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Marc A. Matten/Julia Obertreis (Eds.)

Moving Knowledge – The Soviet Union and China in the Twentieth Century

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Knowledge Circulation in Russia / the Soviet Union and China in the 20th Century

Marc A. Matten / Julia Obertreis

ABSTRACTS

Dieses Heft widmet sich der Geschichte der Wissenszirkulation in Russland bzw. der Sowjetunion und China im 20. Jahrhundert. Am Beispiel der Produktion von Wissen in den Bereichen Biologie, Medizin und Naturwissenschaften in beiden Imperien argumentieren wir, dass dessen Übersetzung, Aufnahme, Weitergabe und Verbreitung nur dann richtig beschrieben werden kann, wenn berücksichtigt wird, dass Entwicklung und Verbreitung von Wissenschaft und Wissen von lokalen Umständen abhängt. In den einzelnen Beiträgen wird die Rolle von Vermittlern bei der Weitergabe von Wissen über sprachliche, ideologische und kulturelle Grenzen hinweg erörtert. In transnationalen Kontexten ausgebildet, kompetent in mehreren Sprachen und in globale Kommunikationsnetze eingebunden, standen diese Vermittler bei ihrer Arbeit vor erheblichen Herausforderungen, die sich aus zwei großen Spannungsfeldern ergaben: der Spannung zwischen „westlichem" Input und nationaler Anpassung sowie zwischen „bourgeoiser" Wissensproduktion und sozialistischen Ideen von Wissenschaft und Wissen. Es sind diese Spannungen, die im Fokus der vier Artikel stehen.

This special issue is dedicated to the history of knowledge circulation in Russia / Soviet Union and China in the 20th century. Focusing on scientific knowledge production in biology, medicine, and natural sciences in both empires we argue that their translation, reception, transfer, and dissemination can only be described properly when taking into account that development and diffusion of science and knowledge are shaped by local circumstances. The papers in this special issue discuss the role of brokers in movement of knowledge across linguistic, ideological, and cultural borders. Educated in transnational contexts, having multilingual competence, and integrated in global communication networks these brokers faced considerable challenges in their work resulting from two big fields of tension: the tension between "Western"

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input and national adaptation, and between "bourgeois" knowledge production and socialist ideas of science and knowledge. It is these tension that are at the core of the different papers.

In the past decades, the history of science has experienced a deep transformation due to a number of turns, of which the cultural and the postcolonial turn can count as the most influential ones. Reacting to this development Peter Burke and Fan Fa-ti have proposed to leave the tunnel history of national science behind and instead to take into consideration especially those local knowledges and practices[1] that do not conform to the European notion of science or the European taxonomy of scientific disciplines.[2] The growing number of publications following this trend in recent years – such as East Asian Science, Technology, and Society: An International Journal (EASTS) – argue that science is no longer an abstract category characterized by assumptions of European modernity theory, but has become more flexible and encompasses a larger variety of practices and forms of knowledge than before.[3] Science and knowledge are more and more re-conceptualized in an interdisciplinary effort that in turn affects many disciplines including sinology and (East European) history. *First* of all, scientific knowledge is no longer seen as universal and "placeless", but rather as "fundamentally local, influenced by the venues in which it is conducted, by the instruments and technologies employed, and by the networks that incorporate it into their culture and practices."[4] The process of knowledge production and the material, social, and cultural conditions under which it takes place have attracted much attention.[5] The interdependence between knowledge and science on the one hand with localities and places on the other has been studied in various ways.[6] *Second*, strict boundaries between knowledge and science have been replaced by an almost exclusive

1 P. Burke, What is the History of Knowledge?, Cambridge, UK 2016; F. Fan, Redrawing the Map: Science in Twentieth-Century China, in: Isis 98 (2007) 3, pp. 524–553.

2 P. Chu, Narrating a History for China's Medical Past: Christianity, Natural Philosophy and History in Wang Honghan's Gujin yishi 古今醫史 (History of Medicine Past and Present), in: East Asian Science, Technology, and Medicine 28 (2008), pp. 14–35.

3 J. Law / W. Lin, Provincializing STS: Postcoloniality, Symmetry, and Method, in: East Asian Science, Technology and Society 11 (2017) 2, pp. 211–227; W. Lin / J. Law, We Have Never Been Latecomers!? Making Knowledge Spaces for East Asian Technosocial Practices, in: East Asian Science, Technology and Society 9 (2015) 2, pp. 117–126.

4 S.G. Solomon, Circulation of Knowledge and the Russian Locale, in: Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 9 (2008) 1, pp. 9–26, at 21.

5 See the groundbreaking anthropological / ethnological work by K. Knorr-Cetina: The Manufacture of Knowledge. An Essay on the Constructivist and Contextual Nature of Science, Oxford 1981; and also her: Epistemic Cultures. How the Sciences Make Knowledge, Cambridge 1999. On how knowledge was "made", see also the seminal works: J. Golinskii, Making Natural Knowledge: Constructivism and the History of Science, Cambridge 1998; H. Kuklick / R. Kohler (eds.), "Science in the Field", special issue of Osiris 11 (1996); B. Latour / S. Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts, 2nd ed. Princeton, NJ 1986.

6 A. Ophir / S. Shapin, The Place of Knowledge: A Methodological Survey, in: A. Ophir / S. Shapin (eds.), Science in Context 4 (1991) 1, pp. 3–21, at 5; S. Shapin, Placing the View from Nowhere. Historical and Sociological Problems in the Location of Science, in: Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, new series 23 (1998) 1, pp. 5–12; Benjamin Elman's study On Their Own Terms: Science in China 1550–1900 (2005) and textbook A Cultural History of Modern Science in China (2006) foreground the importance of finding a valid "conceptual grid" to "explore Chinese interests in natural studies as they articulated and practiced them on their own terms rather than speculate about why they did not accomplish what the Europeans did" (Elman, On Their Own Terms, p. xxvi), and of writing a nuanced account of the "native vicissitudes" of science in China (Elman, A Cultural History, p. 13).

paradigm of knowledge, as demanded by Peter Burke in his fascinating works on this subject.[7] Many scholars no longer see a fundamental difference between scientific and non-scientific knowledge but rather accentuate the co-existence of many different forms of knowledge.[8] *Third*, the unilinear narrative of the diffusion of science and modernity is no longer taken for granted according to which traditional cultures are inevitably drawn into a global modern society.[9]

Research in the modern history of countries in Europe and East Asia has already refuted such narrative that had been prominent since the 1940s when area studies emerged that unconsciously yet avoidably constructed closed containers in the efforts of understanding the Other.[10] The classical account of modern Western science spreading from Europe all over the world dominating in the 1960s and -70s has been challenged in many works since then. The dichotomy between "Western science" coming from Europe or the West and "indigenous" or local knowledge (the latter to be found in non-European, often colonial contexts) has become weaker.[11] As a result, newer studies describe and analyse different forms of "indigenous" knowledge and at times complicated interrelations between different knowledge systems including European ones.[12]

When examining the transfer, reception, dissemination, and popularization of knowledge in this special issue we do not assume that circulation is unidirectional nor that the receiving end only plays a passive role. In the debates on *colonial knowledge* it has been pointed out that we do not see an automatic transfer of a body of knowledge from the centre to the periphery, but a complex process of adaption, rejection, and transformation.[13] In other words, there is a model of reciprocal communication in which knowledge itself can change.[14] Studies on colonial contexts have concentrated on knowledge as obtained by the colonial powers, their – often clandestine – reliance on local knowledge

7 P. Burke, A Social History of Knowledge, From Gutenberg to Diderot. Based on the first series of Vonhoff lectures given at the University of Groningen (Netherlands), vol. 1, Cambridge 2000; P. Burke, From the "Encyclopédie" to Wikipedia, Cambridge 2012. See also his What is the History of Knowledge?

8 J. Vogel, Von der Wissenschafts- zur Wissensgeschichte. Für eine Historisierung der "Wissensgesellschaft", in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 30 (2004), pp. 639–660.

9 See R. Macleod, Introduction, in: R. Macleod (ed.), Nature and Empire: Science and the Colonial Enterprise = Osiris N.S. (2000) 15, pp. 1–13.

10 For a succinct critique of area studies approach in East Asian studies see H. Harootunian, Tracking the Dinosaur, in: History's disquiet (2000), pp. 25–58; D. Vukovich, China and Orientalism: Western Knowledge Production and the P.R.C., Oxon / New York 2012.

11 A. Bishop, Western Mathematics – The Secret Weapon of Cultural Imperialism, in: B. Ashcroft / G. Griffith / H. Tiffin (eds.), The Post-Colonial Studies Reader, London 2006, pp. 80–83; M. Elshakry, When Science Became Western: Historiographical Reflections, in: Isis 101 (2010), pp. 98–109; as well as A. Powell / M. Frankenstein (eds.), Ethnomathematics – Challenging Eurocentrism in Mathematics Education, Albany 1997; and H. Tilley, Global Histories, Vernacular Science, and African Genealogies, in: Isis 101 (2010), pp. 110–119.

12 V. Lipphardt / D. Ludwig, Knowledge Transfer and Science Transfer, in: European History Online (EGO), published by the Institute of European History (IEG) (2001), URL: http://www.ieg-ego.eu/lipphardtv-ludwigd-2011-en [23.04.2019].

13 T. Ballantyne, Colonial Knowledge, in: S. Stockwell (ed.), The British Empire. Themes and Perspectives, Malden, MA 2008, pp. 177–197.

14 M. G. Ash, Wissens- und Wissenschaftstransfer. Einführende Bemerkungen, in: Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte 29 (2006), pp. 181–189, at 182, 189; See also J. Secord, Knowledge in Transit, in: Isis 95 (2004), 4, pp. 654–672.

and their establishing and maintaining power by acquiring, validating, and disseminating such knowledge. Nicholas Dirks comments in this context: "In certain important ways, knowledge was what colonialism was all about."[15] George Basalla's article *The Spread of Western Science*, published in 1967, offers an early effort to view science transfers from a global perspective. Yet, it remains within the paradigm of the unquestioned dominance and superiority of Western modern (scientific) knowledge vis-à-vis so-called superstitious and / or proto-scientific practices.[16] It goes without saying that according to this paradigm the global dissemination of knowledge is understood as a process of the former replacing the latter, especially in formerly colonized countries and societies.[17] Today, the postcolonial critique as well as the emergence of transnational historiography see the whole concept of "science transfer" questionable, for that it „not only excludes indigenous knowledge, but also prevents one from seeing the processes of interaction between knowledge systems."[18] Scholars prefer to speak of *knowledge transfers* accordingly that can take place between countries but also within countries and societies. The transfer model has been much applied in studies on *cultural transfers* within Europe and beyond, and it remains a task for future research to interrelate the fields of study of cultural transfers and knowledge transfers more closely in order to advance a general theory of transfers. As Matthias Middell has shown, a cultural transfer is understood as "a process of appropriation actively advanced by different groups of brokers and guided by the needs of the receiving culture." The chronological steps to study in a transfer process begin with the confirmation of a so-called deficit in a given cultural context and the identification of an object or pattern in a different cultural context that would remedy the deficit. It ends with the evaluation of the transfer process that can range from appreciation of the input from the other culture to negation of the foreign origin and invention of an indigenous origin.[19] Instead of identifying a developmental or civilizational difference between impacting and receiving cultures – an assumption that has shaped the older tradition of diffusionist approaches criticized as early as the 1980s by the French cultural historians Michel Espagne and Michael Werner[20] – we do not share the view that cultural transfer are to be understood by terms such as "diffusion" or "transmission",

15 Lipphardt / Ludwig, Knowledge Transfer, p. 26.

16 M. Bunge, Demarcating Science from Pseudoscience, in: Fundamenta scientiae 2 (1982), pp. 369–388; O. Bruun, Fengshui in China – Geomantic Divination between State Orthodoxy and Popular Religion, Honolulu 2003; R. Nedostup, Superstitious Regimes – Religion and the Politics of Chinese Modernity, Cambridge, MA 2009; S. Smith, Introduction: The Religion of Fools? Superstition: Past and Present, in: Past and Present 199 (2008), pp. 7–55.

17 G. Basalla, The Spread of Western Science, in: Science 156 (1967) 3775, pp. 611–622. For a detailed critique based on latest research findings see Lipphardt / Ludwig, Knowledge Transfer, pp. 17–23.

18 Ibid., p. 28.

19 M. Middell, Kulturtransfer, Transferts culturels, Version: 1.0, in: Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte, 28.1.2016, URL: http://docupedia.de/zg/Kulturtransfer?oldid=125518 [09.09.2019].

20 M. Espagne / M. Werner, Deutsch-französischer Kulturtransfer im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert. Zu einem neuen interdisziplinären Forschungsprogramm des C.N.R.S., in: Francia 13 (1985), pp. 502–510, online http://francia.digitale-sammlungen.de/Blatt_bsb00016288,00518.html [03.09.2019]; M. Espagne / M. Werner, La construction d'une référence culturelle allemande en France: Génèse et Histoire (1750–1914), in: Annales E.S.C. 42 (1987) 4, pp. 969–992, online http://www.persee.fr/doc/ahess_0395-2649_1987_num_42_4_283428 [03.09.2019].

or even "dissemination" that evoke unidirectionality. Rather, the articles in this issue focus on the central role of brokers in movement of knowledge across linguistic, ideological, and cultural borders. These brokers – may they be individual scientists, media or science organizations – were more often than not educated in transnational contexts, had multilingual competence and were integrated in global communication networks. Therefore, the following chapters prefer to use circulation as suggested by the global historian of science Kapil Raj.[21] Stefanie Gänger has provided a fine analysis of the implications and historical layers of the usage of "circulation" in global history, a term favoured for its 'untaintedness' and openness.[22] It can also be applied to the history of knowledge, as we argue in this special issue of *Comparativ*. We do so by comparing two knowledge empires – China and Russia – in their engagement and interaction with new knowledges during the nineteenth and twentieth century.[23] Since the 18th/19th century the two land-based vast empires have experienced deep transformations of knowledge and science. Both Russia and China were characterized by the fact that knowledge production took place on very different scales, from the village level where peasants passed on local knowledge on agriculture or a lonely ethnographer took notes about local knowledge up to the level of imperial ministries or other central institutions collecting, censuring, and publishing concentrated knowledge on the condition of the empire. What is more, knowledge had to be transferred along vast distances, in a geographical sense, but also in a social and cultural sense implying the usage of many different languages within one empire. In order to better understand such circulation within and across empires the science historian Fan Fa-ti calls for studying networks of science by taking science as a general category encompassing a range of practices, institutions, and knowledge traditions. According to him it is important to show

> *how science as cultural practice unfolded in a local context and how it was circulated and translated across the networks of science. In so doing, they challenge the rigid model of center/periphery and of metropole/colony; in its place, they* [scholars] *present a dynamic configuration of imperial power and knowledge production that strove to maintain order and structure but that necessarily played out in local contingencies. The advantage of this picture is that it depicts science in action rather than in abstraction.*[24]

Beginning from the 19th century, knowledge production and circulation in both empires were characterized by two big fields of tension: the tension between "Western" input and national adaptation, and between "bourgeois" knowledge production and socialist ideas

21 K. Raj, Beyond Postcolonialism… and Postpositivism: Circulation and the Global History of Science, in: Isis 104 (2013) 2, pp. 337–347, at p. 344.

22 S. Gänger, Circulation: Reflections on Circularity, Entity, and Liquidity in the Language of Global History, in: Journal of Global History 12 (2017), pp. 303–318.

23 See here the Focus section on colonial science in Isis 96 (2005), pp. 52–87; F. Fan, British Naturalists in Qing China: Science, Empire, and Cultural Encounter, Cambridge 2004; K. Raj, Relocating Modern Science: Circulation and the Construction of Knowledge in South Asia and Europe, 1650–1900, London 2006; and L. Schiebinger, Plants and Empire: Colonial Bioprospecting in the Atlantic World, Cambridge 2004.

24 F. Fan, Redrawing the Map: Science in Twentieth-Century China, in: Isis 98 (2007) 3, p. 527.

of science and knowledge. Overview histories that would reflect systematically upon these tensions and categories still remain to be written.

In the case of modern China, historians have struggled to explain these tensions when comparing the so-called backwardness of Chinese scientific, economic, and military development with the so-called "advanced West." In twentieth century analysis of Chinese history the leading paradigm stipulated that China's modernity was merely a reaction to a "Western impact."[25] It is thus not surprising that the establishment of modern (natural) sciences has long been seen as a result of translation from European languages[26], with the production of modern academic disciplines and institutions largely following the lines of Euro-American or Soviet academic tradition.[27] In Chinese eyes then and now, the West (*xiyang* 西洋, *xifang* 西方) did not only encompass Western Europe and North America, but also included Japan[28] and the Soviet Union.[29] The "West" was the role model of modernity that served as a framework of reference and orientation in the modernization process, as formulated in the saying "The Soviet Union of today is our tomorrow" (*Sulian de jintian shi women de mingtian* 苏联的今天是我们的明天) that enjoyed large popularity in 1950s China. Deviance from or inability to properly implement the Western model have long been explained by outside factors such as the socio-economic structure[30] or inside factors such as traditional customs and cultural values.[31] For instance, Basalla (*The Spread of Western Science*, 1967) claimed that the dominance of Confucianism in Chinese society "prevented the development of a modern scientific tradition until the late 19th century."[32]

25 S. Teng / J.K. Fairbank, China's Response to the West – A Documentary Survey, 1839–1923, Cambridge, MA 1954; Y. Xiong 熊月之, *Xixue dongjian yu wan Qing shehui* 西学东渐与晚清社会 (The Eastward Dissemination of Western Learning in Late Qing Society), Beijing 2011.

26 L. Liu, Translingual Practice. Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity – China, 1900–1937, Stanford 1995.

27 J. Guo 郭金海, Yuanshi zhidu zai Zhongguo de chuangli yu chongjian 院士制度在中国的创立与重建 (The Establishment and Reconstruction of the Academician System in China), Shanghai 2014; L. Liu 劉龍心, Xueshu yu zhidu: xueke tizhi yu xiandai Zhongguo shixue de jianli 學術與制度: 學科體制與現代中國史學的建立 (Academia and Institutions: The Emergence of a System of Academic Disciplines and the Construction of Modern Chinese Historiography, Taipei 2001; D. Stiffler, Creating "New China's First New-Style Regular University," 1949–50, in: J. Brown / P. Pickowicz (eds.), Dilemmas of Victory: The Early Years of the People's Republic of China, Cambridge MA, 2010, pp. 288–308.

28 P. Harrell, Sowing the Seeds of Change – Chinese Students, Japanese Teachers, 1895–1905, Stanford 1992; X. Shang 尚小明, Liu-Ri xuesheng yu Qingmo xinzheng 留日学生与清末新政 (Chinese Students in Japan and the New Policies at the end of the Qing Dynasty), Nanchang 2003; X. Shu 舒新城, Jindai Zhongguo liuxueshi 近代中国留学史 (History of Foreign Students Movement in Modern China), Shanghai 2011.

29 Z. Shen 沈志华, Sulian zhuanjia zai Zhongguo 苏联专家在中国 (Soviet Experts in China), Beijing 2009; T. Bernstein / H. Li (eds.), China learns from the Soviet Union, 1949-present, Lanham 2010.

30 K. Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy, Princeton 2000.

31 A. Smith, Chinese Characteristics, New York 1894; M. Weber, Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen – Konfuzianismus und Taoismus, Tübingen 1986. See also the discussion in W. Knöbl, Die Kontingenz der Moderne. Wege in Europa, Asien und Amerika, Frankfurt am Main 2007.

32 Lipphardt / Ludwig, Knowledge Transfer, p. 17. Critical intellectuals in the first half of the 20th century such as Hu Shi and Lu Xun shared this view, see T. Lam, A Passion for Facts – Social Survey and the Construction of the Chinese Nation-State, 1900–1949, Berkeley 2011.

Such interpretations that tend to essentialize the Other have been re-evaluated for some time now[33] and paralleling the findings in the growing body of literature dealing with the persistence of local knowledges in modernizing societies[34] we argue that it is imperative to take the contributions of non-Western societies to the history of knowledge production more seriously. The aim, however, should not be to (re-)discover local knowledge traditions in their social and cultural contexts (which would eventually again result in unwanted essentialisms),[35] but to ask how their cultural practices were translated, appropriated, and communicated in transcontinental and global networks. To take local knowledge practices serious also prevents underestimating the role of indigenous knowledge in global circulation. While these insights have already been acknowledged in the history of political ideas where nationalism and enlightenment as well as anarchism and Marxism have experienced different degrees of sinicization[36] the history of the transfer of science and technology from one culture to another has only recently started to pay attention to local knowledges and practices on the receiving end.

For instance, the sinologist and renowned historian of Chinese science Joseph Needham (1900–1995) saw the feeling of European superiority critically and dedicated his academic career to explain the development path of Chinese science in a different fashion. In the multi-volume book series *Science and Civilization in China* that is being published since 1954 he has put forward the idea that modern sciences can best be grasped in a metaphoric sense when "the older streams of science in different civilizations like rivers flowed into the ocean of modern science." In his view, China contributed to the genesis of modern, universal science in the 17th century when European and Chinese science began to merge.[37] This metaphor helped to remove the Eurocentric bias in the history of science, as argued by Fan Fa-ti.[38] Instead of asking since when so-called "modern science" has been present in Chinese society,[39] or what role academics and scholars played in the translation and reception of foreign forms of science[40] the interest has now turned to

33 See here the critical view of Vukovich, China and Orientalism.

34 See D. Palmer, Qigong Fever. Body, Science, and Utopia in China, New York 2007; K. Taylor, Chinese Medicine in Early Communist China, 1945–1963: A Medicine of Revolution, London 2005.

35 See exemplarily S. Zhu 祝世讷, Zhongyi wenhua de fuxing 中医文化的复兴 (The Restoration of the Culture of Chinese Medicine), Nanjing 2013.

36 M. Meisner, Li Ta-Chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism, Cambridge, MA 1967; G. Müller-Saini, China, Kropotkin und der Anarchismus: eine Kulturbewegung im China des frühen 20. Jahrhunderts unter dem Einfluß des Westens und japanischer Vorbilder, Wiesbaden 2001; V. Schwarcz, The Chinese Enlightenment: Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919, Berkeley 1986; J. Townsend, Chinese Nationalism, in: The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 27 (1992), pp. 97–130.

37 Needham's metaphor saw the arrogance of the late 19th and early 20th century critically, instead of accepting the view that the European and Japanese colonial presence in China was nothing less than an effort to bring modern civilization to the ancient empire. J. Needham, The Roles of Europe and China in the Evolution of Oecumenical Science, in: J. Needham (ed.), Clerks and Craftsmen in China and the West: Lectures and Addresses on the History of Science and Technology, Cambridge 1970, p. 397.

38 F. Fan, The Global Turn in the History of Science, in: East Asian Science, Technology and Society 6 (2012) 2, pp. 249–258.

39 D. Kwok, Scientism in Chinese Thought 1900–1950, New Haven 1965.

40 M. Lackner / I. Amelung / J. Kurtz, New Terms for New Ideas. Western Knowledge & Lexical Change in Late Imperial China, Leiden 2001.

the question of how to reconcile varying (and possibly co-existing) concepts of science[41] while avoiding the often exclusive binaries of modern / tradition, foreign / indigenous, advanced / backward, centre / periphery, metropolis / colony.[42]

Such binaries are no longer seen as helpful for understanding the complex and multidirectional flows of knowledge. More recent publications in the history of science call for leaving behind the assumption that the transfer of modern science and technology necessarily had to occur from West to East, arguing that knowledge flows are multidirectional.[43] Thus, we have to take into account different and competing sets of knowledge and knowledge cultures. A study on health knowledge in Russia in the 19th century has shown, for example, that physicians trained in modern medicine had to compete with Russian village healers and 'witches' in order to appeal to the rural population. What emerged was a "specific blend of modern and traditional knowledge repositories."[44] Likewise, Sigrid Schmalzer has pointed out in her newest monograph on scientific farming in socialist China that even during the Cultural Revolution (commonly perceived as an anti-scientific and anti-intellectual era) Chinese innovations in science and technology were discussed in the United States after American agricultural scientists had reported their impressions from visits to the People's Republic during the early 1970s to their peers. This example showcases that knowledge also circulated from the so-called periphery back to the centre.[45] Their fascination was first and foremost nourished by the observation of scientific practices among workers, farmers, and physicians that did not stem from the centre, but were local practices derived sometimes from century-old experiences, such as in the case of Chinese agriculture and medicine.[46]

Russia, too, has often been regarded (both in Western and in Russian studies) as a mere recipient of knowledge and science generated in the West. Since the 19th century, the Western impact, be it in technologies or medicine or in social sciences, has been presented as

41 Such as the prominent case of Western biomedicine and Chinese medicine in twentieth century China. See S. H. Lei, Neither Donkey nor Horse: Medicine in the Struggle over China's Modernity, Chicago 2014; and Taylor, Chinese Medicine in Early Communist China.

42 Burke, What is the History of Knowledge?; F. Fan, East Asian STS: Fox or Hedgehog?, in: East Asian Science, Technology and Society: an International Journal 1 (2007), pp. 243–247; X. Fang, Barefoot Doctors and Western Medicine in China, Rochester 2012; X. Xu, 'National Essence' vs 'Science': Chinese Native Physicians' Fight for Legitimacy, 1912–37, in: Modern Asian Studies 31 (1997) 4, pp. 847–877; S. Schmalzer, On the Appropriate Use of Rose-Colored Glasses: Reflections on Science in Socialist China, in: Isis 98 (2007), pp. 571–583.

43 M.A. Matten, Coping with Invisible Threats: Nuclear Radiation and Science Dissemination in Maoist China, in: East Asian Science, Technology and Society 12 (2018) 3, pp. 235–256.

44 R. Cvetkovski, Introduction. On the Making of Ethnographic Knowledge in Russia, in: R. Cvetkovski / A. Hofmeister (eds.), An Empire of Others: Creating Ethnographic Knowledge in Imperial Russia and the USSR, Budapest 2014, pp. 1–22, p. 9. The research study is S. C. Ramer, Traditional Healers and Peasant Culture in Russia 1861–1917, in: E. Kingston-Mann / T. Mixter (eds.), Peasant Economy, Culture, and Politics of European Russia, 1800–1921, Princeton, N.J. 1991, pp. 207–232.

45 S. Schmalzer, Red Revolution, Green Revolution. Scientific Farming in Socialist China, Chicago 2016.

46 On the rediscovery of Chinese veterinary medicine in Maoist China, see the forthcoming monograph by Marc Matten / Rui Kunze: Learning Science from the Masses – Cultures of Knowledge in 20th century China (Lexington Press). An important source for the American openness to non-Western knowledges and practices during the 1970s is D. Conell / D. Gover (eds.), China: Science Walks on Two Legs, New York 1974; as well as Xiaoping Fang with his study Barefoot Doctors.

either necessary and useful for Russia's development (by the "Westerners"), or as harmful and damaging supposedly pure Slavic origins and practices (by the "Slavophiles").
In 2008, Susan Gross Solomon, a specialist in the field of the history of medicine, spoke of a 'project of inclusion' consisting of bringing Russia "into the family of cases covered by an approach honed in the study of 'Western' societies", namely the approach or concept of "circulation of knowledge" (in which she differentiates between an Anglophone and a French discussion of the concept).[47] Yet, studies examining circulation of knowledge are not entirely new to the field of Russian / Soviet studies or historiography. In earlier works on the 20th century, a certain focus was on the inter-war period and on transfers and relations between Russia and Germany. More recently, studies informed about theoretical debates on knowledge characterized Russia not just as a recipient of Western influences but as having developed its own rationale in dealing with and appropriating knowledge coming from the West.
Russia doesn't appear anymore as a mere "receptacle for ideas from abroad" but as a "locus of scientific interaction and innovation."[48] First, a variety of reactions to the impact of imported knowledges can be detected ranging from enthusiastic reception to blocking and incomprehension. How reception of Western knowledge can result largely in failure is shown, for example, by Natalia Avtonomova on the example of the opening of Russia to Western philosophy in the 1990s after many decades of Soviet-Marxist dominance of this discipline.[49]
Further, recent studies have highlighted that Russian and Soviet scientists and scholars have made significant contributions to international debates. They generated findings and concepts that were not only *received* in international discussions but even *shaped* them.[50] We cannot deny that knowledge transfer often takes place in West-East direction (and this special issue will show this again). However, there also instances where the dominant flow of knowledge went in East-West direction, such as in the case of soil sciences in the first half of the 20th century shown by Jan Arend in his PhD thesis entitled "Russia's Soil Science in the World: An East-West Transfer History 1880–1945". Russian and Soviet soil science was extraordinarily productive in this time and produced knowledge that was happily received in many West European countries and in the USA. Russian soil science became an "export hit" (*Exportschlager*) in the inter-war period. This

47 Solomon, Circulation of Knowledge and the Russian Locale, p. 11.
48 Ibid., p. 20. See, for example, the contributions in the special issue of Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 9 (2008), 1.
49 N. B. Avtonomova, The Use of Western Concepts in Post-Soviet Philosophy: Translation and Reception, in: Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 9 (2008) 1, pp. 189–229.
50 It is no coincidence that these examples stem from sciences related to agriculture, the soils, and biology, because Russia / the Soviet Union were especially innovative in these fields of knowledge, and also because Western studies have focused on environmental aspects. L. Ackert, The Role of Microbes in Agriculture: Sergej Vinogradski's Discovery and Investigation of Chemosynthesis, 1880–1910, in: Journal of the History of Biology 39 (2006) 2, pp. 373–406; P. Chu, Mapping Permafrost Country: Creating an Environmental Object in the Soviet Union, 1920s–1940s, in: Environmental History 20 (2015) 3, pp. 396–421; J.D. Oldfield / D.J.B. Shaw, V.I. Vernadskii and the Development of Biogeochemical Understandings of the Biosphere, c. 1880s–1968, in: The British Journal for the History of Science 46 (2013) 2, pp. 287–310.

situation changed only when Lysenkoism became dominant in the Soviet Union.[51] We can summarize that the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union can be seen both as centres of knowledge production that affected other parts of the world and as sites of multiple ways of dealing with imported knowledge.[52]

Although there is a number of case studies for China and for Russia / the Soviet Union, there is little mention of these states and contexts in general (Western) theoretical literature on knowledge and science. The historical study of Western empires has generated a growing amount of contributions on knowledge production and circulation, especially for the North-South direction in the early modern period.[53] Yet, these works tend to focus on (Western, Central) Europe and the more common classical former colonies like India and Africa.[54] China and Russia are mostly missing from this strand of literature as they seem to be blind spots for many historians writing on (post-colonial) knowledge and science. Rather little attention has been paid to the comparison and / or interlocking between Russia and China, with the notable exception of the Soviet advisers working in the PRC in the 1950s,[55] the rejection of Soviet genetics, and Soviet physicists' and philosophers' critique of Einstein's general theory of relativity in the 1960s.[56]

In this special issue, we address questions of the history of knowledge and the history of science by taking an (inter-) imperial and transnational history perspective. The focus is rather on comparison and overarching questions which are relevant for both empires / states than on the transfers between them. We are interested in the processes of validating and disseminating knowledge that are mutually dependent processes as Robert Cvetkovski explains:

> […] *knowledge in its social existence is highly dependent on its dissemination, because only its spreading and its public acceptance authorizes knowledge as such. To be validated*

51 J. Arend, Russlands Bodenkunde in der Welt: eine ost-westliche Transfergeschichte 1880–1945, Göttingen 2017, pp. 16–17 and 259, quotation p. 259.

52 Knowledge exports and exchange took place on a large scale from the Soviet Union into the global South as recent studies have shown. This relates to different fields of knowledge ranging from irrigation agriculture and city building to literature. It would be a rewarding task to generalize the findings of these studies in regard to knowledge transfers and circulation. A. Hilger, Sie bringen das Licht der Sowjetkultur, in: Literaturbeziehungen zwischen der UdSSR und Indien, 1945–1964, in: M. Aust / J. Obertreis (eds.), Osteuropäische Geschichte und Globalgeschichte, Stuttgart 2014, pp. 197–218; J. Obertreis, Imperial Desert Dreams. Irrigation and cotton growing in Central Asia 1860–1991, Göttingen 2017, pp. 334–339; S. F. Miescher, Building the City of the Future: Visions and Experiences of Modernity in Ghana's Akosombo Township, in: Journal of African History 53 (2012) 3, pp. 367–390; L. Stanek, Architects from Socialist Countries in Ghana (1957–1967): Modern Architecture and Mondialisation, in: Society of Architectural Historians Journal 74 (2015) 4, pp. 416–442.

53 See for example A. Brendecke, The Empirical Empire. Spanish Colonial Rule and the Politics of Knowledge, Berlin 2016 (German original in 2009); S. M. Mintz, Die süsse Macht. Kulturgeschichte des Zuckers, Frankfurt am Main 2007; L. Schiebinger, Plants and Empire; J. Tully, A Victorian Ecological Disaster. Imperialism, the Telegraph, and Gutta-Percha, in: Journal of World History 20 (2009), pp. 559–579; A. Zimmerman, Alabama in Africa. Booker T. Washington, the German Empire, and the Globalization of the New South, Princeton 2010.

54 See for example: Lipphardt / Ludwig, Knowledge Transfer.

55 See for example Bernstein / Li, China learns from the Sovjet Union; D. A. Kaple, Dream of a Red Factory. The Legacy of High Stalinism in China, Oxford 1994; Shen, Sulian zhuanjia zai Zhongguo 2009.

56 See for example D. Hu, China and Albert Einstein: The Reception of the Physicist and his Theory in China, 1917–1979, Cambridge 2005; L. Schneider, Biology and Revolution in twentieth-century China, Lanham 2003.

> *it has to circulate either within one social or professional caste or between several of them, but by injecting specific knowledge into separate discourses it is processed, applied, incorporated, and transformed differently. Its power as an approved tool of recognition thus relies on its broader practice, which in turn corroborates its continuous flexibility, just as it guarantees its connectivity.*[57]

Acknowledging that knowledge production is a social phenomenon we follow up with the research results on (auto-)biographies of scientists and experts in imperial and national contexts[58] and focus on biographies and scientific contributions of individuals as well as processes of collective knowledge production. What role did individual scientists play, how were they integrated in national and international scientific institutions, and what obstacles did they face when the state subordinated research and innovation to national and / or ideological needs? In this context, the need for self-assertion in defining distinct indigenous traditions of scientific knowledges[59] that goes beyond national concerns has long been neglected in historical research. Individual and collective knowledge production have to be put into a wider historical context, which includes political constellations influencing knowledge production, social status, the relation of knowledge producers with the public sphere(s) or privileged living and working conditions of the scientists.[60]

With their vast spaces and heterogeneous "landscapes" (both in a sociocultural and geographic-environmental sense), empires have offered chances for social and geographical mobility. This is especially true for knowledge producers. An instructive example are the Polish military doctors in service in the Russian Empire's army. While their possibilities for upward mobility were restricted in Russian-dominated Poland in the second half of the 19th century, quite a few of them made their career in Siberia and Central Asia where they contributed to medical and ethnographic research in different positions. They became "experts of the other and of imperial heterogeneity". At the same time their publications contributed to "the mental compression (*Verdichtung*) of the imperial space between Warsaw and Port Artur".[61] In the case of Maoist China, while domestic mobility of individual scientists was limited and submitted to state control, the open-

57 Cvetkovski, Introduction, p. 8.

58 J. Andreas, Rise of the Red Engineers – The Cultural Revolution and the Origin of Chinas's New Class, Stanford 2009; M. Aust / F. B. Schenk, Imperial Subjects: autobiographische Praxis in den Vielvölkerreichen der Habsburger, Romanovs und Osmanen im 19. und frühen 20. Jahrhundert, Köln 2015; Vermessene Welt. Osteuropaexperten im 20. Jahrhundert = Osteuropa 1 (2017); F. Bretelle-Establet, Chinese Biographies of Experts in Medicine: What Uses Can We of Them?, in: East Asian Science, Technology and Society: an International Journal 3 (2009), 4, pp. 421–451; T. Buchen / M. Rolf (eds.), Eliten im Vielvölkerreich. Imperiale Biographien in Russland und Österreich-Ungarn (1850–1918), Boston 2015; J. Guo, Yuanshi zhidu zai Zhongguo de chuangli yu chongjian 院士制度在中国的创立与重建, Shanghai 2014.

59 See I. Amelung et al. (ed.), Selbstbehauptungsdiskurse in Asien: China – Japan – Korea, München 2003.

60 For late imperial Russia, see E. A. Machten, In Service to Science and Society: Scientists and the Public in Late-Nineteenth-Century Russia, in: Osiris 17 (2002), pp. 171–209.

61 R. Leiserowitz, Polnische Militärärzte im zarischen Imperium. Räume und Spannungsfelder zwischen Warschau und Port Artur, in: T. Buchen / M. Rolf (eds.), Eliten im Vielvölkerreich. Imperiale Biographien in Russland und Österreich-Ungarn (1850–1918), Berlin 2015, pp. 223–239, at p. 239.

ness to the outside world within and outside of the socialist camp still contributed to a lively transnational scientific community in the Cold War era.[62] Symptomatic yet a large lacuna in research is the participation and role of Chinese scientists at international academic conferences in both the Eastern and Western hemisphere. With the exception of a few case study analyses that have shown how Chinese achievements in medicine and agricultural pest control were readily accepted in Europe and the United States as well[63] their embeddedness in global knowledge networks is still under-researched.

Regarding Siberia as a place of knowledge production points us to the co-existence of free and unfree forms of knowledge labour. The exiled Decembrists and other exiles later on made important contributions to Siberia's scientific discovery. Political repression and knowledge production went hand in hand in the Soviet Union as well, especially during Stalinism. In the *sharashkas* scientists and technical experts were forced to work within the system of the Gulag, mostly on military and other specialized technologies. Even under conditions of state repression knowledge production could be successful in the sense of scientific results and could provide ways for the victims of repression out of their isolation and powerlessness.[64] The study of knowledges in Russia and China has to take into account both the chances the empires offered but also the history of repressions. The relation of science and politics as reflected in historical studies is in need of revision: while viewing politics as constraining or even inhibiting science has a long tradition in Western historiography, it is necessary to also take into account the role politics played in facilitating and shaping science (and knowledge) production, dissemination and transfers.[65]

The multiethnic composition of Russia and China is also related to knowledge production and circulation in various ways. Ethnography as a discipline interacted with state- and empire-building when producing knowledge about the multiple ethnic groups that inhabited the empires. The political nature of knowledge production is at stake here, and it is not coincidentally that ethnography, political agendas of the state, and knowledge circulation have interested historians.[66] In the case of the concept of ethnogenesis in the Soviet 1940s and 1950s political circumstances, the significance of institutions and institution-building as well as the division of the USSR's territory into "national" repub-

62 Z. Wang, Transnational Science during the Cold War – The Case of Chinese/American Scientists, in: Isis 101 (2010) 2, pp. 367–377.

63 Schmalzer, Red Revolution; E. Dimond, Acupuncture, Anesthesia, Western Medicine and Chinese Traditional Medicine, in: Journal of the American Medical Association 218 (1971) 10, pp. 1558–1563; R. Bivins, Acupuncture, Expertise and Cross-Cultural Medicine, Basingstoke 2000.

64 On the contribution of exiled to Siberia's knowledge history, see for example M. Rhode, Zivilisierungsmissionen und Wissenschaft. Polen kolonial?, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 39 (2013) 1, pp. 5–34; On the *sharashkas* see A. Sidiqqi, Scientists and Specialists in the Gulag: Life and Death in Stalin's Sharashka, in: M.-D. Fox (ed.), The Soviet Gulag. Evidence, interpretation, and comparison, Pittsburgh 2016, pp. 87–113.

65 T. Mullaney, The Chinese Typewriter: A History, Boston 2017; Solomon, Circulation of Knowledge, pp. 25–26.

66 For Russia see, among others, Cvetkovski/Hofmeister (eds.), An Empire of Others; F. Hirsch, Empire of Nations. Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of the Soviet Union, Ithaca 2005; For China, see P. Duara, Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern, Lanham 2004; S. Harrell, Cultural Encounters on China's Ethnic Frontiers, Seattle 1995; C. Shih, Negotiating Ethnicity in China Citizenship as a Response to the State, London 2003; T. Mullaney, Coming to Terms with the Nation: Ethnic Classification in Modern China, Berkeley 2011.

lics influenced knowledge transfers to Soviet Central Asia: despite of a repressive general political climate at that time, individuals and institutions adapted the concept and produced different meanings in their translations of the concept as issued by Moscow. In this process, the newly founded republican Academies of Science played an important role both in conveying Moscow's boilerplate to the republics and in strengthening scientific autonomy in the republics.[67]

The contributions to this special issue analyse how knowledge and its canonized forms travelled from West to East. The focus is on the forms and institutions of knowledge production and circulation. The four contributions also address the underlying motives, means and techniques of disseminating foreign and indigenous knowledges among the population. As will be shown, political constellations, including geopolitical and foreign policy constellations, were important factors. By taking into account how knowledge was negotiated at the periphery we hope to show how science is no longer understood in an orthodox sense, but has become a far more heterogeneous field that is able to accommodate different notions of (scientific) knowledge.

Scientific concepts and even scientific disciplines were always adopted and changed when being transferred. As Hajo Frölich shows in his analysis of zoology in China in the first decades of the 20th century, the imported discipline of zoology was adapted to older Chinese traditions and eventually became a hybrid. Knowledge was produced during field-work whose forms were adopted from Western models and which was carried out in a hitherto unknown scale. With regards to the contents of zoology, the focus was shifted from experimental biology to taxonomy, and the transfer process had to meet the Chinese demand of integrating regional and national traditions of taxonomy. This happened against the background of political instability in the early 20th century in China and blossoming Chinese nationalism at that time which made Chinese scientists want to contribute to making China "rich and strong".

