheit des Bösen, vom Dämon Hitler und der totalitarismustheoretischen Exkulpation der Trägergruppen des NS waren Ralf Dahrendorf und Jürgen Habermas mit ihren kritischen Analysen zum Zustand der bundesdeutschen Demokratie, deren Impulse zu der bekannten Trendwende bei der Durchsetzung von mehr Modernität und Liberalität am Ende der 1960er führten.

Die größte moralische und juristische Geltung hatte bis dahin jedoch das bürgerlich-konservative, autoritäre und patriarchalische Weltbild, wie der letzte Komplex des Sammelbandes zeigt. Im Aufsatz „Das Ende der Schulzucht“ zeigt *Torsten Gass-Bolm*, daß noch 1957 der BGH das inzwischen umstrittene „Gewohnheitsrecht der Lehrer auf körperliche Züchtigung“ bestätigte. Und noch im Jahr 1961 wurde in der pädagogischen Diskussion bekräftigt, daß körperliche Züchtigung im Gymnasium eine „elementare Verletzung der menschlichen Würde“ – in der Volksschule aber unumgänglich sei (S. 445 f.). *Sybillie Buske*, die die „Debatte über die Unehelichkeit“ rekonstruiert, verweist auf einen Gesetzentwurf von 1961, der davon ausging, daß uneheliche Geburten die staatliche und sittliche Ordnung unterminierten und erneute Unehelichkeit, kriminelles Verhalten und geschädigte Persönlichkeiten nach sich zögen. Das Familienrechtsänderungsgesetz von 1961 erschwerte die Ehescheidung und stellte außereheliche Intimitäten, deren Dul-

dung und Herbeiführung („Kuppelei“) wie auch Homosexualität unter Strafe (S. 337 f.). Eine Gesetzesänderung erfolgte erst 1969. Insgesamt strebte man in der westdeutschen Nachkriegsrepublik eine „sittliche Restabilisierung“ an, die die „Rechtssprechung der Kaiserzeit wie auch der Weimarer Republik zum Ziel hatte“, faßt *Michal Kandora*, dessen Thema „Homosexualität und Sittengesetz“ ist, anhand des Entwurfs zum Strafgesetzbuch von 1962 zusammen (S. 384).

Der Band kann mit den verdienstvollen Sammelbänden zu den 1950er Jahren – *Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau* – und den 1960er Jahren – *Dynamische Zeiten* – in Bezug gebracht werden. Im Vergleich hierzu liefert *Herbert* weniger ein breit angelegtes Diorama einer erfolgreichen Modernisierung, sondern eher eine Tiefenbohrung hinab zu den sedimentierten Traditionen, Ideologemen und mentalen Beständen, die ein Vierteljahrhundert lang die Bundesrepublik prägten und mit der Vergangenheit verbanden.

Thomas Ahbe

Alexander Demandt, Kleine Weltgeschichte, Verlag C. H. Beck, München 2003, 368 S.

Volkspalast und Ostalgieshow – Hits der 60er und die Wiedergeburt des Käferprofils bei VW: die Retrokultur feiert sichtbare Erfolge allerorten. Auch auf dem Markt der Bücher zur Weltgeschichte ist es hierzulande ein bißchen wie früher. *Alexander Demandt* erinnert in seiner Einleitung an die Zeit des Kaiserreichs, als „Weltgeschichte“ noch ohne große Skrupel als Titel von Lehrveranstaltungen benutzt