Surprisingly, the medical-psychological concept of stress was able to move from its origin in capitalist societies to socialist states as shown on the example of the Soviet Union by Jan Arend. The author examines the concept of stress since the mid-1960s and how it was covered differently by three central Soviet newspapers. Besides medical and psychological experts, journalists were important knowledge distributors in this case. Interestingly, there was talk of the problems of modern "civilization" and of "modern man" in Soviet newspapers thereby evening out the differences between capitalist and socialist societies. This trend can be observed in academic Soviet literature on environmental problems in the 1970s and 1980s as well.[68]

Vera Shibanova investigates in her contribution the fate of pedology – at that time considered a scientific alternative to pedagogy – that had migrated from the United States to Europe, but was viewed ambivalently when arriving in Russia. During the 1920s, biolo-

67 M. Laruelle, The Concept of Ethnogenesis in Central Asia: Political Context and Institutional Mediators (1940–50), in: Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 9 (2008) 1, pp. 169–188.

68 Obertreis, Imperial Desert Dreams, pp. 403–404.

gists were debating whether a *bio*genetic or a *socio*genetic approach was more adequate, especially with regard to the development of "backward" peoples in the Soviet Union.[69] The pedology of treating children of *natsmen* (national minorities) became an important policy when replacing evolutionary coincidence by revolutionary practice in the push towards socialism. When pedological knowledge and methodological approaches shaped in Moscow arrived in the Russian region of Udmurtia during the 1920s a "distinct, localized sub-branch of pedology developed in Udmurt schools", taking into account local specificities and interacting with the study of local lore (*kraevedenie*). As in the case of the disciplinary focus of zoology in China, pedology as a discipline was already outdated to a certain extent in the West when the transfer occurred. The example of pedology points to the significance of disciplines which were emerging and defining themselves in demarcation to or in congruence with other disciplines.

As argued in the contribution by Marc Matten, the newly founded People's Republic of China adopted a specific understanding of science as well as an important scientific-popular journal entitled *Znanie – Sila* (*Knowledge is Power*) from the Soviet Union. As the journal aimed at popularizing science, this meant that science distribution concepts were also taken over from the Soviet Union. While the understanding of science in China was Marxist-orthodox at first, it became more pragmatic over time. As this example shows, knowledge from abroad could be rejected when geopolitical changes necessitated. Already before the Sino-Soviet split the Chinese leadership and scientists began to question the orthodoxy of the Soviet Union and the literal translations of the above-mentioned Soviet journal were step by step replaced with an own version of *Knowledge is Power* (*Zhishi jiushi liliang* 知识就是力量). For political reasons the sources of knowledge were diversified, in some cases also resulting in efforts to consume science and technology from countries located at the Western periphery of the Eastern Bloc's leading power. Translations from Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland were considered equally valuable knowledge resources, as much as the one imported during the 1960s and 70s from Western Europe, Japan, and the United States.[70] The dissemination of the "right" knowledge by the state and his institutions was by itself a transnational process and had considerable effects on generating a pragmatic attitude towards what can count as legitimate knowledge. In this context, publishers and educators also did not shy away from justifying strange and obscure knowledges that did not conform to standard science, such as in the case of Lysenkoism or particle physics, even if only temporarily.[71]

69 As a seminal work on early Soviet nationality politics including a hierarchy of advanced/backward ethnic groups see T. Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939, Ithaca 2001.

70 On the Chinese successes in gaining accessed to knowledge beyond the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc starting shortly after Nikita Khrushchev's secret speech in 1956 see the history of the Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (中国科学技术情报研究所) at the Chinese Academy of Sciences. Shanghai kexue jishu qingbao yanjiusuo 上海科学技术情报研究所 (2018): Qingbao de jiyi – jinian Shanghai kexue jishu qingbao yanjiusuo chuangli 50 zhounian 情报的记忆 – 纪念上海科学技术情报研究所创立50周年, Shanghai: Shanghai kexue jishu wenxian chubanshe 2018.

71 Schneider, Biology and Revolution in Twentieth-Century China; Matten, Coping with Invisible Threats.

The case studies in this volume clearly indicate that the established political categories of East vs. West are not very helpful for understanding the history of knowledge circulation on a global scale in the 19th and 20th centuries. In Chinese public opinion, the Soviet Union and other countries of the Warsaw Pact belonged to the "West" as much as did Great Britain or the United States: assigning such status was based on differences in economic and technological development, yet was also accompanied by a racially inflicted chauvinism that was inherent in the learning from the Soviet Union movement.[72] For instance, science dissemination materials in Maoist China contrast the white-skinned Soviet engineer with the tanned Chinese worker, reproducing thereby the civilizational hierarchy that had shaped Chinese self-perception since its encounter with Western modernity in 19th century, as shows the 1953 propaganda poster made by Li Zongjin 李宗津 entitled "Study the advanced production experience of the Soviet Union, struggle for the industrialization of our country" (see the contribution of Matten here).[73]

This does not mean, however, that "East" and "West" were insignificant. To the contrary, all chapters in this issue employ these categories but concretize them historically. The "West" could mean America, Western Europe, but also the Soviet Union. In transcontinental knowledge circulation, different political factors came into effect, be it nationalism, revolutionary zeal and / or the striving for self-assertation and geopolitical manoeuvring. Centre-periphery relations and science networks within the countries to study also have to be taken into account. By these observations we hope to advance a discussion of knowledge circulation that will not leave out Russia / the Soviet Union and China.

72 See A. Jersild, The Sino-Soviet Alliance: An International History (New Cold War History), Chapel Hill 2014; O. A. Westad (ed.), Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance 1945–1963, Washington 1998.

73 https://chineseposters.net/posters/e13-556.php [26.04.2019].

Real Animals: Nationalism and the Practice of Zoological Research in China, 1900s–1930s

Hajo Frölich

ABSTRACTS

Als sich die Zoologie zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts in China etablierte, distanzierten sich ihre ersten Vertreter konsequent von früheren chinesischen Formen der wissenschaftlichen Beschäftigung mit Tieren. Stattdessen betonten sie, wie neu ihre Wissenschaft in China sei, mit der sie – wie die Vertreter vieler anderer Disziplinen – dazu beitragen wollten, China wieder „reich und stark" zu machen. Auf Grundlage eines genaueren Blicks in die ersten zoologischen Fachzeitschriften Chinas zeigt der Artikel jedoch verschiedene Kontinuitäten zur und Bezugnahmen auf die ältere chinesische Tierkunde, die durchaus als bewusste Elemente der Selbstbehauptung gedeutet werden können. Die chinesische Zoologie war also zweifelsohne ein Hybrid. Warum die Rhetorik der Akteure – ebenso wie ein oberflächlicher Blick – anderes suggeriert, erklärt der Artikel insbesondere aus dem globalen politischen Kontext und in Bezug auf den Nationalismus.

When, in the early twentieth century, zoology as an academic subject was established in China, its first agents did all they could to distance themselves from earlier Chinese forms of researching animals. Instead, Chinese zoologists – many of whom had studied abroad – emphasized the complete novelty of their discipline and how it, like many other new branches of science, would contribute to making the Chinese nation "rich and strong" again. Yet by taking a closer look at China's first scholarly journals devoted to zoology, this article demonstrates how in various ways, the new field was in fact also characterized by continuities and by references to "traditional" ways of studying animals in China. I suggest that such continuities should be read as conscious if understated attempts at self-assertion within an increasingly global scientific community. Thus, Chinese zoology doubtless was a hybrid undertaking far from having severed all connections to the country's past. From the 1900s to the 1930s, however, both a cursory look as well as the rhetoric of Chinese zoologists suggested otherwise. This contradiction is explained by referring to the global political context as well as the role of nationalism.

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Introduction

In China, the late imperial era, especially the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, added a myriad of new terms to the lexicon. New fields of knowledge were discovered and appropriated in rapid succession, demanding the coining of new expressions.[1] Among them was *dongwuxue* (動物學) or "zoology". While many of the new terms would sooner or later be replaced with other translations, *dongwuxue* – literally the "study of moving things", first introduced in 1885 – stuck and has remained the standard Chinese term for zoology until this day.[2] As is however often the case with "new" terms in the Chinese discourse around 1900 – many of which were in fact what Lydia Liu has termed "return graphic loans" stemming from recent renderings of Western terms into the Japanese language (with translators drawing on older Chinese texts to find proper equivalents) – *dongwu* itself, for animal, had a much longer history, dating back at least to the fourth century BC when it was first used in the Rites of the Zhou (*Zhouli* 周禮). Later, the term lost its prominence but never disappeared completely. According to Roel Sterckx' fundamental work on animals in early Chinese texts, the most common generic term for "animals" or living beings was *wu* (物) which today would mostly translate as "thing".[3] Yet I do not want to dwell much longer on the history of linguistic changes around 1900, which has been studied in detail by others.[4] This article, by contrast, deals with *dongwuxue* as a *practice* in late imperial and early Republican China – in other words, as "science in action", to use the words of Fan Fa-ti quoted in the introduction to this issue. This is not to deny the intimate connections between terminology and action. Rather, I will use the practical side of the history of *dongwuxue* to shed new light on a question which continues to occupy much of the literature, namely, to what degree the new fields of knowledge being incorporated by Chinese around the turn of the twentieth century can really be described as "new" versus "old", "foreign" versus "native", or "other" versus "self". It is certainly true that, as Marwa Elshakry has argued, nationally distinct versions

1 L. H. Liu, Translingual Practice: Literature, Culture, and Translated Modernity – China, 1900–1937, Stanford, CA 1995. Research for this article was supported by the Fritz Thyssen Foundation through a Herzog Ernst Scholarship enabling me to conduct research at the Forschungszentrum Gotha in 2016. I wish to thank the colleagues there, in particular Iris Schröder, for their questions and comments on a first draft of this paper, and for their support. I am also grateful to the anonymous reviewer whose suggestions helped me to revise an earlier draft of this article. Finally, thanks are also due to Julia Obertreis and Marc Matten for their questions and critical remarks, and for inviting my contribution.

2 He De 赫德 [Robert Hart] and Ai Yuese 艾約瑟 [Joseph Edkins], Dongwuxue qimeng 動物學啟蒙 (Introduction to Zoology), Shanghai 1885.

3 M. Siebert, Klassen und Hierarchien, Kontrastpaare und Toposgruppen: Formen struktureller Eroberung und literarischer Vereinnahmung der Tierwelt im alten China, in: Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 162 (2012), pp. 171–196, on p. 172; R. Sterckx, The Animal and the Daemon in Early China, Albany 2002, pp. 17–19. Dong 動 alone could also stand for "animal", e.g. in the 5th century C.E. work on literature "The Literary Mind and the Carving of Dragons" (Wen xin diao long 文心雕龍), see Hanyu da zidian 漢語大字典 (Great Lexicon of Chinese Characters), vol. 1, Wuhan 2006, p. 375. For "return graphic loans", see Liu, Translingual Practice, pp. 33–34.

4 M. Lackner / I. Amelung / J. Kurtz (eds.), New Terms for New Ideas: Western Knowledge and Lexical Change in Late Imperial China, Leiden 2001; M. Lackner (ed.), Mapping Meanings: The Field of New Learning in Late Qing China, Leiden 2004.

of science – such as "Chinese science" – could only be imagined as such once "European science" had been universalized as a seemingly rootless, global concept, as science *per se*.[5] I will, however, use the example of *dongwuxue* to draw attention to the problem that the binary distinction of "foreign" versus "native" science was initially coined and employed by the historical actors themselves – in our case by the first Chinese zoologists trained abroad, mostly in the US – in an effort to justify and advertise what they were doing. The conscious juxtaposition of "old" and "new" more generally can be said to have become a hallmark of Chinese society from the late nineteenth century onwards.[6] Yet as is well known, there also existed branches of study and schools of thought which explicitly drew on Chinese traditions and established their own versions of nationalism and science in fields ranging from medicine and nuclear physics to geography and agriculture.[7]

However, instead of judging whether the approach chosen by China's zoologists around 1900 really was as new as they themselves proclaimed, I think it will be more fruitful to relate the idea of novelty to the actual working conditions of early twentieth century Chinese zoologists, in order to see if and how such a perspective can help us to better understand the connection between the discourse of novelty and nationalism in science. It is, I believe, only by such social, political and economic contextualization that we can better grasp the forces driving what at first glance seems like a more or less smooth transfer of an entire system of knowledge from the West to the rest of the world.[8] As Julia Obertreis and Marc A. Matten emphasise in their introduction, local knowledges and practices played a far larger role in this process than has hitherto been acknowledged.

In what follows, I will first sketch out the transformation of animal-related knowledge in China around the turn of the century (focusing on taxonomy) and describe how it seemingly led to a complete exchange of the standards of reference. Secondly, by focusing on the first generation of Chinese foreign-trained zoologists from the 1910s to the 1930s, I will explore the effect of their social and economic situation on the discourse of novelty and the question of authentic knowledge of animals. Thirdly, by widening the scope to include foreign – notably European and American – zoologists working in China at

5 M. Elshakry, When Science Became Western: Historiographical Reflections, in: Isis 101 (2010) 1, pp. 98–109.

6 Zhitian Luo, Inheritance within Rupture: Culture and Scholarship in Early Twentieth Century China, Leiden 2015, pp. 7, 115–123; H. Frölich, Warum die "Neue Politik" keine Kopie war: Das Beispiel der Bildungsreformen in China, 1901–1911, in: L. Henningsen and M. Hofmann (eds.), Tradition? Variation? Plagiat? Motive und ihre Adaption in China, Wiesbaden 2012, pp. 33–51.

7 S. Lei, Neither Donkey nor Horse: Medicine in the Struggle over China's Modernity, Chicago 2014; M. Matten, Coping with Invisible Threats: Nuclear Radiation and Science Dissemination in Maoist China, in: East Asian Science, Technology and Society 12 (2018) 3, pp. 235–256; S. Dabringhaus, Territorialer Nationalismus in China: Historisch-geographisches Denken 1900–1949, Köln 2006, pp. 2, 273–274; S. Schmalzer, Red Revolution, Green Revolution: Scientific Farming in Socialist China, Chicago 2016; O. Bruun, Fengshui in China: Geomantic Divination between State Orthodoxy and Popular Religion, Copenhagen 2003.

8 N. Vittinghoff, Introduction, in Lackner (ed.), Mapping Meanings, pp. 1–22; B. A. Elman, New Directions in the History of Modern Science in China, in: Isis 98 (2007), 3, pp. 517–523. For a recent treatment of the connections between practical working conditions in the periphery and the course of zoological research in Europe, see K. Pannhorst, Verpacken, verkaufen, verschenken: Hans Sauters entomologische Praktiken zwischen Formosa und Europa, 1902–1914, in: Berichte zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte 39 (2016), 3, pp. 230–244.

the time, I will shed additional light on the transnational dimension of science in early twentieth-century China and how it was related to nationalism and politics.

Replacing Authorities

In the minds of many nineteenth-century Chinese scholars, the existence of a certain species of animal mainly depended on whether it had previously been described in the existent literature. Empirical fieldwork, by contrast, was not high on the agenda. Thus, due to their different working styles, the British botanists in nineteenth-century South China so amply described by Fan Fa-ti hardly had any contact with their Chinese counterparts.[9] At first glance, it seems that this division along practical lines was quickly eliminated after 1900. Now, empirical investigation of live or deceased animals replaced the ancient books as sources of authentic knowledge of animals. As an entirely new system of knowledge, *dongwuxue* seemed to first complement the Chinese tradition and then, by the 1920s, to entirely deem it useless.[10] The replacement seemed complete.

But was it? There is little doubt that on the surface at least, authorities were indeed exchanged. Charles Darwin (1809–1882) replaced the once acclaimed sixteenth-century Chinese naturalist Li Shizhen (李時珍, 1518–1583).[11] Tellingly, until this day, no English-language volume on the history of Chinese zoology has been included in the monumental "Science and Civilisation in China" (SCC) series founded by Joseph Needham (1900–1995) which by now runs to 26 books organised into seven volumes, most of which consist of several parts by individual authors. "Biology and Biological Technology" formed the sixth of those seven volumes, and in Needham's lifetime, only the parts on Agriculture (1984) and Botany (1986) were published while the one on Zoology, authored by Guo Fu, appeared in Chinese only in Beijing in 1999.[12] Whatever the reasons, the history of Chinese zoology certainly did not too readily fit into Needham's master narrative according to which Chinese science and technology for centuries had far surpassed Europe's but then had fallen behind – for reasons that Needham had been aiming to discover through his series.[13] It seems that this master narrative could be

9 Fa-ti Fan, British Naturalists in Qing China: Science, Empire, and Cultural Encounter, Cambridge, MA 2004.

10 The First World War lessened the Chinese belief in Western science, but not for long. See B. A. Elman, "Universal Science" versus "Chinese Science": The Changing Identity of Natural Studies in China, 1850–1930, in: Historiography East and West 1 (2003), pp. 70–116.

11 J. R. Pusey, China and Charles Darwin, Cambridge, MA 1983; Elman, Universal Science.

12 F. Bray, Agriculture, in: Science and Civilisation in China, vol. 6, 2, Cambridge 1984; J. Needham / G.-J. Lu / H.-T. Huang, Botany, in: Science and Civilisation in China, vol. 6, 1, Cambridge 1986. Between 1996 and 2015, four more parts have been produced. In the preface to Guo Fu's work, Joseph Needham who had been planning the book together with Guo since the mid-1980s, stated: "The Chinese version is published first and separately, but it is a constituent part of the 'Science and Civilisation in China' series." See Guo Fu 郭郛, Zhongguo gudai dongwuxue shi 中国古代动物学史 (History of Zoology in Ancient China), Beijing 1999.

13 D. Saeger / E. Weber, Needham's Grand Question Revisited: On the Meaning and Justification of Causal Claims in the History of Chinese Science, in: East Asian Science, Technology, and Medicine 33 (2011), pp. 13–32.

illustrated more easily and convincingly with reference to astronomy, mathematics or hydraulic engineering, to name but a few.

In contrast to those fields, Chinese knowledge about animals simply appeared to be too mystic and by virtue of its basic principles seemed not to fit at all with Linnaean taxonomy or evolutionary theory – an assumption that was, as more recent research by Roel Sterckx, Roderich Ptak and others has demonstrated, far too general.[14] Yet during most of the twentieth century, this assumption was widely accepted among the general academic audience both in China and abroad. This can be seen from the reactions to Michel Foucault's famous quotation from an obviously fictitious "Chinese encyclopaedia" and its absurd classification of animals in the preface to Foucault's "The Order of Things". Foucault took this humorous classification from a witty 1942 essay by Jorge Luis Borges, but more often than not, the classification has been taken at face value and as proof of a lack of "real" scientific work in pre-1900 China, or at best as proof of the cultural dependency of any scheme of classification.[15]

In contrast to such widespread views, many of the earlier Chinese systems of animal classification, while employing patterns different from those of nineteenth and twentieth century Western zoology, were far from being absurd. Many of them worked with hierarchical schemes. The book Xunzi (荀子) from the fourth century B.C., for example stated that all things in the world possessed "energy" (*qi* 氣) but only living things simultaneously possessed a "vegetative principle" (*sheng* 生).[16] In turn, animals were separated from plants by the former's "knowledge" (*zhi* 知), while humans were the only animal additionally equipped with "morals" (*yi* 義). Scholars of later centuries would produce many alternative hierarchies, based on, for example, the mode of birth-giving, the appearance of the body surface, the number of orifices of the body or the existence of an eye-lid. In the fourteenth century, Ye Ziqi (葉子奇, c. 1327–1390) proposed a hierarchy depending on the direction in which the "head" of a living being grew – downwards in the case of plants (their roots), horizontally for animals, and upwards for humans. Apart from the hierarchies put forward in *Xunzi* and other texts, there also existed morphological systems of classification. The most widespread was the separation of the animal world into "crawling" (*chong* 蟲), "fish" (*yu* 魚), "birds" (*niao* 鳥) and "mammals" (*shou* 獸) which was employed by the *Erya* 爾雅, a dictionary dating from the second century BC.[17] Other works dealing in part with animals included the richly illustrated mythical

14 R. Sterckx, Animal Classification in Ancient China, in: East Asian Science, Technology, and Medicine 23 (2005), pp. 26–53. Also see R. Ptak, Literary Species or Real Species? Some Notes on Animals in the Chinese Classics, in: R. Ptak, Birds and Beasts in Chinese Texts and Trade: Lectures Related to South China and the Overseas World, Wiesbaden 2011, pp. 3–17 and especially Siebert, Klassen und Hierarchien.

15 M. Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, New York 1970, p. xv; C. S. Nappi, The Monkey and the Inkpot: Natural History and its Transformations in Early Modern China, Cambridge, MA 2009, pp. 1–2.

16 The following passage is mostly based on Guo Fu, Zhongguo gudai dongwuxue shi, pp. 132–141; Siebert, Klassen und Hierarchien; and on Sterckx, Animal Classification.

17 Siebert, Klassen und Hierarchien, pp. 174–179.

geographical text *Shanhaijing* 山海經 from the Western Han 漢 dynasty (206 BC–9 AD).[18]

In terms of quantity of information on animals, perhaps the most important group of sources were the *pulu* 譜錄, or "treatises and lists" on flora and fauna as well as on merchandise and material culture more generally. As Martina Siebert notes, *pulu*, most of which were written during the Song 宋 (960–1279) as well as during the Ming 明 (1368–1644) and Qing 清 (1644–1911) dynasties, have been used extensively by Guo Fu 郭郛 to produce his "History of Zoology in Ancient China" (中国古代动物学史, 1999).[19] Very substantial lists of certain (local) types of animals were also compiled for the genre of local chronicles (*fangzhi* 方志) throughout the empire.[20] By the time of the Qing dynasty, the authors of a famous encyclopaedia, the *Gujin tushu jicheng* (古今圖書集成) completed in 1726, were able to list numerous sources of information on many kinds of animals.[21] Around the same time, depictions of animals in paintings or as illustrations also became ever more detailed and – by today's standards – more accurate.[22]

Yet despite the fact that the aforementioned, morphological schemes of classification were more reminiscent of Western taxonomy, foreign naturalists as well as their early twentieth-century Chinese colleagues found little sense in them, in particular when it came to the far less clear-cut subdivisions. In light of the sheer amount of information on animals in Chinese works stretching back three millennia or more, this turn-of-century rejection might at first come as a surprise. I see, however, at least three conditions which make this rejection seem reasonable. In a nutshell, those were the perceived lack of one unifying system, linguistic barriers, and the nexus between transnational science and nationalism. In the following, I will only briefly touch upon the first two of these reasons but devote much more attention on the issue of nationalism which is at the core of this article.

Firstly, while there did exist a lot of sources on animals, it was the perceived lack of a classificatory scheme akin to Linnaeus in Chinese texts that led early twentieth-century zoologists to look elsewhere. While the classificatory systems mentioned above did exist, they never featured prominently in any of the older works. Perhaps unwillingly, recent and very fruitful attempts by Roderich Ptak and others to dig up the true wealth of animal-related information from pre-imperial and imperial Chinese sources testifies precisely to this relative unimportance of classificatory schemes. Using an approach that reminds the reader of early twentieth century Western authors (see below), Ptak and others have, besides following other questions, searched numerous sources in an attempt to

18 R. E. Strassberg, A Chinese Bestiary: Strange Creatures from the Guideways through Mountains and Seas (Shanhaijing), Berkeley, CA 2002. For this and many more, see Guo Fu, Zhongguo gudai dongwuxue shi.

19 M. Siebert, Pulu: "Abhandlungen und Auflistungen" zu materieller Kultur und Naturkunde im traditionellen China, Wiesbaden 2006, p. 9, n. 2.

20 For an annotated translation of such a list, see R. Ptak/Baozhu Hu, The Earliest Extant Bird List of Hainan: An Annotated Translation of the Avian Section in Qiongtai zhi, Wiesbaden 2015.

21 T. Kaiser, Unsterblich problematisch: Grus japonensis, in R. Ptak (ed.), Tiere im alten China: Studien zur Kulturgeschichte, Wiesbaden 2009, pp. 3–16.

22 Ibid., p. 14.

identify older Chinese descriptions with certain "species" as recognized by modern zoology, thereby implicitly making up for a lack of such clear-cut divisions in the Chinese sources themselves.[23]

Again, this is not to say that earlier Chinese authors did not classify at all. Yet as Roel Sterckx has pointed out with regard to pre-imperial times, their fundamental principle of classification was very different, attempting to explain interrelations reaching beyond the animal sphere instead of marking boundaries to further subdivide that sphere itself.[24] As the works mentioned above show, this had somewhat changed by late imperial times. The most famous and widespread of the more analytical and empirical works on animals as well as plants was the pharmacopoeia – a collection of pharmaceutics partly of animal origin – put together by the aforementioned Li Shizhen in the sixteenth century under the title *Bencao gangmu* (本草綱目; by no means the single or earliest pharmacopoeia[25]). Li divided mammals into "domesticated" (*chu*/*xu* 畜), "wild" (*shou* 獸), "rodents" (*shu* 鼠), "monkey-like" (*yu* 寓) and "strange" (*guai* 怪). Birds, on the other hand, were classified by Li depending on their habitat, while fish were either scaled or not, and the "crawling" could either be oviparous, pupating, or live in the water. Despite this abundance of categories, the *Bencao gangmu* remained the one Chinese work that Western naturalists were most likely to accept as a source of some sort of knowledge – which does make sense if we take into consideration that Li's entries on single animal species contained a lot more details than had most of the earlier sources.[26] In their eyes, Li's book was definitely superior to many other works continuing to appear throughout the nineteenth century, and which relied on moral instead of biological criteria or employed a combination of both.[27]

Parallel to such publications, in the 1880s there appeared the first works on Western zoology in China. In the beginning, these were almost solely authored by missionaries and British employees of the Imperial Maritime Customs.[28] Soon after 1900, however, more and more Chinese periodicals came into print. The earliest of those came under the classical Chinese heading of *bowu* (博物) or "broad knowledge of things", yet already roughly eighty per cent of their content dealt with topics which would soon be labelled "zoological".[29] Until around 1919, these early scientific journals would still pay equal respect to, say, British biologist Thomas Huxley (1825–1895) and China's Li Shizhen,

23 See the chapters in Ptak (ed.), Tiere im alten China; R. Ptak, Marine Animals in Traditional China: Studies in Cultural History, Wiesbaden 2010. For Ptak's own reflexions on this approach and a critical engagement with Roel Sterckx's work (following note), see Ptak, Literary Species, esp. pp. 9–11.

24 Sterckx, Animal Classification, pp. 26–29. For more details, see Sterckx, The Animal and the Daemon.

25 For more on this genre and its long history, see P. U. Unschuld, Medicine in China: A History of Pharmaceutics, Berkeley, CA 1986 and Guo Fu, Zhongguo gudai dongwuxue shi, pp. 524–526.

26 Kaiser, Unsterblich, p. 10.

27 Nappi, Monkey, pp. 113–116; Siebert, Klassen und Hierarchien, p. 185.

28 Hart and Edkins, Dongwuxue.

29 Xu Wenmei 徐文梅, Zhongguo jindai zui zao de shengwuxue xueshu qikan: "Zhongguo kexue she shengwu yanjiusuo congkan" 中國近代最早的生物學學術期刊: „中國科學社生物研究所叢刊" (Modern China's Earliest Biological Scientific Journal: "Science Society of China Biological Research Institute Serial"), in: Zhongguo keji qikan yanjiu 20 (2009) 5, pp. 963–965.

printing both men's portraits side by side and calling both of them "great naturalists" (*bowuxue da jia* 博物學大家).[30] The Chinese way of studying nature was still placed on an equal footing with its Western counterpart, and in 1914, the Nanjing-based magazine *Bowuxue zazhi* (博物學雜誌) gave due weight to the former's genealogy, tracing "Chinese" *(Zhonghua* 中華) natural studies back to the book of changes (*Yijing* 易經) in the third millennium BC.[31] In this turn-of-the-century, nationalistic narrative, Li Shizhen was portrayed as a reformer of a long-standing indigenous tradition and as the founder of an independent, empirically working Chinese zoology.[32]

A dozen years earlier, however, in 1902, one of China's first scientific journals, the *Putong xuebao* (普通學報) from Shanghai, had already published an article describing the Linnaean system of classification as a seemingly universal "method of classifying animals".[33]By 1915, Nanjing's *Bowuxue zazhi* also began to tune into the swansong of the Chinese *bowu* tradition. In his introductory essay, Xue Fengchang (薛鳳昌, 1876–1944), who had studied in Japan, bemoaned what he called the "tragedy of Chinese natural studies [*woguo bowuxue zhi beiguan* 我國博物學之悲觀]". According to Xue, this branch of study was suffering from three illnesses: First, the "strangeness of naming" (*mingming zhi shichang* 命名之失常) which, in the case of plants, would randomly relate to habitat, human usage, or outer appearance. Second, he pointed out that the number of species was too low (*zhonglei zhi xishao* 種類之稀少). This deficit Xue blamed on the ancient writings which Chinese naturalists used as standard references, not daring to introduce new species. This, Xue lamented, made it impossible to correctly classify those animals and plants which the ancients (*guren* 古人) had not yet known – despite the obvious fact that "great and abundant China" (*Zhongguo zhi di da wu bo* 中國之地大物博) must have as many species as Europe or America. Third, Xue criticized mistakes in the terminology (*mingcheng zhi miuwu* 名稱之謬誤) resulting from unstandardized ways of translating Chinese names of species into English or Japanese and vice-versa, as well as from the arbitrary introduction of new Chinese names.[34]

Thus in 1915, Xue Fengcheng would still discuss the deficits of traditional natural studies. After 1919, however, such *explicit* reference to tradition was to disappear almost entirely. Instead, the growing number of zoologists educated abroad – most notably in the United States – emphatically related to the West as the only source of real science. In their rhetoric, these "Young Chinese" banned older terms such as *bowu* or *gezhi* (格致) for natural studies to the realm of "superstition" (*mixin* 迷信) entirely and resorted instead to exclusively using the Japanese return graphic loan *kexue* (科學, literally "classified learning based on technical training") which has since remained the standard

30 Bowu zazhi [Beijing] 1 (1913) 2, pp. 2–4.

31 Zhonghua bowuxue yuanliu pian 中華博物學源流篇 (The Origin and Development of Chinese Natural Studies), in: Bowuxue zazhi 1 (1914) 1, pp. 11–23.

32 Nappi, Monkey, p. 138.

33 Dongwuxue fenlei fa 動物學分類法 (Zoological Classification), in: Putong xuebao 普通學報 (1902) 3, pp. 53–56.

34 Xue Fengchang 薛鳳昌, Woguo bowuxue zhi beiguan 我國博物學之悲觀 (The Tragedy of Chinese Science), in: Bowuxue zazhi 2 (1915) 2, pp. 1–8.

Chinese (and Japanese) term for science.[35] A Chinese "History of Zoology" published in 1933 already limited itself to developments in Europe – *dongwuxue* seemed to have become a purely Western system of knowledge and method of inquiry.[36]

This, at least, was the story as it appears on surface. Before I turn to casting doubt on that narrative by looking into the actual, practical work of zoologists more deeply, I want to emphasize that the rhetoric of denying any connection to earlier Chinese scholarship must be understood by looking at the larger political and social context of the time. When more and more Chinese scholars translated, published, circulated and taught ever growing amounts of "Western knowledge" in the second half of the nineteenth century, they did so with specific aims in mind. What is often described in China today as the "spread of Western learning to the East" (*xixue dongjian* 西學東漸) was not, as the term might suggest, an almost natural phenomenon; neither was it, as the famous formula by John King Fairbank (1907–1991) – who, as Julia Obertreis and Marc A. Matten note in the introduction to this issue, saw Western "impact" followed by Chinese "response" – implied, a one-way-street. Instead, different schools of thought developed in China around 1900 which developed different answers to the challenges of the day, combining to varying degrees elements of what now became "Chinese" knowledge with certain chosen elements of Western science. Some turned to glorifying allegedly purely Chinese "national learning" (*guoxue* 國學) while others did the same with regard to Western science – in both cases, specific forms and norms of knowledge were meant to solve the crisis many Chinese felt had been troubling their country since at least the mid-nineteenth century. [37] Now that Confucian learning and the Qing dynasty toppled in 1911 had failed to make the Chinese empire "rich and strong" (*fuqiang* 富强) again, for the latter group of scholars at least, Western science was to achieve the same aim for the Chinese nation under the young Republic (while those in power would often rely on modern armies instead). Science and "saving the nation" (*jiu guo* 救國) thus were intimately connected. During the last years of the Qing dynasty, officials had tried (mostly if not exclusively in vain) to save the empire by way of several ambitious reforms. Now a large faction of the new intellectuals, many of whom had studied abroad, subscribed to a much more radical rejuvenation of Chinese culture.[38]

35 B. A. Elman, From Pre-Modern Chinese Natural Studies 格致學 to Modern Science 科學 in China, in: Lackner (ed.), Mapping Meanings, pp. 25–73.

36 Liu Xian 劉咸, Dongwuxue xiaoshi 動物學小史 (A Short History of Zoology), Shanghai 1933.

37 Fa-ti Fan, Nature and Nation in Chinese Political Thought: The National Essence Circle in Early Twentieth-Century China, in: L. Daston / F. Vidal (eds.), The Moral Authority of Nature, Chicago 2004, pp. 409–437; Tze-Ki Hon, National Essence, National Learning, and Culture: Historical Writings in Guocui xuebao, Xueheng, and Guoxue jikan, in: Historiography East and West 1 (2003) 2, pp. 242–286; Xiong Yuezhi 熊月之, Xixue dongjian yu wan Qing shehui 西學東漸與晚清社會 (The Dissemination of Western Learning and the Late Qing Society), Shanghai 1994; Ssu-yü Teng / J. K. Fairbank (eds.), China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839–1923, Cambridge, MA 1954. For a fine example of why this was not a one-way-street, see A. M. Wu, From Christ to Confucius: German Missionaries, Chinese Christians, and the Globalization of Christianity 1860–1950, New Haven 2016.

38 C. Furth, Intellectual Change: From the Reform Movement to the May Fourth Movement, 1895–1920, in: M. Goldman / Leo Ou-Fan Lee (eds.), An Intellectual History of Modern China, Cambridge, UK 2002, pp. 13–96.

The Practice of *dongwuxue*

Judging from the rhetoric analysed in the previous section, we might expect to find China's early adherents of *dongwuxue* to have no connection to their country's scholarly tradition whatsoever. Yet this was not the case. As often in knowledge transfer, in China, zoology was appropriated and changed in the course of being "transferred". In practical terms, Chinese zoology certainly featured elements that "broke" with the past, yet at the same time it also carried over elements from classical *bowu* learning. Just as Dagmar Schäfer, Martina Siebert and Roel Sterckx argue, any study of animals and knowledge related to them in China should keep an eye on long term developments.[39] Chinese zoology was zoology, yet it was also Chinese.

If this sounds obvious, it does stand in contrast to many recent studies on the history of science in twentieth-century China. Those studies – ranging from the history of the social sciences to archaeology and geology – tend to emphasize breaks while paying much less attention to continuities.[40] A point in case is the role of fieldwork. Doing fieldwork has been identified by these studies as a hallmark and important part of the identity of the new generation of Chinese scientists in the first half of the twentieth century. From social statistics to palaeoanthropology, the demanding and often dirty bodily work gained tremendous importance for the self-staging of those who consciously tried to set themselves apart from the classical image of the bookish scholar.[41]

This finding at first seems to hold true in the case of zoology, too. Indeed, in the late nineteenth century, European zoologists had often blamed Chinese authors for lacking any real-world encounter with the animals they were writing about. The older works quoted above demonstrate that those authors had in fact been keen to integrate every species they found in the literature having come down upon them – which is why, for example, dragons always held their ground.[42] In the 1890s, the German missionary and sinologist Ernst Faber (1839–1899) claimed that Chinese authors knew books much more intimately than nature itself.[43] In fact, even the first Chinese to popularize Western zoology in China primarily came from the ranks of those who had failed the imperial examination system, which despite adjustments remained focused on classical texts, and who saw themselves primarily as compilers and translators. None of them would have

39 D. Schäfer / M. Siebert / R. Sterckx, Knowing Animals in China's History: An Introduction, in: D. Schäfer / M. Siebert / R. Sterckx (eds.), Animals through Chinese History. Earliest Times to 1911, Cambridge, UK 2018, pp. 1–19, on p. 2.

40 Perhaps with the exception of Chinese medicine, see B. Elman, On Their Own Terms: Science in China, 1550–1900, Cambridge, MA 2005, pp. 396–408.

41 G. Yen Shen, Unearthing the Nation: Modern Geology and Nationalism in Republican China, Chicago 2014; Tong Lam, A Passion for Facts: Social Surveys and the Construction of the Chinese Nation State, 1900–1949, Berkeley, CA 2011; S. Schmalzer, The People's Peking Man: Popular Science and Human Identity in Twentieth-Century China, Chicago 2008.

42 Siebert, Klassen und Hierarchien, p. 188.

43 Quoted after R. Sterckx, The Limits of Illustration: Animalia and Pharmacopeia from Guo Pu to Bencao Gangmu, in: Asian Medicine 4 (2008) 2, pp. 357–394, on p. 391.

entertained the idea to go out and look for wild animals themselves.[44] Having spent four years in China, the German malacologist Otto Franz von Möllendorff (1848–1903) in 1877 delivered the following judgement:

> *[T]he compilors of more modern works give evidence less of practical observation than of an extensive knowledge of ancient literature; and very often give rise to confusion by indiscriminate use of the terms employed by the older books. Thus we find in many instances that an article about an animal consists in a meagre description together with a rough drawing, supplemented by profuse quotations from old authors.*[45]

Evidently, the "more modern" authors Möllendorff had read continued to follow the example of imperial Chinese *leishu* or encyclopaedia in that they to large degree compiled and re-organised information from earlier works.[46] To counter the ensuing confusion described, von Möllendorff attempted to relate the species he found in the Chinese literature – the *Bencao gangmu* among them – to the terms employed by Western zoology, an approach in some respect similar, as mentioned above, to the recent work of Roderich Ptak, Guo Fu, and others. Already in the early 1930s, von Möllendorff's pattern had been followed by the British chemist and pharmacist Bernard E. Read (1887–1949). In his English translation of the animal-related passages of the *Bencao gangmu*, Read, who had been teaching in Beijing since 1908, added the probable Latin name to every species listed.[47] Thus Li Shizen's work merely provided the raw data for Read or von Möllendorff to feed into the new system of knowledge.

Yet the focus of foreign zoologists working in China certainly was not old books but rather fieldwork within the framework of lavishly equipped expeditions, often financed by foreign museums of natural history (see the following section). At first sight, their Chinese colleagues seemed to do precisely the same. Beginning with the *Bowu zazhi* (The Magazine of Natural History), which started publication in Beijing in 1919, we find more and more reports on expeditions conducted by Chinese scientists.

And yet, there were differences setting those expeditions apart from the way in which foreign scientists did fieldwork and presented their results. The main differences were the geographical scope, the thematic foci, and the style of publications. I shall deal with each of these in turn, and relate them to the economic and political context of the time. What I hope to arrive at is a more nuanced picture which neither portrays China's early practitioners of *dongwuxue* as modern zoologists indistinguishable from their Western

44 Elman, From Pre-Modern Chinese Natural Studies, p. 53.

45 O. F. von Möllendorff, The Vertebrata of the Province of Chihli with Notes on Chinese Zoological Nomenclature, in: Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, North-China Branch, N.F. 11 (1877), pp. 41–111, on p. 42.

46 On that genre, see C. Kaderas, Die *leishu* der imperialen Bibliothek des Kaisers Qianlong (reg. 1736–1796), Wiesbaden 1998, esp. p. 21.

47 B. E. Read, Chinese Materia Medica: Animals Drugs. II The Wild Animals, in: The Peking Society of Natural History Bulletin 6 (1931/1932) 1, pp. 1–52.

colleagues, nor banishes them to the realm of "tradition", thus avoiding one of the core binaries alluded to by Julia Obertreis and Marc A. Matten in the introduction.

Regarding geographical scope, expeditions conducted by foreign scientists mostly led to the margins of the territory under control of the Chinese Republic, and often beyond that into the changing territories of several warlords rivalling for power with the central government.[48] This was especially true for archaeologists in the late Qing and early Republic.[49] Due to the sheer size and publicity (and thus written sources) produced by such undertakings, research thus far has heavily concentrated on these large-scale expeditions. Yet they did not necessarily account for the majority of foreign-led expeditions, and certainly not for those led by Chinese.[50]

By contrast, before the beginning of the politically more stable Nanjing decade (1927–1937), Chinese-led zoological expeditions were far more regional and modest in scope. Most of them only inquired about the animal kingdom in the vicinity of the respective research institute. Biologists and geologists of the Society for Natural Studies (*Bowuxue hui* 博物學會), founded in Beijing in 1916, travelled to the Western Hills on the outskirts of the city, to neighbouring Zhili province, or to Shanxi province some 200 kilometres further west.[51] From 1925 on, the English-language *Contributions from the Biological Laboratory of the Science Society of China* in Nanjing almost exclusively published articles on fishes, amphibia and plants found within the city itself or its immediate surroundings. Whenever expeditions went a little further, for example to a neighbouring province, the *Contributions* printed lengthy diaries describing in vivid detail the hardship endured by the scientists in the field.[52] Others even collected their specimen from the city's markets, most notably many varieties of goldfish.[53]

Large-scale expeditions to far-away regions were hampered by the political and economic situation. Before 1927, both the politically fractured landscape of the Warlord era and the meagre funding of the roughly 30 existing biological research institutes rendered such endeavours almost impossible for Chinese zoologists.[54] And yet these were not the

48 J. M. Jacobs, Nationalist China's "Great Game": Leveraging Foreign Explorers in Xinjiang, 1927–1935, in: Journal of Asian Studies 73 (2014) 1, pp. 43–64.