wurde. Es war aber gerade die Berliner Universität für ihre frühe Ablehnung eines solchen Vorgehens, die Beschränkung auf einzelne Zeitabschnitte und ein Plädoyer für Spezialisierung bekannt, was unter anderem Kurt Breyzig mit relativer Isolation und Marginalität bezahlen mußte. So eignet sich eine pur lokale Traditionsstiftung kaum, aber aufs Ganze gesehen trifft *Demandts* Verweis auf große Vorgänger sicherlich den Kern. Unter Weltgeschichte verstand man vor rund 100 Jahren in weiten akademischen Kreisen Deutschlands die arbeitsaufwendige Hingabe an ein bildungsbeflissenes Publikum innerhalb und außerhalb des Hörsaals. Zugleich stand das Interesse an diesem mehr öffentlichen als innerfachliches Prestige verheißenden Sujet unter dem Verdacht des Verrats am Humboldtschen Ideal eines zur Spezialisierung zwingenden Forschungsimperativs, der auch die Ausrichtung der ihrerseits forschungsgebundenen Lehre gehorchen sollte. Nur im Nachkriegssemester des Jahres 1919 diente an der hauptstädtischen Universität „Weltgeschichte“ (von Eduard Meyer gelesen) als legitimes Instrument, die Lücken, die der lange Frontaufenthalt im Wissen der Studenten gerissen hatte, schnell zu schließen.

Auch Anfang des 21. Jh.s weist der Autor, Berliner Professor für Alte Geschichte und seit Jahren durch Bemühungen um weitreichende epochenübergreifende Vergleiche hervorgetreten, zuerst den Gedanken von sich, überhaupt Weltgeschichte wagen zu können. Es bedurfte der Initiative eines Verlages, wie schon vor mehr als 100 Jahren, als die großen Lexikon- und Publikumsverlage sich gegenseitig in der Konzipierung mehrbändiger

Weltgeschichten überboten, wie Hartmut Bergenthum in seiner kürzlich erschienenen Gießener Dissertation im einzelnen belegt hat.

Den Verlegern stand ein kulturkritisches Argument zu Gebote, das den Hochschullehrer herausgefordert hat: Unter den heutigen Studienstrukturen, die nichts anderes als die Zuspitzung jener Argumente sind, deren man sich schon um 1900 zur Austreibung der Weltgeschichte aus der Hochschule bediente, ist der große Überblick an den Rand gedrängt worden. In der Konsequenz sind Prüfungsanforderungen „der zugespitzten Forschungspraxis schon so weit angeglichen, daß ein Kandidat sein Examen mit Sehrgut ablegen kann, ohne den Namen Perikles, Kolumbus oder Mao Tse-tung je gehört zu haben.“ (S. 8) Das Motiv lag schon dem weltgeschichtlichen Nachschlagwerke „Geschichte griffbereit“ des Bremer Historikers Imanuel Geiss zugrunde, und dessen anhaltender Erfolg belegt, daß hier tatsächlich ein Nerv getroffen ist. Konsequenterweise konzipiert *Alexander Demandt* seine Weltgeschichte in einem Band als Compendium des aus seiner Sicht wünschenswerten, aber unsicher gewordenen historischen Allgemeinwissens, nicht als irgendwie geartete Forschungsproblematik. Dieses Programm arbeitet der Vf. mit einer staunenswerten Selbstdisziplin ab – auch hierin den Vorgängern ein Jahrhundert zuvor im Arbeitsstil ähnlicher als heutigen Professoren, die sich kurze Texte zwischen Gremiensitzungen abringen: Genau ein Jahr nach dem Start legt er die Feder (für die „Digitalisierung“ wird der Sekretärin gedankt, wie vor dem den ersten Virtuosinnen der Schreibmaschine) beiseite, täglich