49 M. Leutner, Helden, ihre Kämpfe und ihre Siege – Sven Hedin und Wilhelm Filchner in China und Zentralasien, in: W. Kubin (ed.), Mein Bild in deinem Auge: Exotismus und Moderne: Deutschland – China im 20. Jahrhundert, Darmstadt 1995, pp. 83–102.

50 See for example the recollections of the Austrian lepidopterologist and botanists Heinrich von Handel-Mazzetti about his trips in Yunnan and Hunan in the 1910s: H. von Handel-Mazzetti, Naturbilder aus Südwest-China: Erlebnisse und Eindrücke eines österreichischen Forschers während des Weltkrieges, Wien 1927.

51 Bowu zazhi [Beijing] 1 (1919), pp. 24–26, 26–30; 2 (1920), baogao, pp. 1–20. There are many more such reports of expeditions to the surroundings of Beijing in the *baogao* section of all issues up to 1925 when the journal seized publication.

52 E. g., Contributions from the Biological Laboratory of the Science Society of China 1 (1925) 1, pp. 1–11; 1 (1925) 3, pp. 1–3; 7 (1931) 4, pp.173–175; 7 (1931) 2, pp. 65–67.

53 Lijing Jiang, Retouching the Past with Living Things: Indigenous Species, Tradition, and Biological Research in Republican China, 1918–1937, in: Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences 46 (2016) 2, pp. 154–206.

54 Luo Guihuan 罗桂环, Minguo shiqi dui Xifang ren zai hua shengwu caiji de xianzhi 民國時期對西方人在華生物採集的限制 (The Restrictions on Collecting Animal and Botanical Specimens by Westerners in Republican China), in: Ziran kexue shi yanjiu 30 (2011) 4, pp. 450–459.

only reasons. In part, the choice of local over distant fauna was a conscious decision. Having graduated mostly from US universities before returning to China, the young zoologists were painfully aware that the 1877 dictum by von Möllendorff, quoted in length above, still held true in the 1920s: that "an exhaustive knowledge of the Fauna Sinensis" was still lacking. And while long-distance expeditions might still lead to the more prestigious discovery of large mammals such as the Great Panda, the skin of which had first been collected by Jesuit missionary Armand David (1826–1900) in Sichuan province in 1869, or unknown varieties of the takin, a goat-antelope, in Tibet in 1907 and 1911, a wealth of less impressive yet far more easily accessible species waited to be inscribed into the Linnaean system.[55]

In terms of geographical scope, it was only in the early 1930s that Chinese zoologists began to conduct expeditions to more distant places within China. The Nanjing decade brought along more stable political conditions, making long-distance travel more comfortable and, above all, safer. In addition, in 1928, Academia Sinica was called into being, a national research body providing scientists with more personnel, institutional support, and financial means. Thus, the Metropolitan Museum of Natural History, founded by Academia Sinica in Beijing in 1930, could envision building a comprehensive taxonomic collection of animals from all of China. To this end, the museum planned to henceforth send out collecting teams to every province twice annually. [56] Already in 1928, Beijing had witnessed the founding of the influential Fan Memorial Institute of Biology (*Jingsheng shengwu diaochasuo* 靜生生物調查所).[57]

This leads us to the difference in thematic foci. While in the West, the early twentieth century witnessed a turn to experimental biology, Chinese zoologists concentrated on taxonomy, that is, the description of species of animals.[58] While different in methods and terminology, such an interest in the appearance of animals was very much in line with the elder works on animals treated above. Secondly, it was due to the gap just described – remember Xue Fengchang's 1915 claim that China must have as many species as Europe or America. Thirdly, the interest in taxonomy was born out of Chinese nationalism reaching new heights in the 1920s. Completing the catalogue of indigenous, local species was meant to bring China on an equal footing with the more advanced nations, to open up new economic potential, and to foster pride in things local, and ultimately in the nation.[59] Consequently, while studying the local fauna in the early 1920s, scientists at

55 E. Songster, Panda Nation. The Construction and Conservation of China's Modern Icon, New York 2018, pp. 11–13; E. Schäfer, Unbekanntes Tibet: Durch die Wildnisse Osttibets zum Dach der Erde, Berlin 1937, p. 1.

56 Sinensia: Contributions from the National Research Institute of Zoology and Botany, Academia Sinica, 1 (1929) 1, Preface.

57 D. Y. Hong / S. Blackmore, Plants of China: A Companion to the Flora of China, Cambridge, UK 2015, pp. 237–239. On the Fan Memorial Institute, see Hu Zonggang 胡宗剛, Jingsheng shengwu diaochasuo shigao 靜生生物調查所史稿 (Historical Manuscript of Fan Memorial Institute of Biology), Jinan 2005.

58 L. A. Schneider, Biology and Revolution in Twentieth-Century China, Lanham 2003, pp. 37–38; L. K. Nyhart, Biology Takes Form: Animal Morphology and the German Universities, 1800–1900, Chicago 1995, p. 243; Jiang, Retouching, pp. 195–196.

59 The reasoning behind this was not unlike the textbooks on local customs and conditions introduced by the

Nanjing's Biological Laboratory of the Science Society of China were keen to emphasize that they were researching the *nation's* animals rather than those of Jiangsu province.[60] While China remained politically fractured, its animals – and nature more generally – were meant to testify to the existence of a unified nation.[61] And not only that: Modern, scientific research on the nation's fauna and flora, argued the early biologists, would directly help to unify and safeguard that nation. Biology could be put to direct use by protecting citizens' health through better crops and livestock, and by improving hygiene through fighting bacteria and vermin such as *Schistosoma japonicum*, the parasite causing snail fever.[62]

As Lijing Jiang has recently demonstrated, this concern with the nation influenced the working style of China's zoologists in yet another respect, again linking them more closely to those earlier Chinese ways of studying animals they claimed to be so distant from. In order to get a better grasp of the local fauna, zoologists turned to old books and local gazetteers from imperial times, including but not limited to Li Shizhen's *Bencao gangmu*.[63] What is more, even their style of writing about research trips and biological discoveries – including poems on plants and mountains – at times was reminiscent of that of "traditional poets and scholars".[64] Investigated closely, the lengthy and poetic reports – quoted above as proof of the rise and importance of fieldwork – simultaneously preserved some elements of the world of traditional Chinese scholarship. Far from seamlessly replacing Chinese ways of studying animals, *dongwuxue* turned out to be a hybrid of zoology and *bowu* studies.

This is also evinced by certain features of the early biological journals. Those of the 1910s, in particular, contained rubrics which illustrated the earlier connection between natural and textual scholarship or were typical for the early Chinese press: readers' questions to the editor complete with answers, "natural studies short stories" (*bowu xiaoshuo* 博物小說) and even "natural studies jokes" (*bowu xiaotan* 博物笑談).[65] It is perhaps little wonder that to a

Ministry of Education in the last years of the Qing dynasty, see Ching May-bo 程美寶, You aixiang er aiguo. Qingmo Guangdong xiangtu jiaocai de guojia huayu 由愛鄉而愛國: 清末廣東鄉土教材的國家話語 (To Love my Native-Place, to Love my Country. The National Discourse on Native-Place Textbooks in Late Qing), in: Lishi yanjiu 4 (2003), pp. 68–84.

60 Jiang, Retouching, pp. 176–177.

61 Fan, Nature and Nation, p. 437; Songster, Panda Nation, pp. 24–28 and passim.

62 Statement on the tenth anniversary of the Biological Laboratory of the Science Society of China, 1932, quoted in: Hu, Jingsheng shengwu diaochasuo, p. 6. The same idea led to the Japanese inspired establishment of agricultural experiment stations during the last years of Qing rule. See P. Lavelle, Agricultural Improvement at China's First Agricultural Experiment Stations, in: D. Phillips / S. Kingsland (eds.), New Perspectives on the History of Life Sciences and Agriculture, New York 2015, pp. 323–344. On the "scattered and unsystematic" beginnings of the fight against schistosomiasis or snail fever in Republican times as well as the much more successful campaigns after 1949, see M. Gross, Farewell to the God of Plague: Chairman Mao's Campaign to Deworm China, Oakland 2016, pp. 6–7 and passim.

63 Jiang, Retouching, p. 182.

64 Ibid., p. 173.

65 Those appeared regularly in Bowuxue zazhi since 1914.

historian in search of the "progress" of biology in China, such elements qualify the earlier journals as merely "science disseminating" (*kepu* 科普) rather than truly "scientific".[66]

Foreign Zoologists and Chinese Nationalism

While Chinese zoology began extending its reach to every corner of the Republic, the degree of internationalization in animal research also rose. Supported financially by the China Foundation for the Promotion of Education and Culture (*Zhonghua jiaoyu jijinhui* 中華教育基金會) and thus the United States' Boxer Indemnity Fund, the Nanjing based Biological Laboratory of the Science Society of China had begun to publish its aforementioned journal primarily in English in 1925 already, with the stated aim of making the voice of Chinese zoologists heard internationally and thus help them to become recognized as equal members in the international academic community.[67] Yet internationalization by no means meant overcoming national borders but rather standing the nation's ground in competition with research conducted in other nations.

The Science Society's initiative soon bore fruit when the leading British journal Nature recognized the Contributions for having placed Nanjing's Biological Laboratory on the international scientific stage.[68] From 1929 on, Academia Sinica's National Research Institute of Zoology and Botany followed suit with its journal Sinensia. Beginning in 1935, the newly founded Chinese Journal of Zoology published articles in Chinese, English, German, and French. More and more of these articles were authored by non-Chinese zoologists. What is more, Chinese zoologists also wrote about their research using animal specimen which had been collected by foreigners in China and were now stored in museum collections in Europe.[69] Others had such collections sent back to China for inspection. In 1933, for example, a certain S. H. Chen in Beijing analysed several specimens of ants which had been collected by German zoologist Rudolf Mell (1878–1970) in Guangzhou a few years earlier and then taken to Berlin's Museum of Natural History. In Beijing that same year, there appeared an article on a new species of nematode (or threadworm) which had been taken from the bowels of a walrus at Hagenbeck's zoo in Hamburg, Germany, and sent to the Chinese author.[70]

While Chinese zoologists thus became more and more intertwined with the international scientific community without fully leaving behind their inherited working styles and thematic foci, Western zoologists working in China after 1900 indeed almost fully ignored earlier Chinese research on animals. Otto Franz von Möllendorff in the 1870s

66 Xu, Zhongguo jindai zui zao, p. 963.
67 Ibid., p. 965.
68 Ibid.
69 H. S. Wu, On Some Fishes Collected from the Upper Yangtse Valley, in: Sinensia 1 (1930) 6, pp. 65–86.
70 S. H. Chen, Some Species of Helticinae from Canton, in: The Peking Society of Natural History Bulletin 8 (1933/34) 1, pp. 43–58; H. F. Hsü, A New Nematode, Anisakis Alata, from the Walrus, ibid., pp. 59–63.

and Bernard E. Read in the 1930s were among the rare exceptions who, albeit in critical fashion, grappled with the Chinese tradition at all.

That the vast majority of Western scientists did not care about earlier works anymore also had to do with a change in the group of people who conducted research in China. Until the end of the nineteenth century, this had mostly been composed of missionaries like Armand David, and of diplomats who pursued the recognized avocation of collecting plants and animals in their spare time.[71] Yet after 1900, academically trained zoologists were to take the reins, usually in the context of expeditions sent out for research purposes only. Unlike their predecessors, these (almost exclusively) men did not possess any command of the Chinese language. By which name the Chinese called a given species was relevant to them only insofar as the communication with indigenous hunters and collectors demanded such knowledge. Into the 1940s, the majority of foreign expedition reports therefore mention Chinese only as anonymous hunters, servants or other subalterns.[72]

In 1932, Roy Chapman Andrews (1884–1960), who on behalf of the American Museum of Natural History undertook hunting expeditions in China and Mongolia, was among the first to acknowledge the skills of his Chinese – again – assistants. It needs to be noted, however, that Andrews claimed part of the merit for himself since he had chosen the assistants and sent some of them to the United States for further training.[73] In 1929, the German geographer Günther Köhler (1901–1958), who would go on to a career at various Chinese universities, thanked a Chinese colleague for providing access to certain maps.[74] Yet overall, Western authors seemed to take little notice of the rapid expansion of science going on in China itself, or at least preferred not to give it much prominence. In that respect, the nineteenth century continued. And if Fan Fa-ti rightly argues that despite their invisibility in most written sources, Chinese hunters, collectors and translators in the nineteenth century did play a vital role for the research conducted by foreigners in China, this is even more true for Chinese zoologists in the early twentieth century – even though they, too, usually went unmentioned.[75]

Yet the ignorance, and sometimes arrogance, of Western scientists must also be seen in the context of increasing international competition. While Western zoologists downplayed the contributions of their Chinese colleagues, the latter sought to stand their ground by dissociating themselves from the former. In seemingly paradox fashion, and just as in many other areas, the increasing internationalization of zoology fostered a

71 Fan, British Naturalists.

72 R. C. Andrews, Across Mongolian Plains: A Naturalist's Account of China's "Great Northwest", New York 1921, p. 270; Handel-Mazzetti. Naturbilder, pp. xiii, 250–251, 357–358; A. Caradja, Materialien zur einer Mikrolepidopterenfauna des Mienshan, Provinz Shansi, China, in: Deutsche Entomologische Zeitschrift "Iris" 53 (1939), pp. 1–15; A. Caradja, Materialien zu einer Mikrolepidopterenfauna des Yangtsetales bei Batang, in: ibid., pp. 15–26.

73 R. C. Andrews (ed.), The New Conquest of Central Asia: A Narrative of the Explorations of the Central Asiatic Expeditions in Mongolia and China, 1921–1930, New York 1932, p. 12.

74 G. Köhler, Der Hwang-Ho: Eine Physiogeographie, Gotha 1929, Preface and p. 203. On Köhler's career in China, see W. Fuchs, Günther Köhler in memoriam: 1901–1958, in: Oriens Extremus 5 (1958) 2, pp. 246–251.

75 Fa-ti Fan, Science in Cultural Borderlands: Methodological Reflections on the Study of Science, European Imperialism, and Cultural Encounter, in: East Asian Science, Technology and Society, 1 (2007) 2, pp. 213–231.

longing for national identity and self-reliance.[76] It was this aim – national, anti-imperial self-assertion – which in practical terms made it imperative for Chinese scientists to keep the foreign agents of science at bay, even though science itself was praised as saviour of the nation.[77] Taking the lead were Chinese archaeologists – again, most of them educated in the United States – who succeeded in lobbying the Beijing government to prevent the export from China of archaeological findings dug up by foreign expeditions.[78] Such regulations soon were extended to foreign expeditions of any kind. Chinese zoologists, too, made the governments in Beijing and later in Nanjing put heavy restrains on foreign zoological and botanical expeditions.[79] To justify their initiative, the eminent biologist Bing Zhi (秉志, 1886–1965), who had graduated from Cornell University and, in 1921, been among the founders of China's first Institute of Biology at Nanjing University, in 1934 argued as follows:

> *European and American scientific bodies frequently send out expeditions to China in order to collect animals and plants. They are not greedy but spend enormous amounts of money, travel thousands of kilometres, do not shy away from hard labour and thoroughly reflect upon their research.* [The result is that] *foreign biologists ship rare treasures out of our country, investigate them and present their findings to the world in important publications. We Chinese must stand up* [against this] *according to our own plan. We want to till the field on our own, so as to bring in the good harvest ourselves.*[80]

The restrictions which Academia Sinica, with support from the government, henceforth placed on foreign biologists were meant to serve precisely this end. When, for instance, in 1930, an expedition headed by German zoologist Hugo Weigold (1886–1973) and financed by the Museum of the Academy of Natural Sciences in Philadelphia planned to collect specimen of animals and plants in the south-western provinces of Yunnan and Sichuan, Weigold first had to sign a list of terms and conditions in Shanghai. Among other proscriptions, members of the expedition were not allowed to export cultural goods and had to let the Academia inspect any naturalia they wished to take home. The Academia itself was allowed to dispatch several of its own men to accompany Weigold's team. Taking pictures and shooting film had both to be explicitly permitted by the respective local government first; no pictures or film scenes were to be permitted which could "harm the dignity of the Chinese people"; any recordings had to go through inspection by both the ministry of education and the ministry of the interior prior to leaving the country. Most importantly, the expedition team as a gift had to leave two complete sets of all specimen

76 S. Conrad / K. Mühlhahn, Globale Mobilität und Nationalismus: Chinesische Migration und die Re-Territorialisierung des Nationalen um 1900, in: B. Schäbler (ed.), Area Studies und die Welt: Weltregionen und neue Globalgeschichte, Wien 2007, pp. 217–251.

77 Xu, Zhongguo jindai zui zao, p. 965.

78 Shen, Unearthing.

79 Xu, Zhongguo jindai zui zao, pp. 964–965.

80 Bing Zhi 1934, quoted after Luo, Minguo shiqi dui Xifang ren, p. 451.

they would collect with the Academia. Should members of the expedition breach these conditions, the government could ban them from later re-entering China.[81]
Three years earlier, the then rivalling government in Beijing had permitted the Swedish explorer Sven Hedin (1865–1952) to lead an expedition to the Central Asian province of Xinjiang under similar terms, again under pressure from Academia Sinica. Regardless of the government's agenda behind these measures – by granting the expedition, Beijing wanted to demonstrate that Xinjiang, then controlled by a warlord opposed to the expedition, remained under the jurisdiction of the centre – the international community of scientists was alarmed.[82] Petermann's Mitteilungen aus Justus Perthes' Geographische Anstalt, the internationally leading journal of explorers, printed a German translation of the contract signed by Hedin. Walter Stötzner (1882–1965), a German zoologist and anthropologist, upon entering China to explore the provinces of the North-East, had to agree to similar terms. In Petermann's Mitteilungen, Stötzner wrote that he fully understood that the Beijing government was banning the export of cultural relics. Animals and plants as well as ethnographic objects and recordings, however, to Stötzner presented an entirely different matter:

> *Pondering on all the justifications* [presented by the Chinese government]*, one has to concede that the 'Young Chinese' are quite right to demand the conclusion of certain agreements with the foreign explorers. Yet just like the Young Nationalists and Fascists of all countries including the European ones, in their nationalist idealism and their enthusiasm to fight for the nation's goods, they somewhat overshoot their target.* […] *Animals and plants and primitive peoples can never and will never be exterminated nor even reduced in number by those few explorers. It is only the Chinese colonist himself who by advancing into the untouched wilderness, bringing his culture with him, is endangering the abundant amount of natural scientific and ethnographic national goods.* […] *It is thus high time for natural scientists and ethnographers to get to work here [in Manchuria] in order to collect and observe in the service of all peoples' non-partisan science ('parteilose Wissenschaft aller Völker') before it is too late. It needs to be said, too, that for such work a sufficient number of young Chinese scientists does not yet exist* […]*, in particular zoologists and anthropologists.*[83]

That Stötzner did discuss those contracts at all is significant insofar as the sheer mentioning of such bureaucratic hindrances did not fit well with the still dominant image of the adventurous Westerner setting out to explore an untouched wilderness.[84] To protect such an image, Western authors usually chose to mention neither contracts with the government nor contributions by their Chinese colleagues. For example, most Western-

81 Luo, Minguo shiqi dui Xifang ren, pp. 451–452.
82 For details of Hedin's expedition and the respective agendas of the central government and Xinjiang's warlords, see Jacobs, Nationalist China's "Great Game", pp. 45–52.
83 W. Stötzner, Die Verträge mit den fremden Forschungsreisenden in China, in: Dr. A. Petermanns Mitteilungen aus Justus Perthes' Geographischer Anstalt 73 (1927), pp. 294–298, on p. 295.
84 Leutner, Helden.

language publications which were to result from Sven Hedin's "Central Asian Expedition", lasting from 1927 to 1930, did not mention Xu Xusheng (徐旭生, 1888–1976, also known as Sü Ping-chang) although Xu, dean and professor of history at Peking University, had been appointed by Academia Sinica as an equal co-leader of the expedition.[85] Writing in 1937, just when Chinese sovereignty came under even more serious attack from Japan, the young German zoologist and SS-member, Ernst Schäfer (1910–1992), again did not mention the contracts. Instead, in the foreword to his report on an expedition into Tibet, Schäfer again celebrated the kind of self-image that Chinese scientists and politicians found so appalling, and which at the same time echoed their own linking of science with nationalism:

> *The time of the great geographic discoveries might be gone* […]. *Yet whoever possesses the will to be a pioneer and the idealism enabling him to endure hardship, and whoever takes pride in labouring for the mother country abroad and in wilderness – all of these will still be drawn with the same furiousness to the white spots on the map of the earth, for science, and for Germany!*[86]

To counter such ambitions, in 1927 already, Academia Sinica had explicitly argued against Hedin's expedition that its name alone meant an insult to Chinese sovereignty. After all, the word "expedition" implied to do scientific research by "foraging into dangerous territory in military fashion", although the territory in question undoubtedly belonged to the territory of the Republic of China. Would, the Academia's statement asked rhetorically, Sweden be willing to grant permission to a Chinese "expedition" into its territory?[87] As much as such an argument was directed against any warlord's claim to independence from Beijing (or, soon, Nanjing), it was equally directed against any foreign scientist implicitly casting doubt on the pre-eminence of the government of the Republic of China.[88] Again, we see how the political context and the quest for power shaped the rhetoric of scientists, scientific policies, and thus scientific results themselves and the ways these would be arrived at (or not).

Yet pride in a fragile national sovereignty – disputed by warlords as well as, if implicitly, by foreign explorers moving about at will as if China was a formal colony – was not the only factor driving Chinese zoologists' lobbying for protective measures. Another one I can only hint at here was the beginning of a Chinese environmental protection movement. This, too, was closely linked to nationalism and the idea that the government should guard the nation's natural treasures. Zoologists criticizing the government for doing too little on this front found themselves vindicated when in 1936, American

85 For a rare exception, see Königlich Schwedische Akademie der Wissenschaften (ed.), Zur Arthropodenwelt Nordwest-Chinas: Sammlungen Dr. David Hummels in den Jahren 1927–30: Insecta, Myriopoda, Arachnoidea, Stockholm 1937. Also see Jacobs, Nationalist China's "Great Game", p. 46.

86 Schäfer, Unbekanntes Tibet, p. iii.

87 Quoted after Stötzner, Verträge, p. 298.

88 Jacobs, Nationalist China's "Great Game", somewhat underscores this second dimension of the Academia's claim to sovereignty, targeting external instead of internal forces.

textile designer and self-made animal catcher Ruth Harkness (1900–1947) succeeded in bringing out of China the first live Great Panda ever, against the fierce resistance of Academia Sinica. Harkness' commercial success was however of such magnitude that she as well as others returned to catch at least eleven more baby Pandas over the next two years, shooting the mothers first. In 1939, in the midst of fighting against Japan, the academy finally pressured the Chinese government to ban the export of live rare animals.[89] This arguably laid the foundation for the ambitious Panda protection and breeding program the Peoples Republic would install only in the 1960s, and for the Panda's eventual rise as China's national icon.[90]

Lastly, as the duty to hand over full sets of collected specimen to Academia Sinica demonstrates, another important factor was the international competition for scientific prestige by being the first to add a certain species to the Linnaean system. Already in the eighteenth century, scientists had been confronted with a problem: Often it was not decisive who had first tracked down and shot (or else collected) a certain animal, but rather whose finding had first made it back to Europe and been described in a scientific journal.[91] The Austrian lepidopterologist and botanist Heinrich von Handel-Mazzetti (1882–1940) was in a rage when in 1917, China's entry into the First World War meant that his collection of butterflies from South China only reached Vienna with more than a year's delay. In the meantime, rivalling zoologists had already described the species Handel-Mazzetti had collected.[92] As expressed in Bing Zhi's statement quoted above, this was exactly the kind of competition which Chinese biologists were trying to enter into. Hence, they began conducting their own, if small-scale, expeditions and issued their own, sometimes foreign-language scientific journals, which reached university libraries from Berlin to Cornell through subscriptions or publication exchange and were meant to ensure that Chinese biologists' discoveries would be recognized as such. In addition, they tried to keep their foreign competitors, who doubtless were superior in terms of financial means and number of educated personnel, at bay by way of the treaties described – all with the aim in mind to become first-time describers and thus name-patrons for a species of animal or plant.

Conclusion

In a recent interview, historian Luo Zhitian, commenting on China's early twentieth century transformation, stated:

89 Luo, Minguo shiqi dui Xifang ren, pp. 455–457; V. C. Croke, The Lady and the Panda: The True Adventures of the First American Explorer to Bring Back China's Most Exotic Animal, New York 2005.

90 This programme's story is told in Songster, Panda Nation.

91 A. Mariss, "A world of new things": Praktiken der Naturgeschichte bei Johann Reinhold Forster, Frankfurt a. M. 2015, pp. 72, 220.

92 Handel-Mazzetti, Naturbilder, p. 357.

> *[M]odern China indeed exhibited a general tendency toward change outside its own tradition* […]. *This is understandable, because our tradition did not help us win wars in modern times.* […] *The Chinese discarded classical studies and scholarship because they were deemed useless and even obstacles to China's search for wealth and power. Not surprisingly, in their eagerness to embrace the new world, many educated Chinese were quite ready to abandon their tradition so that they could travel light into the new world.*[93]

Light they did travel, yet not weightless. The example of zoology from the 1900s to the 1930s demonstrates that in the process of transfer, knowledge inevitably was transformed. In order for us to see that transformation, however, early twentieth century Chinese *dongwuxue* requires a particularly close look. After all, many Chinese scientists did their utmost to cover up any traces that would link the newly coined *dongwuxue* back to the Chinese scholarly tradition instead of "zoology" as they had encountered it whilst studying abroad. As suggested by Luo Zhitian, probably many of them truly believed they were doing something entirely new. Also, as my brief overview has shown, the state of animal research in China prior to the turn of the twentieth century certainly helped to create such an impression. Compared to other fields of knowledge – such as philology or hydraulics – earlier Chinese research on animals provided relatively little ground for claiming an equal status with zoology as it was practiced in the West. While the amount of texts related to animals, from the *Shanhaijing* to large numbers of *pulu*, was far larger than earlier research has assumed, those sources were also very diverse in their principles of classification.

Consequently, by the 1920s, Chinese adherents of *dongwuxue* increasingly claimed to be disconnected from the past. As we have seen, such distancing was at least equally induced by the newness of their subject and the way they would treat it as it was induced by the young scientists' desire to help the late nineteenth century slogan of making China "rich and strong" finally come true. Now science, as a distinctively Western method, for many was their tool of choice.

Yet as we turn away from rhetoric to look into the practice of *dongwuxue* as a "science in action", we find several indications casting, perhaps unsurprisingly, doubt on the claim of complete newness. I have highlighted three of these. True, Chinese zoologists sought to set themselves apart from their predecessors through conducting hard fieldwork and publishing their findings in foreign languages. Still, firstly, their field trips mainly went to the immediate surroundings of their workplace, and even to local food markets. Lack of funds, personnel and a save environment for travel accounted for this – and yet the geographically narrow scope was also due to the biologists' desire to catalogue the entirety of the nation's animals, and not only the more spectacular ones to be found in far-off places. Secondly, the same desire also led Chinese zoologists – in contrast to the concurrent trend in zoology in Europe and America – to choose taxonomy over experimental bio-

93 Yanjie Zhao, Understanding Chinese History in the Context of World History. An Interview with Luo Zhitian, June 4, 2016, in: Journal of Modern Chinese History 10 (2016) 2, pp. 206–229, on p. 217.

logy. Thirdly, a close look at their publications reveals that even in terms of their style of writing, we can find many traces – or willful continuations – of China's earlier scholarly tradition. Not only did zoologists, like the scholars of yore, write poems and poetic reports from the field, but also the early zoological journals continued to feature popular elements such as questions and answers as well as natural history short stories and jokes. If *dongwuxue* was in fact different from zoology in those respects, why would many Chinese nevertheless claim that it was not? Why would they, in line with the now outdated narrative of "diffusion", portray their field of study as almost place- as well as timeless? The reason again lies in the wider political context which I have dealt with in the third section. In order for "science to save the nation", Chinese scientists, including zoologists, had to get on an equal footing with their competitors from other nations. This foremost required that their occupation would be identified as nothing but (presumably) universal zoology, not any local variant. Having established such a bottom-line, Chinese zoologists could proceed to lobby the government to put restrains on foreign-led expeditions. Only such an exercise in Chinese sovereignty could make sure that Chinese zoologists would get a fair chance to move to the forefront of their discipline globally, and to assist national consciousness, cohesion, and well-being. Domestic political support thus proved decisive in promoting and shaping Chinese science.

Despite their eagerness, however, to demonstrate to the outside world that they were practicing "universal" zoology, Chinese scientists, at least in their Chinese language publications, continued to tap into certain stylistic and methodological conventions from imperial China's scholarly tradition. Certainly, Chinese zoologists were "embracing the new world", and science in particular, because they, as Grace Shen has argued, found science "useful".[94] Yet embracing Western zoology did not equal dissolving oneself in it. Late imperial and Republican scientists, some wittingly, some unwittingly, built on earlier ways of writing about animals. While making fieldwork a core ingredient of their occupation, as we have seen, many continued to hold knowledge gathered by their forbearers in high esteem, and they continued to include poetry in their scientific contributions. They, in other words, were establishing *dongwuxue* as zoology with Chinese characteristics. Embracing Western science did not only not hinder but perhaps even necessitate such self-assertive behaviour. (Looking back from current, more outspoken and self-confident PRC-claims at a distinct Chinese way of meeting a range of challenges, this may not come as a surprise).

The story of *dongwuxue* thus demonstrates that it was possible to be both Chinese and scientific. While they were embracing Western science, Chinese zoologists did by no means annihilate their own scholarly roots. As a result, China's early zoologists contributed to the creation of *dongwuxue* as an academic discipline that united features of both Western zoology and earlier Chinese ways of studying animals.

94 G. Shen, Murky Waters: Thoughts on Desire, Utility, and the "Sea of Modern Science", in: Isis 98 (2007) 3, pp. 584–596, on p. 595.

Child Studies in Udmurtia in the 1920s

Vera Shibanova

ABSTRACTS

Die interdisziplinäre Kinderforschung entstand im späten 19. Jahrhundert im Umkreis des amerikanischen Psychologen und Sozial-Darwinisten G. Stanley Hall. Bald wurde sie zu einer länderübergreifenden wissenschaftlichen Bewegung, die sich unter der Bezeichnung der Pädologie verbreitete und im bolschewistischen Russland der 1920er Jahre besonders stark an Fahrt gewann. Der vorliegende Aufsatz gibt einen Einblick in die pädologische Praxis in der Sowjetischen Udmurtischen Republik und zeigt die Auseinandersetzung der lokalen Eliten mit den theoretischen Implikationen sowie den praktischen Konsequenzen der Anwendung des pädologischen Wissens für die indigene Bevölkerung. Udmurtische Intellektuelle empfanden die sozial-biologischen Theorien als diskriminierend und formulierten alternative Konzepte für die Erziehung der nächsten Generation. Im Beitrag werden die bis heute wenig beachteten Bildungsprojekte udmurtischer Intellektueller vorgestellt, die im Kontext des neuen Programms der Kinderforschung in der Region entstanden sind. Der intellektuelle und wissenschaftliche Transfer, der in Udmurtien stattfand, war keine Einbahnstraße, sondern reflektierte den reziproken Kommunikation- und Austauschprozess. Die lokalen Eliten verfügten in den 1920er Jahren über gewisse Freiräume und versuchten, die sowjetische Wissenschaftspolitik zu beeinflussen. Die Pädologie erwies sich als ein wichtiges, wenn auch kurzes Kapitel in der russischen Wissenschaftsgeschichte.

Interdisciplinary child research emerged in the late nineteenth century with the pioneering work of the American social-Darwinist psychologist G. Stanley Hall. It soon became a transnational scientific movement, pedology, which gained particular traction in Bolshevik Russia in the 1920s. The present essay offers an insight into pedological practice in the Soviet Udmurt Republic and highlights the engagement of local elites, who were concerned with both the theoretical implications and practical consequences of pedology for the indigenous population. Udmurt intellectuals regarded social-biological theories as discriminatory and formulated

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alternative approaches to school the next generation. This article presents their hitherto little documented educational projects, which evolved in the context of the new programme of child studies conducted in the region. The intellectual and scientific transfer that took place in Udmurtia was not a one-way street, but reflects a reciprocal process of communication and exchange. For about a decade, local elites enjoyed a modicum of freedom and attempted to influence Soviet scientific policy. Pedology proved to be an important but short-lived chapter in the history of Russian science.

Introduction

Just over a century ago on the streets of Petrograd and Moscow, the Bolsheviks seized power in an audacious attempt to radically restructure a crisis-wracked country and, in the course of time, to reassert Russia's position as a leading actor in global history. The new administration launched a programme of unprecedented modernization that demanded nothing less than a comprehensive transformation of Russian society. This programme included a concept of "cultural revolution"[1] and far-reaching educational reform. To advance the latter, the regime looked to an emerging branch of child studies, "pedology."

In this paper, I investigate the adoption of pedology by Soviet scientists in the 1920s, with a particular focus on pedological research conducted in the 1920s in the central Russian region of Udmurtia. Furthermore, I will consider reactions in a local educational journal to pedological practice in Udmurt schools. I shall then examine alternative proposals for studies of Udmurt childhood that were formulated by local intelligentsia.

The contradictions and complex interdependencies of science and politics, as well as centre and periphery in Imperial and Soviet Russia have engaged the attention of a number of historians in recent times.[2] However, the history of the Volga region, populated by Udmurts and other ethnic groups, remains a largely neglected chapter in Soviet historiography. This research is intended to contribute to the history of child studies in this region and to consider the local and national impact of Udmurt elites.

1 I use the term "cultural revolution" in a broad sense, not restricting it to the years 1928–1931. See M. David-Fox, What Is Cultural Revolution?, in: The Russian Review 58 (1999) 2, pp. 181–201, here 182.

2 For the history of ethnographical and anthropological research see, R. Cvetkovski/A. Hofmeister (eds.), An Empire of Others: Creating Ethnographic Knowledge in Imperial Russia and the USSR, Budapest 2014; M. Mogilner, Homo Imperii: A History of Physical Anthropology in Russia, Lincoln 2013; F. Hirsch, Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge and the Making of Soviet Union, Ithaca 2005. For child studies in Central Asia, see C. Cavanaugh, Biology and Backwardness: Medicine and Power in Russian and Soviet Central Asia, 1868–1934, PhD diss., Columbia University 2001. For specific ethnopedological research on children in the periphery and local influence on pedological theory, see A. Byford, Imperial Normativities and Sciences of the Child: The Politics of Development in the USSR, 1920–1930s, in: Ab Imperio 2 (2016), pp. 71–124; S.N. Tseniuga, Pedologicheskaya rabota v Sibiri pervoi treti XX veka [Pedological work in Siberia in the first third of the twentieth century], in: Obrazovanie i nauka 67 (2009) 10, pp. 82–93; N. Kurek, Istoriya likvidatsii pedologii i psikhotekhniki [A history of the liquidation of pedology and psychotechnics], Saint Petersburg 2004.

Early Years of Pedology

The American scholar Oscar Chrisman (1855–1929) introduced the term "paidology" in 1893 in the journal *Pedagogical Seminary*. Originally, Chrisman simply envisioned pedology as an offshoot or branch of pedagogy, one that would carry out investigations in a "field of new work […] to study the child scientifically in the laboratory, and then to apply the results of this study in a further study of the child in the home, in the school, and in all the life of the child." However, he then proposed the creation of an entirely new "department in college or university, whose sole aim of study and centre of attention is the child […]. Such work as this […] might be known as a department of Paidology."[3] From these bold, if somewhat vague roots, American, European and Russian scholars soon adopted the term for the nascent science of comprehensive child study.

Pedology offered a scientific alternative to pedagogy, which, at the time, had a strong philosophical orientation.[4] Pedologists, in contrast to exponents of pedagogy, employed a positivist approach based on experimental methods. Evolutionary theory, in particular, the "recapitulation" theory of biologist Ernst Haeckel (1834–1919), a German disciple of Darwin, had a major impact on pedology. The core of Haeckel's doctrine is the "biogenetic law," which is based on the notion that an animal embryo replays or "recapitulates" the same developments that occurred during the long process of the evolution of the particular species. Thus, "ontogeny" (the specific biological development of an individual organism from the moment of fertilization) "recapitulates phylogeny" (the evolutionary history of a species).[5]

Originally a biological principle, Haeckel's theory was soon applied by Western social scientists to determine and classify the purported developmental level of individuals within a particular race[6] or society. Certain races, particularly those associated with premodern cultures, were considered to be genetically stunted, arrested at a lower level of the evolutionary ladder. According to this logic, individuals of such races, even if

3 O. Chrisman, The Hearing of Children, in: Pedagogical Seminary 2 (1892/1893) 3, pp. 418–441, here 439. The term "Paidology" is derived from the Greek, παῖς (*pais*, child) and λόγος (*logos*, reason). Chrisman's use of the suffix "-logy," which often appears in the names of scientific disciplines, emphasizes the intended scientific aspect of paidology/pedology.

4 Similar reasons spawned the development of experimental pedagogy in Germany at the turn of the century. However, it did not gain the popularity of the pedological movement. See C. Hopf, Die experimentelle Pädagogik. Empirische Erziehungswissenschaft in Deutschland am Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts, Bad Heilbrunn 2004. For an overview of different forms of experimental child studies at the time, see M. Depaepe, Zum Wohl des Kindes?: Pädologie, pädagogische Psychologie und experimentelle Pädagogik in Europa und den USA, 1890–1940, Weinheim 1983.

5 "Die Ontogenesis ist die kurze und schnelle Recapitulation der Phylogenesis, bedingt durch die physiologischen Functionen der Vererbung (Fortpflanzung) und Anpassung (Ernährung). Das organische Individuum […] wiederholt während des raschen und kurzen Laufes seiner individuellen Entwickelung die wichtigsten von denjenigen Formveränderungen, welche seine Voreltern während des langsamen und langen Laufes ihrer paläontologischen Entwickelung nach den Gesetzen der Vererbung und Anpassung durchlaufen haben." E. Haeckel, Generelle Morphologie der Organismen, vol. 2, Berlin 1866, p. 300.

6 The term race appears here without quotation marks, as I employ the term as it was used in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century scientific discourse.

removed from their group and transferred to another environment, would not be able to climb to a higher rung because their particular development "corresponds" to, and in this case is restricted by, the general limitations of their race. Children from advanced races go through very similar stages; however, they soon attain and move beyond the level of the fully developed adult "savage." This explains the alleged correspondence between the behavioral pattern of the Western child, for example, and that of the uncivilized, primitive adult.

Recapitulation theory influenced the thinking of the American child psychologist G. Stanley Hall (1846–1924), one of the founding fathers of pedology. Adopting Haeckel's biogenetic law, Hall developed a general phyletic theory, which divides the duration of childhood into stages that correspond to the ancient history of mankind.[7] Bolstered by the evolutionary theories of Haeckel and Hall, pedology began to take on the characteristics of a comparative science, with particularly negative implications for pre-modern societies.[8]

After the First World War, interest in pedology in the West declined, but the course of its journey was to expand elsewhere.[9] Russian pedologists, encouraged by the new government, continued their research after the October revolution. Certainly until the early 1930s, Russian scientists were in continuous contact and exchanged knowledge with their Western colleagues.[10] However, Soviet pedologists and developmental psychologists also began to pursue their own theories and lines of research. Crucially, they were divided on the matter of recapitulation theory.

Pavel Blonskii (1884–1941) was the most prominent adherent of Hall's phyletic theory. Blonskii regarded the biogenetic law as universal for all living organisms and emphasized biological factors in the stepwise development of children. He asserted that it is impossible to skip required stages, and that mental development could not be accelerated in this manner. Instead, he emphasized that every child advances from the stage of "primitive" to "civilized" in order to foster a harmonious personality.[11] The pedagogue must con-

7 Hall maintained that youths should be given the possibility to express their "hereditary impulsions" in accordance with their "phyletic stage." G. S. Hall, Adolescence: Its Psychology and its Relations to Physiology, Anthropology, Sociology, Sex, Crime, Religion and Education, vol. 1, New York 1904, p. x. He claimed that the same principle of development should be applied in the curriculum and criticized the teaching of writing in the first years of school: "Here again we violate the great law that the child repeats the history of the race, and that, from the larger historic standpoint, writing as a mode of utterance is only the latest fashion". Ibid., vol. 2, p. 462.

8 The judgements of the adherents of Haeckel's recapitulation theory were not restricted to the field of child development. The "child-savage" analogy was widely employed by criminal anthropologists and psychologists who argued that the savage, the mentally retarded person and the born criminal are all arrested at a child's level of development and cannot ascend to the level of the civilized man. See J. Gould, Ontogeny and Phylogeny Cambridge, MA 1977, pp. 115–165.

9 Regarding the wane of interest in pedology in the West, see Depaepe, Zum Wohl, pp. 127–130.

10 A well-researched study on intensive international relations between Western and Soviet scholars of psychological and human sciences during the interwar period may be found in A. Yasnitsky, Ob izolyatsionizme sovetskoi psikhologii [Concerning the isolationism of Soviet Psychology], in: Voprosy Psikhologii 3 (2010), pp. 101–112; 1 (2011) pp. 124–136; Idem, Izolyatsionizm sovetskoi psikhologii? [Isolationism of Soviet Psychology?], in: Voprosy Psikhologii 6 (2011), pp. 108–121; 1 (2012), pp. 100–112; 2 (2012), pp. 66–79.

11 See chapters 2–5 in P. Blonskii, Pedologiya, Moscow 1925, pp. 26–273.

sider these stages to facilitate "natural" conditions for the maturation of a child. "Naturalization" of the child reflected the positive-scientific developmental approach of some pedologists and was an inherent part of Blonskii's theoretical scaffolding. In Blonskii's most famous book, *Trudovaya shkola* (The labour school), the "authentic" child-worker assumes a central role, and juvenile activity is explained as the child's "natural" will "to make things" ("*delat' veshchi*").[12] In 1921, Blonskii, along with other pedagogues, was invited by Lenin's wife, Nadezhda Krupskaya (1869–1939) to collaborate on a new school curriculum. In 1923, the curriculum, reflecting Blonskii's views, was released, with one edition for urban areas, and the other for rural regions. From 1924 onward he started to regard himself not as pedagogue but as a pedologist; in 1925 he published his major work *Pedologiya* (Pedology), which was the first monograph on this new science in the USSR. In the monograph, Blonskii proposed standards of child development according to different "age stages." While he considered social factors in his research, his claim that biological determinants influence the process of maturation and growth evoked criticism among colleagues.[13]

One of the most adamant opponents of Blonskii was the neuroscientist Aron Zalkind (1888–1936).[14] The latter dubbed Blonskii and his adherents "*bio*geneticists." Zalkind favored a "*socio*genetic" approach. Sociogenitists emphasized the influence of environmental factors and rejected the limiting principle of correspondence between the stages of ontogeny and phylogeny. Zalkind was convinced of the boundless malleability of the brain, of its capacity to adapt to a changing cultural and social environment, and its ability to develop at a rapid pace. With the introduction of Stalin's First Five-Year Plan in 1928, Zalkind's theories gained increasing attention.[15] His promise that the heterogene-

12 P. Blonskii, Trudovaya shkola: Chast' I [The labour school: Part I], Moscow 1919, p. 113. Rousseau, of course, emphasized the natural aspects of childhood. In Émile, he refers to an "authentic" child who "lives and is unconscious of his own life" ("vivit, et est vitae nescius ipse suae"). The concept of the authentic child became central to theories of progressive education developed by Blonskii's contemporaries John Dewey (1859–1952) and Maria Montessori (1870–1952). Both pedagogues were very influential in the West and in the Soviet Union. Regarding the impact of these three figures on Blonskii, see P. Blonskii, Kak ya stal pedagogom [How I became a pedagogue], in: B.P. Esipov et al. (eds.) Izbrannye pedagogicheskie proizvedeniya [Selected pedagogical works], Moscow 1961, pp. 7–45.

13 See A. Pinkevich, Blonskii, Pavel Petrovich, in: Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya [Great Soviet Encyclopedia], 1st edn., vol. 6, Moscow, 1927, pp. 522–523.

14 For Zalkind's prominent role in the pedological movement, see C. Kuhr-Korolev, "Gezähmte Helden": Die Formierung der Sowjetjugend 1917–1932, Essen 2005, pp. 106–108. During the 1920s, Zalkind was an enthusiastic supporter of psychoanalysis, which he sought to reconcile with Marxism. After his works on "Freudo-Marxism" were heavily criticized, he openly apostatized from his adherence to Freudian theory. In the mid-1920s he published several works on the sexual education of proletarian youth, which proclaimed the complete subordination of sexuality to proletarian class interests. Zalkind formulated his conservative views on sexual ethics in a concentrated form in his declaration of "twelve sexual commandments for the revolutionary proletariat," which first appeared in his popular brochure Revoliutsiya i molodezh' [Revolution and youth], Moscow 1925. See A. Etkind, Eros of the Impossible: The History of Psychoanalysis in Russia, Boulder 1997; M.B. Miller, Freud and the Bolsheviks: Psychoanalysis in Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union, New Haven 1998; E. Naiman, Sex in Public: The Incarnation of Early Soviet Ideology, Princeton 1997.

15 Aron Zalkind's popularity was spurred by his organizational talent. In 1928 he became the editor of the flagship journal for pedological research, Pedologiya [Pedology] (1928–1932), was appointed president of the Interdepartmental Pedology Planning Commission and organized the first All-Union Congress of Pedology.

ous and asymmetrical Soviet population could be swiftly transformed was appealing.[16] "Backward" peoples, especially those who lived in remote areas of the country, urgently needed to be converted into a modern productive force. Zalkind's theory of "plasticity" would facilitate the emergence of the optimized Soviet man.[17]

Lev Vygotsky (1896–1934), known today as the founder of the cultural-historical approach in psychology, was also engaged in the pedological movement. He was convinced of the possibility of accelerating human transformation through cultural change. Vygotsky expected to observe such advancement in the course of the First Five-Year Plan and supported Zalkind's efforts to establish a new research field, the pedology of *natsmen* (national minorities). Both scholars aimed to better coordinate pedological laboratories in the outlying Soviet republics with the central institutes and administration.[18] The absence of a unified theoretical framework and a standard methodical approach proved a significant problem, in particular in regard to pedology's treatment of *natsmen* children. In some national republics, pedological work was poorly conducted and the conclusions were of questionable scientific quality. Minority children were often depicted as physically and mentally "underdeveloped." The results of such laboratorial research produced an aversion among local elites and pedagogues to the budding science.

Udmurts and Votskaya Autonomous Oblast' (VAO)

In the mid-1920s, pedological research expanded to a particular group of *natsmen*, Udmurts, an indigenous Finno-Ugric ethnic minority, referred to by Russians at the time as Votyaks. In tsarist times, the Udmurts were clustered within Vyatka guberniya (governorate, or province), within which they constituted the largest non-Russian ethnic group.[19] In 1920, part of that large administrative area became the independent territorial unit of Votskaya Autonomous Oblast' (VAO), the designated homeland for the Udmurt people.[20] In tsarist times, the non-Russian population of this area had become

16 Party ideologists explained the hierarchy between ethno-national groups in Soviet Russia according to the social-economical model of historical materialism, which assumed a transition of societies from a primitive stage to slavery, feudalism, capitalism and eventually communism. Marx and Engels maintained that this scheme did not necessarily apply to the development of every folk or nation. See J.H.J. van der Pot, Sinndeutung und Periodisierung der Geschichte: eine systematische Übersicht der Theorien und Auffassungen, Leiden 1999, pp. 467–468.

17 For the history of the concept of neuroplasticity see G. Berlucchi/H.A. Buchtel, Neuronal plasticity: historical roots and evolution of meaning, in: Experimental Brain Research 192 (2009), pp. 307–319.

18 See L. Vygotsky, K voprosu o plane nauchno-issledovatel'skoi raboty po pedologii natsional'nykh men'shinstv [On the question of a plan for scientific research work regarding the pedology of national minorities], in: Pedologiya 3 (1929), pp. 367–377, here 369.

19 According to the 1897 census. http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus_lan_97_uezd.php?reg=307 [31.03.2019].

20 In June 1928, VAO was absorbed into a larger entity, Nizhegorodskii Krai; in 1932, VAO was renamed Udmurt Autonomous Oblast'; in 1934 it became Udmurt Autonomous Republic, a part of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. Regarding the struggle of Udmurt elites for self-determination, see K. Kulikov, Bor'ba za samoopredelenie Udmurtskogo naroda v 1917–1937gg. [Struggle for self-determination of Udmurt people in 1917–1937], in: K. Kulikov (ed.) Natsional'no-gosudarstvennoe stroitel'stvo v Udmurtii v 1917–1937gg.: Sbornik statei [Contruction of the nation-state in Udmurtia, 1917–1937: collected essays], Izhevsk 1991, pp. 4–40.

partially Christianized; however, many Udmurts retained their animistic beliefs or practised syncretic rituals.

The education of non-Russians in Vyatka governorate began in the eighteenth century and often took place in the context of enforced Christianization. During that century, some church schools accepted children of baptized non-Russians, preparing them for the clergy with a three- to four-year course. However, Udmurts often could not afford church schools, and some were reluctant to send their children to such schools. Moreover, since the language of instruction was Russian, the teaching was ineffective and many children dropped out of school in the first year.

Even after secular schools were opened for Udmurt children in the middle of the nineteenth century, attendance remained very low. The situation began to change only at the end of the century, after linguist and missionary Nikolai Il'minskii introduced his method of education for non-Russian children of the Vyatka region in their mother tongue.

At that time, a number of Udmurts started to work as pedagogues for their own people. In 1890, one of them, K.A. Andreev, became the principal of Central Udmurt School, the first Udmurt teaching seminary, in the village of Staryi Karlygan.[21] However, in 1913, Russia's Ministry of Education prohibited teaching in a minority language.[22] Chronic underfinancing worsened the situation. As of 1917, 18 per cent of the entire population of the territory that later became the Udmurt Republic was literate; the percentage of literacy of the indigenous Udmurt population was 14.7 per cent.[23] In June 1921, at the "First Meeting of Udmurt Educators" conference, it was noted that there were 450 teachers and eight pedagogical lecturers in the entire region, which had a population of about 900,000.[24] In response, local elites initiated a large-scale reform of the educational system, building schools, educating teachers, and transforming the

21 For the history of the Karlygan teaching seminary, see G. Frolova, Iz istorii Udmurtskoi shkoly [From the history of Udmurt school], Izhevsk 1971, pp. 47–52.

22 In 1913, the Minister of Education, Lev Kasso issued Pravila o nachal'nykh uchilishchakh dlya inorodtsev [Regulations for basic schools of non-Russians] which significantly modified policies concerning non-Russian ethnic minorities. The regulations allowed teaching of children of non-Russians in their native language for no more than two years. Russian language commenced from the third month of schooling. The requirement to teach in pupils' mother tongue was abandoned under the pretext that there were not enough qualified instructors. See Pravila o nachal'nykh uchilishchakh dlya inorodtsev (14 June 1913, N 25897) [Regulations about the basic schools for non-Russians], in: Russkaya Shkola 9 (1913), pp. v–viii. With the Regulations of 1913, language was enlisted to consolidate the heterogeneous population of Russia. This became an urgent necessity after the failed attempt to unite ethnically diverse groups through religion. See I.A. Anokhina, Gosudarstvennaya politika v dele prosveshcheniya nerusskikh narodov Povolzh'ya. Vtoraya polovina XIX–nachalo XX veka [State policy in the matter of the education of non-Russian peoples in the Volga region from the second half of the nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth century], in: Izvestiya PGPU 3 (2007) 7, pp. 85–90. Concerning the impact of the Regulations on Udmurt public education, see K.A. Ponomarev, Iz istorii narodnogo obrazovaniya Udmurtii [From the history of Udmurt public education], Izhevsk 1996, p. 12.

23 V.A. Maksimov, Kul'turnyj rost Udmurtii za 17 let diktatury proletariata [Udmurt cultural growth during 17 years of the dictatorship of the proletariat], Izhevsk 1935, p. 4.

24 Iz Rezoliucii Pervogo Vserossiiskogo S'ezda Rabotnikov Prosveshcheniya i Socialisticheskoi Kul'tury Udmurtov [From the Resolution of the First All-Russian Meeting of Udmurt Educators], in: A.A. Tronin (ed.) Kul'turnoe stroitel'stvo Udmurtii: sbornik dokumentov [Udmurt cultural construction: collected documents], Izhevsk 1970, pp. 84–85.

church school into the "labour school" (*trudovaya shkola*), which aimed to link learning to productive work.[25]

In 1924, in the midst of the extensive transformation of Russia's educational system, a newly designed national school curriculum was introduced in VAO. The curriculum was characterized by four principles, which were referred to as i) *kompleksnost'* (a comprehensive, thematic approach to subject learning) ii) *kraevedenie* (studies of the local environment) iii) pedology, and iv) *sovremennost'* (contemporaneity, modernity).[26] A distinct, localized sub-branch of pedology developed in Udmurt schools. In 1926, a pedological laboratory (*kabinet*) was opened in Izhevsk, the capital of VAO. The office was part of the regional bureau, *Okhrana zdorov'ya detey* (Bureau for the Protection of Children's Health), or OZD, and employed medically educated pedologists who supervised the teachers' work at schools and orphanages.[27]

In 1924, the superintendency of the educational measurements in VAO was delegated to *Oblastnoy otdel narodnogo obrazovaniya* (The Regional Department of Public Education), or OBONO, which became the administrative body responsible for Udmurt education.[28] The official organ of OBONO, the bilingual *Prosveshchenie Udmurtov* (Enlightenment of Udmurts),[29] which was launched in 1927, devoted much attention to pedological examination of Udmurt children, as well as studies of the local environment (*kraevedenie*). OBONO published relevant materials for teachers involved in child studies, inviting them to professional exchange and discussions in the columns of the journal. Four reports from the pedological laboratory appeared in the first issue of *Prosveshchenie Udmurtov*. These included anthropometrical studies on Udmurt and Russian children, the results of tests of children's writing in Russian and Udmurt language, and assessments

25 Concerning the Declaration on United Labour School (30 September 1918), see E.M. Balashov, Politika v oblasti shkol'nogo, professional'no-tekhnicheskogo i srednego spetsial'nogo obrazovaniya, 1917–1941 gody [Policies in school, professional-technical and intermediate special education, 1917–1941], in: A.N. Dmitriev (ed.) Raspisanie peremen: Ocherki istorii obrazovatel'noi i nauchnoi politiki v Rossiiskoi imperii – SSSR (konets 1880-kh – 1930e gody) [Schedule of changes: essays on the history of educational and scientific policies in the Russian Empire (from the late 1880's – to the 1930's)], Moscow 2012, pp. 436–443. Regarding the realization of the declaration in Udmurtia, see V. G. Bobrova, Stanovlenie sovetskoi shkoly v Udmurtii [Establishment of the Soviet school in Udmurtia], Izhevsk 1967, pp. 24–41.

26 Frolova, Iz istorii, p. 111. A.I. Klepova maintains that pedological examinations of Udmurt children were inaugurated in 1923. Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Archiv Udmurtskoi Respubliki [Central Governmental Archive of the Udmurt Republic] (herein: TsGA UR) f. R 175 op. 1 d. 122 ll. 1–9.

27 The early history of childcare in VAO has yet to be written. Due to a dearth of sources and lack of secondary literature it is difficult to reconstruct how many medically educated pedologists worked at the pedological office. The fact that the numbers of medically educated personnel in VAO in the 1920s was very low suggests that the investigations were not of large scale. Apparently, the medical personnel supervised the work of teachers, who actually conducted the investigations. In 1920 only 32 doctors were available in the entire VAO, which counted 970,000 people. See V. Tuganaev (ed.) Udmurtskaya Respublika. Entsiklopediya [Udmurt Republic. Encyclopedia], Izhevsk 2000, pp. 41, 102.

28 Before OBONO, Narodnyi Commisariat Natsional'nostei [The People's Commissariat of Nationalities], or Narkomnats, was responsible for the education of national minorities. The Commissariat was disassembled in 1924.

29 The term prosveshchenie (enlightenment) is one of a number of terms in Russian that refer to education. See R. Harris, Society and the Individual: State and Private Education in Russia during the nineteenth and twentieth Centuries, in: D. Johnson (ed.) Politics, Modernisation and Educational Reform in Russia from Past to Present, Oxford 2010, pp. 17–57, here 17–19.

of their arithmetical skills.[30] According to the reports, Udmurt children were shorter than their Russian schoolmates, and the deficiency gap between their weight and the Russian norm began to increase from the age of nine. Local pedologists attributed these developmental gaps to the living conditions and anthropological constitution of Udmurts and Finns in general. In a similar vein, the authors of the reports argued that Udmurt children's writing skills were rather underdeveloped due to the specifics of the Udmurt language. The low mathematical fitness of both Russian and Udmurt children in the schools of VAO, as compared with children from Moscow and America, was left without explanation. Even though no direct connections between mental and physical underdevelopment were made, the overall impression regarding Udmurt children, as expressed by pedologists in the first issue of the only local journal devoted to education and child studies, was rather unfavorable.[31] These scientific results endorsed the description of Udmurts as a backward people and played into a narrative of savageness, which had became dominant among Russian psychiatrists and ethnographers by the turn of the twentieth century.[32] Methods widely applied in Udmurt schools did not take in consideration ethno-cultural peculiarities of minority groups, other than noting linguistic difference. Similarly, in their withering criticism of the past, Udmurt pedological studies repeated the biased and demeaning tropes that continued to wound the local population. In the second issue of the journal, a group of teachers from Udmurt schools presented their report on pedological work, which they started to implement in four Izhevsk schools.[33] The "mental age" of Udmurt children was diagnosed as lagging about two to three years behind the prescribed norm for their actual age (the terminology used is *pasportnyi vozrast*, passport age), and was assessed as lower than the "mental age" of Russian children. Regrouping the children according to their ranking allowed for more appropriate teaching. After two trimesters of learning in one of the reconstructed groups,

30 See the reports by O. Sokolovskaya, M. Sushkov, and N. Polyakova in: Prosveshchenie Udmurtov 1 (1927), pp. 27–44.

31 Blonskii's reference works, which were widely used by Udmurt pedologists, allowed for such developmental linkage. In particular, many of Blonskii's assumptions were based on Ernst Kretschmer's Konstitutionslehre, which was very popular in Soviet anthropological research in the 1920s. Kretschmer's theory assumed an interdependency between one's inherited bodily constitution and behavioral pathologies. See P. Blonskii, Pedologiya, Moscow 1925, p. 182; E. Kretschmer, Körperbau und Charakter. Untersuchungen zum Konstitutionsproblem und zur Lehre von den Temperamenten, Berlin 1921. On popularity of the Konstitutionslehre in Soviet anthropological studies in 1920s and its Soviet interpretation, see Hirsch, Empire of Nations, pp. 231–246.

32 In 1892, a group of Votyak (Udmurts) from the village of Old Multan faced accusations of human sacrifice for ritual purposes. In the ensuing blood libel trial, the Multan Case (1892–1896), the convictions were annulled; however, the stigma of Votyak savageness persisted for years after. See M. Khudyakov, Politicheskoe znachenie Multanskogo dela i ego otgoloskov v nastoyashchee vremya [Political impact of Multan case and its reminiscences in contemporary times], in: Sovetskaya etnografiya 1 (1932), pp. 43–62; R. Geraci, "Ethnic Minorities, Anthropology, and Russian National Identity on Trial: The Multan Case 1892–96," The Russian Review 59 (2000) 4, pp. 530–554. According to Marina Mogilner "the archetypal 'Multan Case' […] documented the turning point in the attitudes of scholars toward survivals of primitivism in the midst of Russian society." Scholars who had previously considered ethnic differences as dynamic and cultural began to regard characteristics of the Other as "stable and biologically preconditioned." M. Mogilner, Racial Psychiatry and the Russian Imperial Dilemma of the 'Savage Within', in: East Central Europe 43 (2016), pp. 99–133, here 103, 105.

33 Z. Sokovikova, Bazhutina, Pinegina, M. Shigina "Kak my primenyali pedologiyu na praktike" [How we applied pedology in practice], in: Prosveshchenie Udmurtov 2 (1927), pp. 65–70.

teachers, who had enthusiastically adopted pedological methods, reported that pupils displayed positive dynamics in their skills development. However, reports of these promising changes did not stop some local intellectuals from criticizing the methods of pedological studies. Still others saw pedology and pedologists as rivals to their authority and competitors to scarce finances.[34]

Critics of Udmurt Pedological Studies

The critical debate regarding the implementation of pedological studies in Udmurt schools was publicly opened in 1928 by one of the authors of *Prosveshchenie Udmurtov*, signed only as Knyazeva.[35] In her essay, Knyazeva criticized the use of inappropriate tools in evaluating a child's physical fitness, as well as the lack of professionalism of teachers, who acted as assessors.[36] Furthermore, she rejected the notion that the results of the anthropometrics, which she considered to be grossly flawed, constituted "proof" of the alleged unfitness of Udmurt children. Such conclusions of the pedologists nourished, according to Knyazeva, a deleterious image of the Udmurt people, particularly since the latter was often described in public discourse as "backward" and "being in state of degeneration."[37] Knyazeva argued that the norms and standards defined by the scientists in Moscow ("the general Russian norms") should be subject to critical revision when applied to Udmurt children:

> *Marxist pedology has declared that the characteristics of physical development are closely tethered to external conditions, the economic situation, professional occupation and the cultural way of life* […]. *Consequently, there can be no general anthropometric standards for all Russian children*.[38]

Knyazeva's critique contributed to the emerging discussion regarding the application of universal Russian norms to *natsmen* children. The results of pedological investigations pointed to discrepancies between the developmental pace of Russian and *natsmen* children. These incongruities were often attributed to race. Some practitioners and theoreticians of *natsmen*-pedology tried to rectify the gap, introducing ethnic-specific correctives and lowering the targeted norms of mental and physical maturation for *natsmen* children. Although the correctives were not intended to imply a racial hierarchy,

34 Protocol of a UONO meeting in Glazov (1 March 1927), in TsGA UR f. R-202 op. 1 d. 447, ll. 1–2.

35 Most likely, the full name of the author is Evdokiya Afanas'evna Knyazeva (1896–?). In the late 1920s, she held responsible positions at the department of methodology of education in the OBONO. I am grateful to Vladimir Churakov from the Udmurt Institute for Research in History, Language and Literature for providing information about Knyazeva.

36 Knyazeva, O materialakh po izucheniyu rebenka Votoblasti [Regarding the documentation of child studies in Vot[skaya] Oblast'], in: Prosveshchenie Udmurtov 3 (1928), pp. 65–67, here 65.

37 Knyazeva, O materialakh, p. 65.

38 Ibid., p. 66.

some pedologists faced accusations of chauvinism.[39] Knyazeva does not suggest lowering the standard for Udmurt children by applying correctives, but rather disputes the entire principle of a uniform standard. Not only the weight, but the muscular structure of peasant children should be taken in consideration. Similarly, she criticizes the written tests given to Udmurt children, who often had insufficient command of Russian. In doing so, Knyazeva emphasizes the value of linguistic diversity and cultural distinctiveness (*svoeobrazie*), arguing for a more differentiated approach in child studies.[40]

Udmurt Folk Pedagogy: Ethnographic Approach in Child Studies

Knyazeva's criticism of the work of the local pedological laboratory coincided with the rise in the popularity of Aron Zalkind's sociogenetic approach, which stresses sociological and environmental factors. Although Zalkind energetically popularized his position on child development, it was not until 1930 that he published a textbook that was comparable to that of his opponent, Pavel Blonskii. The majority of local pedologists in VAO used Blonskii's texts for reference. However, it is highly likely that some Udmurt pedagogues were in contact with Zalkind or heard of his ideas while studying pedagogy in Moscow.[41] Zalkind's theory, which stressed the importance of pedological studies of *natsmen* children, offered the Udmurt intelligentsia not only better arguments to explain the poor performance of children, but also supported Udmurt hopes for rapid improvement and transformation.

Concomitantly, national self-consciousness was growing among the Udmurt population, which was engaged in a rediscovery of native traditions.[42] By the end of the 1920s, as lo-

39 N.S. Kurek, O sotsial'noi istorii kul'turno-istoricheskoi psikhologii: Otvet B.G. Meshcheryakovu i V.P. Zinchenko [On history of cultural-historical psychology: an answer to B.G. Meshcheryakov and V.P. Zinchenko], in: Voprosy psikhologii 6 (2000), pp. 67–72, here 67; Vygotsky, K voprosu, p. 375.

40 Regarding the notion of "distinctiveness" in ethno-pedological research, see Byford, Imperial Normativities.

41 See A. Zalkind, Osnovnye voprosy pedologii [Fundamental questions of pedology], Moscow 1930. I have yet to find evidence that Zalkind's text book was used for local pedagogical practice. This may be due to the establishment of Blonsky's 1925 volume as the standard reference text among pedologists in VAO. The same could be stated with relative certainty for the distribution of the pedological ideas of Lev Vygotsky in VAO. I have not seen references to Vygotsky's textbooks in Udmurt printed materials, although by 1929 he had already published three works on pedology: Pedologiya shkol'nogo vozrasta [Pedology of school age], Moscow 1929; Pedologiya yunosheskogo vozrasta [Pedology of the youth age], Moscow 1929; Pedologiya podrostka [Pedology of the adolescent] vol. 1, Moscow 1929. Despite the absence of references to these books in the official Udmurt pedagogical organ or in archival documents, Udmurt students undoubtedly established personal contacts with Vygotsky. One of his disciples in Leningrad's Herzen Pedagogical Institute, Serapion Korotaev, was a doctoral student of pedology from Izhevsk, VAO. Korotaev received the transcripts of lectures on pedology from Vygotsky, which were published only after Korotaev's death. See L. Vygotsky, Lektsii po pedologii [Lectures on pedology], Izhevsk 1996.

42 The "affirmative action" policies (to use Terry Martin's terminology) of the Bolshevik government toward national minorities gave the Udmurt intelligentsia some freedom in comparison to the pre-revolutionary era. The reinstated right to teach in one's native language spurred the rise of a native Udmurt intelligentsia. However, promises of VAO economic and cultural self-determination were left unfulfilled. The rapid realization of the ambitious project of "culturalization" (okul'turivanie) of Udmurts, as envisioned by local and central elites, lacked both financial support and pedagogical cadres. Although one can speak about growing Udmurt self-awareness

cal elites started to express their discontent with the judgments of many mainstream pedologists, studies of indigenous child culture became increasingly important. This focus on positive cultural distinctiveness contested the notion of inherent ethnic backwardness and sought to relativize the presumed developmental gap of *natsmen* children. Ethnographic studies of local customs of child upbringing featured in the research of local culture. While Yuri Slezkine rightly asserts that "the pre-industrial folks became an easy prey for pedologists,"[43] my research suggests that local ethnographers and pedagogues countered this trend by conducting their own ethnographic research and proposing pedagogical concepts that softened or even avoided negative preconceptions regarding pre-modern ethnic groups.

From August to October 1928, Udmurt ethnographers Kuzebai Gerd (the pen name of Kuz'ma P. Chainikov) (1898–1937) and I. Ya. Il'in (1892–1953) organized an expedition that included an ethnographic research programme, *Trud i byt udmurtskikh detei* (Work and everyday life of Udmurt children). In August 1929 they continued the research together with Iosif Pozdeev (1893-?), an Udmurt pedagogue and doctoral student at Vtoroi Moskovskii Gosudarstvennyi Universitet (Second Moscow State University), or Vtoroi MGU.[44] In 1929, both Gerd and Pozdeev published articles on Udmurt child education in OBONO's journal, which was renamed *Prosveshchenie v Votoblasti* (Education in Vot[skaya] Oblast').

Pozdeev's article is entitled "Narodnaya pedagogika Udmurtov" (Udmurt folk pedagogy).[45] The key terms of the title require explanation. "Folk" refers, as it often does, to that which relates to the traditional, popular practices of a given ethno-national group. Pedagogy, however, is not clearly defined, and the author often conflates folk pedagogy and family education, to the point where they appear synonymous.

Pozdeev opens his article with the following declaration: "Every tribe and every folk has its own, sometimes *distinctive* educational ideals, views, tasks; different ways, methods, instruments and procedures of child education"[46] (my emphasis). Although Pozdeev

in the 1920s, this cannot be attributed directly or solely to Bolshevik policies. Regarding the shortcomings of such policies, see Stat'ya Esipova v gazete 'Pravda'' A etot front vse eshche zabyt' ot 11 yanvarya 1921g [An article of Esipov in the newspaper "Pravda"'This battle-front still remains forgotten' from 11 January 1921], in: Kul'turnoe stroitel'stvo, pp. 101–105; K. Kulikov, Bor'ba, p. 7.

43 Y. Slezkine, Sovetskaya etnografiya v nokdaune [Soviet ethnography in knockdown], in: Etnograficheskoe obozrenie 2 (1993), pp. 113-125, here 118.

44 Today Moskovskii Pedagogicheskii Gosudarstvennyi Universitet (Moscow Pedagogical State University), or MPGU. On Udmurt expeditions, see V. Churakov, Obzor fol'klorno-lingvistichekikh i arkheologo-etnograficheskikh ekspeditsii, rabotavshkh sredi Udmurtov v 20–30gg. XX veka [Review of folklore, linguistic, archeological and ethnographic expeditions conducted among Udmurts in the 20–30s of the twentieth century], in: Ezhegodnik finno-ugorskikh issledovanii 2 (2010), pp. 102–115, here 108; Idem, Fol'klorno-lingvisticheskie i arkheologo-etnograficheskie ekspeditsii, rabotavshie sredi Udmurtov v 20-30gg. XX veka" [Folklore, linguistic, archeological and ethnographic expeditions conducted among Udmurts in the 20–30s of the twentieth century], in: Idnakar 19 (2014) 2, pp. 54–103, here 74.

45 I. Pozdeev, Narodnaya pedagogika Udmurtov [Popular pedagogy of Udmurts], in: Prosveshchenie v Votoblasti 4–5 (1929), pp. 67–77. Appearing in the last issue of 1929, the article contains no information about Gerd's expedition in which Pozdeev participated.

46 Pozdeev, Narodnaya, p. 67.

claims that old folk ways of child rearing and education generally lack "a clear theory, system and consistency, having many flaws, [such as] traditional, obsolete, irrational, primitive and random [elements],"[47] he advocates studying *Udmurt* folk pedagogy in order to understand its cultural particularity. Pozdeev considers Udmurts, if not primitive, then certainly "culturally backward." However, like any traditional society, their ways of instruction are not without redeeming qualities:

> *Even among the most primitive tribes, education is illuminated with the light of consciousness, orientation towards a goal and understanding; and where there is a goal and consciousness, indeed forethought (as weak as it is), then one can speak about what education really means.*[48]

According to Pozdeev's conception, Soviet pedagogy would enable the "culturally backward" to leap over historical stages, creating a progressive generation of socialists. First, however, the current state of popular pedagogy must be purged of its "negative, weak sides and aspects." The primitive, individualist forms of traditional upbringing will completely disappear in the course of this transformation:

> *Popular folk pedagogy should be studied from the perspective of the educational aims of Soviet pedagogy, the communal, socialist upbringing, which should replace and, with time, completely dislodge family education, which is ideologically antisocialist. Family upbringing, over and above its class heterogeneity, is insulated within the narrow interests of house and yard. It generally nurtures the feelings of family egoism and individualism, separating the family from neighbours and from society.*[49]

Pozdeev's depreciation of the Udmurt familial structures is rooted in Engels (who regarded the family as an obstacle to communism) and mirrored in strains of early Communist doctrine. Alexandra Kollontai, a high-ranking party activist and feminist, called for the elimination of this "bourgeois institution." Kollontai asserted that the family, "with its parental squabbles and its habit of thinking only about the well-being of relatives," constitutes a negative influence on children and "cannot educate the New Person."[50] In the 1910s and 1920s, many shared Kollontai's belief that parents should isolate themselves from their children in order to avoid the transfer of individualist and anti-collectivist attitudes to the next generation.[51]

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid., p. 68.

49 Ibid., p. 69.

50 A. Kollontai, Sem'ya i kommunisticheskoe gosudarstvo [Family and the communist state], Moscow 1918, pp. 18–19.

51 Kollontai's radical views were confronted by a more conservative wing of Communist ideologues, including Lenin, who was convinced that the family should remain as a voluntary ("svobodnyi," in the sense that the marriage is not arranged or forced) and equal unit. On family politics in the early Soviet Union, see D. L. Hoffman, Stalinist Family Values, in: Idem, Stalinist Values: The Cultural Norms of Soviet Modernity, 1917–1941, Ithaca 2003, pp. 88–117.

Pozdeev also regards the ideological influence of the family and the village as deleterious. This notwithstanding, he regards Kollontai's project as utopian in the Udmurt context. The lack of schools and the absence of pre-schooling facilities in Votskaya Oblast' make the separation of children from the family at this stage of economic development impossible. Instead of an abrupt change of traditional ways in children's upbringing, he suggests a slow reform of Udmurt folk pedagogy. Pedagogues must first collect and examine Udmurt customs and traditions in order to assess their value and utility. Pozdeev elaborates on ethnographic methods and models of investigation for teachers, such as face-to-face conversations and interviews, observation, and the methods of collecting oral children's folklore. Additionally, he includes an analysis of children's school essays, focusing on children's worldviews and ideological predispositions.[52]

Although Pozdeev mentions pedological methods of investigation,[53] he does not discuss them in any detail, and it may be that the inclusion of pedology was merely perfunctory. The ethno-pedological expeditions, which were initiated at this time by the Moscow-based *Institut Metodov Shkol'noi Raboty* (Institute for the Methods of Work in Schools), or IMSR, differ from the approach chosen by Pozdeev. The expeditions in Siberia, organized by Moscow scientists, used a completely different framework for studies of minorities. Their "monographic" approach, which aimed to investigate each group individually and comprehensively, included "the study of the ethnic child's 'organism' at individual and population levels, both anthropologically and psychologically."[54] In contrast, Pozdeev's Udmurt folk pedagogy was designed as an ethnographic project with a special focus on traditional child education, and did not employ anthropometric methods or psychological tests.

Pozdeev's article on folk pedagogy appeared in the context of major changes in ethno-national politics. With the introduction of the First Five-Year Plan (1928–1932), the Soviet regime redoubled its efforts to industrialize rural areas and educate the "backward" multi-ethnic population. In 1929, Stalin proclaimed a campaign of rapid economic and social transformation that emphasized the power of nurture over nature.[55] The "backwardness" of ethnic groups was explained solely in sociohistorical terms and, accordingly, was to be remedied through social-economic progress. Stalin's pronouncements impacted the politics of science. In April 1929, at a meeting of Soviet ethnographers, historian V. B. Aptekar' deemed ethno*logy* "a bourgeois surrogate for the social sciences," incompatible with Marxism due to its reliance on biological theories.[56] According to the resolutions of the conference, only ethno*graphy* was consistent with historical materialism. Its task was to study the everyday life of peoples, registering the changes which were occurring dur-

52 On children's essays as means of ethno-pedagogical investigations, see C. Kelly, Learning about the Nation: Ethnographic Representations of Children, Representations of Ethnography for Children, in: An Empire of Others, pp. 263–264.

53 Pozdeev, Narodnaya, p. 70.

54 Byford, Imperial Normativities, p. 99.

55 I. Stalin, God velikogo pereloma [Year of the great break], in: Voprosy Leninizma, Moscow 1932, pp. 432–441.

56 Soveshchanie etnografov Leningrada i Moskvy [Conference of Moscow and Leningrad ethnographers], in: Etnografiya 2 (1929), pp. 110–144, here 115–116.

ing the Great Transformation. Udmurt elites carried out a number of expeditions from the late 1920s to document the transformational process in VAO. Pozdeev's article and pedagogical programme emerge in this context. However, Gerd, who initiated several expeditions, had a different approach for educating and transforming Udmurt society.

Constructing the New Udmurt Child: Fiction vs. Science

Kuzebai Gerd regarded himself as an "enlightener" of the Udmurt people. Despite the poverty of his childhood, he was among the few Udmurt children to receive formal schooling. At the age of 18, after graduating from a teachers' seminary, he worked as a principal of an Udmurt village school. Two years later, in January 1918, Gerd took part in the Vyatka governorate's "First Meeting of Educators."

As a participant of the meeting, he filled out a questionnaire regarding his views on the education of children, affirming his support for the "revolutionary" rather than "evolutionary" approach: "It is too long to wait until the wheel of history will turn on its own. One must turn it WITH FORCE".[57] Despite his sympathy for revolutionary transformation, Gerd never was a Party member and was skeptical of Bolshevik policy concerning ethnic minorities. He expressed his worries about the fate of Udmurt people in the local newspaper *Izhevskaya Pravda* (Izhevsk Truth) (18 May 1922), rejecting and condemning the notion that Udmurts are "in state of degeneration and Russification." He claimed that the negative typecast of Udmurts is due to Russian attitudes, which include chauvinism, belittling deprecation, and neglect of indigenous interests.[58] After studying literature and ethnography in Moscow from 1922 to 1926, Gerd was compelled to return to VAO. From 1926 to 1929, he lived in Izhevsk, working on a doctorate on Udmurt ethnography. During this time, he organized and participated in several linguistic and ethnographic expeditions. During these expeditions, Gerd collected materials on Udmurt culture and folklore, obtaining in 1930 a large collection of photographs documenting children's life in villages.[59]

In 1929, in his article Detskie tipy v udmurtskoi detskoi literature (Children's types in Udmurt children's literature),[60] Gerd appealed to the "masses of the workers of the

57 Accentuation in the original. N. Kuznetsov, Krest poeta: Istoriko-filosofskoe osmyslenie sud'by Kuzebaya Gerda [The cross of the poet: historical-philosophical reflection on the fate of Kuzebai Gerd], in: Luch 11–12 (2010), pp. 83–87, here 84.

58 Ibid, p. 83.

59 Finnish ethnographer Ildikó Lehtinen, who examined Gerd's literary and scientific legacy, discovered that Gerd's interest for child ethnography arose in 1926. Lehtinen bases this conclusion on the list of photographs which Gerd sent to the director of the Finnish National Museum. Of among approximately 600 photographs shot in expeditions from 1925–1929, about 145 illustrated the lives of Udmurt children. I. Lehtinen, Kommentarii: Kuzebai Gerd – etnograf i prosvetitel' [Comments: Kuzebai Gerd – ethnographer and enlightener], in: K. Gerd, Chelovek i ego rozhdenie u vostochnykh finnov [Man and his birth among the Eastern Finns], Helsinki 1993, pp. xx–xxii.

60 K. Gerd, Detskie tipy v udmurtskoi detskoi literature (v poryadke obsuzhdeniya) [Children types in Udmurt children literature (as a matter for discussion)], in: Prosveshchenie v Votoblasti 3 (1929), pp. 13–20.

enlightenment"[61] to conduct in-depth studies of everyday life, of the creative work and literature of Udmurt children. "Every Udmurt child who enters an Udmurt school is a completely unknown entity" who must be discovered by the teacher:

> *What conceals this child? How has it lived? What has filled its life before it began to attend school? From what kind of childhood environment did it emerge? For the teacher, all this remains an unknown, alien world. The study of childhood opens that path for the teacher, and as a result she is able to discover the individuality of each child.*[62]

The child studies that Gerd recommends have little in common with the pedological practices adopted in Udmurtia. The above quotation contains clear references to the *Detskii fol'klor i byt* (Children's folklore and everyday life) (1925), written by linguist and folklorist Georgi Vinogradov (1887–1945).[63]

Both Gerd and Vinogradov emphasize the importance of environmental studies for understanding children's individuality. Gerd's notion of environment includes not only the child's general life circumstances, but extends to the school, and the literature taught in the school, thus encompassing both *con-text* and *text*. As indicated by the title of his article, he provides a critical review of popular Udmurt children's literature rather than an ethnographic case study.

Gerd analyzes books written by three children's authors, each of whom, according to Gerd, create a particular type of a child protagonist. The first type appears in a story by Prokopii Gorokhov (1855–1943). Its protagonist is an energetic, curious and unruly boy, who, despite being raised in a wealthy family, is unhappy. He is merely "a working cog[64] in the family economy." Neglected from a pedagogical perspective, he is caned for his every mistake. Gerd is critical of the protagonist's character and behavior as depicted by Gorokhov:

> *Heedless of the warnings – however awful – of adults, he still heads off into the forest to pick troll flowers. He does not refrain from offering sacrifices in the field. He slices off the head of a cock with his own hands, delighting in its anguish. To satisfy his hunger, he does things that are difficult for him. In the end, with two rubles in his pocket, he sets off all alone, on foot, without a proper command of Russian, and boards a steam ship by himself, aiming to enter Karlygan Votskaia teachers' school. For all his curiosity, perseverance, indeed stubbornness, this type of child is extremely poorly equipped in terms of his psychological qualities. His interests do not penetrate deeply.*[65]

61 The concept of "enlightenment" in the 1920s and 1930s was not of one cloth. It ranged from the narrow sense of political enlightenment (loyalty to ideology, leader, and state) to a much broader notion of literacy, hygiene, ethics, customs, byt [everyday practices], understanding of science and other categories. See M. David-Fox, What Is Cultural Revolution?, p. 199; D.L. Hoffman, Cultivating the Masses: Modern State Practices and Soviet Socialism, 1914–1939, Ithaca 2011, p. 220.

62 Gerd, Detskie tipy, pp. 13–14.

63 G. Vinogradov, Detskii fol'klor i byt [Children's folklore and everyday life], Irkutsk 1925, p. 6.

64 Russian: vintik, literally, "screw."

65 Gerd, Detskie tipy, p. 16.

From a "pedagogical point of view," notes Gerd, this child is a "negative" example (*otritsatel'nyi tip*). Lacking the inner personal strength and endurance for achieving his goals, this "anti-hero" harbors elements of the savage.[66]

Another Udmurt writer, Bagai Arkash (Arkadii Klabukov, 1904–1984), writes of a "spoiled" boy who lives in a "cozy and patriarchal Udmurt family," surrounded by "sentimental" grannies and grandpas.

The girls in the stories of Ashal'chi Oki (Akilina Vekshina, 1898–1973) – regarded as the first female Udmurt poet – experience a deep inner world; however, Gerd contends that they are also individualistic, lacking a sense of collectivism.