fünf Stunden Schreiarbeit sind in das Werk geflossen, das in seiner Gliederung an die Ullstein-Weltgeschichte gemahnt, die erstmals ab 1905 unter der Leitung Pflugk-Harttungs erschien. Die Kapitel über den Alten Orient, die Kultur der Griechen, das Imperium Romanum, die Großreiche Asiens, Rußland und Amerika als Großmächte und den Nationalstaat nebst Imperialismus sind *Demandts* Interesse am Vergleich der großen Imperien in der Weltgeschichte geschuldet, deren Ende von den Persern bis zur Sowjetunion er 1997 einen Band gewidmet hat, auf den er hier verschiedentlich zurückgreift. Betrachtet man die Forschungsfelder, auf denen die fulminantesten Entwicklungen in den letzten Jahren stattgefunden haben – etwa im Bereich der evolutionären Anthropologie und des Einzugs der Genetik in die Untersuchung der Anthropogenese am einen Ende und in der Diskussion der Spezifik einer Globalgeschichte am anderen Ende des Zeitstrahls – dann nimmt sie *Demandts* Darstellung zum „Erwachen der Menschheit“ oder zu „democratie global?“ nur am Rande auf. Er will gesichertes Wissen vermitteln, nicht Kontroversen präsentieren oder gar in sie eingreifen.

Der Verlag beweist mit der Bauchbinde, die für eine „meisterliche Darstellung“ wirbt, Verständnis einmal für den guten Stil, in dem der Vf. seine Weltgeschichte lesefreundlich anbietet, aber zum anderen (wohl unfreiwillig) auch Sinn für den Charakter einer traditionsreichen *master narrative*, die diesem Band zugrunde liegt. Daß diese Erzählung, der man Eurozentrismus, teleologische Zurichtung und die Ausblendung weiter Teile der Geschichte vorgeworfen hat, gegenwärtig von ver-

schiedenen Seiten her dekonstruiert wird, bleibt dem nach Allgemeinbildung suchenden Leser in diesem Band verborgen, dazu muß er sich anderswo informieren.

Noch ist eine neue Meistererzählung, die stärker an die Erfahrungen der Globalität anschließt, erst in Umrissen in Sicht: *world historians* streiten mit *global* und *new global historians*, verschiedene Lager von Anthropologen mit diversen Gruppierungen von Kognitionswissenschaftlern, unterschiedlich radikale Varianten von *cultural*, *spatial* und *postcolonial turn* treffen aufeinander usw. usf. Und weil dieses Vage voraussehbar noch Jahre der (für das Publikum verwirrenden) wissenschaftliche Kontroverse benötigt, um sich zu konsolidieren, sollte man *Demandts* „kleine Weltgeschichte“ in ihrem Anspruch, sich des historischen Allgemeinwissens wieder stärker zu versichern, ernst nehmen und nutzen, vielleicht ergänzt um einen der zahlreichen Aufsätze, die gegenwärtig die Weltgeschichte der Zukunft projektieren.

Matthias Middell

Karl Schlögel: Im Raume lesen wir die Zeit. Über Zivilisationsgeschichte und Geopolitik, Hanser, München 2003, 566 S.

In den letzten Jahren häuften sich die Metaphern, die von der Wiederkehr des Raumes in der Sozialtheorie kündeten: Die Rede war von *mental maps*, von Gesellschaften als Netzwerken, gar von einem *spatial turn*. Der Historiker *Karl Schlögel* hat diese Tendenzen nun zusammengefaßt und ein

schönes Buch geschrieben, das die verschiedenen Ansätze in einem großen Panorama zusammenfaßt.

Die Wiederkehr des Raumes: Diese Formulierung bezieht sich vor allem auf die Vernachlässigung räumlicher Dimensionen in den großen Theorien der Gesellschaft, die im 19. Jh. entstanden waren. Für Marx und Weber, aber auch etwa für Simmel standen Prozesse im Vordergrund, nicht soziale und kulturelle Räume. Dies entsprach der disziplinären Entwicklung: Wurden im 18. Jh. Geographie und Geschichte noch zusammen betrachtet, differenzierte sich die Historie in der historistischen Epoche zur eigenständigen Disziplin aus. Entwicklung, Fortschritt, Gleichzeitigkeit des Ungleichzeitigen – das waren die Schlüsselbegriffe eines Verständnisses von Gesellschaft, das Unterschiede temporalisierte. Das 19. Jh. war geprägt von der Herrschaft der Zeit.