In response, Gerd tasks contemporary Udmurt literature with the creation of a fresh narrative about its people. Influenced in his literary work by the proletarian writer Maxim Gor'kii, Gerd regarded children's literature as a primary educational tool. Creating heroic role models for the next generation would help Udmurt children move beyond their traditions and open the way to modernity. Disappointed with the state of local children's literature, Gerd writes:

> *None of these types currently satisfies us. We still lack the type of child who exhibits a creative, active, independent personality, a child who organizes its own life and the life of the children's collective. We lack the energetic child, who would achieve its intended goal through personal effort, despite misfortune, adversity and deprivation.*[67]

The resourceful, perseverant and resilient type of child proposed by Gerd reflects his own biographic trajectory. Gerd grew up in very modest circumstances with six siblings and a single mother. As he was attending school, where he was the only Udmurt boy, Russian schoolmates often bullied him on account of his ethnicity. Although Gerd's own experiences are inscribed in his literary work and scholarly research, he warns his colleagues of the shortcomings of an approach that does not go beyond mere memoirs and depiction of reality:

> *The authors of children's literature build their stories only on the material of everyday life, while this everyday life is conveyed almost as the refraction of a photographic instrument, the way it is. Compositionally they are very basic, constructed without psychological complexity, without collisions between distinct personalities of each child and the children's collectives. Each author writes his stories based on the memories of his own childhood. Nearly all of the stories are autobiographical.*[68]

Rejecting the purely factual, autobiographic-realist method, Gerd prioritizes the imaginative and programmatic content in children's books. In order to "turn the wheel of history," as he had advocated over a decade earlier, Gerd strives to modernize the traditional

66 For centuries, Russians from the Volga region considered Udmurts as "the least Christianized and the least 'civilized' of the Finnic peoples." R. Geraci, Ethnic Minorities, p. 531. Gerd may regard "autobiographic" stories of this kind as supportive of this old narrative.

67 Gerd, Detskie tipy, p. 19.

68 Ibid.

worldview with the encouragement of positive narratives. While the social sciences, including pedology and ethnography, perpetuate old pejorative stereotypes, fictional literature is able to transcend and outpace real life, offering the readers an *augmented* reality that raises Udmurt consciousness. Gerd proposes a literature, which, rather than simply transmitting tradition, constructs experiences that inspire progressive role models. Envisioning literature as an essential instrument of advancement and enlightenment, Gerd distances himself from normative concepts based on evolutionary thought.

Conclusion

In the early Soviet Union, scientific research and educational practice were marshalled for a large-scale campaign of social transformation. The urban proletariat appeared to adapt in some measure to this national "civilizing" project; however, peasants and ethnic minorities in the provinces failed to keep pace. To address this problem, local elites were enlisted to collect data about the indigenous inhabitants. Information regarding children's physical health and mental development was then analysed in the major scientific centres by specialists, who were often acolytes of the relatively new science of pedology. In this way, pedology was increasingly integrated into early Communism's official scientific programme and incorporated in the attempt to homogenize the Soviet population.
Pedology had emerged globally at the intersection of medical-biological, psychological and pedagogical theories about child development, all of which were influenced by various evolutionary theories of the day. In the Soviet Union, evolutionary theories were espoused by pedagogue (and then pedologist) Pavel Blonskii and his disciples, but countered by those from pedology's socio-genetic wing, who minimized biological factors and stressed environmental influences.
During its heyday in the mid- to late-1920s, pedological research was conducted across several regions populated by non-Russian ethnic groups. Some studies were designed by academics from the main scientific centres and carried out by their students in form of ethno-pedological expeditions. Others were conducted by local teachers who often did not have sufficient training or guidance. The studies which took place in Udmurtia were of the second type and their results appeared to provide evidence of the "backwardness" of the local population, thus inadvertently supporting the pre-revolutionary narrative of Udmurt "savageness."
Understandably, the application of standardized pedological methods and norms became controversial in VAO. In response, the local Udmurt elite began to develop and innovate non-pedological approaches for child studies, while the pedagogue Knyazeva highlighted the positive cultural distinctiveness of traditional Udmurt child rearing.
This article has considered the proposals of two Udmurt scholars who outlined non-pedological approaches to child studies which appeared in a local educational journal. Iosif Pozdeev pioneered the discipline of Udmurt folk pedagogy. In contrast to the pedological approach, folk pedagogy, a descriptive, ethnographically-based project, did not

assess children through anthropological measurements or psychological tests. However, Pozdeev did pass value judgments on traditional Udmurt child upbringing. He distinguished between useful and harmful customs and advocated the elimination of the latter in order to facilitate the transition to Soviet modernity.

Another proposal came from poet and scholar Kuzebai Gerd. Gerd took up the tradition of education through literature, which constituted a *Gegenbewegung* (countercurrent) to bio-social child studies in the early Soviet Union. Rather than slowly passing through developmental stages in course of natural maturation, Gerd's envisioned Udmurt child, inspired by a fresh, progressive literature, jumps from childhood into adulthood, leaving behind the state of "primitiveness" in which its ancestors had dwelled. The political child, graduating from a programme of enlightened self-awareness, is capable of organizing its own life and the life of the collective.

I have argued that the attempt by leading Soviet pedologists to assert scientific hegemony over the peripheries was often contested by local elites, a fact that has been overlooked by much of the academic literature to date. Moreover, local intelligentsias initiated critical discourse on pedology, and this criticism often made its way back to the scientific centres.

If pedology was not accepted wholeheartedly in the provinces, it was also encountering resistance in major research centres. By the end of the 1920s, "bio-social" sciences such as ethnology and pedology faced strong criticism as being discriminatory, non-Marxist and thus products of "bourgeois science." Such "pseudo-science" promoted notions of unalterable biological characteristics, suggesting the inherent inferiority of non-Western races. These ideas contradicted the core tenets of Communism and went against the grain of Stalin's push for rapid change. In Moscow in 1931, problematic theoretical issues were addressed in the context of Stalin's redefinition of Marxism in Soviet sciences.[69] By the mid-1930s, Stalin's mistrust of intellectuals came to the fore and was directed toward science as well, including pedology. In the course of these events Blonskii dissociated himself from pedological research; in 1934, Vygotsky died of tuberculosis. Criticism of pedology reached its peak in July 1936, when it was prohibited by a Party decree, On Pedological Distortions.[70] Within days of the decree, Zalkind suffered a fatal heart attack.

The Udmurt "enlightenment" lost its most active members behind the walls of Stalinist forced labour camps. Kuzebai Gerd was arrested in 1932 for his purported leadership in a major separatist plot of Finnic peoples in the Soviet Union and was killed in 1937 in Solovetskii gulag. Evdokiya Knyazeva was arrested in 1933 for supporting Gerd, but freed in 1935.[71] The fate of Pozdeev remains unknown after his disappearance in work camps in 1938.[72]

69 Etkind, Eros, p. 281.

70 O pedologicheskikh izvrashcheniyakh v sisteme Narkomprosov [On pedological distortions in the system of the Narkompros] (4 July1936), http://www.libussr.ru/doc_ussr/ussr_4084.htm [31.03.2019].

71 N. Kuznetsov, Iz mraka… [From the darkness…], Izhevsk 1994, p. 385.

72 L. Khristoliubova, Pozdeev, Iosif Yakovlevich (1893–?), in: L. Khristoliubova (ed.), Uchenye–udmurty; bio-biblio-

The pedological research and the ethnographical child studies that were conducted in Udmurtia nearly a century ago have been all but forgotten. The snippets of information which have been uncovered to date in Udmurt archives have yet to provide a comprehensive picture of the events surrounding this movement. The larger question of the transfer, exchange, adaption, and transformation of knowledge from the major scientific centres to the provinces and peripheries, and vice versa, and the role of local intelligentsia, remains a desideratum.

grafícheskii spravochnik [Udmurt scientists; bio-bibliographical reference book], Izhevsk 1997, p. 215.

Turning Away from the Big Brother: China's Search for Alternative Sources of Knowledge During the Sino-Soviet Split

Marc A. Matten

ABSTRACTS

In den ersten beiden Jahrzehnten der Volksrepublik China spielte die transnationale Wissenschaftszirkulation eine wichtige Rolle beim sozialistischen Wiederaufbau des Landes. In diesem Zusammenhang wurde die Modernisierung durch die Übersetzung und Weitergabe von sowjetischem Wissen vorangetrieben, insbesondere in Form der Zeitschrift *Knowledge is Power* (*Zhishi jiushi liliang*). In Anlehnung an den Stil und die Ideen seines sowjetischen Namensgebers *Znanie – sila* präsentierte sie jungen Arbeitern und Studenten die Vision von „morgen" – der nahen Zukunft. Sie erschien seit dem Jahr 1956, als der Staat zum „Marsch in Richtung Wissenschaft" aufrief, ein Slogan, hinter dem Chinas Bewusstsein für die eigene Rückständigkeit in Wissenschaft und Technologie stand. Frühere Forschung hat argumentiert, dass ideologische Kampagnen in den 1950er Jahren Chinas versuchten, die technologische und wissenschaftliche Abhängigkeit von der Sowjetunion zu verringern, aber die maoistische Neuformulierung der Rolle und Funktion von Wissenschaft in der zweiten Hälfte der 1950er Jahre – unter Betonung der Notwendigkeit einer eigenständigen Entwicklung (*duli zizhu de fazhan*) – führte letztlich zu einer transnationaleren Ausrichtung von Wissenschaft und Technologie.

In the first two decades of the People's Republic of China transnational science circulation played a significant role in the country's socialist reconstruction. In this context, modernization was pursued via translation and transfer of Soviet knowledge, most prominently in the form of the journal *Knowledge is Power* (*Zhishi jiushi liliang*). Following the style and ideas of its Soviet namesake *Znanie – sila* it presented the vision of "tomorrow" – the near future – for young workers and students. Starting its publication in 1956, it supported the state's call for "marching towards science," a slogan behind which was China's awareness of its backwardness in science and technology. Earlier research has shown how ideological campaigns in 1950s China tried

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to reduce the technological and scientific dependence on the Soviet Union, but the Maoist reshuffling of the role and function of science in the second half of the 1950s – while emphasizing the need of self-reliant development (*duli zizhu de fazhan*) – eventually resulted in a more transnational orientation towards science and technology.

> *We must overcome difficulties, we must learn what we do not know. We must learn to do economic work from all who know how, no matter who they are. We must esteem them as teachers, learning from them respectfully and conscientiously. We must not pretend to know when we do not know. We must not put on bureaucratic airs. If we dig into a subject for several months, for a year or two, for three or five years, we shall eventually master it. At first some of the Soviet Communists also were not very good at handling economic matters and the imperialists awaited their failure too. But the Communist Party of the Soviet Union emerged victorious and, under the leadership of Lenin and Stalin, it learned not only how to make the revolution but also how to carry on construction. It has built a great and splendid socialist state. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is our best teacher and we must learn from it.*
> Mao Zedong: *On the People's Democratic Dictatorship*, 30 June 1949.

> [The Chinese] *have placed before themselves the task of catching up to global science (including our own) in twelve years. But everything suggests that they will accomplish this even sooner.*
> Aleksei V. Stozhenko (geography professor and deputy chair of the Far Eastern Branch of the Academy of Science), 1956.[1]

Searching for Modern Science

The modernization process in 20th century China is characterized by the ambition to catch up or even surpass the advanced nations in East and West. In the last decades of the Qing Empire (1644–1911) scholars and intellectuals envied the so-called civilized countries for their achievements in science and technology and thus engaged in translating foreign knowledge from Europe, Japan, and the United States at an impressive speed.[2] Scholars in the field of Chinese history have since the 1940s described the Chinese

1 Aleksei V. Stozhenko to Andrei M. Chekashillo, Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, Moscow (Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv noveishii istorii), collection 5, inventory 28, roller 5200, file 506, pp. 94–95. Here taken from A. Jersild, The Sino-Soviet Alliance: An International History (New Cold War History), Chapel Hill 2014, pp. 39–40. I thank Rui Kunze for her valuable comments on the part discussing science dissemination.

2 The publications on China's translated modernity are too many to mention, suffice to list the following three ones as most significant: D. Kwok, Scientism in Chinese Thought 1900–1950, New Haven 1965; L. Liu, Translingual Practice. Literature, National Culture, and Translated Modernity – China, 1900–1937, Stanford 1995; M. Lackner / I. Amelung / J. Kurtz, New Terms for New Ideas. Western Knowledge & Lexical Change in Late Imperial China, Leiden 2001.

process of modernization as a continuous reaction to a Western impact.[3] Their interpretations reflect the historical observation that – most notably since the May-Fourth-Movement (1917–1927) – progressive thinkers who had personally experienced Western modernity propagated "Mr. Science" (*sai xiansheng* 赛先生) and "Mr. Democracy" (*de xiansheng* 德先生). The declared aim was to achieve a strong nation-state able to survive in a social-Darwinist world.[4] This rationale helped intellectuals such as Hu Shi 胡适 (1891–1962), Li Dazhao 李大钊 (1889–1927), Ding Wenjiang 丁文江 (1888–1936), and Chen Duxiu 陈独秀 (1879–1942) to formulate a sweeping modernization ideology ruling both conservative and progressive circles[5], with the only variation being the question which "Western" country could count as most advanced. Europe and Japan, the models since the 1870s were replaced by the United States in the 1910s, while the success of the October Revolution in 1917 and the ambitions of the Communist International during the 1920s and -30s almost immediately put the Soviet Union on the map. In summer 1949 (a few months before the founding of the People's Republic of China on 1 October) Mao Zedong 毛泽东 (1893–1976) spoke on the occasion of the 28th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) that the party should orient itself towards the Soviet Union when establishing socialism. He expected China to "lean to one side" (*yibiandao* 一边倒), that is to take Lenin's and Stalin's revolutionary strategy as the exclusive model.[6] In his eyes, learning from the Soviet Union meant achieving quick progress. Sharing this view, party officials such as Liu Shaoqi 刘少奇 (1898–1969), Chen Yun 陈云 (1905–1995), and Zhou Enlai 周恩来 (1898–1976) emphasized the urgent need to gain Soviet support for rash socialist construction in order to catch up not only to the Soviet neighbour, but also to surpass capitalist countries.[7] When Mao Zedong met the West German writer Günther Weisenborn (1902–1969) – who on a lecture tour through Asia and Europe[8] passed through Beijing in November 1956 – he described the Soviet Union as

3 Famous here the study by Ssu-yü Teng and J.K. Fairbank, China's Response to the West – A Documentary Survey, 1839–1923, Cambridge, MA 1954.

4 See H. Chang, Chinese Intellectuals in Crisis – Search for Order and Meaning, 1890–1911, Berkeley 1987; T. Chow, The May Fourth Movement, Cambridge, MA 1960. For the role of Mr. Science in the Maoist era see C. Wei / D. Brock (eds.), Mr. Science and Chairman Mao's Cultural Revolution: Science and Technology in Modern China, Lanham, 2013.

5 See T. Fröhlich, Staatsdenken im China der Republikzeit (1912–1949). Die Instrumentalisierung philosophischer Ideen bei chinesischen Intellektuellen, Frankfurt am Main / New York 2000; and V. Schwarcz, The Chinese Enlightenment – Intellectuals and the Legacy of the May Fourth Movement of 1919, Berkeley 1986.

6 Mao Tse-tung, On the People's Democratic Dictatorship, in: Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Peking 1965, vol. IV, pp. 411–424.

7 See here the intriguing discussion in Jersild, The Sino-Soviet Alliance: An International History, pp. 12–16.

8 Weisenborn had become famous for his postwar writings on his participation in the resistance against Nazism and was touring Asia (Myanmar, India, the Soviet Union, and the PRC) and European cities (London, Paris, Prague, and Warsaw) for lectures after he had published the first comprehensive report on the German resistance (Der lautlose Aufstand, 1953).

> […] *the first socialist country in the world. [It is a country with] very rich experience. We must learn from them. They have also made some mistakes there. We must also learn from their mistakes, so that we can avoid detours and reach our goal along the shortest route*.[9]

When participating in the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution in Moscow one year later Mao reported his personal observation that the neighbouring country had indeed already achieved tremendous progress.[10] Impressed by Nikita Khrushchev's (1894–1971) call for the Soviet Union to exceed the United States in industrial output in the next 15 years he ambitiously declared that China should embark on the same path.[11] At the Eighth National Congress of Chinese Trade Unions on 2 December 1957, the First Vice Chairman of the Communist Party (1956–1966), Liu Shaoqi (an orthodox Soviet-style Communist who was known for favouring state planning) envisioned such an aim:

> *In 15 years' time the Soviet Union will be able to catch up with or surpass the United States in the output of the most important industrial and agricultural products and in this time we, on our part, should strive to surpass Britain*[12] *in respect of output of iron and steel and of other major industrial products. In this way, the socialist world will leave the imperialist countries far, far behind.*[13]

Such vision became the central political rationale in the Great Leap Forward (1958–1961) during which the aim of leaving England behind and the transition from socialism to communism were thought to occur at the same time. This conviction was undoubtedly fostered by the strong optimism among Chinese communist leaders,[14] yet it would be too simple to explain such view by either referring to the teleology of Hegel and Marx with its secularized promise of salvation, or to view it as an effect of the non-contingent character of Chinese modernity.[15]

Continuing the intellectual legacy of the Republic of China the young PRC pursued the building of a strong state based on rationalism and enlightenment. The goal of building

9 Conversation published 14 April 1957 in Liaoning Daily (Liaoning Ribao 辽宁日报). Here quoted after M.Y.M. Kau / John K. Leung (eds.), Mao Zedong, The Writings of Mao Zedong, 1949–1976, vol. 2, January 1956–December 1957, Armonk 1992, p. 154.

10 See his reports in the publication of his speeches in Moscow that appeared in December 1957, Mao zhuxi zai Sulian de yanlun 毛主席在苏联的言论, Beijing: Renmin Ribao chubanshe 1957.

11 Shen Z. / Xia Y., Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, 1945–1959: A New History, Lanham 2015, p. 266.

12 Choosing Britain as an ideal is owed to the perception that the United States were the big brother of Great Britain as was the Soviet Union compared to China.

13 H. C. Hinton (ed.), The People's Republic of China 1949–1979: A Documentary Survey, Wilmington 1980, vol. 2, p. 618.

14 Such optimism was a central element in Chinese ideological rhetoric in the Maoist era. Compare here the journal Red Flag (Hongqi 红旗), the CCP's official journal founded in 1958.

15 This paradigm is present in the majority of Chinese books dealing with the socio-economic transformation of China (published both before and after 1978) and constitutes an important element of the Chinese self-perception today. See here for instance publications by Zhou S. 周尚文, Li P. 李鹏 and Hao Y. 郝宇青 (eds.), Xin Zhongguo chuqi "liu-Su chao" shilu yu sikao 新中国初期"留苏潮"实录与思考 (Historical Records and Reflections on the Study in the Soviet Union Movement in the Early Period of New China), Shanghai 2012; Zhang Pengsong 张彭松, Wutuobang yujingxia de xiandaixing fansi 乌托邦语境下的现代性反思 (Reflections on Modernity in the Utopian Context), Beijing 2010.

a modern state was informed by a strong belief in technocracy where technicians and engineers were thought to be the guiding force.[16] In the 1950s, the government continued to combine American pragmatism as taught by William James and John Dewey[17] with the principles of scientific management as put forward by Fredric Taylor and introduced the idea of organizing production under the command of the party that later evolved into the *edinonachalie*, or one-man management.[18] The turn towards technocracy however – while installing a virtually blind belief in the potentialities of the future – had to fight against virtually any irrational phenomena that denied control by the engineer.[19] The Communist Party therefore simultaneously engaged in a harsh struggle against superstition (*mixin* 迷信) that was considered a counterforce to socialist modernity.[20] The materialist science philosophers Xu Liangying 许良英 (1920–2013) and Fan Dainian 范岱年 (born 1926) emphasized in their 1957 book *Science and Socialist Construction in China* (*Kexue he woguo shehuizhuyi jianshe* 科学和我国社会主义建设) that such struggle was highly desired to ensure that the population thinks and acts scientifically.[21]It was vital for the science dissemination movement of that era to replace wrong idealist beliefs with scientific knowledge based on materialism (so that lightning and thunder were no longer seen as signs of the gods, for example)[22], instead of removing ignorance by filling a knowledge vacuum in a top-down fashion.[23] Authoritative knowledge could accordingly not (necessarily) be found in the Chinese tradition, but had to be imported. The geopolitical situation of the post-World War II era made the Soviet Union a quite natural source of legitimate and verified knowledge. The 1950s saw thus intense translation activities in a variety of sciences, ranging from agriculture and medicine to heavy industry technology and nuclear physics. Taking the Soviet Union as the best teacher for

16 See S. Schattenberg, Stalins Ingenieure. Lebenswelten zwischen Technik und Terror in den 1930er Jahren, München 2002; S. Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain. Stalinism as a Civilization. Berkeley 1995; J. Andreas, Rise of the Red Engineers – The Cultural Revolution and the Origin of China's New Class, Stanford 2009.

17 See D.W. Marcell, Progress and Pragmatism. James, Dewey, Beard and the American Idea of Progress, Westport 1974. On the reception of American pragmatism in Republican China see the discussions in Schwarcz, The Chinese Enlightenment; and Chow, The May Fourth Movement.

18 The Book Series of Studying Soviet Experience of (Economic) Construction (Sulian jianshe jingyan congshu 苏联建设经验研究丛书, 1951) that assembles translations of Soviet texts discusses ways of bringing the Party into industrial production as the organizer, the agitator, and the supervisor of the production. See also H. Kuromiya, Edinonachalie and the Soviet Industrial Manager, 1928–1937, in: Soviet Studies 36 (1984) 2, pp. 185–204; W. Brugger, Democracy and Organisation in the Chinese Industrial Enterprise (1948–1953), Cambridge/MA 1976.

19 See the discussion in D. van Laak, Technokratie im Europa des 20. Jahrhunderts – eine einflussreiche "Hintergrundideologie", in: L. Raphael (ed.), Theorien und Experimente der Moderne. Europas Gesellschaften im 20. Jahrhundert, Köln 2012, pp. 101–129.

20 For an overview on the fight against superstition in China since the late Qing dynasty, see O. Bruun, Fengshui in China – Geomantic Divination between State Orthodoxy and Popular Religion, Honolulu 2003; R. Nedostup, Superstitious Regimes – Religion and the Politics of Chinese Modernity, Cambridge, MA 2009; Kwok, Scientism in Chinese Thought 1900–1950.

21 An English translation of this work appeared in 1982; for their arguments against superstition, see Xu L./Fan D., Science and Socialist Construction in China, Armonk 1982, p. 66, 69.

22 As argued by S. Schmalzer, The People's Peking Man: Popular Science and Human Identity in Twentieth-Century China, Chicago 2008.

23 M. Michael, Ignoring Science: Discourses of Ignorance in the Public Understanding of Science, in: A. Irwin/B. Wynne (eds.), Misunderstanding Science? The Public Reconstruction of Science and Technology, Cambridge 2003, pp. 107–125.

a socialist country, however, also meant to accept the important premises of the socialist philosophy of science, among which the view that there is no pure science was a central element. [24]

When meeting Nikolai I. Bukharin (1888–1938), the major theorist of the Communist Party, on the occasion of giving lectures for the Ministry of Heavy Industry in the Soviet Union in 1935 the American philosopher Michael Polanyi (1891–1976) realized that according to the Soviet notion of science the fundamental tenets of natural dialectics and historical materialism eventually limited the scientist's autonomy.[25] In historical research the opposition of Polanyi's view that science required free debate and the socialist assumption that science could be planned has long been taken for granted, even in the case of China.[26] For instance, the Chinese Communist military leader and leading responsible figure in the Chinese nuclear weapons project from 1958 onwards, Nie Rongzhen 聂荣臻 (1899–1992), argued in 1958 that science can certainly be planned and that socialist states should not allow freedom in scientific research as capitalist societies did.[27] In addition, the physicist and Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) vice president Wu Youxun 吴有训 (1897–1977) warned against doing research in the sense of "la science pour la science" (*wei kexue er kexue* 为科学而科学), that is doing science without considering its practical application, which would be detrimental to socialist construction.[28]

24 When the Chinese People's University (Renmin daxue 人民大学) was founded in October 1950 as the first university of the New China it followed the Soviet model. In contrast to the American model its departments were not the fundamental academic units, but subjected to ideological control of education via the sub-departmental jiaoyanshi 教研室, or Teaching-Research Section. Its primary task was to offer the indispensable courses in Marxism-Leninism, Materialism and Political Economy, thereby nurturing the understanding that a socialist state had to pertain to the ideology of class struggle and historical materialism, and second to subordinate science to the material need of economic production. See D. Stiffler, Creating "New China's First New-Style Regular University," 1949–50, in: J. Brown / P. Pickowicz (eds.), Dilemmas of Victory – The Early Years of the People's Republic of China, Cambridge, MA 2007, pp. 288–308. A similarly important role played the The History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik) – Short Course (1938) that was translated in 1939 (Liangong (Bu) dangshi jianming jiaocheng 联共（布）党史简明教程). It is interesting to note in this context that Mao made conscious use of the canonical Short Course when pursuing the sinification of Marxism-Leninism: The Short Course had pointed out Lenin's innovation in adapting Marxism to Russia. On the significance of the Short Course for China see Li Hua-yu, Instilling Stalinism in Chinese Party Members: Absorbing Stalin's Short Course in the 1950s, in: T. Bernstein / H. Li (eds.), China learns from the Soviet Union, Lanham 2010, pp. 107–130. On the predominance of this book in Chinese education in the 1950s and the Chinese discontent of only learning the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and not of the Chinese Communist Party see the findings of Shen Z. 沈志华, Sulian zhuanjia zai Zhongguo 苏联专家在中国 (Soviet Experts in China), Beijing 2009, p. 191.

25 See the discussion in J. Niederhut, Grenzenlose Gemeinschaft? Die scientific community im Kalten Krieg, in: Osteuropa 10 (2009), pp. 57–68. On the significance of the meeting for Polanyi's later understanding of science see the introduction in his most prominent work The Tacit Dimension, London 1966.

26 As does earlier research, such as L.A. Orleans (ed.), Science in Contemporary China. Stanford 1980; L.A. Orleans, Soviet Influence on China's Higher Education, in: R. Hayhoe / M. Bastid (eds.), China's Education and the Industrialized World. Studies in Cultural Transfer, Armonk 1987, pp.184–198; and most prominently Shen Z., Sulian zhuanjia zai Zhongguo. See also the relevant propaganda posters celebrating the Sino-Soviet Friendship and cooperation, https://chineseposters.net/themes/sino-soviet-cooperation.php [05.06.2018].

27 Nie Rongzhen 聂荣臻, Woguo kexue jishu gongzuo fazhan de daolu 我国科学技术工作发展的道路 (My Country's Path in Developing Science and Technology Work), in: Hongqi 9 (1958), pp. 4–15. Nie, military leader of the PLA, was made a Marshal in 1955 and was later responsible for the Chinese nuclear weapons programme.

28 Wu Youxun吴有训, Zhongguo Kexueyuan wulixue shuxue huaxuebu baogao (1955 nian 6 yue 2 ri zai Zhongguo Kexueyuan xuebu chengli dahuishang de baogao) 中国科学院物理学数学化学部报告（1955年6月2日

Contrary to these observations I share the insights of Klaus Gestwa and Stefan Rohdewald that the transnational organization of natural sciences and technology not necessarily followed the logic of ideological camps during the Cold War era. While their scope is limited to the transcontinental region structured by the iron curtain in the heart of Europe, this paper intends to show that the transnationality of sciences – being a classical example of an entangled history or histoire croisée – also applies to Maoist China that actively contributed to the emergence of a global science community. For both Chinese scientists and the CCP learning from the class enemy was undoubtedly a valid strategy for achieving modernity.[29]

For the young People's Republic, this required first and foremost an emancipation from the Stalinist model of development. During the second half of the 1950s a growing critical attitude towards a whole-sale imitation of Soviet state-building developed that was partly the result of lacking economic resources,[30] but also caused by an epistemological turn in Maoist knowledge production. This paper argues that such turn included the conscious consideration of alternative sources of knowledge, may it be indigenous or capitalist knowledges. This paradigmatic turn that had been formulated for the first time in Mao Zedong's 1937 text *On Practice* (*Shijianlun* 实践论) reflected his idea that "neither 'rationalism' nor 'empiricism' understands the historical or the dialectical nature of knowledge."[31] Scientific knowledge is ideally derived from workers' and peasants' practical experiences, instead of simply being an objective fact that could be taken out of other contexts and adopted to a new environment. Such science philosophy nurtured a deep-seating pragmatism in choosing the "right" knowledge: legitimate was exactly that knowledge that could serve the aim of modernization and socialist construction. Such view gained considerable speed during the Great Leap Forward (1958–1961) which on the surface can be explained by the insight that nature, society and the economic production can be subjected to human control, eventually resulting in the well-known Maoist voluntarism that emphasized autarchy (*duli zizhu* 独立自主) and self-reliance (*zili gengsheng* 自力更生). These ideas continued to shape the understanding of science and technology up to the Cultural Revolution decade (1966–76). In 1963, Mao – discussing problems in rural work – pointed out in his text "Where do correct ideas come from?" that correct knowledge stems from three kinds of social practice, namely the struggle for production, the class struggle, and scientific experiment. In all three cases a continuous circular relation occurs between perceptual and rational knowledge: matter influences consciousness, and consciousness reflects back again on matter.[32] Mao identifies here a

在中国科学院学部成立大会上的报告), in: Lun wo guo de kexue gongzuo 论我国的科学工作 (On Science Work in our Country), Beijing 1956, p. 61.

29 For the case of the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as the situation in Europe see M. Aust / D. Schönpflug (eds.), Vom Gegner lernen. Feindschaften und Kulturtransfers im Europa des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, Frankfurt am Main 2007.

30 See the forthcoming monograph by Matten / Kunze, Learning Science from the Masses – Cultures of Knowledge in 20th century China (Lexington Press).

31 Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. I, pp. 303–304.

32 This text was part of the Draft Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on Certain

virtually endless process leading to more refined forms of knowledge, which is in line with his dialectical materialist theory of knowledge. At the same time however, the fact that knowledge production is an endless process reacting to changes both in consciousness and matter means that knowledge is in a fluid state. The chairman of the CCP hereby denies the orthodoxy of any given knowledge, and to search for knowledge beyond the Soviet Union is thus not simply a result of geopolitical changes, but to a large degree also the result of an epistemological turn that was seemingly fostered by both economic necessity and national self-assertion.

The simultaneous rediscovery and innovative development of local knowledge in the quest for political and economic autarchy (a political ideal that envisioned peasants and workers as serious knowledge producers, especially in agriculture and veterinary medicine since the late 1950s)[33] however was more than a consequence of the Sino-Soviet split that seemed to cut the Middle Kingdom off from non-indigenous sources of science and technology. Rather, this paper argues that an explicit scientific pragmatism defined the Maoist attitude of choosing the "right" technological and scientific knowledge.[34] Contrary to common interpretations that the opening to the outside world would find its true breakthrough only with the reform-and-opening politics of Deng Xiaoping in 1978 this paper is going to argue that even after the split and despite the call for a self-reliant development in the propaganda of the 1960s China remained an active member of a transnationally organized global science community.

Idealizing the Soviet Union as the Primary Source of Scientific Modernity

The significant role of science in modernization was politically recognized as early as November 1949 when the Bureau of Science Dissemination under the leadership of the Ministry of Culture of the Central People's Government (*Zhongyang renmin zhengfu wenhuabu kexue pujiju* 中央人民政府文化部科学普及局) was founded. Starting in December it published the *Newsletter of Science Dissemination* (*Kexue puji tongxun* 科学普及通讯) that understood its main task as "disseminating natural scientific knowledge." Its goals well transcended the arena of natural science:

Problems in Our Present Rural Work. See Mao Zedong 毛泽东, Ren de zhengque sixiang shi cong nali laide 人的正确思想是从哪里来的? (1963), in: Mao Zedong zhuzuo xuandu (xiace) 毛泽东著作选读（下册), Beijing 1986, pp. 839–841. On a typical interpretation of Mao's text on the question where correct ideas come from see Fanfu shijian buduan qianjin 反复实践 不断前进, Jinan 1965.

33 See here the forthcoming monograph by Matten/Kunze, Learning Science from the Masses, as well as Fang Xiaoping, Barefoot Doctors and Western Medicine in China, Rochester 2012.

34 A classic example of how the emancipation in knowledge production was celebrated by the Communist Party offers Du Runsheng, Great Progress Made in the Natural Sciences in China During the Last Decade, in: The Science News Letter (Scientia Sinica) 78 (1960) 24, pp. 377–392.

> *to propagate materialism and to enable the laboring people to grasp techniques and technology for production as well as the rules of natural development so that they are qualified for the tasks of national* [economic] *production and construction.*[35]

The great bulk of popular science literature in the 1950s and 1960s shared this line of argument in spreading the idea of people's science (*renmin kexue* 人民科学), or mass science (*qunzhong kexue* 群众科学).[36] Its keynote had been set in 1941 by the oversimplified definitions of natural science by Mao Zedong 毛泽东 (1893–1976) as "the weapon to explain and conquer nature" [37] and "the knowledge about the struggle of production" in 1942.[38] Controlling and shaping the natural world according to human needs made perfect sense to Maoist thinking, represented most prominently in the famous parable "The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains" (*Yugong yishan* 愚公移山).[39]
Such spirit was most prominently embodied by the famous saying of Francis Bacon (1562–1626) that knowledge meant power. Introduced to the Chinese audience in 1936 as the father of science who had invented materialist philosophy and liberated philosophy from the monasteries the image of Bacon influenced attitudes towards science and technology profoundly.[40] His dictum "Knowledge is Power" became common knowledge however only twenty years later when in 1956 the science dissemination journal bearing the title "*Knowledge Is Power*" (*Zhishi jiushi liliang* 知识就是力量) was published for the first time. The first issues were direct translations from its Soviet namesake journal on popular science (Znanie – sila, founded in 1926) that had installed the slogan as a generally shared idea in socialist countries and shaped the consciousness of the new working class. With its distinct focus on industrial development this journal arrived at

35 Kexue puji wenti zuotanhui zongjie 科学普及问题座谈会总结 (A Summary on the Symposium on Science Dissemination Problems), in: Kexue puji tongxun 科学普及通讯 (Science Dissemination Newsletter) 1 (1950), p. 3 and 7; 2 (1950), pp. 20–22. A slightly different formulation is the following: "the propagation of natural scientific knowledge plays an extremely important role in cultivating the Communist worldview and enables ordinary workers, peasants, and soldiers to learn science and technology required by economic production and thereby grasp the laws of natural evolution." See Sige yue lai de kexue pujiju 四个月来的科学普及局 (The Office of Science Dissemination in the Past Four Months), in: Kexue puji tongxun, (1950) 1, p. 2.

36 The term appeared for the first time in the early 1950s, e.g. Gao Shiqi 高士其, Jianshe aiguozhuyi de renmin kexue 建设爱国主义的人民科学 (Building a Patriotic People's Sciences), in: Kexue puji gongzuo 2 (1951), p. 29.

37 Mao Zedong, Tichang ziran kexue 提倡自然科学 (Promoting Natural Sciences), in: Jiefang Ribao, 12 June 1941.

38 Mao Zedong, Zhengdun dang de zuofeng 整顿党的作风 (Correcting the Party's Work Style). The essay was originally published as Zhengdun xuefeng dangfeng fenweng in: Jiefang ribao 解放日报 (Liberation Daily), 27 April 1942.

39 Presented for the first time by Mao Zedong in his concluding speech at the Seventh National Congress of the Communist Party of China on 11 June 1945, this text became in 1966 one of the "three frequently-read articles" (Laosanpian 老三篇). For the parable see Mao Zedong xuanji 1967, 3, pp. 1049–52; English translation in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 3, pp. 271–274.

40 On the occasion of the 310th death day of Francis Bacon (1562–1626), Weng Zhiyun 翁植耘, an important publisher of Zhejiang province, lauded Bacon as the one who had turned philosophy into a powerful tool for humankind for improving its living conditions. Weng's article appeared in the journal Tushu zhanwang 图书展望 (Book Outlook) (1935–27, 1946–49). Published by the Zhejiang Provincial Library it introduced new books and bibliophile knowledge. See Weng Zhiyun 翁植耘, Kexue de fuqin zheren Folanxisi Peigen [Francis Bacon]: shishi sanbai shinian jinian: Zhishi jiushi liliang, liliang jiushi zhishi "科學的父親"哲人佛蘭西斯·培根：逝世三百十年紀念："知識就是力量，力量就是知識" (The Father of Science – the Philosopher Francis Bacon: Remembering his 310th death day: Knowledge is Power and Power is Knowledge), in: Tushu zhanwang 6 (1936), pp. 19–27.

creating a vision of modernity that was readily taken over by the Chinese. Following the journal's style and ideas it presented the vision of "tomorrow" – the near future – for young workers and students of polytechnic secondary schools. It started its publication exactly at a time when the state called for "marching towards science," a slogan behind which were China's awareness of its backwardness in science and technology and its desire to catch up with the achievements of the Soviet Union.

Fig. 1: Title page of the journal *Knowledge is Power* (left image Soviet original of 1/1959, right image Chinese version of 4/1960).



Learning from the Soviet Union and overcoming backwardness – an important concept in devising state plans and developing education – was part of the political guideline of 1950s Maoist China, resulting in a full-fledged transfer of ideological, political, social, and technological knowledge. Such transfer occurred in that era more often than not in a copy-and-paste fashion (see Fig. 1) owed to the obligation to follow the lead of the Soviet Union.[41]

41 However, knowledge transfer sometimes also took the opposite direction: in 1961 the journal Zhishi jiushi liliang reports that the Soviet Union was implementing and developing Chinese medical practices such as acupuncture (Zhongyi zhenjiu zai Sulian 中医针灸在苏联, in Zhishi jiushi liliang 2 (1961), p. 46). See also the Chinese translation of an article by the two corresponding members of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences Kočergin 柯切尔金 and Kassil 卡西里 on the function of acupuncture (translated by Wang Changbi 王昌璧), Zhenjiu 针灸 (Acupuncture), in: Zhishi jiushi liliang 6 (1961), pp. 18–19.

In the early 1950s the Sino-Soviet knowledge transfer was indeed characterized by a clear hierarchy as shows the following propaganda poster dating from April 1953 (Fig. 2). The Soviet expert is not only physically larger, but judging from his outer appearance and gestures also appears as an icon of "Western" modernity. When both countries concluded the 30-year Treaty of Peace, Security, and Friendship on 14 February 1950 the PRC accepted to take over the role of a "little brother" who was eager to conform to Soviet conceptions of ideology and foreign policy while receiving support in the socialist construction of their country. A central part of the treaty was economic cooperation and the transfer of technological knowledge to kick-start China's industrial development. Existing research shows that learning from the Soviet Union was never truly smooth, but from time to time conflictual, caused by cultural insensitiveness, chauvinism, colonial attitudes, disputes over payments, privileges, and technical competence etc., i.e. problems that contradicted the ideal of proletarian internationalism that was considered the foundation of Soviet help to the younger brother.[42]

Fig. 2: Study the advanced production experience of the Soviet Union, struggle for the industrialization of our country, April 1953 (designed by Li Zongjin 李宗津).[43]



Though *Knowledge is Power* is considerably unideological (it was dedicated to popularize a given set of scientific knowledge) – with the exception of the texts that are politically motivated, such as those commemorating the 40th anniversary of October Revolution – ,

42 See here the findings of Shen, Sulian zhuanjia zai Zhongguo and Jersild, The Sino-Soviet Alliance: An International History.

43 Link: https://chineseposters.net/posters/e13-556.php [10.04.2018].

it reinforced the view that power can be legitimized by science and that science itself can be instrumentalized in a techno-political fashion.[44] The close connection of science and development was characteristic in the journal that strikes the reader as a magazine displaying tomorrow. The idea of a near, utopian future of communism is conveyed and concretized through large amounts of visuals such as colored covers, inserts, illustrations, and photos. Even the fact that this magazine could afford to print these visuals on relatively high-quality paper was itself rare at the time and therefore appeared futuristic as an indication of material abundance. The first five issues of the magazine published with the help of the Soviet Union set up the keynote of expecting and prescribing the future following an idealized portrayal of the achievements and application of Soviet, i.e. socialist, science. It is interesting, however, to note that the attempts to demonstrate the positive role of science and technology for humanity and thus to argue the superiority of its political system characterized both sides of the Iron Curtain. Whereas the West side claimed "an indissoluble link between scientific genius and liberal democracy,"[45] the East side celebrated their scientific and technological progress under socialism, which was believed to be realized by the state's central – necessarily scientific – planning and the creativity of the liberated labor force. In the words of the Soviet chemist N. D. Zelinsky (1861–1953): "The happiness of the Soviet man lies in the joyful, beautiful, and creative work, which is only possible under the socialist system." In other words, the political system of socialism liberates the laborer, allows him / her to receive education and training which turn him / her into a new man (or woman) – the Soviet man (or woman) – who, in turn, contributes to the progress of science that benefits the progress of humanity. The Communist Party, by making and implementing "the strict, scientific plan," leads its people to produce miracles, "which one after another come out of science fiction and become reality."[46] Therefore, the faith in the infallibility of science turned into the faith in the infallibility of the Party and the political system. To convince the reader of a predictably beautiful "tomorrow," some visuals and texts in *Knowledge Is Power* deliberately reduce the distance between the present and the future, as became prominent in the conviction that "The Soviet Union of today is our tomorrow" (*Sulian de jintian shi women de mingtian* 苏联的今天是我们的明天)[47], as shows Fig. 3.

44 As argued by Heuermann in his article on technology as myth and ideology. See H. Heuermann, Technik als Mythos-Technik als Ideologie, in: P. Drexler / Heuermann (eds.), Technikgläubigkeit. Technikkritik: Ihre Darstellung und Bewältigung in Kultur und Gesellschaft. Beiträge zur Ringvorlesung an der Technischen Universität Braunschweig im Wintersemester 1992/1993, Braunschweig 1993, p. 24.

45 B. Schroeder-Gudehus / D. Cloutier, Popularizing Science and Technology During the Cold War: Brussels 1958, in: R.W. Rydell / N. Gwinn (eds.), Fair Representation: World's Fairs and the Modern World, Amsterdam 1994, pp. 157–180.

46 Zelinsky is quoted in Zhou Wenxiang 周文椿, Qinai de pengyou men! 亲爱的朋友们 (Dear Friends!), in: Zhishi jiushi liliang 1 (1956), p. 2.

47 Other media in this context were pictorials such as Su-Zhong youhao 苏中友好 (Soviet-Chinese Friendship) and Zhongguo huabao 中国画报 (China Pictorial) that visualized the knowledge exchange happening in every corner of society.

Fig. 3: The Soviet Union is our Model (*Sulian shi women de bangyang* 苏联是我们的榜样), October 1953 (designed by Zhao Yannian 赵延年 and Qian Daxin 钱大昕).[48]



Inviting the Soviet Experts to China

Taking the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as the best teacher from whom China could learn (as Mao Zedong put it in 1949), the 1950s saw a huge influx of Soviet experts (*Sulian zhuanjia* 苏联专家) who provided Chinese workers and peasants with new knowledge and technology in virtually every area of economic production.[49] Previous research has shown that in the 1950s China profited enormously from the experiences of the Soviet Union when not only Chinese went to USSR to receive training in various fields in industry and agriculture, but also Soviet advisors were sent to China. Their exact numbers are difficult to determine. Orleans claims that more than 11,000 Chinese went to the USSR to get Soviet style training and 7324 came back with proper qualifications, and estimates a total of 8,000–10,000 Soviet advisors residing in China from 1950–1960, but only 126 in the years 1950–1952.[50] This number seems plausible given the recent discovery in Russian archives by Shen Zhihua. According to his findings, the Soviet minister of Foreign Affairs (1949–1953) Andrey Vyshinsky (1883–1954) had listed in a secret report (dated 17 April 1952) to the Soviet diplomat-politician and the First Deputy Premier (1942–1957), Vyacheslav M. Molotov (1890–1986) 107 ex-

48 See https://chineseposters.net/posters/pc-1953-002.php [15.03.2018].
49 For a testimonial report on the Soviet experts in China see M. Klochko, Soviet Scientist in China, London 1963.
50 Orleans, Soviet Influence on China's Higher Education, p. 188.

perts of which 73 had already been sent by 15 April 1952.[51] Goikhman specifies the number of 10,000 non-military advisors during 1949–1960 but adds that it is unclear who counted as a specialist or expert.[52] Deborah Kaple mentions a number of roughly 10,000, but admits that she found during her research only one exact number: in the first quarter of 1954, 403 Soviet advisors had been sent to China working at twenty-eight ministerial-level institutions, among them 127 in the Ministry of Education, 49 in the Ministry of Fuel Industry and 45 in the Ministry of Heavy Industry.[53] She holds the opinion that the actual exchange with advisors only started in 1953 after Stalin's death. Before that, the transfer existed mainly in the form of books and translations, not so much in the form of advisors.

In fact, from the early 1950s on there is a bustling activity of translating Soviet books and manuals on science and technology that growingly entered Chinese libraries.[54] Chinese communists eagerly read Soviet newspapers, journals, and books to obtain valuable insights. The *Chinese General Title Catalogue* (*Quanguo zongshumu* 全国总书目) for the years of 1949 to 1953 includes thousands of Soviet books that were translated and printed in Chinese.[55] In the agricultural sector, for example, the journal *Soviet Agricultural Science* (*Sulian nongye kexue* 苏联农业科学, starting publication in 1950) introduced translations of Soviet articles dealing with new discoveries in plant breeding (including the theories of Lysenkoism), use of herbicides and pesticides, and animal husbandry to the Chinese. In the field of natural sciences, the Scientific Information Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (中国科学院科学情报研究所, founded in 1956)[56] published translations of excerpts taken from major Soviet scientific journals.[57]

Despite Mao's later warning against "mechanical absorption of foreign material" in his April 1956 speech "On the Ten Major Relationships" the CCP took over in almost wholesale fashion the Soviet model of economic development in the First Five Year Plan (1953–57), as shows an internal reading material (*neibu duwu*)[58] published one month

51 Weixinsiji zhi Moluotuofu han: paiqian Sulian zhuanjia wenti 维辛斯基致莫洛托夫涵：派遣苏联专家问题 Letter of Vyshinsky to Molotov on the Problem of Sending Soviet Experts), in: Z. Shen, Eluosi jiemi dang'an xuanbian – Zhong-Su guanxi 俄罗斯解密档案选编–中苏关系 (Collection of declassified Russian archival documents – Sino-Soviet Relations), Shanghai 2015, vol. 4, pp. 212–214.

52 I. Goikhman, Soviet-Chinese Academic Interactions in the 1950s: Questioning the "Impact-Response" Approach, in: Bernstein / Li (eds.), China learns from the Soviet Union, p. 282.

53 D. Kaple, Soviet Advisors in China in the 1950s, in: O.A. Westad (ed.), Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–1963, Washington 1998, pp. 117–140.

54 On the restructuring of Chinese libraries under Soviet influence in the 1950s and the ideological consequences thereof, as well as the growth rate of Russian language publication in two major libraries in Beijing see P.C. Yu, Leaning to One Side: The Impact of the Cold War on Chinese Library Collections, in: Libraries & Culture 36 (2001) 1, pp. 253–266.

55 For a list of such books, see Kaple, Soviet Advisors in China in the 1950s, pp. 14–18.

56 This institution still exists today, now called Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China (中国科学技术信息研究所).

57 Such as in physics (物理文摘), chemistry (化学文摘), mechanics (力学文摘), metallurgy (冶金文摘), mathematics (数学文摘), mechanical engineering (机械制造文摘) etc.

58 Internal reading materials were texts that were not publicly accessible, but restricted to party cadres and / or members of a distinct institution. They in most cases contained sensitive information, such as reports on other countries or information in some fields that were central to national interest.

later. The booklet *On Science Work in our Country* (*Lun wo guo de kexue gongzuo* 论我国的科学工作) includes reports of the divisions of the Chinese Academy of Sciences as well as five editorial pieces taken from the *People's Daily (Renmin Ribao*, from 1954 to 1955) that mention in virtually every article the superiority of the Soviet Union in scientific research. In a similar fashion did a short booklet entitled *Learning from the Soviet Experts* (*Xiang Sulian zhuanjia xuexi* 向苏联专家学习, 1953) admonish in every chapter to be thankful for the Soviet help that would surely speed up China's industrialization, may it be in the steel, petroleum or cement industry, in paper mills or in veterinary medicine.[59] Kaple describes in her 1994 study how the CCP translated the Soviet model into Chinese, propagating to the Chinese population that the Soviets had achieved the most advanced socialist industrial management. According to her, the Chinese did not simply import a "generic Soviet model", but a distinct Stalinist one, i.e. a model that had resulted from the particular circumstances in the post-war era and reflected the preeminent position of Stalin. After fifteen years of war against Japanese imperialism (1931–45) and four more years of civil war against the Kuomintang (KMT) (1945–49) the CCP took over the idea that Stalin united both political power and intellectual acumen.[60] This was partly due to the fact that the great leader had been intervening in a number of scientific debates after the end of the Second World War.[61] However, his influence should not persist. A particular turning point was the year 1956 when the Chinese questioned Soviet authority for the first time.

Questioning the Soviet Union

When Mao Zedong visited Khrushchev in Moscow on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution he seemingly still believed in the Sino-Soviet friendship. This becomes evident in his speech on the Moscow Airport on 2 November 1957 when he not only praised the recent Sputnik success of the Soviet Union, but also emphasized the historical significance of the 1917 revolution for guiding the Chinese people to liberation, prosperity, and strength. When addressing the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union on 6 November 1957 Chairman Mao pointed to the exemplary industrialization of the Soviet Union, achieving not only the completion of the first nuclear power plant and the first passenger jet plane, but also satellites and intercontinental ballistic missiles.[62] This positive assessment was to a large extent owed to diplomatic needs aiming at maintain-

59 Edited by Zhongguo jingji lunwenxuan bianji weiyuanhui 1953.

60 Andrew Walder even goes further when claiming in a 1982 article that Maoism was a primeval offshoot of Stalinism. See here A. Walder, Some Ironies of the Maoist Legacy in Industry, in: M. Selden / V. Lippit, The Transition to Socialism in China, Armonk 1982, pp. 215–237.

61 For an overview on debates ranging from the role of Hegel in the history of Marxism to Pavlov and Michurin and Stalin's efforts of removing quantum mechanics and relativity from Soviet physics, see E. Pollock, Stalin and the Soviet Science Wars, Princeton 2006.

62 See Mao zhuxi zai Sulian de yanlun 毛主席在苏联的言论 (Chairman Mao's Speeches in the Soviet Union), Beijing 1957.

ing a stable relationship to the Soviet neighbour. It did not reflect the profound changes caused by Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" in February 1956 that had denounced the cult and dictatorship of Joseph Stalin. Reacting to this speech shortly afterwards the editorials in the *People's Daily* expressed a growing disagreement with the De-Stalinization, thereby eventually contributing to the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relations. At the same time, however, discussions emerged whether China was not able to formulate a different development model that was more appropriate than the Stalinist path.

In March 1956, a Committee of Scientific Development Planning (*Kexue guihua weiyuanhui* 科学规划委员会) was set up to draw a twelve-year "Outline of Developing Science and Technology between 1956 and 1967" (1956–1967 *nian kexue jishu fazhan guihua* 1956–1967 年科学技术发展规划). Its call for a campaign of "Marching towards Science" (*Xiang kexue jinjun* 向科学进军) was set up to cultivate China's own talents. Originally aiming to encourage young intellectuals to improve their professional qualification, the campaign soon expanded its agendas to promoting technological innovations among industrial workers and developing the collaboration between the worker, the scientist, and the technician. In this context the question arose who possessed the primary authority in knowledge production.

As Wang Zuoyue has shown this plan was a direct reaction to the report of a Soviet soil scientists, V.A. Kovda, in January 1955 who worked as the chief advisor to the president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing, Guo Moruo (1892–1978). Institutionally, the plan resulted in the establishment of the State Science and Technology Commission (today the Ministry of Science and Technology). At the same time, the plan made path for introducing a of large-scale Soviet technological aid to China, arguing that technical cadres are indispensable for fulfilling the aims stated in the plan, for which a reasonable regulation of the relation of production, research, and education is necessary. Technical cadres were expected to participate in economic production without neglecting their research. Next to the dissemination of scientific knowledge among the population (*kexue puji gongzuo* 科学普及工作) the plan postulated the urge to ask the Soviet Union and foreign experts from other countries for technological assistance in underdeveloped science fields in China, to send students to the Soviet Union and other countries to study, and finally to call all Chinese foreign students back home who were still residing in capitalist countries.[63] This shows that science in Maoist China was in principle a highly transnational phenomenon, unconstrained by the Cold War logic. Yet, it demanded to clarify if and to what extent Soviet and other knowledges still conformed to the prevailing ideology. Owing to the impact of Kovda premier Zhou Enlai delivered in January 1956 (one month before the Secret Speech!) a speech in which he demanded to end the ambiguous political identity of intellectuals – that is, professionally trained specialists – by assigning them into the working class. This gestured towards the acknowledgement of professional knowledge in the modernization process of the PRC

63 Z. Wang, The Chinese Developmental State During the Cold War: The Making of the 1956 Twelve-year Science and Technology Plan, in: History and Technology 31 (2015) 3, pp. 180–205.

while opening a path for reducing the predominance of Soviet knowledge that in some cases even led to open rejection.

One of the most controversial cases in this context was Lysenkoism that had enjoyed considerable popularity in China during the years of 1948–1956. Trofim Lysenko (1898–1976) became famous for rejecting Mendelian genetics in favor of hybridization theories. He was influenced by a reading of Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (1744–1829), as well as by ideas of Ivan V. Michurin (1855–1935), the spiritus rector of Soviet biology, and propagated the latter as the true successor to Darwin. Thanks to his good relations with the political leadership Lysenko succeeded in formulating a new theory in genetics according to which all organic nature could be subjected to human will. Forces outside of organisms – and not chromosomes or genes – caused change, and the habituation of food plants to different environmental conditions (frost and aridity) could be inherited by the organism and passed down from generation to generation. In 1948 Lysenko organized the August meeting of the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences (Vsesoiuznaia akademiia sel'skokhoziaistvennykh nauk imeni V.I. Lenina). His speech as president of that academy (1938–1956) "On the Situation in Biological Science" (edited by Stalin himself) led to a formal ban on teaching the genetic theories of Gregor Mendel (1822–1884), August Weismann (1834–1914), and Thomas Hunt Morgan (1866–1945). When the pro-Soviet policy in China made learning from the neighboring socialist power possible Soviet advisors tried endlessly to propagate Lysenko's thinking in the neighboring country. Lysenko's 1948 speech – available in Chinese translation as early as August 1949[64] – and the ensuing translations of Soviet publications in agricultural sciences[65] imported the "correct" vision of biology and genetics to China, resulting 1952 in the complete ban of Western genetics.

Due to Stalin's support Lysenko became a transnational icon of socialist science who was in China lauded in specialist and non-specialist literature, such as in magazines like *Science for the People* (*Kexue dazhong* 科学大众), *Popular Science Monthly* (*Kexue huabao* 科学画报) and – for barely literate peasants – the *People's Agriculture* (*Dazhong nongye* 大众农业). These magazines used huge varieties of illustrations and photos, complemented by simple texts. Though one might assume that this approach was to ensure a widespread dissemination of new knowledge, the openly visible political rhetoric in these texts – pointing out that the choice of the correct theory of genetics was a question of class struggle[66] – made it difficult for Chinese genetics experts to accept Lysenkoism. This was despite the fact that Soviet propaganda was busy using inspirational stories of

64 Translated by Li He 李何 and Duyi 独伊, Beijing: Tianxia tushu gongsi 1949.

65 See here the journal Sulian nongye kexue 苏联农业科学 (Soviet Agricultural Science) that was whole-sale translated from the Russian to the Chinese and published by the North China Agricultural Science Research Institute (Huabei nongye kexue yanjiusuo 华北农业科学研究所). Influential was also the Zhongguo Miqiulin xuehui huikan 中国米丘林学会会刊 (Periodical of the Chinese Michurin Study Society) that started to introduce in its first issue of August 1950 Soviet genetics to a Chinese audience. Head of this society was Luo Tianyu 乐天宇 (1901–1984).

66 See here for example the introduction in Chu Qi 褚圻, Yichuanxue de Miqiulin luxian 遗传学的米邱林路线 (Genetics and Michurin's political line), Beijing 1954.

successful peasants in order to show its superiority in both theory and practice (a point shared on the Chinese side because this biology was considered "easy to understand, easy to use"). The fact that this biology was justified by merely anecdotal evidence however raised the suspicion that it lacked scientific evidence, especially among those Chinese geneticists who had studied in Europe and the United States before the founding of the People's Republic.

Khrushchev's secret speech criticizing Stalin's cult of personality in February 1956 pushed Chinese biologists and experts in genetics to withdraw their support for Soviet science. Lysenko had already come under attack by Soviet biologists in 1952, a knowledge that had been made public in China only two years later. When the centenary of Michurin was celebrated in China in 1955 (as it was done in the Soviet Union), the official position was to safeguard his biology. The situation changed in the ensuing year when Hans Stubbe, the president of the East German Academy of Agricultural Science, lectured at Beijing Agricultural University, telling his audience that there was no scientific foundation for central tenets of Lysenko's beliefs.[67] In April 1956, the Soviet academician Nikolai Vasilyevich Tsytsin (1989–1980)[68] – a specialist in biology and agriculture – told the Chinese on his visit to the PRC when helping to draft the 12-year science and technology plan of China that Lysenko had been dismissed from his duties. These developments contributed to Mao's April 1956 speech "On the Ten Major Relationships" where he emphasized that one did not have to copy everything blindly and transplant mechanically from the Soviet Union. This speech was the final reassurance that one was able to reject Lysenko's pseudo-scientific theories.

In the end, the science philosopher and economist Yu Guangyuan 于光远 (1915–2013) organized a Genetics Symposium in Qingdao in August 1956 where the participants should openly discuss if the American Morgan or the Soviet Michurin were right.[69] The symposium – as the organizers claimed themselves – was the first national conference in the field of natural science that applied the ideal of the Hundred Flowers Movement (*Baihua yundong* 百花运动, 1956/57). According to its slogan "Letting a hundred flowers blossom, letting a hundred schools of thought contend" this campaign had at its core the principle of independent thinking and the freedom to criticize and debate, instead of continuing the erroneous idea that natural sciences and medicine possessed a class char-

67 After his own visit to the Lysenko Institute in Moscow Stubbe had tried to reproduce the Soviet experiments at his institute in Gatersleben, yet failed to do so. See J. Siemens, Lyssenkoismus in Deutschland (1945–1965), in: Biologie in unserer Zeit 27 (1997), pp. 255–262; E. Käding, Engagement und Verantwortung. Hans Stubbe, Genetiker und Züchtungsforscher. Eine Biographie, Müncheberg 1999.

68 From 1945 until his death, Tsytsin had been the director of the Main Moscow Botanical Garden of Academy of Sciences (today named after him) and member of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union (1938–1946, 1950–1954 and 1954–1958). His main field of research was the breeding of new crop varieties.

69 The according assessment in the People's Daily of 7 October 1956 was that both schools presented their recent discoveries one after the other before engaging in discussions. See Huang Qinghe 黄青禾 and Huang Shun'e 黄舜娥, Yige chenggong de xueshu huiyi – ji yichuanxue zuotanhui – 个成功的学术会议–记遗传学座谈会 (A successful academic conference – Reporting on the Genetics Symposium), in: Renmin Ribao 人民日报 (People's Daily), 7 October 1956.

acter. It made a two-week confrontation of both schools possible that in the end resulted in favouring Morgan over Michurin, with the defenders of the former pointing out that in the last years socialist genetics had regressed due to the lacking access to the newest developments in DNA and molecular biology research. One of the leading critiques Tan Jiazhen 谈家桢 (1909–2008) – an academician of the Chinese Academy of Science who had obtained his PhD in 1937 at the California Institute of Technology while working with Thomas Morgan on establishing the fruit fly Drosophila as the leading species in genetic research – pointed out that already other states had begun to see Lysenko critically. It is interesting to observe in this context that it was not the Chinese preference for practice instead of theoretical reflection that led to the rejection (given the absence of theory in Lysenkoism), but rather the insight that Michurin biology was hardly scientific, as the director of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Party Lu Dingyi 陆定一 (1906–1996) had put it in an earlier speech to scientists, social scientists, writers, and doctors.[70] He ensured his audience that natural science does not have a class character and that it would be wrong to equate it with politics, even though this does not mean that "science for science's sake" were a justified standpoint. It would be wrong to assume that "traditional Chinese doctors are feudal doctors" and that "doctors of the Western school are capitalist doctors", or that "Michurin's theory is socialist" and that "Mendel's and Morgan's principles of heredity are capitalist."[71] A final assessment appearing in the *People's Daily* on 26 August 1956 concluded that the symposium succeeded in achieving a closer rapprochement of both schools.[72] Intriguing is here a later textbook on genetics that argues for the validity of Michurin genetics by referring to its global acceptance in both socialist and non-socialist states, among them listing Switzerland, France, England, Japan, India, Denmark, Belgium, and Italy as countries that conduct research in the field of Michurin genetics.[73] The emancipation from the Soviet Union was thus not a sudden, but a gradual one. The historical significance of the Qingdao Symposium clearly lies in the insight that the Soviet Union could no longer be accepted as the exclusive knowledge provider.

This assessment persisted and resurfaced in the mid-1980s when Yu Guangyuan and Gong Yuzhi 龚育之 (1929–2007) repeated their critique of superstition on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Hundred Schools campaign. Lysenkoism reemerged in public discussion when a new edition of the proceedings of the Qingdao Symposium was published in December 1985. Gong and Yu argued in various articles appearing between April and July 1986 in the *People's Daily* that research in natural sciences can only

70 26 May 1956, published in the People's Daily on 13 June 1956. English translation in R. Bowie / J. Fairbank (eds.), Communist China 1955–1959. Policy Documents with Analysis, Cambridge, MA, 1965, pp. 151–163.

71 Ibid., pp. 156–157.

72 See the report on the success of the Symposium in the People's Daily, Yichuanxue zuotanhui zai Qingdao jieshu – kexuejiamen jiaoliu jingyan quchang buduan huxiang tigao 遗传学座谈会在青岛结束 科学家们交流经验取长补短互相提高 (The Genetics Symposium in Qingdao has ended – Scientists exchanged their experiences and made progress by learning from each other), in: Renmin Ribao, 26 August 1956.

73 See Zhang Dongsheng 张冬生 and Zhang Zhenhua 章振华, Miqiulin yichuanxue 米丘林遗传学 (The Genetics of Michurin), Beijing 1961, p. 10.

be successful if free of politic influence. In the abstract of an article that remembers the achievements of the Qingdao Symposium it reads accordingly:

> *The fundamental accomplishments gained at the Qingdao Conference were (1) Scientific arguments must be strictly distinguished from political issues, and free discussion be fully encouraged in settling differences in scientific arguments (2) Freedom of expression, especially exchanging ideas concerning scientific endeavours within the academic circles, must be guaranteed and democracy, the prerequisite of such freedom, must be exercised.*[74] *(3) Scientific arguments must be based on the results of research. (4) Conclusions on scientific pursuits can only be reached by scientists themselves*.[75]

Such view is undoubtedly a reflection of the liberalization of academia after the end of the Mao era, yet the symposium in 1956 had already given Tan the opportunity to call for the restoration of the autonomy of science by emphasizing that natural science is a universal language. Seeing how Lysenko had used his relationship to Stalin in order to propagate his ideas the symposium's participants concluded that the absence of political intervention was an indispensable element of scientific progress.

While scientific freedom was justified by the Hundred Flowers Campaign, another, even more important, factor was that the Chinese reference to scientific findings of other countries beyond the Soviet Union avoided the scientific nativism of Michurin who – in the Soviet understanding – had been able to develop his theory without being influenced by foreign bourgeois science.[76] Lu Dingyi pointed out in his speech of 26 May 1956 (that is, three months before the Qingdao Symposium) that Chinese scientists should not accept whole-sale westernization and thereby advocate a national nihilism. Learning from the Soviet Union was certainly correct, yet "besides learning from the Soviet Union, we must also learn from the People's Democracies. Every People's Democracy has its own special merits."[77] It thus did not come to surprise that the Qingdao genetics symposium proposed to the CCP to invite European genetics experts to China to give lectures, to send Chinese delegations to Europe, America, and the Soviet Union to learn the newest developments in biology, and finally to translate publications in biology from all countries into Chinese.[78] After all, the aim was to develop genetics to such an extent that it could reach international standards in the coming twelve years, argued Tong Dizhou 童第周 (1902–1979), the chairman of the symposium in his opening speech on 10 August

74 Democracy refers here to the absence of autocracy in scientific discourse. According to the Maoist ideal of mass science peasants and workers could make valuable contributions in the process of knowledge production. Science was thus less experts' science than people's science (renmin kexue 人民科学).

75 Li Peishan 李佩珊, Meng Qingzhe 孟庆哲, Huang Qinghe 黄青禾, Huang Shun'e 黄舜娥, Qingdao yichuanxue zuotanhui de lishi beijing he jiben jingyan 青岛遗传学座谈会的历史背景和基本经验 (The historical background and general experiences of the Qingdao Genetics Symposium), in: Ziran bianzhengfa tongxun 自然辩证法通讯 (Journal of Dialectics of Nature) (1985) 4, pp. 41–49, 79, here p. 79.

76 L. Schneider, Lysenkoism in China: Proceedings of the 1956 Qingdao Genetics Symposium: Editor's Introduction, in: Chinese Law and Government 19 (1986) 2, p. vi.

77 Bowie / Fairbank, Communist China 1955–1959, pp. 161.

78 In addition, the new role of genetics was also institutionalized by establishing a National Professional Organization of Geneticists and a Genetics Institute at the Chinese Academy of Sciences.

1956. The symposium was in effect an important event that helped Chinese scientists to emancipate themselves from the Soviet Union and look further for adequate sources of knowledge, and they succeeded in doing so quicker than the German Democratic Republic that achieved a liberation of biology only in the 1970s.[79] They seized the opportunity provided by the Hundred Flowers Campaign during which Maoist science epistemology reinforced the view that the search for legitimate knowledge was an endless dialectical process that could impossibly restrict itself to the neighbouring socialist power.

Turning away from the Soviet Union

The insights detailed above caused Chinese science planners to turn away from the Soviet Union and to generate a growing interest in other countries within and beyond the Eastern bloc. As described by Jersild the Soviet advisors on *komandirovka*[80] in China were often considered being arrogant and colonial in attitude, enjoying a luxurious lifestyle compared to the Chinese people, quickly reminding the receiving nation that the Soviets' aid was by no means selfless, nor were the red experts representing the most intimate friend of China. Growing conflicts where Russian technicians and experts failed to achieve the promised aims due to drunkenness, laziness or because they committed crimes[81] certainly contributed to the growing split between China and the Soviet Union, yet did not become directly detrimental to the image of the big brother. Rather, the appreciation of the Soviet Union providing modernity in principle persisted, but was modified so that socialist modernity no longer necessarily meant Soviet modernity.
It is in this sense that premier Zhou Enlai 周恩来 (1898–1976) and marshal Nie Rongzhen 聂荣臻 (1899–1992) of the People's Liberation Army established in October 1956 the Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China 中国科学技术情报研究所.[82] Its primary task was to gather global technological knowledge and to introduce it to Chinese scholars and experts, and doing so meant first of all to translate foreign materials. Starting in 1955, the institute issued the *Bibliography of Translated Texts in Science and Technology* (*Kexue jishu yiwen tongbao* 科学技术译文通报), and in December

79 See the findings of I.J. Polianski, Das "Lied vom Anderswerden" – Der Lysenkoismus und die politische Semantik der Vererbung, in: Osteuropa 10 (2009), pp. 69–88.

80 The system of *komandirovka*, or work-related travel, included the deployment of advisors throughout the bloc and can be understood as a continuation of Russian imperial practices. See Jersild, The Sino-Soviet Alliance, p. 28.

81 Ibid., pp. 43–46.

82 Renamed to Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China 中国科学技术信息研究所 (ISTIC) in 1992 this institute exist still today and is the largest electronic database for academic publications and statistic data, ranging from journals, dissertations and conference proceedings to patents and information on Chinese companies in the fields of Chinese studies (arts/humanities/social sciences), TCM (Traditional Chinese Medicine), Chinese Business, Law, Government, Defense, Military, Science, and Technology etc. (www.wanfangdata.com.cn). It is also the responsible institution for providing access to international academic databases, ranging from Nature to Springer to ProQuest, Oxford Academic Journals and Lexis, see http://www.istic.ac.cn/suoguan/web.htm [20.02.2018].

1957 the journal *Scientific & Technological Information Work* (*Keji qingbao gongzuo* 科技情报工作) that was two years later complemented by an English-language serial *Science abstracts of China* 中国科学文摘 addressing different science fields, ranging from medicine to earth sciences and biological sciences. Their declared transnational perspective was meant to go beyond the Soviet Union as the sole or the primary source of knowledge. The need to do so was justified by the simple fact that the USSR was not necessarily the most advanced of the socialist countries, a circumstance recognized by the Chinese leadership when the Soviet Union under Khrushchev intensified its exchange with Central Europe in the search for new knowledge and technologies. At the same time, the big brother started to show interest in the Western colonial heritage in China dating from the pre-1949 era that could possibly provide access to knowledge from non-socialist countries that was difficult to obtain given the geopolitical situation.[83] The technological superiority of Central European states was not only recognized by the USSR and China but also consciously pushed by the socialist states of Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Romania. The growingly complex relationships between these countries and the Soviet Union in the wake of the 1956 uprisings in Poland and Hungary – seen by China as a first sign of their political emancipation from Moscow – had a considerable impact on Chinese foreign policy behaviour in the East European socialist camp. While in the case of Poland the CCP warned the Soviets not to intervene to oust the nationalist Communist government under Władysław Gomułka, it supported the efforts in Hungary to destroy the counterrevolutionary forces and to reinstall Communist rule, before breaking radically with the USSR in the 1958 alignment of Albania with the CCP's policy of de-Stalinization and peaceful coexistence.[84]

Mao Zedong justified the Chinese engagement in the affairs of the Warsaw Pact by a reference to his theory of contradiction originally developed in the 1930s. During the Yan'an era when the CCP resided in a remote and isolated mountainous area in northern Shaanxi after the Long March (1934–1935), the Party's chairman had written his piece *On Contradiction* (*Maodulun* 矛盾论, August 1937).[85] It became the most central theoretical text guiding political campaigns before and after the founding of the PRC. Based on a reading of Lenin's "Conspectus of Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*" it argued that "law of contradiction in things, that is, the law of the unity of opposites, is the basic law of materialist dialectics", pointing out to different kinds of contradiction that in political struggle need to be identified correctly:

> *As opposed to the metaphysical world outlook, the world outlook of materialist dialectics holds that in order to understand the development of a thing we should study it internally and in its relations with other things; in other words, the development of things should be seen as their internal and necessary self-movement, while each thing in its movement*

83 Jersild, The Sino-Soviet Alliance, p. 61.

84 For an overview see J.W. Graver, China's Quest. The History of the Foreign Relations of the People's Republic of China, Oxford 2016, pp. 113–145.

85 Mao Zedong, On Contradiction, in: Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. I, pp. 311–347.

> *is interrelated with and interacts on the things around it. The fundamental cause of the development of a thing is not external but internal; it lies in the contradictoriness within the thing. There is internal contradiction in every single thing, hence its motion and development.*[86]

Rejecting the metaphysical variation of the law of the development of the universe and regarding contradiction as an essentialist characteristic of every phenomenon Mao insists that research into world affairs is an ever-continuous process. Declaring in his text *On Practice* (1937) that rational knowledge cannot exist independently or be derived solely from reason there can be no authority in defining what is correct or legitimate knowledge, and accordingly there is no end in scientific research. If there were one, it would constitute an end to science itself where the last knowable thing can only be metaphysically founded.

In February 1957 Mao refined his view on contradictions, pointing out in his speech "On the correct handling of contradictions among the people" (*Guanyu zhengque chuli renmin neibu maodun de wenti* 关于正确处理人民内部矛盾的问题) differences between non-antagonistic and antagonistic contradictions. While the former could be overcome by adequate ideological education, the latter was irreconcilable: one could under no circumstance cooperate with a capitalist individual or an imperialist country.[87] Celebrated in Eastern Europe this speech showed a way how to acknowledge differences among socialist systems without feeling the authoritarian need to suppress deviations from the Soviet model.[88] After all, Maoist dialectics held that there was always a unity of opposites, as Mao put it in his 1956 speech at the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on 15 November 1956:

> *Everything in the world is a unity of opposites. By the unity of opposites we mean the unity of opposite things differing in nature. For instance, water is a combination of two elements, hydrogen and oxygen. If there were only hydrogen and no oxygen, or vice versa, water could not be formed. Over a million compounds are said to have already been named and no one knows how many have not yet been. All compounds are unities of opposites differing in nature. Likewise with things in society. The relationship between*

86 Ibid., p. 313.

87 In this speech (presented to the Eleventh Session (Enlarged) of the Supreme State Conference in February 1957 and published in June 1957), Mao insisted on the positive results of the events in Poland and Hungary: "In our society, as I have said, disturbances by the masses are bad, and we do not approve of them. But when disturbances do occur, they enable us to learn lessons, to overcome bureaucracy and to educate the cadres and the masses. In this sense, bad things can be turned into good things. Disturbances thus have a dual character. Every disturbance can be regarded in this way. Everybody knows that the Hungarian incident was not a good thing. But it too had a dual character. Because our Hungarian comrades took proper action in the course of the incident, what was a bad thing has eventually turned into a good one. Hungary is now more consolidated than ever, and all other countries in the socialist camp have also learned a lesson." See Mao Zedong, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People, in: Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. I, p. 416.

88 See A.S. Whiting, The Sino-Soviet Split, in: R. MacFarquhar / J.K. Fairbank (eds.), The Cambridge History of China, vol. 14: The People's Republic of China, Part 1: The Emergence of Revolutionary China 1949–1965, Cambridge, UK 1987, pp. 478–538.

> *the central and the local authorities is a unity of opposites, and so is that between one department and another.*
> *The relationship between two countries is also a unity of opposites. China and the Soviet Union are both socialist countries. Are there any differences between them? Yes, there are. The two countries are different in nationality. Thirty-nine years have gone by since the October Revolution took place, whereas it is only seven years since we won state power throughout the country. As for the things each has done, they are different in many ways. For instance, unlike theirs our agricultural collectivization has gone through several stages, our policy towards the capitalists is different from theirs, so are our market price policy and the way we handle the relationship between agriculture and light industry on the one hand and heavy industry on the other, and so are our army system and Party system. We have told them: We don't agree with some of the things you have done, nor do we approve of some of the ways you handle matters*.[89]

The same year saw the publication of the periodical *Bulletin of the Studies of Dialectics of Nature* (*Ziran bianzhengfa yanjiu tongxun* 自然辩证法研究通讯) whose declared aim was to equip the scientists with the "weapon of materialist dialectics" for seeking truth (*zhenli* 真理). It provided scientists with an ideological justification to search for knowledge beyond the Soviet Union at a time when their country was beginning to emancipate itself and to regain influence in global affairs. It would be however wrong to assume that this reorientation occurred only after Khrushchev's secret speech or as a consequence of the Sino-Soviet split. Rather, East European countries played an active role in diversifying access to scientific and technological knowledge, an aspect that is often neglected in the growing literature on Sino-Soviet relations in recent years.[90]

For instance, when Poland and China agreed to sign an Agreement on technological cooperation (*Zhong-Bo jishu he jishu kexue hezuo xieding* 中波技术和技术科学合作协定) in 1954 and an Agreement on Cultural Cooperation (*Zhong-Bo wenhua hezuo xieding* 中波文化合作协定) in February 1955, the Polish embassy in Beijing started in the same year to publish a journal entitled *Knowledge on Poland* (*Bolan zhishi* 波兰知识).[91] It ran a number of articles that boasted the Soviet contribution to Poland's development, emphasizing that Poland had already surpassed the technological level of Italy,[92] and praising the global reputation of Polish natural sciences when noting that the American academic journal *Mathematical Reviews* published papers of Polish mathema-

89 Mao Zedong, Speech at the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 15 November 1956, in: Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. V, p. 339.

90 See here Bernstein / Li (eds.), China learns from the Soviet Union; M. Sleeboom-Faulkner, The Chinese Academy of Science (CASS) – Shaping the Reforms, Academia and China, Leiden 2007; Shen / Xia, Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership.

91 The version available to the author was a donation by the Polish embassy to the library of the Shanghai Institute of Finance and Economics 上海财政经济学院.

92 Bolan jishu kexue de gaishu 波兰技术科学的概述 in: Knowledge on Poland 波兰知识 (Miesięcznik Polski) 2 (1955), pp. 12–14.

ticians.[93] The task of the day then was according to the journal to intensify the relations and exchange between both countries, as the Polish ambassador to Beijing, Stanisław Kiryluk, told in a speech when awarding Guo Moruo 郭沫若 (1892–1978) (in April 1953 the Chinese delegate to the funeral ceremonies for Stalin and the first President of the Chinese Academy of Sciences from its founding in 1949 until his death) the title of a member of the Polish Academy of Sciences on 28 December 1954. Kiryluk lauded the achievements of Chinese science and technology in the past, emphasizing that Chinese successes in scientific research are Poland's successes as well. In his acceptance speech Guo told the audience that China was willing to learn from Poland because the country had absorbed Soviet knowledge, and learning from Poland would mean strengthening Sino-Soviet friendship.[94] While such statement was a lip-service to the big brother in the East the journal itself continued to strengthen Poland's reputation when praising the advanced optical glasses produced in Poland that were – based on German technology – exported to the Soviet Union, China, and Hungary.[95] A similar image is painted in the *Czechoslovakia Pictorial* (*Jiekesiluofake huabao*) where the country boasted itself to be the second-largest producer of brown coal in the world, and the largest producer of motorcycles worldwide,[96] that is an advanced industrialized country that seemingly is even able to take over tasks in global development, such as exporting advanced cranes and tractors to China.[97] Appearing almost simultaneously in China the magazines *Knowledge on Poland* and *Czechoslovakia Pictorial*, which were published by the Polish and the Czechoslovakian government respectively in their efforts to emancipate themselves while hoping for Chinese support, appealed to their readers that the Soviet Union was not the only country to consult in the process of modernization.

While it is extremely difficult to estimate the true impact of knowledge transfers from these countries (primarily due to only scarce documentation beyond the propagandistic pictorials and due to the current lack of access to historical archives of the PRC era) these observations exemplify how the Chinese modernization process did not focus exclusively on the Soviet Union as implied by the slogan "The Soviet Union of today is our tomorrow." A closer look at the activities of the Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China shows that Maoist China also did not follow the logic of the Cold War where only socialist countries could be emulated. Not only were the years

93 Kexue wei shenghuo fuwu 科学为生活服务 (Science has to serve life), in: Knowledge on Poland (Miesięcznik Polski) 3 (1955), pp. 13–16.

94 Bolan zhu Hua dashi Jililuoke – daibiao Bolan kexueyuan shouyu Guo Moruo yi yuanshi xuewei 波兰驻华大使基里洛克 – 代表波兰科学院授予郭沫若以院士学位 (The Polish Ambassador to China Kiryluk represents the Polish Academy of Sciences in awarding Guo Moruo the title of an academician), in: Knowledge on Poland 波兰知识 (Miesięcznik Polski) 1 (1955), pp. 8–9.

95 Bolan de jimi yiqi he guangxue gongye 波兰的精密仪器和光学工业 (Poland's precision instruments and optics industry), in: Knowledge on Poland (Miesięcznik Polski) 9 (1956), pp. 23–24.

96 Cong shuzi zhong kan Jiekesiluofake 从数字中看捷克斯洛伐克 (Seeing Czechoslovakia from numbers), in: Czechoslovakia Pictorial 捷克斯洛伐克画报 2 (1958).

97 See Wei Zhongguo pengyou shengchan jiqi 为中国朋友生产机器 (Producing Machines for our Chinese Friends), in: Czechoslovakia Pictorial 2 (1955).

before the Great Leap Forward characterized by a considerable openness to the global scientific community, but also the radical push for economic development during the GLF – a movement that has often been described as an irrational movement characterized by a conscious renunciation of scientific modernity[98] – did not hinder the Institute of Scientific and Technical Information of China in its quest for new knowledge, which is particularly visible in its decision in 1959 – at the height of the GLF movement – to push its internationalization by complementing its publications with an English-language serial *Science abstracts of China* (*Zhongguo kexue wenzhai* 中国科学文摘). In the following years – also during the Cultural Revolution that has long wrongly assumed to have been anti-scientific in nature[99] – it provided summaries of foreign publications in a large number of indices, bulletins, and catalogues of foreign materials on science and technology, such as the *Indices of Scientific and Technological Documents* 科技文献索引 (1963), the *Bulletin of Translated Texts of Science and Technology* 科学技术译文通报 (starting publication in 1964), the *Catalogue of Foreign Materials on Science and Technology* 国外科技资料目录 (1975), the *Science and Technology Reference News (Part of Foreign Countries)* 科技参考消息 (国外部分) (1965–67), the *Comprehensive Overview on Trends in Foreign Science and Technology* 国外综合科技动态 (1962–1963), or the *Internationally Standardized Index of Journal Articles 1951–1961* (国外标准化期刊论文索引1951–1961) (1963).[100]

Conclusion

These examples reveal how Maoist China avoided – both before and after the split from the Soviet Union – to limit itself to Soviet knowledge in its modernization agenda. Instead, it consciously pursued a global search of knowledge that even went beyond the socialist bloc. With his emphasis on practice as the true criteria of knowledge Mao Zedong maintained an open attitude towards new knowledges, eventually leaving behind the exclusive dependency on the Soviet Union while establishing academic institutions that were dedicated to the search and translation of scientific and technological knowledge from all over the world, including capitalist countries. The very pragmatic attitude in choosing knowledge independent of its political or cultural context seems to imply that ideological considerations only played a minor role when transferring knowledge; the rare exception being cases in mathematics and physics where Albert Einstein's theory of general relativity and the standard model of particle physics were rejected, for instance.

98 For this assessment see F. Dikötter, The history of China's most devastating catastrophe, 1958–62. London 2010; Yang Jisheng, Tombstone: The Untold Story of Mao's Great Famine, London 2012; F. Wemheuer, Steinnudeln: Ländliche Erinnerungen und staatliche Vergangenheitsbewältigung der "Grossen Sprung"-Hungersnot in der chinesischen Provinz Henan, Frankfurt am Main 2007.

99 Contrary here the findings of Wei and Brock who describe in detail the scientific breakthroughs in that era, see Wei / Brock (eds.), Mr. Science and Chairman Mao's Cultural Revolution, pp. 1–118.

100 These publications have escaped the historians' attention so far, yet will become part of a future project dealing with transnational knowledge transfers in the Cold War era.

Such rejection was grounded epistemologically and focused more on the function of science in modernization than on its ideological purity.[101] The true nature and impact of transnational knowledge transfers from and to China are, however, still insufficiently researched. To fill this lacuna by identifying all the important actors, their academic institutions and their global movement in education and research as well as their interaction with each other will undoubtedly contribute to more thorough and truly global history of knowledge transfers in the Cold War era, a history that still remains to be written.