Allerdings, und daran wird erst heute wieder häufiger erinnert, entstand um 1900 auch ein neues Raumbewußtsein, das sich etwa in der Geographie eines Friedrich Ratzel – und dann später in der Geopolitik – manifestierte. Erst ein Jahrhundert später, im Zuge eines erneuten Globalisierungsschubes, werden viele dieser Ansätze wieder aufgegriffen. *Schlögel* stellt in dem spannendsten Teil des Buches, dem ersten Kapitel, diese Strömungen vor. Zu seinen Ahnherren zählt er vor allem Lefebvre, Yi-Fu Tuan, Edward Soja und David Harvey. Dazu gehören aber auch die lange geographische Tradition in Frankreich oder die *urban studies*. *Schlögel* will dabei ausdrücklich keinen Paradigmenwechsel der historischen Forschung beschreiben, geschweige denn einläuten: „Spatial

turn“, betont er, „heißt daher lediglich: gesteigerte Aufmerksamkeit für die räumliche Seite der geschichtlichen Welt – nicht mehr, aber auch nicht weniger.“

Schaut man auf die historiographische Praxis, dann ist das allerdings schon eine ganze Menge. In zwei großen Kapiteln, „Kartenlesen“ und „Augenarbeit“, entwickelt *Schlögel* ein breites Spektrum von möglichen Gegenständen, Themen und Fragestellungen. Sein Verständnis von „Raum“ ist dabei sehr breit, eklektizistisch und wenig dogmatisch. Hier geht es um Karten und Kartographie, um Grenzen und die trigonometrische Vermessung der Erde. Dabei dominiert keineswegs die Makroperspektive, im Gegenteil: Es geht gleichermaßen um Mikroräume des Handelns, es geht um die Stadt, um das Haus, ja um Interieurs oder das Berliner Adreßbuch. Schließlich ist ausführlich von der Erfindung des Fingerabdrucks die Rede, der in Indien (und Japan) entwickelt wurde, bevor der Polizeipräsident von London die daktyloskopische Methode 1901 auch in England und Wales einführte.

Schlögels Buch liefert eine Fülle von Material, immer wieder überraschende Einblicke und Anregungen, die sicher von vielen Historikern und Kulturwissenschaftlern aufgegriffen werden. Das Buch liest sich gut, fast sogar zu gut; vor allem bei den letzten

beiden Kapiteln wünscht man sich bisweilen einen Ohrensessel als angemessenes Ambiente für die Lektüre. Die eine oder andere theoretisch spannende Frage wird auf diese Weise ausgeblendet oder leichtin abgetan. Zum Beispiel: Die Wiederkehr des Raumes scheint ein Effekt der gegenwärtigen Globalisierung zu sein – einer Globalisierung jedoch, die zugleich mit der Auflösung des Raumes, mit der Überwindung von Zeit und Raum (David Harvey) und der Deterritorialisierung von Politik und Gesellschaft einherzugehen scheint. Wie diese offenbar konträren Entwicklungen zusammen zu denken sind, wird hier nicht weiter erörtert. Auch eine andere Konsequenz des *spatial turn* wird nur kurz angerissen, aber nicht weiter ausgeführt: Die Meisterzählungen der Modernisierung, ganz einer Sprache der Zeit verpflichtet, werden abgelöst durch eine Terminologie des Raumes und – Toynbee einerseits, Huntington andererseits lassen grüßen – eine Geschichte der Zivilisationen. Darin könnte das wichtigste Erbe, jedenfalls die wichtigste Herausforderung der Entwicklung liegen, die in diesem Buch dokumentiert ist. Wie genau das aussehen könnte, mit welchen fruchtbaren Perspektiven, aber auch zu welchen Kosten, bleibt hier aber noch undiskutiert – und daher vorerst eine offene Frage.

Sebastian Conrad

Resümees

Elisabeth Elgán

Geschlechterkonstruktion in der schwedischen und französischen Abtreibungs- und Verhütungspolitik 1900–1940

Der Artikel behandelt das Verhältnis von Geschlecht und Sozialpolitik vor und in den prägenden Phasen der europäischen Wohlfahrtsstaaten. Er analysiert die der Abtreibungs- und Verhütungspolitik zugrunde liegenden Motive, wie sie in den parlamentarischen Debatten der Zeit deutlich werden. Die französische Politik war ein Teil des französischen Pronatalismus, dieser wiederum Bestandteil des französischen Republikanismus, des hegemonialen politischen Diskurses, der die moderne französische Demokratie begründete. Die schwedische Politik war anfangs eine moralische Reaktion gegen das moderne städtische Leben. Später wurde sie Bestandteil der wohlfahrtsstaatlichen Reformen, die durch den Geist des 'social engineering' und das Vertrauen in die medizinische Wissenschaft als Leitlinie für soziale Maßnahmen geprägt waren. In beiden Ländern wurde in der Abtreibungs- und Verhütungspolitik das weibliche Geschlecht "naturalisiert" und das männliche sozialisiert. Frauen betrachtete man als Wesen, die durch ihre Fähigkeit zur Reproduktion bestimmt oder verpflichtet waren, sich dieser zu unterwerfen. Nur Männern wurde eine Sexualität jenseits der Reproduktion zugesprochen, aber die Politik versuchte ihnen zu vermitteln, daß sie Sexualität auf eine bestimmte Weise zu nutzen hatten. Die an Männer gerichtete Politik hatte generellen Charakter und enthielt Anreize; die an Frauen gerichtete war individuell und repressiv. Die Autorin interpretiert dies als Resultat einer unterschiedlichen Sicht auf die Geschlechter als Staatsbürger. Die schwedische und französische Abtreibungs- und Verhütungspolitik des frühen 20. Jahrhunderts produzierte und reproduzierte diesen Unterschied: Männer waren Staatsbürger, Frauen waren Mütter.

Maren Wichmann

Steuerpolitik und Gleichberechtigung von Frauen in Westdeutschland und Dänemark – mit Schwerpunkt auf den 1950er Jahren

Die Auseinandersetzungen um das Steuerrecht sind vor dem Hintergrund der Arbeitsmarktlage, der Gleichstellung der Frau und der Ehe- und Familienpolitik zu betrachten. Schon seit den 1920er Jahren wurde mit Hilfe der Steuerpolitik versucht, einerseits sittlich-moralische Vorstellungen von der Lebensweise von Familien zu verankern und andererseits den Bedürfnissen des Arbeitsmarktes Rechnung zu tragen. Als Manövriermasse galten verheiratete Frauen. In beiden Ländern galt der sog. Haushalt als Basis der Steuererhebung. Die Individualbesteuerung fungierte als Alternativmodell zur Förderung der Erwerbstätigkeit von Ehefrauen. Damit wurde die Besteuerung von Eheleuten eine gesellschaftspoli-

tisch brisante Frage. In Deutschland hatte die Arbeitsmarktlage oft direkte Auswirkungen auf die Steuerpolitik. In der Weimarer Republik wurde als Sonderregel für viele berufstätige Ehefrauen die Individualbesteuerung eingeführt. Sie wurde im Wesentlichen bis 1958 beibehalten, d. h. bis zur grundlegenden Reform des Steuerrechtes mit Einführung der wahlweisen Individualbesteuerung bei gleichzeitiger Splittingtabelle. Während das Eherecht in Dänemark seit den zwanziger Jahren die gegenseitige Versorgerpflicht festlegte, basierte das Steuerrecht bei einer Ehe auf dem männlichen Versorger, der allein steuerpflichtig war. Trotz unermüdlicher Interventionen der Frauenverbände kam es hier erst seit Mitte der 1960er Jahre bei eklatantem Arbeitskräftemangel zur ernsthaften Debatte und schließlich zur Individualbesteuerung.