101 See Hu Danian, The Reception of Relativity in China, in: Isis 98 (2007) 3, pp. 539–557; M.A. Matten, Coping with Invisible Threats: Nuclear Radiation and Science Dissemination in Maoist China, in: East Asian Science, Technology and Society 12 (2018) 3, pp. 235–256.

Stress in the USSR. On the Dissemination of Health Knowledge in the Soviet Public Sphere, 1960s–1991

Jan Arend

ABSTRACTS

Wann wird Stress – verstanden als eine mit sozialem Wandel, Zeit- und Konkurrenzdruck assoziierte körperlich-psychische Empfindung – zu einer gesellschaftsprägenden Thematik? Die historische Forschung hat das Thema bislang exklusiv im Westen verortet: Stress als Grundgefühl eines als westlich verstandenen Kapitalismus und / oder Neoliberalismus. Dieser Beitrag zeigt hingegen, dass Stress – der Begriff kam in den 1960er Jahren über Wissenstransfers aus dem Westen in den sowjetischen Kontext – auch in der sowjetischen Öffentlichkeit verbreitet thematisiert wurde. Anhand einer Untersuchung von drei der meistgelesenen sowjetischen Zeitungen beleuchtet dieser Artikel Narrative der Stressthematisierung im sowjetischen Kontext und zeigt damit, wie Stress als Phänomen des sowjetischen Alltags öffentlich gedeutet wurde. Auf diese Weise wird die Vermittlung und Zirkulation von Gesundheitswissen im Spätsozialismus beleuchtet. Zugleich geraten bislang wenig beachtete blockübergreifende Ähnlichkeiten im Verständnis von Emotionen und Körperempfindungen in den Blick.

When and where does "stress" – a psychological and bodily condition associated with the pressure to perform – become a social concern? Previous historical research has situated the topic in the West, linking it to what is understood to be a Western type of capitalism and / or neoliberalism. This article departs from this line of research by demonstrating the broad dissemination of the topic of stress in the Soviet public sphere since the mid-1960s. Based on an examination of three of the most widely read Soviet state newspapers, the article shows how the notion of stress was conveyed to the Soviet public and thereby sheds light on the circulation of knowledge related to health in the period of late socialism. Stress, although the concept originally came to the Soviet context through a process of knowledge transfer from the West, had a life of

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its own in the Soviet Union. By analyzing how the concept of stress was adapted to a state socialist context, the article points to previously underexplored cross-bloc similarities with regard to perceptions of emotions and the body.

"Rasskazhite, pozhaluista, o stresse podrobnee."
"Izvol'te…" ("Please tell us more about stress." "With pleasure…")[1]

Since the early 20th century, the English term "stress" has found its way into a great number of languages and has gradually become a central concept people use to make sense of day-to-day experiences of tension and strain. As a bodily and emotional experience of pressure and anxiety, stress has been associated with numerous features of social life in modern(izing) societies such as urbanization, industrial noise, environmental pollution, overburdening responsibility at work, conflicts in private life and others. The times we live in have been labelled an "age of stress".[2]

This article examines how the notion of stress was conveyed to the Soviet public since the mid-1960s and thereby sheds light on the communication of knowledge related to emotions and the body in the USSR in the period of late socialism. By demonstrating the circulation of the topic of stress in late Soviet socialism, the article substantially widens the perspective of existing historical research, which has assigned stress its historical place in the West. By focusing on the Soviet Union, my approach departs from previous accounts that have linked the issue of stress to capitalism, neoliberalism and what is seen as a Western type of modernity. As this article shows, stress, although the concept originally came to the Soviet context through a process of knowledge transfer from the West, had a life of its own in the Soviet Union.

By focusing on how knowledge of stress was related to the public in Soviet newspapers, I shed light on the ways journalists and experts from the medical and psychological fields adapted the concept of stress to a Soviet context and thereby contributed to determining what "stress" actually meant in a socialist country.[3] This question is far from trivial. As I argue, stress presented a substantial challenge to a regime built on the premise of

1 B. Baranov, Kogda khuliganiat gormony [When Hormons Cause Mischief], in: Literaturnaia Gazeta 1967, 12 July, p. 11.

2 M. Jackson, The Age of Stress. Science and the Search for Stability, Oxford, 2013.

3 I am aware of studies that question if a socialist system ever existed in the Soviet Union. Scholars such as Richard D. Wolff and Stephen A. Resnick, for example, argue that the USSR developed into a form of state capitalism. If one followed this diagnosis, the question of stress in the Soviet Union would have to be addressed differently than it is done in this article. However, the question of the "real" nature of the Soviet system is not as central to the issue as one might think. The challenge faced by the Soviet regime of making sense of stress in a socialist context did not emerge only, and perhaps not even primarily, from reasons to be found in the structure of the political and economic system of the Soviet state. Rather, it also resulted from this state's claim to represent a socialist order. The newspaper narratives analysed in this article should be seen as responses to the challenge of addressing stress in a social context that was socialist by aspiration and declaration. See R. D. Wolff / S. A. Resnick (eds.), Class Theory and History. Capitalism and Communism in the USSR, New York 2002. Also, see M. Postone, Time, Labor, and Social Domination. A Reinterpretation of Marx's Critical Theory, Cambridge 1993.

optimized planning not only of the economy and work processes, but also of recreation.[4] Therefore, for the proponents of a socialist system, the existence of stress is anything but self-explanatory: If stress was admitted to exist in the Soviet Union – and, as I will show, it was –, it was a phenomenon in acute need of explanation.

In view of its omnipresence in our world one might be tempted to consider stress a universal, essentially ahistorical aspect of human life. Historians of emotions and the body, however, have argued plausibly in the last two decades that feelings and bodily sensations have a history and do not exist independently of the concepts and terms we use to refer to them.[5] The work of such historians as Mark Jackson, Patrick Kury, and Lea Haller suggests that this is also true in the case of stress.[6] They demonstrate that the term, first coined in the 1920s, for many decades remained a word used almost exclusively by scientists from different fields (ranging from materials science to physiology and psychology). "Stress" only came into broader use in the 1970s in Western Europe and North America when a veritable boom of social stress awareness occurred, a boom that, in some respects (think of the discussions surrounding the concept of burn-out), lasts until today.[7] Building on the cited studies, I understand stress here as a socially and culturally shaped experience that is subject to historical fluctuations of public awareness.

This article is based on an examination of three of the most widely read Soviet state newspapers (Pravda, Izvestiia, Literaturnaia Gazeta) in a period spanning from the late 1960s – the time, when Soviet newspapers began writing about stress – to the collapse of the USSR in 1991. As will be shown, by the 1970s the official discourse of these news-

4 On the ideals linked to the planning principle in the Soviet context, see M. Schulze Wessel, Zukunftsentwürfe und Planungspraktiken in der Sowjetunion und der sozialistischen Tschechoslowakei: Zur Einleitung, in: M. Schulze Wessel / C. Brenner (eds.), Zukunftsvorstellungen und staatliche Planung im Sozialismus. Die Tschechoslowakei im ostmitteleuropäischen Kontext 1945–1989, München, 2010, pp. 1–18, 2–11.

5 For an introduction to the field of history of emotions, see J. Plamper, The History of Emotions. An Introduction, Oxford (UK) 2015; B. Hitzer, Emotionsgeschichte – ein Anfang mit Folgen, http://www.hsozkult.de/literaturereview/id/forschungsberichte-1221 [10.06.2016]. For an approach that focuses explicitly on the interplay between emotion-related terminology and concepts on the one hand and emotions on the other, see U. Frevert et al. (eds.), Gefühlswissen. Eine lexikalische Spurensuche in der Moderne, Frankfurt a. M. 2011. On the history of the body, see, for example, M. Möhring, Die Regierung der Körper: "Gouvernementalität" und "Techniken des Selbst", in: Zeithistorische Forschungen 3 (2006) 2, pp. 284–290; P. Sarasin, Reizbare Maschinen. Eine Geschichte des Körpers, 1765–1914, Frankfurt a. M. 2001.

6 Jackson, The Age of Stress; P. Kury, Der überforderte Mensch. Eine Wissensgeschichte vom Stress zum Burnout, Frankfurt a. M. 2012; L. Haller, Stress, Cortison und Homöostase. Künstliche Nebennierenrindenhormone und physiologisches Gleichgewicht, 1936–1960, in: NTM. Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Wissenschaften, Technik und Medizin 18 (2010) 2, pp. 169–195; E. Ramsden / D. Cantor (eds.), Stress, Shock, and Adaptation in the Twentieth Century, Rochester, NY 2014; C. Borck, Kummer und Sorgen im digitalen Zeitalter: Stress als Erfolgsprodukt der fünfziger Jahre, in: Archiv für Mediengeschichte (2004) 4, pp. 73–83. For another important contribution to the historiography of stress see the recent special issue of Zeithistorische Forschungen ed. by Lea Haller, Sabine Höhler, and Heiko Stoff: Zeithistorische Forschungen / Studies in Contemporary History, Online edition, 11 (2014) 3 (http://www.zeithistorische-forschungen.de/3-2014).

7 See S. Höhler, Resilienz: Mensch – Umwelt – System: Eine Geschichte der Stressbewältigung von der Erholung zur Selbstoptimierung, in: Zeithistorische Forschungen 11 (2014) 3, pp. 425–443; H.-G. Hofer, Labor, Klinik, Gesellschaft: Stress und die westdeutsche Universitätsmedizin (1950–1980), ibid., pp. 382–405; J. Melling, Making Sense of Workplace Fear: The Role of Physicians, Psychiatrists, and Labor in Reframing Occupational Strain in Industrial Britain, ca. 1850–1970, in: Ramsden / Cantor (eds.), Stress, Shock, and Adaptation, pp. 189–221.

papers was no longer following a monolithic ideology. Rather, different and conflicting narratives of stress can be detected.[8]

I have taken into consideration only articles that both contain the term stress – originally borrowed from the English language, the Russian loanword *stress* gained currency in the Soviet Union the 1970s – and treat the issue in some depth.[9] A total of 120 such texts have been taken into account. About one third of them made stress their main topic and therefore I have analysed them here in more depth. The authors of these articles – journalists, professional science writers and experts from the fields of medicine and psychology – fulfilled a key function in a process of public communication, in which knowledge of stress was imparted, negotiated, and moulded between different bearers of knowledge and the readers of Soviet newspapers.

In studying the dissemination of stress-related knowledge to the late Soviet public, this article takes up impulses from recent discussions on the topic of knowledge dissemination in the fields of history of science and in science and technology studies. Scholars such as Jonathan R. Topham, Andreas W. Daum and James A. Secord have demonstrated how moving beyond a narrow focus on famous scientists and their "high science" can contribute to a better understanding of how knowledge is produced and how it circulates in society.[10] Those who, like the authors of the newspaper articles analysed here, disseminate knowledge in public do more than merely transmitting an existing body of knowledge. They select and interpret knowledge – and thus modify it – as they pass it on. Texts such as the newspaper articles analysed here, therefore, constitute an important body of sources as they provide insights into the interwoven processes of knowledge production and knowledge circulation.[11]

8 As my primary interest lies in the dissemination of health knowledge to a broader public, I pay less attention to expert publications that addressed a professional readership. For examples of Soviet expert literature on stress, which covered a broad range of topics in psychology and medicine (both veterinary and human), see, for example, P. J. Sprincis, Stress zhivotnykh i ego vliianie na kachestvo miasa [Animal Stress and Its Influence on Meat Quality], Moscow 1977; Nauchnyi sovet AN SSSR i AMN SSSR po fiziologii cheloveka, Stress, adaptaciia i funktsional'nye narusheniia. Tezisy vsesoiuznogo simpoziuma (13–14 iiunia 1984 g.) [Stress, Adaptation, and Functional Disorders. Proceedings of the All-Union Symposium (June 13–14 1984)], Kishinev 1984; Minsterstvo zdravoochranenija MSSR, Stressovye sostoianiia i preduprezhdenie ikh vrednykh posledstvii. Ukazatel' otechestvennoi literatury za 1980–85 [Stress and the Prevention of Its Negative Effects. A Bibliography of National Literature for 1980–85], Kishinev 1985.

9 Derived terms such as "stress-inducing" (stressuiushchii) are also taken into account.

10 See, for example, J. R. Topham, Rethinking the History of Science Popularization/Popular Science, in: F. Papanelopoupou / A. Nieto-Galan / E. Pedriguero (eds.), Popularizing Science and Technology in the European Periphery, 1800–2000, Aldershot 2009, pp. 1–20; A. W. Daum, Varieties of Popular Science and the Transformations of Public Knowledge: Some Historical Reflections, in: Isis 100 (2009) 2, pp. 319–332; J. A. Secord, Knowledge in Transit, in: Isis 95 (2004) 4, pp. 654–672; A. Schirrmacher, Introduction: Communicating Science: National Approaches in Twentieth-Century Europe, in: Science in Context 26 (2013) 3, pp. 393–404. For a discussion of public knowledge dissemination in the Soviet context, see J. T. Andrews, An Evolving Scientific Public Sphere: State Science Enlightenment, Communicative Discourse, and Public Culture from Imperial Russia to Khrushchev's Soviet Times, in: Science in Context 26 (2013) 3, pp. 509–526.

11 Newer literature has also demonstrated that the dissemination of knowledge should not be understood as a one-way process that operates "from above": The dichotomy between "active" expert "popularizers" and "passive" lay recipients has been called into question. Instead, the recipients of knowledge are now more commonly seen as having an active role themselves as they interpret and contextualize what they learn and thereby change

The Historiography of Stress

Stress is connected to questions that touch upon the very foundations of the social world. Firstly, it is linked to norms and values related to both mental and physical health. Secondly, the concept of stress touches upon the question how societies manage time. This in mind, it seems surprising that stress has not had a more prominent place in historical scholarship. In this section, I will briefly review the existing historical research on the issue of stress, pointing both to its important findings and its problematic tendency of describing stress as typical exclusively of what is seen as Western-type modernity.

A number of studies have treated stress in the context of what Lutz Raphael has termed the "scientization of the social" in the 20th century. In this process, by which the advising, counselling and norm-setting activity of experts increasingly turned to psychological and social phenomena of everyday life, stress became one of their key issues of interest.[12] Historians of Germany have convincingly linked the preoccupation with stress in the FRG that began in the 1970s to the so-called "Psycho-Boom" and "therapeutization", that is, to the processes whereby ever larger parts of society began to make use of psychotherapy and psychological coaching and to practice relaxation techniques such as yoga and autogenic training.[13]

To explain the growing concern for stress in Western societies beginning in the 1970s, historians have also pointed to widespread perceptions of crisis, that came as a consequence of deindustrialization, the oil crises and a growing awareness of environmental problems. The rising social concern for stress, in this view, was a symptom of a post-fordist development towards neoliberal flexibility and the increasing complexity of a globalized world.[14]

knowledge in form and content. While this is an aspect of knowledge dissemination that is well worth exploring, it has not been my primary focus in the research for this article. See, for example, Topham, Rethinking the History of Science Popularization.

12 L. Raphael, Die Verwissenschaftlichung des Sozialen als methodische und konzeptionelle Herausforderung für eine Sozialgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 22 (1996) 2, pp. 165–193; B. Bernet et al., "Auf den ersten Blick quer": Stress als flexible Regulierung und die Dis-Kontinuitäten des 20. Jahrhunderts, in: Zeithistorische Forschungen 11 (2014), pp. 444–461. For a broader perspective on psychological knowledge as an example of "Verwissenschaftlichung des Sozialen", see M. Tändler / U. Jensen, Psychowissen, Politik und das Selbst: Eine neue Forschungsperspektive auf die Geschichte des Politischen im 20. Jahrhundert, in: M. Tändler / U. Jensen (eds.), Das Selbst zwischen Anpassung und Befreiung. Psychowissen und Politik im 20. Jahrhundert, Göttingen 2012, pp. 9–35, especially 11.

13 P. Kury, Selbsttechniken zwischen Tradition und Innovation: Die ersten deutschsprachigen Stressratgeber der 1970er Jahre, in: S. Maasen et al. (eds.), Das beratene Selbst. Zur Genealogie der Therapeutisierung in den "langen" Siebzigern, Bielefeld 2011, pp. 139–158; S. Maasen, Das beratene Selbst: Zur Genealogie der Therapeutisierung in den "langen" Siebzigern. Eine Perspektivierung, ibid., pp. 7–34; M. Tändler, Das therapeutische Jahrzehnt. Der Psychoboom in den siebziger Jahren, Göttingen 2016.

14 Older labour regimes such as Taylorism and Fordism were in decline as the concept of stress gained currency in the 1970s. It is up to future scholars to explore, with a broader diachronic approach, which concepts were used to make sense of work strain before "stress" gained currency. See Kury, Der überforderte Mensch, pp. 223–266; Hofer, Labor, Klinik, Gesellschaft, pp. 397–404. On perceptions of crises in Western societies in the 1970s, see A. Doering-Manteuffel / L. Raphael, Nach dem Boom. Perspektiven auf die Zeitgeschichte nach 1970, Göttingen 2012; K. H. Jarausch (ed.), Das Ende der Zuversicht? Die siebziger Jahre als Geschichte, Göttingen 2008; N. Ferguson et al. (eds.), The Shock of the Global. The 1970s in Perspective, Cambridge, Mass. 2010.

The existing historical studies, for the most part, depict stress as inherently linked to what they see as Western-style capitalist and neoliberalist lifestyles. Mark Jackson, for example, sees stress as "linked historically to the processes, patterns, and preoccupations of advanced Western societies".[15] Similarly, Lea Haller et al. consider the stress-related discourse they study as an "eminently Western phenomenon".[16]

This, I argue, is problematic, as it contributes to a narrative of Western singularity that is insensitive to similar developments elsewhere. By implying that stress is essentially a Western phenomenon the cited studies provide support for the notion that the West is somehow profoundly different from other regions of the world, both in positive and in negative ways. This article, by contrast, shows how a study of the ways stress was perceived and framed on the Eastern side of the "Iron Curtain" can make visible cross-bloc similarities.

This study thus contributes to a growing body of scholarship which has pointed to similar developments on both sides of the "Iron Curtain", as well as to convergences, transfers and entanglements, in the 1970s and 1980s.[17] Quite a few of the trends that historians have associated with a rising social awareness of stress in Western societies can be shown to have existed, in their own form, in the socialist countries of Eastern and East-Central Europe. The Soviet Union of the 1970s and 1980s was a modern industrial state which underwent a multifaceted crisis that shared some traits with the contemporary crises of the Western world. Here, too, growing environmental degradation and technological change brought about an increasing awareness for questions of time management and health.[18] As the next section shows, it made sense to Soviet contemporaries to reflect about stress in their own, non-capitalist social and political system.

Newspapers, Journalists, and their Sources of Knowledge

The texts analysed in this article were published in nation-wide Soviet newspapers that were, with differences in degree, all close to the ideological line of the Communist Party. They thus provide suitable material for a study of how the issue of stress was incorporated

15 Jackson, The Age of Stress, p. 2.

16 L. Haller / S. Höhler / H. Stoff, Stress – Konjunkturen eines Konzepts, in: Zeithistorische Forschungen 11 (2014) 3, pp. 359–381, 381.

17 See, for example, C. S. Maier, Two Sorts of Crisis? The "long" 1970s in the West and the East, in: H. G. Hockerts (ed.), Koordinaten deutscher Geschichte in der Epoche des Ost-West-Konflikts, München 2004, pp. 49–62; J. Arend, Wider das "halbierte Bewusstsein"? Neuere Beiträge zu einer blockübergreifenden Perspektive auf das Jahr 1968, in: Bohemia. Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Kultur der böhmischen Länder 49 (2009) 2, pp. 445–453; M. Schulze Wessel, Konvergenzen und Divergenzen in der europäischen Geschichte vom Prager Frühling bis heute, in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 43 (2017) 1, pp. 92–109.

18 M.-J. Calic / D. Neutatz / J. Obertreis, Introduction, in: M.-J. Calic / D. Neutatz / J. Obertreis (eds.), The Crisis of Socialist Modernity. The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the 1970s, Göttingen 2011, pp. 7–27. K. Gestwa, Von der Stagnation zur Perestrojka: Der Wandel der Bedrohungskommunikation und das Ende der Sowjetunion, in: B. Belge / M. Deuerlein (eds.), Goldenes Zeitalter der Stagnation? Perspektiven auf die sowjetische Ordnung der Brežnev-Ära, Tübingen 2014, pp. 253–312; B. Belge / M. Deuerlein, Einführung: Neue Perspektiven auf die Brežnev-Ära, ibid., pp. 1–36, 16–18.

into official Soviet discourses. The Pravda, issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, was the ideological mouthpiece of the party. Izvestiia, the second newspaper analysed here, was published by the USSR government. With Pravda it had in common that it addressed a mass audience, and that its assigned task was to "educate" the Soviet people as a whole.[19] Literaturnaia Gazeta, founded in the early nineteenth century by Aleksandr Pushkin among others, was the official public organ of the Soviet Writers Association. Originally concerned mainly with literary studies, in the years following 1968 it continually broadened its thematic scope and began to cover cultural, political and social questions for the educated strata of Soviet society. Although a state newspaper, it was less close to official ideology than Pravda and Izvestiia.[20]

The authors of the newspaper articles analysed here were either journalists or scientists, in the latter case often coming from the fields of medicine and psychology. Quite often, they were both: journalists with a scientific education specializing in publishing on certain scientific topics. Their texts are often exemplary of the high prestige of scientific knowledge in Soviet official culture.[21] Often the texts analysed here took the form of interviews, in which a journalist would present questions (sometimes allegedly coming from the letters of readers) to a scientist. This genre of "talks with scientists" (*besedy s uchenymi*) was commonly used in newspaper articles related to stress.[22] Quite often, the texts claimed to represent the latest stage of research, citing both Western and Soviet scientific work.[23] But knowledge of stress could also be authorized by referring to the work of scientists from the more or less distant past. This would typically be Russian scientists, often representing a tradition going back to the times of Imperial Russia.[24]

19 On the political functions assigned to newspapers in late Soviet socialism, see S. Lovell, The Russian Reading Revolution. Print Culture in the Soviet and Post-Soviet Eras, New York, 2000, pp. 100–104; T. C. Wolfe, Governing Soviet Journalism. The Press and the Socialist Person After Stalin, Bloomington 2005, pp. 104–106, 122–126, 163–175.

20 Lovell, The Russian Reading Revolution, p. 101.

21 Andrews, An Evolving Scientific Public Sphere.

22 See, for example, V. Mikhailov, "Nevroz: Bolezn' veka ili nedug lichnosti?" Besedy s uchenymi ["Neurosis: Disease of Our Age or Disorder of Personality?" Talks with Scientists], in: Literaturnaia Gazeta 1973, February 7, p. 12; N. Fedotova, Mozhno li oboitis' bez stressa? [Can one get by without stress?], in: Literaturnaia Gazeta 1982, April 28, p. 12; Baranov, Kogda khuliganiat gormony.

23 In the mid-1970s a series of articles appeared in Literaturnaia Gazeta that informed the Soviet readers about the work of Hans Selye (1907–1982), a Hungarian-Canadian endocrinologist that published pioneering work on the biology and physiology of stress. It seems that his work was considered a most important source on the topic by Soviet experts. See Bol'shoj gorod – ugroza stressa? [Large Cities. Danger of Stress?], in: Literaturnaja Gazeta 1972, January 26; D. Valentei / I. Lisitsyi, Nevernyi diagnoz – Plokhoe lekarstvo [Wrong diagnosis, bad medication], in: Literaturnaia Gazeta 1972, January 26, p. 13; Neskol'ko zamechanii ob „al'truisticheskom egoizme" [A few remarks on the topic of "altruistic egotism"], in: Literaturnaja Gazeta 1975, January 15, p. 13; Mozhno li zhit' bez stressa [Can one live without stress?], in: Literaturnaja Gazeta 1975, January 15, p. 13. In 1983, Selye himself published an overview of his work in the newspaper. See G. Sel'e, Kliuch k zdorov'iu: Begstvo ot stressa [The key to a healthy life: avoiding stress], in: Literaturnaia Gazeta 1983, June 1, p. 14; G. Kositskii, Retsept ne dlia sotsial'nykh nedugov [A Prescription Not Suitable for Social Diseases], in: Literaturnaia Gazeta 1983, June 1, p. 14. On Selye, see Jackson, The Age of Stress, pp. 78–88; R. Viner, Putting Stress in Life: Hans Selye and the Making of Stress Theory, in: Social Studies of Science 29 (1999) 3, pp. 391–410.

24 See, for example, the reference to the Russian psychiatrist Vladimir Fëdorovich Chizh (1855–1922) in P. Zachepitskii, "Nervy, nervy…" ["Nerves, Nerves…"], in: Literaturnaia Gazeta 1986, November 12, p. 13. Another authority

There are also cases, however, where journalists writing on the topic of stress had an area of expertise that was not related to science, specializing in such diverse journalistic fields as, for example, tourism, family policy, primary education and astronautics.[25] The fact that stress was written about in such diverse contexts, indicates that, at the time, the issue was developing into a more broadly discussed social phenomenon that occupied minds beyond the expert niches. While science was the most often invoked source of stress-related knowledge in the articles analysed here, they also referred to other sources or traditions when writing about stress. Besides science, the authors drew on forms of Eastern spirituality, naturopathy, Russian popular traditions (such as Banya), as well as the arts and literature.[26]

"Stress" – A New Term Enters Official Soviet Discourse

Before the mid-1960s, stress was hardly ever written about in Soviet state newspapers. Then, in the late 1960s, several articles that touched upon the issue appeared, but only in the early 1970s did stress become a much-debated issue in official Soviet newspapers. In the early phase, Soviet journalists and experts who wrote about stress shared an awareness of the fact that it was a concept an ordinary Soviet reader of newspapers would not necessarily be familiar with. In their texts, they treated the term as a concept that the Soviet public needed to be introduced to. Thus, V. Baranov, professor of medicine and member of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences, introduced the term in an interview for Literaturnaia Gazeta in 1967 by first translating it: „Stress can be translated to Russian as tension, strain, and emphasis (*davlenie, napriazhenie, udarenie*)".[27] Some writers,

frequently invoked was the eminent physician and physiologist Ivan Petrovich Pavlov (1849–1936). See, for example, Mikhailov, Nevroz. Also, see the reference to the neurologist and psychiatrist Vladimir Mikhailovich Bekhterev (1857–1927) in E. Manucharova, Pozvoni na pomoshch' radost' [Make use of joy!], in: Izvestiia 1982, May 10, p. 3.

25 A. Lepikhov, Na soiuzakh i Apollonakh [On the Soyuz and Apollo Spacecrafts], in: Literaturnaia Gazeta 1972, June 7, p. 12; Zhizn' – v dvizhenii [Life consists of movement], in: Izvestiia 1975, March 10, p. 5; L. Ivchenko, Kak pobedit' stress [How to master stress], in: Izvestiia 1983, October 25, p. 6; G. Alimov, Beregite nas na rabote i doma [Treat us with care – at work and at home], in: Izvestiia 1988, March 7, p. 2; E. Berezniak, Deti drugie, a uchitel'? Otkrovenno ob avtoritete pedagoga [The children have changed, but what about the teachers? Frank comments on the authority of educators], in: Pravda 1987, September 23, p. 3.

26 For references to bania as a relaxation practice against stress, see: A. Ershova, S goria – V baniu… [Going to the Banya out of grief], in: Literaturnaia Gazeta 1982, April 28, p. 12; S. Tutorskaia, Pregrady stressu [Barriers against Stress], in: Izvestiia 1983, December 15, p. 3. Also, see the reference to hypnosis as an anti-stress treatment in: S. Tutorskaia, Gipnoz bez chudes [Hypnosis without magic], in: Izvestiia 1988, April 16, p. 6. For references to Russian literature as a source of stress-related wisdom, see E. Manucharova, Ulybnites', Kaskadery! Kak pobedit' stress [Smile, Stuntmen! How to overcome stress], in: Izvestiia 1986, November 27, p. 6. For references to Far-Eastern and Siberian herbal medicine, see M. Popovskii, Apteka dlia zdorovykh [A drugstore for the healthy], in: Pravda 1969, November 16, p. 3; I. Zhigailov / V. Chebakov, Istselit dar taezhnyi [The Healing Gift of the Taiga], in: Pravda 1981, March 17, p. 6.

27 Baranov, Kogda khuliganiat gormony. Another author, in 1979, referred to "what is now commonly referred to as stress", thereby also betraying an awareness of the unfamiliarity of the term. E. Manucharova, Chto my znaem o bioritmakh [What we know about biorhythms], in: Izvestiia 1979, July 7, p. 3. For more examples of this kind of introductory explanation of the term, see Popovskii, Apteka dlia zdorovykh; I. Chernichenko, Proidennogo ne

such as the film critic M. Turovskaia in an article published in 1973, explicitly commented on the novelty of the term. Turovskaia distanced herself from it, describing "stress" as a kind of fashionable and foreign concept that displaced a more easily understood Russian vocabulary: "They used to say 'experience', now they say 'trauma', they used to write 'pangs of conscience', now they write 'stress'."[28] Typically, in the early phase, the word would be put into quotation marks to signal that an unfamiliar, new term is being used.[29] What one can observe in the course of the 1970s and 1980s is a gradual process whereby "stress" becomes a much-used word, a term that the authors no longer feel the need to translate, put into quotation marks or explain. "Stress" becomes a normal term of the language of Soviet official newspapers. By 1985, P. Simonov, an expert with a background in neurophysiology, wrote in the Pravda: "This scientific term has now left behind the stage when it was mainly to be found in specialized literature. Nowadays one encounters it almost on a daily basis in newspapers, radio, TV, and in everyday conversations."[30] If "stress" became normal on the level of official language, did this mean that the phenomenon was acknowledged as a reality of Soviet life? To answer this question, one must turn to the narratives of stress presented in Soviet newspapers.

What is Stress? And where is it? Three Narratives of Stress in Soviet State Newspapers

Beginning in the mid-1960s, when the first articles that touched upon the issue of stress appeared, three narratives of stress coexisted in Soviet state newspapers. They differed in many ways, were incompatible in some respects, and overlapped in others. The fact that three distinct versions of dealing with the issue can be observed testifies to the heterogeneous character of official discourse in late Soviet socialism. We are not dealing with a monolithic ideology but with a certain (limited) plurality of ways the phenomenon of stress was framed for the Soviet public. In the first narrative, stress was depicted as virtually non-existent in the USSR, while in a second narrative its existence was more or less explicitly acknowledged and linked to Soviet modernity. A third narrative highlighted the role of the individual person.

povtoriaia [Not repeating what has already been treated], in: Pravda 1973, May 6, p. 3; V. Mikhailov, Mozhno li zhit' bez stressa? [Can one live without stress?], in: Literaturnaia Gazeta 1975, January 15, p. 13.

28 M. Turovskaia, Net, v soglasii c zamyslom fil'ma [No – in agreement with the intention of the movie], in: Literaturnaia Gazeta 1973, March 7, p. 8. Note that stress in the sense of "pangs of conscience" is not encountered often in the newspaper articles studied here.

29 V. Bespaa'ko, V Vuz – Bez ėkzamena! [Admission to Higher Education – Without an Exam!], in: Literaturnaia Gazeta 1971, October 6, p. 11; Zhizn' – v dvizhenii; M. Agafonov, Est' takoe selo [There is one such village], in: Izvestiia 1975, May 4, p. 5; P. Bogomolov, Telepaty iz Lėngli [The Telepaths from Langley], in: Pravda 1982, September 18, p. 5. This use of quotation marks virtually disappears in the 1980s. For one of the rare exceptions, see A. Blinov, Soslalis' na stress [Their excuse was stress], in: Izvestiia 1988, August 4, p. 4.

30 P. Simonov, Ne perezhivat', a deistvovat' [Don't worry, do something!], in: Pravda 1985, February 12, p. 3.

"In the West the consumption of tranquilizers has reached gigantic scales."[31]

In the first newspapers articles on stress in the mid-1960s and the 1970s the predominant narrative located the phenomenon firmly outside the Soviet sphere. The authors depicted stress as a condition characteristic of life in the capitalist West. This narrative, thus, remained within the ideological framework of Soviet Cold War rhetoric.[32] The USA, especially, were described as a veritable land of stress. In a number of texts of the mid-1970s, mostly written by Washington-based foreign correspondents of Soviet newspapers, a strong link is established between American capitalism, the contemporary crisis of US-economy in the years between 1973 and 1975, and stress. Unemployment figures among the most prominent causes of American stress that official Soviet newspapers referred to.[33]

In this narrative, the Soviet Union (and the socialist sphere of influence at large) were described as a more or less stress-free space. A number of articles referred to the "humanism" of Soviet socialism and described it as an antidote to stress. For example, Z. Ianushkevichus of the USSR Academy of Medical Sciences pointed out in 1976, that Soviet socialism had established "protective mechanisms that heighten the ability of the Soviet people to resist stress". Exemplifying his point, Ianushkevichus listed such (alleged) features of Soviet life as the planned nature of work and leisure, the "caring" attitude of the Soviet government towards its citizens, the resolvedness of conflicts between the individual and society, and a close relationship of the Soviet people to nature.[34] While this first narrative, which more or less explicitly denied the possibility of stress in a socialist state, can be observed in individual articles right until the late 1980s, it was less frequently resorted to from the late 1970s onwards.[35]

"Negative effects of scientific-technological progress"[36]

From the mid-1960s onwards, a second narrative of stress began to establish itself in Soviet newspapers, becoming regularly invoked in the course of the 1970s and 1980s. The

31 A. Tolkunov, Stress bezrabotitsy [The Stress of Unemployment], in: Pravda 1982, September 12, p. 5.

32 A. M. Ball, Imagining America. Influence and Images in Twentieth-Century Russia, Lanham, Md., 2003, pp. 183–190.

33 A. Tolkunov cited the work of the American medical sociologist M. Harvey Brenner to provide evidence for links between the high incidence of stress-related diseases and economic crisis in American society. Tolkunov, Stress bezrabotitsy; M. H. Brenner, Mental Illness and the Economy, Cambridge, MA, 1973. For more examples, see Mikhailov, Nevroz; I. Barsukov, Ėpidemiia samoubiistv [An Epidemic of Suicides], in: Izvestiia 1975, October 27, p. 4. For a later example, see L. Santos, Pis'mo iz Ameriki [A Letter from America], in: Pravda 1983, February 18, p. 5. For another instance of reference to American expertise on stress matters, see a 1987 Izvestiia article by A. Blinov, which cited work by the American journalist and opinion polling expert Louis Harris (1906–1991) as it touched on the widespread perception of stress as a problem in American society. See Amerikantsy sami o sebe [Americans About Themselves], in: Izvestiia 1987, November 20, p. 5; L. Harris, Inside America, New York 1987.

34 Z. Ianushkevichus, Kak uberech'sia ot stressa: Uchites' vlastvovat' soboi [How to protect yourself from stress: learn to control yourself], in: Literaturnaia Gazeta 1976, September 1, p. 13. Also, see Fedotova, Mozhno li oboitis' bez stressa?.

35 For a late example of this narrative, see Blinov, Amerikantsy sami o sebe; A. Blinov, Rabota i stress [Work and Stress], in: Izvestiia 1987, January 29, p. 5.

36 Mikhailov, Nevroz.

main difference to the first narrative was that it assigned stress a different "place" – both geographically and culturally. Here, stress was no longer externalized from the Soviet sphere. Instead, the authors began locating stress vaguely in „the developed countries", or – in an equally vague temporal variant of the narrative – in "industrial modernity".[37] B. Karvasarskii from the Bekhterev Institute of psychoneurology in Leningrad described stress in 1973 as a phenomenon of "civilization".[38] In a similar vein, P. Zachepitskii, also a scientist from the Bekhterev Institute, stated in 1986 that stress had become "a hallmark of the 20th century". An article of 1976 referred simply to "contemporary man", who "suffers from heightened psychological pressure, at work and at home". This "contemporary man" was described here as an inhabitant of "modernity".[39] However unclear the borders of this spatiotemporal location of stress were – it definitely included not only the "West", but, first and foremost, the Soviet Union.

For a better understanding of this narrative of stress, it is useful to consider an analogous case. Historian of science and medicine Carsten Timmermann argues that medical experts in the GDR, when confronted in the 1960s with a rising incidence of cardiovascular disease in East Germany, actually nurtured ambivalent feelings. On the one hand, naturally, the increase in heart disease in the population was seen as a problem both in economic terms and with regard to health policy. However, Timmermann also detects "secret pride" in the reactions of East German medical experts to the rising incidence of cardiovascular illnesses in the GDR. "Did it not show that the government managed to maintain a level of affluence that was comparable to the West?"[40]

I argue, that a similar "secret pride" can be detected in the newspaper articles analyzed here. Just like the increasing occurrence of cardiovascular diseases testified to the economic and welfare performance of socialism in the case studied by Timmermann, so did the existence of stress in the Soviet Union testify to the modernity of its society. The occurrence of stress implied that the USSR was part of "civilization", "industrial modernity", and Soviet man was a "contemporary man". This was good news in the late socialist USSR, which faced the toughening economic competition with the West. Stress, in the logic of this narrative, was a bad thing that was a sign of a good thing.

"A competent man is totally capable of regulating his emotions"[41]

When studying Soviet newspaper narratives of stress, it is useful to be sensitive to the question of agency. Who was actually "doing" things in the stories about stress that were circulated by Soviet state newspapers? For one, in certain respect, modernity itself was

37 Fedotova, Mozhno li oboitis' bez stressa?; V. Mikhailov, Polezno li serdtsu besserdechnost'? [Is heartlessness good for the heart?], in: Literaturnaia Gazeta 1974, October 30, p. 13; M. Airapetiants, Ot stressa – k nervozu [From stress to neurosis], in: Literaturnaia Gazeta 1986, November 12, p. 13.

38 Mikhailov, Nevroz.

39 Zachepitskii, Nervy, nervy…; Ianushkevichus, Kak uberech'sia ot stressa.

40 C. Timmermann, Appropriating Risk Factors: The Reception of an American Approach to Chronic Disease in the two German States, c. 1950–1990, in: Social History of Medicine 25 (2012) 1, pp. 157–174, 165.

41 Manucharova, Pozvoni na pomoshch' radost'.

given agency in newspaper narratives of Soviet stress: Journalists and experts described it as a historical force that brought about stress.

Besides modernity, there was another prominent actor in newspaper narratives of Soviet stress: Perhaps surprisingly, given the predominance of collectivism in Soviet ideology, this actor was the individual person. In a large majority of the articles, stress was conceptualized as a phenomenon that concerned not so much society or politics, but the individual. Both the causes of stress and the resources of resistance to stress were located within the individual. In this context, the authors regularly referred to, for example, "individuality", "certain personal characteristics", "people of a certain psychological constitution" and "peculiarities of disposition and temper".[42] Stress was depicted as something that "some can live with, while others are broken by it".[43] Those "broken" by stress, B. Karvasarskii held, were individuals "uncapable of tackling the challenges life sets us".[44]

This narrative included strong appeals to individual responsibility in health matters. For example, in an interview of 1967, V. Baranov, endocrinologist and professor of medicine, reminded the readership of Literaturnaia Gazeta, that "it is important to learn to deal reasonably with one's organism, to regulate one's tone and vitality".[45] With this emphasis on self-regulation (*samoupravlenie*, *samoregulirovanie*), Baranov set the tone for many Soviet experts, who, in the following two decades, advised the Soviet people how to deal with stress.[46] Z. Ianushkevichus, for example, called for "everybody to build their lives on healthy foundations".[47] G. Kosickii, answering reader's questions related to stress in an article for Literaturnaia Gazeta in 1982, argued: "The goal is to [learn to] regulate one's relationship with the surrounding world and in so doing to calculate the degree of stress that will work 'for' you as opposed to against you. In this, I believe, lies the greatest wisdom in life".[48]

These calls for self-regulation were part of a distinctly ethical discourse that emphasized the responsibility of each person to deal with the stress of life in order to stay productive and fit for work and fulfil their duty vis-a-vis their fellow human beings.[49] Everyone, so the argument went, should confront the tasks life poses by "toughening one's nervous system".[50]

This third narrative of individual responsibility was established well before Gorbachev set to reforming the country with his programme of glasnost' and perestroika in early

42 Dorogaia tsena [A High Price], in: Literaturnaia Gazeta 1968, September 4, p. 12; Mikhailov, Nevroz; Simonov, Ne perezhivat', a deistvovat'.
43 Manucharova, Ulybnites', Kaskadery!
44 Mikhailov, Nevroz.
45 Baranov, Kogda khuliganiat gormony.
46 For articles advocating self-regulation, also see Tutorskaia, Pregrady stressu; Manucharova, Pozvoni na pomoshch' radost'.
47 Ianushkevichus, Kak uberech'sia ot stressa.
48 Fedotova, Mozhno li oboitis' bez stressa?.
49 R. Fedorov, Strasti 33-go dnia: Sluzhba zdorov'ia [The Horror of the 33rd day: First-Aid Service], in: Pravda 1980, September 18, p. 6.
50 Fedotova, Mozhno li oboitis' bez stressa? On toughening (*zakalka*), also see Zachepitskii, Nervy, nervy….