Iris Rittenhofer

Auf die Mitte eingestellt. Führung in Dänemark und in der Bundesrepublik 1960–1989

Die 'glass ceiling' ist keineswegs nur geschlechtsspezifisch. Neuere soziologische Untersuchungen in sowohl Dänemark als auch Deutschland zeigen, daß es trotz des festen Glaubens an die Chancengleichheit durch Ausbildung keinen gleichwertigen Zugang zu machtvollen Positionen in diesen Gesellschaften gibt. Medien sind Quellen veröffentlichter Kultur und bilden als solche den Ausgangspunkt für diese Untersuchung. Gender wird hier als eine von vielen, nur temporär auftretenden Verknüpfungen von Diskursen definiert. Diese Diskurse ermöglichen die keineswegs einheitlichen Auffassungen davon, was eine gute Führungskraft ausmacht. Diese Verknüpfungen gestalten einen kaleidoskopischen Raum und die Mitte der gesellschaftlichen Selbstbilder. Im Sprachgebrauch dieser beiden Länder gestaltet sich diese Mitte auf unterschiedliche Weise. Themen, die in beiden Ländern diskutiert werden, wie der Selfmademan, Chancengleichheit oder wechselnde Führungsideale, erhalten unterschiedliche Inhalte und Bedeutungen. Das gilt auch für die 'gender'-Kategorie. Im dänischen Sprachgebrauch ermöglichen Gemeinsamkeiten die friedliche Koexistenz von Meritokratie und privilegiertem Zugang zu Führungspositionen. Im polarisierenden deutschen Sprachgebrauch ist dagegen die Rede von unvereinbaren Gegensätzen.

Johanna Kantola

Gender und die diskursive Konstruktion des Staates: Vergleiche zwischen Finnland und England, 1960er bis 1990er Jahre

Der Artikel untersucht, wie dominante feministische Diskurse über den Staat das auf den Staat bezogene Handeln von Frauen prägen. Ziel ist es, die Dichotomie zwischen der Strategie, innerhalb, und derjenigen, außerhalb des Staates zu agieren, in Frage zu stellen, die die feministischen Diskussionen über den Staat bisher dominiert hat. Dies geschieht mit einer komparativen Studie über Finnland und England. Finnland repräsentiert die nordische Tradition eines frauenfreundli-

chen Wohlfahrtsstaates, während England eine eher liberale 'top-down'-Demokratie ist. Nordische feministische Staatsauffassungen dominieren in Finnland und der Staat wird positiv als frauenfreundlicher Wohlfahrtsstaat betrachtet. In England sind dagegen radikale und marxistisch-feministische Vorstellungen bedeutsamer gewesen und der Einfluß des Staates wird als negativer aufgefaßt. In der komparativen feministischen Literatur besteht eine Tendenz, die beiden Fälle stereotyp zu repräsentieren. Der Artikel stellt die Dichotomie zwischen 'innerhalb' und 'außerhalb' des Staates ebenso in Frage wie die stereotypen Darstellungen Finnlands und Englands. Er analysiert jeweils eine zentrale feministische Debatte: Kinderbetreuung in Finnland und Gewalt gegen Frauen in England. Beide lassen sich auf die jeweiligen länderspezifischen Kontexte zurückführen. Während Kinderbetreuung in den 1970er Jahren eine Schlüsselfrage für die finnischen Feministinnen darstellte, war Gewalt gegen Frauen ein wichtiges Thema für britische Feministinnen.

Abstracts

Elisabeth Elgán

Gender Construction in Swedish and French Abortion and Contraception Policies, 1900–1940

The article deals with the relation between gender and social politics in the (pre-) formative periods of the European welfare states. It analyses the motives behind abortion and contraceptive policies as they can be seen in the parliamentary debates of the time. The French policy was part of French pronatalism, which in turn formed part of French republicanism, the hegemonic political discourse which served as the foundation of modern French democracy. The Swedish policy was, in the beginning, a moral reaction against modern urban life. Later it became part of the welfare state reforms shaped by the spirit of social engineering and faith in medical science as a guide to social measures. In both countries abortion and contraceptive politics was a domain where the female gender was “naturalized” and the male gender socialized. Women were perceived to be governed by their reproductive possibilities or as being obliged to submit to them. Men alone were perceived as having a sexuality beyond reproduction, but the policies aimed at making them realize that sexuality had to be used in a certain way. Policies directed towards men were of a general nature and provided incentives. Policies directed towards women were individualistic and repressive. The author interprets this as a result of a differential view of the sexes as citizens. Swedish and French abortion and contraceptive politics in the early 20th century produced and reproduced this difference: men were citizens, women were mothers.

Maren Wichmann

Tax Politics and Women's Equality in West Germany and Denmark – with a Focus on the 1950s

The conflicts about taxation law have to be considered against the background of the labour market situation, women's equality, and marriage and family law. Already in the 1920s it was tried, by means of tax politics, to establish moral ideas about family life on the one hand, and to meet the needs of the labour market on the other. Married women served as a manoeuvrable mass. In both countries, the so-called household was the basis of taxation. Individual taxation functioned as an alternative encouraging married women's gainful employment. Thus, the taxation of spouses became an explosive social policy issue.

In Germany, the labour market situation often had a direct impact on tax politics. In the Weimar Republic, individual taxation was introduced as a special provision for many working wives. It was kept in principle until 1958, when a tax reform introduced optional individual taxation in connection with a splitting

table. In Denmark, while marriage law prescribed the obligation to mutual maintenance since the 1920s, the tax law for married couples was based upon the male provider, who alone was obliged to pay taxes. In spite of the unceasing interventions of women's associations, a serious debate, and eventually the introduction of individual taxation, did not occur until the mid-1960s, when Denmark faced a severe labour shortage.

Iris Rittenhofer

Centered societies. Business Leadership in Denmark and West Germany, 1960–1989

The phenomenon 'glass ceiling' is by no means limited to gender. Recent sociological research conducted in both Denmark and Germany reveals that there still remain restricted career possibilities for advancement into positions of power and influence in either country. With outset in the conceptualization of the media as a source of published culture as its starting point, this study endeavors to provide an explanation as to how the firm belief in equal opportunities could be established and maintained for decades in both countries. Gender is but one nexus of those discourses which frame the various understandings of the concept of good leader and manager. These nexuses create a kaleidoscopic space which centers the Danish and the German societies. However, due to differences in language usage in both countries, themes which emerge, such as "self-made man" or "equal opportunities", gain divergent meanings, as does gender. In the Danish language use, "community" makes it possible for a rhetoric of meritocracy to peacefully coexist with its entire opposite: privileged access to leadership positions. In the polarizing use of language in the German context, meritocratic versus privileged access to leadership positions are incompatible.

Johanna Kantola

Gender and the Discursive Construction of the State: Comparisons on Finland and England, 1960s to 1990s

The article explores the ways in which dominant feminist discourses about the state actually shape women's engagements with the state. The aim of the article is to challenge the dichotomy between the strategies of either working within or outside of the state that have dominated feminist debates about the state until today. The article is a comparative study of Finland and England. Finland represents the Nordic tradition of a woman-friendly welfare state, while England is a more liberal, top-down democracy. Nordic feminist understandings of the state have been dominant in Finland and the state is viewed in positive terms as a woman-friendly welfare state. In England, by contrast, radical and Marxist feminist ideas have been more influential and the impact of the state has been understood as negative. There is a tendency in the comparative feminist literature to represent these two cases stereotypically. Therefore, while this article challenges this dichotomy between the inside/outside approach of dealing with the state, it

also questions the stereotypical portrayals of Finland and England. It analyses one important topic of feminist debate in each country: childcare in Finland and violence against women in England. The two debates stem from the two different contexts. Whilst childcare was a key concern for Finnish feminists in the 1970s, violence against women was an important issue for feminists in England.

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Aus dem Inhalt

Aufsätze

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