1986. Overall, in the state newspapers studied here, the new transparency promised by the perestroika reformers did not bring about turnaround change with regard to the ways stress was written about. However, in some instances, the narrative of self-regulation was further explored and linked to the project of perestroika. Neurophysiologist P. Simonov, for example, in an interview for Pravda in 1987, stated:

> *Our society is now undergoing perestroika. The psychological pressure on each of us has increased a great deal. The most difficult task is the perestroika of consciousness* (perestroika soznaniia). *To overcome stereotypes, to break with inherited ideas, even with worldviews, is always connected with negative emotions, with stress.* […] *This is why everyone should take up an active position in life, why each and every one is called to face the challenges life poses*.[51]

Conclusion

Following Soviet journalists' and experts' writing on the subject of stress from the mid-1960s to the late 1980s, we see how stress, on the level of official Soviet discourse, came to be acknowledged as a phenomenon of life in the USSR. The term, treated as unfamiliar and in need of explanation in the early phase, gradually came to signify a phenomenon the existence of which in the Soviet world was taken for granted. The narrative which located stress outside of the sphere of socialism became muted in the course of the 1970s and 1980s.

And yet, in the writing of Soviet journalists and experts on the issue of stress one senses a lasting discomfort: Stress remained problematic for the socialist state, as it put into question the successes of socialist welfare policy at providing comfort and security to its citizens. The two narratives of stress that gradually replaced the older tale of denial, were both attempts at framing a familiar condition in ways that tended to decrease the potential for critique inherent in the concept of stress. In one of these narratives, stress was transformed into a marker of Soviet modernity, a sign of a certain equality of civilizational development with the West.

In the other narrative, stress was at the centre of a disciplining discourse that called for the individual – not the state – to take responsibility for his or her health and fitness. Historians have associated such appeals to the individual with the (neo)liberal tradition and noted that they became more frequent in Western societies since the 1980s. In this process, concepts such as physical "fitness" and "wellness" gained importance in the Western world and were increasingly seen as aspects of individual lifestyle.[52] By con-

51 S. Bogatko, Bienie mysliashchego serdtsa [The Beat of a Thinking Heart], in: Pravda 1987, August 20, p. 6. Also, see A. Iusin, Znat', chtoby ne bolet' [Knowing Not to Suffer], in: Pravda 1989, May 10, p. 6.

52 Doering-Manteuffel / Raphael, Nach dem Boom, p. 11; S. Graf, Leistungsfähig, attraktiv, erfolgreich, jung und gesund: Der fitte Körper in post-fordistischen Verhältnissen, in: Body Politics 1 (2013) 1, pp. 139–157; S. Duttweiler, "Körper, Geist und Seele bepuscheln…" Wellness als Technologie der Selbstführung, in: B. Orland (ed.), Artifizielle Körper – lebendige Technik. Technische Modellierungen des Körpers in historischer Perspektive, Zürich 2005,

trast, state socialist regimes such as the Soviet Union are predominantly described in the research literature as paternalistic, as regimes that denied their citizens both the burden and the freedom of individual responsibility. One of the aspects often associated with Eastern European socialism is a paternalistic health policy that operated from above, bringing affordable, but medically unsophisticated health care to the people.[53]

The findings presented here suggest something different: Appeals to personal responsibility for health (both mental and physical) were more common in late Soviet socialism than the existing literature acknowledges. My evidence supports the work of researchers such as Larisa Honey and Anna Paretskaya, who have pointed to the increase of individualist attitudes in late Soviet socialism.[54] Paretskaya points to what she calls "post-collectivist discourse" in political speeches and state newspaper articles in the Brezhnev era, a discourse "that promoted values of individuality, self-reliance, and privatism".[55] While Paretskaya seems uncertain about the causes for the emergence of this post-collectivist discourse (she points to such explanations as Western influences and Enlightenment traditions), my findings suggest that it was a way the Soviet state began, by the 1970s, to outsource responsibility for the welfare of its citizens to the individual.

In sum, then, my findings point to two previously underexplored features of late Soviet socialism, both of which are suggestive of cross-bloc similarities with regard to understandings of emotions, health, and the body. First, like in the West, the issue of stress was broadly disseminated in the USSR of the 1970s and 1980s and official narratives were established which made sense of the phenomenon in a socialist context. Second, we see official Soviet newspapers propagate an individualist attitude towards questions of health and fitness, an attitude not unlike the one associated with Western (neo-)liberalism.

pp. 261–277; E. Martin, Flexible bodies. Tracking Immunity in American Culture, From the Days of Polio to the Age of AIDS, Boston 1994.

53 See, for example, R. Rose, How Much Does Social Capital Add to Individual Health? A Survey Study of Russians, in: Social Science & Medicine 51 (2000) 9, pp. 1421–1435.

54 L. Honey, Pluralizing Practices in Late-Socialist Moscow: Russian Alternative Practitioners Reclaim and Redefine Individualism, in: N. Klumbytė/G. Sharafutdinova (eds.), Soviet Society in the Era of Late Socialism, 1964–1985, Lanham 2014, pp. 117–142; A. Paretskaya, A Middle Class without Capitalism? Socialist Ideology and Post-Collectivist Discourse in the Late-Soviet Era, ibid., pp. 43–66.

55 Paretskaya, A Middle Class without Capitalism?, p. 59.

BUCHBESPRECHUNGEN

Lon Kurashige (ed.): Pacific America. Histories of Transoceanic Crossings, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press 2017, 288 pp.

Reviewed by
Steffen Wöll, Leipzig

An associate professor of history and spatial sciences at the University of Southern California, Lon Kurashige has published extensively in the field of transpacific and global American history.[1] Kurashige's most recent academic foray is an edited volume released in 2017 and with a paperback edition set for publication in April 2019. Firmly embedded in recent paradigm changes brought about by (Trans)Pacific and Archipelagic American Studies,[2] the book provides a variety of takes on the reciprocal histories, knowledges, and conflicts across the Asia-Pacific region and the United States, as seen from an East-West perspective. In fifteen chapters and on 250 pages, the authors trace these connections alongside four thematic parts that focus on early modern Chinese history, diasporic networks of identities and trade, racism and imperialism, as well as the archipelagic regions of Oceania. Thanks to Kurashige's careful editing, the quality of the collected essays remains consistently high and the book manages the balancing act between accessibility for a general readership and 'quotable' material geared toward experts in the field.

The approach to the subject of transpacific history could be described as eclectic, with essays ranging from Madeline Hsu's in-depth analysis of Chinese-American student exchanges to Greg Dvorak's fascinating meditation on networks of trauma, memory, and amnesia that connect the Marshall Islands, Japan, and the United States, therefore "reinstat(ing) the Pacific as a 'Sea of Islands,' a region deeply interconnected – not divided – by the ocean" (p. 230). In one form or another, connections are the common threat that informs the theme of the book. In contrast to other works that are often occupied with the economic and diplomatic policies behind American imperialism and expansionism in the Pacific arena,[3] most authors – while certainly not ignoring the important milestones of top-down history – are interested in more personal perspectives that showcase the historical agency of individuals, social groups, and lower tier political organizations. Elizabeth Sinn's essay about "The Hong Kong Connection, 1850–1900," for instance, examines

how larger historical contexts of the gold mountain migration to California together with personal experiences of migrants created "networks that in turn facilitated further movements and transactions across the Pacific" (p. 48). Moreover, Sinn suggests that "(t)he flow of people with different interests and desires was accompanied by the flow of goods, money (as capital and remittances), communication, information, and the bones and coffins of deceased emigrants" (p. 48). In "Pop Gingle's Cold War," Peter E. Hamilton investigates "how nonstate actors and (…) individuals deploy and complement states' power" during the Cold War. He fleshes out the place-making dynamics of the American expat Edward Francis Gingle and his role as an information broker between China and the US, operating from the fringes of the Bamboo Curtain in Hong Kong. These and similar approaches impressively demonstrate the importance of grassroots histories – and grassroots research, respectively – in a transpacific space that has regularly been reduced to economic factors, political tensions, and a hemispheric Yellow Peril rhetoric that has currently reemerged in US foreign affairs.

A point of critique concerns the somewhat arbitrary sequence of the essays, which are juxtaposed in the book's chapters but do not always speak to each other thematically. In the preface, Kurashige attributes this to the authors' diverse research interests that reflect themselves in the "partial, preliminary, and ongoing nature of our conversations" (p. ix). While this could be understood as part of an overarching discursive strategy aimed at further variegating transpacific discourses and in this way "surmount the comfortable 'academic silos' that limit conceptualization of history as a field and experience" (p. ix), a more focused approach would have benefited the book's overall cohesion and reader guidance. At the same time, this broad-ranging narrative approach also brings to the fore the fault lines and messiness of the emerging field of transpacific history and its desire to operate outside of the rutted paths of policy-driven Eurocentric globalization narratives. Overall, Kurashige succeeds in assembling an instructive body of essays, which not only stand for themselves argumentatively but also provide valuable insights into more granular microhistories of subaltern actors and grassroots organizations and their roles in the larger picture of an ongoing transpacific history. The essays work together by reducing the geographic and epistemic distance between America and the Asia-Pacific region, thus highlighting the importance of their historical and contemporary integration. In doing so, the book puts additional and still much-needed emphasis on the blind spots of traditional historical narratives (such as the frontier and manifest destiny) that revolve around the seemingly natural sequence of East-West movement as the mainspring of Western civilization and American nation-building.

Understanding and tackling the challenges of a globalized world including assumed threats of Chinese economic dominance and migration, Kurashige's book proposes, means engaging in a discourse that takes into account the historical experiences and agency of marginalized actors and colonized subjects. This approach seems particularly productive and relevant as it understands the nation-centric grand flows of history as the springboard for a

more granular and dialogical history that does not shy away from acknowledging the perspective multiscalarity and rippled patterns of Asian-American relations with all their contradictions and complexities. The book pinpoints the core of these contradictions in the fact that "(w)hile people in the West have been mesmerized by the potential economic fortunes to be made in and from this region, they have also been repelled by its peoples, cultures, and environments, which are seen as incompatible to the West" (p. 2). By confronting these often-painful histories imbued with colonial exploitation and racism, Pacific America allocates largely understudied epistemic connections that help in comprehending the issues of a contemporary global order, whose center of gravity continues to shift toward the Asian-Pacific region and its interplays with the United States.

Notes

1 L. Kurashige, Two Faces of Exclusion. The Untold History of Anti-Asian Racism in the United States, Chapel Hill 2016, L. Kurashige, Global Americans. A History of the United States, Andover 2017.

2 See, e.g., Y. Shu / D. E. Pease (eds.), American Studies as Transnational Practice. Turning toward the Transpacific, Lebanon (NH) 2015; B. R. Roberts / M. A. Stephens (eds.), Archipelagic American Studies, Durham 2017.

3 See, e.g., J. Hoskins / V. T. Nguyen, Transpacific Studies. Framing an Emerging Field, Honolulu 2014.

Krishan Kumar: Visions of Empire. How Five Imperial Regimes Shaped the World, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2017, 576 pp.

Reviewed by
Carolien Stolte, Leiden

In this wide-ranging volume, sociologist Krishan Kumar asks what the histories of five major European empires – Ottoman, Habsburg, Russian, British, and French – might have to teach the contemporary world about governance in general, and about managing difference and diversity in particular. The justification of his choice of case studies is brief: "that is in a sense arbitrary, a reflection of my own tastes and interests as well as of the limits of my knowledge … at least I can say that the empires I have chosen represent by any standard – size, power, impact – the most important of the modern empires…" (p. xv). For a book that covers five empires – six if you count the Romans, who provide the imperial blueprint at the beginning of the book – this gives the impression of a very personal work. And indeed, the author appears quite attached to "his" empires: "of all the empires discussed in this book, the Habsburg Empire is the most tortuous, treacherous, and protean … at the same time, it is also – if such a thing is permitted of empires – the most lovable" (p. 145). However, if one's point of departure is the Roman empire and the administrative as well as symbolic legacies of

both its western and eastern parts, which other empires would one choose? The Safavids hardly claimed to take up the Roman mantle, nor did the Dutch imperial enterprise suffer from universalist aspirations. Given the focus on imperial elites, this is an eminently defensible selection.

The focus on rulers and metropoles itself, however, rubs against the historiography of recent decades. Somewhat unfashionably, Kumar takes "the global" out of the history of empire and places the attention firmly on Europe. That some of the action in the book takes place outside of Europe is a matter of circumstance rather than method. This is a work of European history, which sits uncomfortably with the subtitle of the book. However, the book succeeds in a number of important ways. One of the driving arguments is that the carving up of territory by these empires was not about competition between nativist epistemologies – a notion that has long been dominant in European historiography – but about rival universalisms. The author traces the intellectual ideology of these universalisms, from the Holy Roman Empire to Ottoman notions of reconstituting the Byzantine Empire. This provides coherence to the wide-ranging subject matter while remaining attentive to ruptures and the introduction of new elements to imperial identities. The Russian Empire, as the book shows, also cast itself as a successor to Tatar rule, not just to the Orthodox church of the Byzantines (p. 228). In a similar vein, this book resurrects a stage to nineteenth-century thinkers on the nature of empire such as John Seeley who have in recent generations been reduced to a single quote (pp. 332–335). A corrective is implied here to recent trends in historiography that privilege the impact and lived realities of imperial rule, but these trends remain unspecified.

The book is at its best when highlighting the importance of culture in the making of imperial elites, especially in the Habsburg chapter. It is here, Kumar argues, that empires were especially successful in managing difference. Great stress is placed on underplaying ethnicity in favour of an inclusive culture: "any educated and cultivated denizen of the empire would think of and call himself an Osmanli" (p. 95). Russianness is portrayed as civic rather than ethnic, especially in the later Russian Empire (p. 252). Overall, this is an optimistic account of empire, of inclusive court cultures and the safeguarding of minority rights. So much so, that the reader is left a bit sceptical. In order to make this argument for all five empires across the periods, a lot of historical contingencies must be overcome. Who gets to be part of the elite and by what mechanism? How does it matter that the book deals with the courtly elites of dynastic rule as well as with the urban elites of the nineteenth century France? It is here that the narrative struggles because the question of "who speaks for the empire" is left unresolved. However enjoyable the multitude of voices, the criterion for inclusion in this book appears to be loyalty to empire rather than membership of the ruling circle. The chapters quote a range of intellectuals, both from the metropole and, to an extent, from colonial territories. But the uninformed reader could be forgiven for thinking that public spheres across empires were largely grateful for imperial rule. Moreover, in extending the book's ambition beyond "visions of empire" and

into the history of these empires themselves, the silence on dissenting voices is noticeable. This silence becomes louder in the latter part of the book, where the formal colonialism of the modern period plays a larger role. Likewise, little attention is paid to the mobility of people and ideas. Borders, after all, are notoriously porous. That the existence of an international civil society does not appear until page 474 as part of the post-imperial world, is telling.
Overall, readers will enjoy five portraits of empire, painted from a wealth of well-chosen literature. They will not find a synthesis or even a conclusion. For that, the five empires present too vast a canvas. Even hints of comparisons across empires are made with some hesitation (p. 266, for instance). "Have I been too kind to empire?" Kumar rhetorically asks in the preface (p. xv). His answer is "perhaps", this reviewer's answer is "yes". Had this book indeed been confined to the question of how imperial elites saw themselves as carriers and missionaries of universal civilization – in short, to visions of empire – the answer would have been different. In its current form, however, this is a more ambitious project that reaches deep into the workings of empire. This makes the exclusion of forms of resistance and dissent, whether from individuals, groups, or populations, correspondingly problematic.

Jutta Wimmler: The Sun King's Atlantic. Drugs, Demons and Dyestuffs in the Atlantic World, 1640–1730, Leiden: Brill Publisher 2017, 229 pp.

Reviewed by
Alexander Engel, Göttingen

Global history in the age of colonialism tends to be interpreted in terms of a European transformation of the world. Yet undoubtedly, as a consequence of new trans-continental involvements, European societies and economics transformed as well. This is very much the central point of emphasis in Jutta Wimmler's book in which she studies the material and conceptual impact of the Atlantic world on France from the mid-seventeenth century to the 1720s. More specifically, she is concerned with the impact of goods and ideas ("drugs, demons, and dyestuffs") that were flowing into France due to its engagement in America and Africa (and also Asia).
The book consists of a ten-page introduction, six main chapters, a short epilogue, and an annex of tables with import data for different commodities. While it makes sense how the chapters are ordered, the reader is explicitly free to pick and choose, as she or he would from an anthology. The six parts do not build on each other like stair steps: they approach the problem of the Atlantic worlds' impact on France from different perspectives, studying different aspects, which are in part wholly independent of each other. Each chapter is

full of interesting insights, interpretations and hypotheses, which even if one might not all agree with, are generally worth discussing.

Chapter 2 starts by analysing selected French port records, for the 1720s, to get a picture of the range of commodities brought in from the Americas and Africa. Judging from the data collected, sugar and indigo from French Caribbean made up most of the value of the transatlantic imports, but also cocoa, cotton, tobacco, other dyestuffs as well as hides and fur come into view. Wimmler correctly points to the very limited reliability of the numbers, and indeed it seems that products from the realm of other colonial powers are heavily underrepresented. This is especially true for a group of commodities Wimmler gives broad attention to, i.e. dyestuffs. British logwood and Spanish cochineal hardly make a dent in the data: a comparison with imports to Britain or Hamburg for that time could have revealed that they played a much bigger role in commerce than the French port books suggested.

This, however, would only have strengthened Wimmler's argument about the instrumental role transatlantic products beyond sugar had on European industry and consumption. Chapter 3 mainly deals with the "colour revolution", i.e. the introduction of new dyes in European dyeing (and textile printing). As in other parts of the book, there is a strong focus on the French court (it's about the "Sun King's" Atlantic after all!), it is surprising that this aspect is largely absent in this chapter. One would have expected to hear more about the logic behind and effects of Colbert's 1669 rules for dyers, which specified in detail which materials had to be used (the accompanying "Instruction générale pour la teinture des laines" of 1672 was, for decades, considered all over Europe the standard work in dyeing).

Chapter 4 continues the exercise to look at less prominent goods that changed everyday lives in small ways, here with a view on medication, food and cosmetics. It particularly shows that while certain foreign foodstuffs became ever more common – both in terms of volume and in terms of the parts of the population that consumed them –, the "nouvelle cuisine" strove to include new, still exotic and expensive components to stay exclusive and elitist. Both in chapters 3 and 4, products from Africa are analysed along with those from the Americas (gum for the textile industry, grey amber for perfume making).

Chapter 5 links a change in medical thought – the rise of iatrochemistry over humoralism ("Galenism"), a change that was particularly favoured at the French court – with the rise of botany as a colonial science. This entailed the installation of botanical gardens around the world, in the quest to find new vegetable substances, not least with potential medical applications.

Chapter 6 asks for the representation of America(ns) and Africa(ns) on stage and in print (more specifically: in court theatre and state-sponsored newspapers), to show their relative neglect compared to Asia[ns].

Chapter 7, finally, discusses religious concepts, i.e. how the French tried to frame American and African worlds in terms of a Christian worldview, a Christian framework of religious ideas, and how these concepts, in turn, adapted to the world they encountered.

Considering that the book was written as a dissertation, it is surprisingly lean (181

pages of text). That should not be interpreted as lack of effort, though, but rather welcomed as conciseness. Wimmler explores very different avenues of how French society transformed because of its involvements in the Atlantic world, so following Blaise Pascal's dictum that you need time to make texts rather shorter than longer, a book of both such scope and concise brevity is not easily and quickly written and published. Still, at some points, more context to the examples chosen, some comparisons to other countries, and/or a broader grounding in adjacent literature would have strengthened the argument.

The book has a decidedly anthological character, and the short epilogue cannot overcome this. Depending on taste and expectations, one could frame this as a shortcoming, a lack of a more overarching analysis. Still, like a well-composed bouquet of flowers, it is much more than the sum of its parts and well worth looking at. A caveat would be, that the bouquet is an expensive one and that it contains one unpleasant component: The quality of the nine diagrams is poor. They are small (not using the width of the page) with miniscule fonts, and they are washed out in print, which makes them very hard to decipher. For a book of two hundred and a few pages, its price is already breathtaking. Even if the book is otherwise of fine printing quality, given the price, such blunders look ludicrous. Nevertheless, it should not detract from the fact that Julia Wimmler has written a highly interesting, readable, and thought-provoking book.

Kenneth N. Owens/Alexander Yu. Petrov: Empire Maker. Aleksandr Baranov and Russian Colonial Expansion into Alaska and Northern California, Seattle: University of Washington Press 2015, 360 pp.

Reviewed by
Susanna Rabow-Edling, Uppsala

Aleksandr Andreevich Baranov served as the virtual imperial viceroy of Russian America for almost three decades from 1790 to 1817. He supervised Russia's colonial venture when Russia's fur-trade business in the North Pacific expanded from Kodiak Island to south-eastern Alaska and northern California and trade relations were monopolized by the Russian-American Company. Kenneth N. Owens' book is the first full-length scholarly biography of Baranov and a welcome addition to the growing literature on Russian America.

Aleksandr Andreevich led an eventful life. He grew up in Kargopol', a merchant town in northern Russia, born into a wealthy merchant family. In his thirties, he moved to Irkutsk together with his wife and brother. Here, in the capital of Eastern Siberia, he pursued different business ventures and became involved with the fur-trading merchants. Having lost most of the fortune he had acquired in Siberia, Baranov accepted the post of resident Chief Manager in Alaska for the North Eastern Company, when offered to him by its managing director, Grigorii Shelikhov. After a dramatic journey, which included

being shipwrecked, he reached Kodiak Island in 1791 and assumed command of the Company's business. Owens describes how Baranov supervised the Company's hunting and trading activities, including his efforts to extend operations into the mainland territories of south-central and south-eastern Alaska and conducting explorations to search for new fur-producing territories. The book ends with an interesting account of Russia's expansion beyond Alaska, discussing trade relations with California's Spanish residents and with Anglo-American merchant shipmasters.

Owens portrays Baranov as an energetic, resourceful and charismatic leader, who successfully led Russia's fur-trade business as well as its colonial expansion into Alaska and northern California, with very little support from the homeland. He had to deal with various misfortunes and disasters almost single-handedly (disgruntled workers, Alutiiq rebellion, disagreement with missionaries, insurgents, war with the Tlingits, foreign rivals, injuries), always short of manpower and supplies. Nevertheless, he generated huge profits for the company and its shareholders.

The author aims to provide an improved understanding of Baranov and his administration. To this end, he devotes much space to refuting criticism against the Chief Manager's conduct raised by Company employees and, especially, by the Russian Orthodox missionaries. They accused him of immoral behaviour and of mistreating Alutiiq peoples. Owens argues that the missionaries were influenced by a rigid moralistic outlook and shows that their critique was instigated by disgruntled employees.

Another important objective is to gain a fuller understanding of the Company's relations with the Alutiiq peoples of the Kodiak Islands and Chugach Bay and the Tlingit peoples of south-eastern Alaska. Unfortunately, despite good intentions, Owen is only partly successful here. While he does include a Tlingit viewpoint in the description of the Sitka Sound War, making use of a compilation of oral histories, the voices of the Alutiiq peoples are not heard. Other missing voices are those of Native women. Here Owens could have made use of Gwen A. Miller's book "Kodiak Kreol".1 The book also contains some unsubstantiated remarks in relation to women that appear out of place (for example p. 264).

Most importantly, in its efforts to provide a sympathetic account of Baranov, the author lacks a critical perspective depicting its subject in too positive a light. Baranov forced Alutiiq peoples to work and hunt for The Russian-American Company and deprived Tlingit peoples of their homeland. Yet Owen ascribes to him no responsibility for the disastrous consequences of the fur-trade and Russian colonisation for Native Alaskans. It is noticeable that when it comes to the consequences of empire, the dominating actor-oriented approach of the book is replaced by a structure-oriented approach, where Baranov's actions are governed by structures beyond his control. Furthermore, the contrast between the empathetic merchant Baranov and the "arrogant navy aristocrats," who succeeded him, is exaggerated. The building of empire was often motivated by commercial interests and Baranov's management was governed by profit, not by altruism. He was evidently a clever and skilful entrepre-

neur, but he was also unscrupulous. What is more, some of the "navy aristocrats" in fact tried to improve conditions for the indigenous people when they served as Chief Managers, although they did so in a patronizing manner.

The book is based on careful consideration of a wide range of sources including new archival findings and is written in an engaging and accessible style. It provides an important contribution to our knowledge about the Russian-American Company and of the early epoch of Russian America. Above all, it offers new insights into and a fuller understanding of the character and conduct of Aleksandr Baranov and his administration. It is relevant both to historians of Russian America and Global Historians with an interest in comparative experiences of colonization, especially those concerned with the fur-trade business and colonial expansion.

Note

1 G. A. Miller, Kodiak Kreol. Communities of Empire in Early Russian America, Ithaca, N.Y. 2010.

James Alexander Dun: Dangerous Neighbors. Making the Haitian Revolution in Early America, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 2016, 352 pp.

Elizabeth Maddock Dillon / Michael J. Drexler (eds.), The Haitian Revolution and the early United States, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 2016, 432 S.

Reviewed by
Andy Cabot, Paris

Revolution and the history of the early American republic has been among the most researched topic in the U.S academia, especially since the bicentennial of Haiti's independence in 2004. This growing interest has led to a flurry of collective volumes on the global impact of Haiti during the crucial years of the Age of Revolutions from the early 1790s through to the Congress of Vienna.[1] For some, this has led to considering Haiti as the "final frontier" of historical research. Yet, to account for this repositioning of Haiti and its revolution at the centre of academic debates – one that transcends particular disciplines and fields – a strong suggestion would be the return of a "Haitian" turn – first located by Joseph Celucien in the writings of African American intellectuals in the first half of the twentieth century – in the present U.S academia, but this time with a fiercer postcolonial stance.[2]

The two books under review here originate from this growing pace of publications. The first is James Alexander Dun's exploration of the reception of the Haitian Revolution in Philadelphia – the early republic's capital and main urban centre at the time – from its inception through the end of Thomas Jefferson's presidency. The other is a collective volume edited by Elizabeth Maddock Dillon and Michael Drexler on "The Haitian Revolution and the Early United States" which gathers contributions from established authorities in the field and younger scholars. Indeed, compared to previous volumes on Haiti from U.S scholars, this work has for the main distinction to present essays from emerging voices in the fields who, for the most part, have a background in cultural studies and literature. This fits the editors' ambitions to deliver a truly multidisciplinary approach to the topic.

Drawing on his 2004 dissertation and later works on the links between Philadelphia and French Saint-Domingue during the 1790s and beyond, Dun seeks to demonstrate how the Haitian Revolution was interpreted in the U.S at the time and particularly in Philadelphia, then by far the most industrious locale for the print economy at the time as well as the site of the emerging First Party system. He views news about Saint-Domingue in Philadelphia as undergoing "a process of Americanization" that was "constitutive of American political culture as it developed over the early national period" (Dun, p. 17).

Chapter I focuses on how news of and about Saint-Domingue was received and perceived in Philadelphia before the outbreak of the slave revolt. Then the developing political and racial tensions in the French colony were still conceived as an offshoot of the revolution in the Continent, and interpretations from influential U.S newspapers on the island were divided between an early Federalist/Republican axis, with the former insisting on the dangers of factionalism while the latter emphasized the positive aspects of the radical changes taking place. Contemplating the difficulty of American commentators to escape associations between domestic concerns and foreign events, Dun often goes in details to correct the misinterpretations of contemporaries and admits that, despite the different motives in reporting events in Saint-Domingue "their [Americans] gaze was conditioned by the colony's capacity to tell them about themselves" (Dun, p. 30).

This interpretation goes a long way. Interestingly enough, the author does not refrain from distancing himself from it and finding ways to highlight the shortcomings of this American lens of interpretation, which forms the thesis of his work. This is especially true of how the book covers the issue of slavery and abolition in the early republic. In Chapters II and III, the book devotes more attention to how the antislavery nature of both the slave revolt in Saint-Domingue and French legislation became clearer after 1791 and changed the tone of domestic debates. Even if Dun initially reminds us that observers still often "tended to blunt the implications of the challenge posed to slavery in the colony" (Dun, pp. 58–59), he then extensively covers how important public voices – Connecticut news editor Abraham Bishop, Pennsylvania antislavery activist Warner Mifflin and Kentucky Reverend David Rice are cited-formed "a potent brew, if

only among a certain swath of Americans" (Dun, p. 76) that readily embraced the antislavery message of the revolt.[3]

Most telling in this exploration of the links between American antislavery and foreign revolutions is how Dun treats the famous diplomatic mission of Charles Edmond Genet in 1793. Heralded as the symbol of the French revolution's radicalism and the threats it posed to the U.S, Dun chooses rather to place Genet as the missing link between antislavery, domestic support for foreign revolutions and the emerging republican opinion throughout the country. He considers the principled stand of Genet for French civil commissioners in Saint-Domingue and their immediate emancipation measures as a rallying cry for American commentators such as Benjamin Bache and Philip Fréneau, who seized this opportunity to associate their Francophilia with cosmopolitan support for universal emancipation. As he beautifully evokes it, the emancipation process initiated in Saint-Domingue in June 1793 helped American writers to transcend partisan divisions over the issue of slavery which "created a high point of antislavery expression" (Dun, p. 114).

Chapter IV highlights the efforts of the Pennsylvania Abolition Society and Richard Allen's African Methodist Church at pressing local courts to consider the validity of the French abolition decree of February 1794 and thus to grant freedom to refugee slaves from Saint-Domingue. Certainly, Dun's ultimate position is that American abolitionists in Philadelphia eventually distanced themselves from French emancipation which signalled a further localization of abolition in the country along with "a fraying of the society's sense of its connection to other antislavery struggles" (Dun, p. 133). Yet, his insistence on the impact of St. Domingue migrants – especially slaves and free coloured- and French revolutionary agents in the Caribbean over the actions of the nascent American Convention for Abolition Societies are refreshing. It paints the national political debates on slavery in the early republic as much more positively influenced by revolutionary movements than previous studies would have had it, and thus offer a truly illuminating perspective on the international dimensions of early American abolitionism.

Chapters VI and VII return to a more traditional perspective: the eventual marginalization of Haiti in the U.S public opinion in the aftermath of independence. It takes distance from the "silencing" thesis of Michel-Rolph Trouillot and rather argues for the "simplification" of conversations on Haiti during Jefferson's presidency. It convincingly shows how the rising influence of Republican politicians over the national government created a rift within those who had formerly held "cosmopolitan" support for abolition – mostly public figures related to the Republican press like Benjamin Franklin Bache and Philip Freneau- and those more traditional antislavery critics fed by religious reformism and Enlightenment critics. The Haitian war of independence forced Republicans now in power to take a radical departure from its former stance upon revolutionary cosmopolitanism to emphasize the "dangers of external interference with slavery" (Dun, p. 197). Of great novelty in this argument is the focus on the role played by Pennsylvania Republicans –William Duane, Albert Gallatin – in shaping a rhetoric aimed

at reconciling the manufacturing interests of Northern republicans with the plantation interest of Lower South politicians which led, among other things, to the first trade embargo against Haiti in 1806. Dun's study stops around the term of Jefferson's presidency and gives the reader the opportunity to jump off to the volume by Dillon and Drexler that covers mostly the period from Haitian independence up to the Civil War.

This volume is divided into three parts ("Histories", "Geographies", "Textualities") which offer a wide and complete portrait of current academic research on Haiti in the U.S. As the two editors state in the Introduction, the ambition of this volume is twofold: First, it wants to analyse the process by which the antislavery and universal principles of Haitian independence were "decisively overwritten in the U.S by a quite different narrative – one in which Haitian and U.S histories were not parallel but antithetical" (Dillon Drexler, p. 5–6). Second, it aims at taking distance from this "silencing" of Haiti interpretation to posit the "evidence of alternative narratives (…) to the one that places the United States conceptually, historically, and geographically distant from one another" (Dillon Drexler, p. 15).

In the "Histories" section, the article by Carolyn Fick "Revolutionary Saint-Domingue and the Emerging Atlantic" convincingly exposes how the independent diplomacy carried by Toussaint-Louverture with John Adams' administration and Britain was grounded on what Robin Blackburn coined the "jigsaw puzzle of Atlantic politics".[4] For Fick, supporting Toussaint was more than a mere anti-French Machiavellian move, it also was a tacit recognition of the inherent weakness of the Caribbean plantation economy. The decision to refuse to supply French troops in 1802 was also an indirect recognition of the importance of slave emancipation in the international politics of the era (Fick, p. 41). The second essay by James Alexander Dun reiterates the argument from "Dangerous Neighbours" emphasizing how Americans saw events in Saint-Domingue before the slave revolt through the lens of political developments in revolutionary France, hence evading the more obvious racial component of debates surrounding free coloured's political rights. Duncan Faherty's analysis of rumours about French ships returning from Cap-Français loaded with revolted slaves returning from Haiti demonstrates how Americans started conceiving race, citizenship and nationality as a whole "through the hazy filter of the Caribbean" (Faherty, p. 60). The minute reconstruction of newspapers' reactions and contradictory statements over the ship's origins through the summer of 1802 is arguably the most satisfying part of the article. On the theoretical side, it reformulates the old thesis that Americans started conceiving slavery at home in "national" terms -i.e less troublesome and fundamentally different than in the Caribbean equivalent- at the turn of the century. Ivy G.Wilson's study looks at the shifting meanings of Toussaint Louverture's representations in African-American literature and print culture throughout the nineteenth century. Unfortunately, it sometimes relishes in commonplace post-colonial criticisms. For example, it states the dated assumption that "Louverture

and the Haitian Revolution are subjugated knowledges within the histories of the United States and France" (Wilson, p. 82) a claim which essentially contradicts the avowed aim stated in the introduction that "the archive is replete with evidence of alternative narratives" (Dillon Drexler, p. 15) of Haiti's importance in early U.S history. The last article by Dubois goes over Frederick Douglass' famous tenure as U.S ambassador to Haiti and his relations with then foreign relations minister Anténor Firmin. It mainly casts the ups and downs of a partnership seen as the prelude to the not-so-distant rising political and economic dominance of the U.S over the territory.

The introduction to the "Geographies" correctly states that the "Haitian Revolution was at the centre of a reconfiguration of the geographic imaginary of the post-revolutionary United States" (Dillon-Drexler, p. 114). To demonstrate the workings of this process, David Geggus first reconsiders the diplomatic dispositions of French imperial thinking in its dual decision to abandon the reconquering of Saint-Domingue and the expedition to Louisiana in 1802, eventually according to the renewed threat of war with Britain more primacy than any other factors in this fateful decision. Cristobal Silva turns on to how the development of yellow fever pandemics in Philadelphia spurred debates within the "Republic of Medicine" between "importationists" who castigated Dominguan migrants as the source of the plague and "Republican" physicians who insisted on the immunity acquired by West Indian migrants; these debates obviously finding resonance with contemporary party politics, early national attitudes towards migrants, and racial beliefs. Edlie Wong's piece focuses on the passage of numerous Negro Seamen Acts throughout slave coastal states in the years following the 1822's Denmark Vesey's conspiracy. She reconstructs the efforts from southern lawmakers and representatives in depicting Haiti as a counter-revolutionary and banditti nation while, as a response to this pro-slavery interpretation, free black writers and radical abolitionists decided to challenge this "powerful imaginary" and "adapted into a rallying cry to end slavery and racial injustice." (Wong, p. 188). To end this section, Colleen O. Brien chooses to explore the influential role played by Prince Saunders' Haytian Papers – a collection of the country's constitutional documents and proclamations initially compiled for easing international recognition – on the development of a distinct free-labour ideology among black Americans emphasizing individual land-ownership over wage labour as a way towards economic freedom.

The closing section of this volume titled "Textualities" is devoted to the study of texts and objects of literary culture that helped shape opinions, thoughts and ideas about Haiti in the U.S. Michael J. Drexler and Ed White's analysis of the 1801 Louverturian constitution contends that the document went far beyond being a political statement and that it permeated the literary imaginary of the emerging Caribbean and black American literate class throughout the early nineteenth century. Gretchen J. Woertendyke's essay links the lasting effect of the Haitian Revolution on early American literature and its different genres, particularly romanticism and its main figures (Edgar Allan Poe, Herman Mel-

ville). Siân Silly Roberts situates Leonora Sansay's travel narrative "Secret History; or, the Horrors of Saint-Domingo" (1808) at the centre of the literary repertoire that fuelled writings on or influenced by the Haitian Revolution. Peter Reed locates one of the revolt's earliest form of cultural representation with the 1795 play "The Triumphs of Love, or Happy Reconciliation" which featured mostly French continental exiles and Dominguan refugees as actors. The performance reflected mainly on the terror and fear that the revolt had inspired among Americans. In contrast, it is interesting to note that, in other locales, theatrical performances assumed a more celebratory tone for the changes brought by the revolt.[5] Lastly, the piece by Maureen L. Daunt takes the writings of influential Haitian political personality Baron De Vastey and places them at the heart of emerging conversations in Northern U.S newspapers around the recognition of the country' independence.

There are several flaws in the volume's organization. The content of some essays overlaps, as shown with Edlie Wong and Colleen C. O'Brien's articles which both rely heavily on the influence of Prince Saunders' Haytian Papers over black radical and abolitionist discourses friendly to Haiti. The relations between the articles and sections are sometimes puzzling. For example, as it focuses on the reception of the Haytian Papers, would not O'Brien's article have fitted better in "Textualities"? Same goes for Wilson's article in "Histories" which could have perhaps found more striking resonance in "Textualities". Lastly, however remarkable and comforting for their command of the subject, certain articles by established scholars on Haitian scholarship will draw the informed readers' attention. Dubois' article easily ignores the chronological perspective introduced by the editors while the piece by Geggus revises a previous article of his, albeit with a much different focus.[6] Despite some notable form-related issues and the persistence of conventional post-colonial reasoning over the place of Haiti within Western modernity, this series of article succeeds in presenting the depths of current research by U.S academics on Haiti's long-term impact over America's early national history. It functions neatly in tandem with James Alexander Dun's "Dangerous Neighbours" and the works of others emerging scholars such as Julia Gaffield to prove how much studies tracing connections, comparisons and influences between the first two independent American republics can do to recast traditional historical perspectives on slavery, race and nationhood in the nineteenth century U.S.

Notes

1 D. P. Geggus (ed.), The Impact of the Haitian Revolution in the Atlantic World, Columbia 2001; D. P. Geggus / N. Fiering (eds.), The World of the Haitian Revolution, Bloomington 2009; M. J. Clavin (ed.), Toussaint Louverture and the Civil War. The Promise and Peril of a Second Haitian Revolution, Philadelphia, PA 2010; J. Gaffield (ed.), The Haitian Declaration of Independence, Charlottesville 2016.

2 P. R. Girard, The Haitian Revolution. History's New Frontier – State of the Scholarship and Archival Sources, in: Slavery & Abolition (2013), p. 485–507; J. Célucien, "The Haitian Turn". An Appraisal of Recent Literary and Historiographical Works on the Haitian Revolution, in: Journal of Pan African Studies (2012), pp. 37–55.

3 The same individuals had also been spotted as positive interpreters of Haitian liberation in: D. B. Davis, Revolutions. Reflections on American Equality and Foreign Liberations, Cambridge 1990, pp. 49–51.

4 R. Blackburn, Haiti, Slavery and the Age of Democratic Revolutions, in: William & Mary Quarterly (2006), pp. 643–674, 645.
5 B. Gainot, La Révolution des Esclaves, Paris 2017.
6 D. P. Geggus, French Imperialism and the Louisiana Purchase, in: P. Hoffman (ed.), The Louisiana Purchase and its Peoples. Perspectives from the New Orleans Conference, Lafayette 2004, pp. 25–34, 269–273.

Dietmar Hüser (Hrsg.): Populärkultur transnational. Lesen, Hören, Sehen, Erleben im Europa der langen 1960er Jahre, Bielefeld: transcript Verlag 2017, 356 S.

Rezensiert von
Michael G. Esch, Leipzig

Die historiographische Auseinandersetzung mit dem Phänomen Pop / populäre Kultur hat im deutschen akademischen Betrieb nach wie vor mit einigen Barrieren umzugehen: Förderprogramme und professorale Forschung konzentrieren sich nach wie vor lieber auf Aspekte bürgerlicher Hochkultur, Studien zur populärkulturellen Vermittlung der Kulturrevolution der „langen 1960er" finden meist als Qualifikationsarbeiten statt, deren thematischer Umfang notwendig auf bestimmte Genres oder Kulturformen sowie auf einen definierten nationalen Container eingegrenzt ist. Die anhaltende Scheu bildungsbürgerlicher akademischer Eliten und ihres Nachwuchses vor dem massenwirksamen Profanen erklärt der Herausgeber interessanterweise damit, dass die historische Relevanz popkultureller Ausdrucksformen nicht immer hinreichend deutlich gemacht werde. Genau diese Lücke will der hier zu besprechende Sammelband füllen – nicht zuletzt, indem Erkenntnisblockaden nicht nur popgeschichtlicher Herangehensweise durch eine konsequent transnationale Herangehensweise in den einzelnen Beiträgen vermieden werden. Das Ziel besteht dem Herausgeber zufolge vor allem darin, den eigentümlichen Beitrag populärer Kultur, ihrer Rezeption und Aneignung zum Wandel nicht nur kultureller, sondern auch politischer Institutionen und Praktiken nachzuweisen. Diese bestand nicht zuletzt darin, dass insbesondere junge Leute „populäre Künste im Alltag nutzten, um tradierte Institutionen und Autoritäten kritisch zu beleuchten und neue Modi politischer Artikulation und Partizipation zu etablieren" (S. 13) – und damit natürlich ganz maßgeblich zum gesellschaftlichen Wandel beitrugen. Eine zweite Debatte, in die sich der Band einordnet, ist die um „Amerikanisierung" oder „Westernisierung" bzw. „Europäisierung" Europas im Verlauf der langen 1960er. Hier bietet der Band zahlreiche Argumente dafür, dass von einem eindimensionalen Transfer über den Atlantik nicht die Rede sein kann – nicht nur wegen der vom Beitrag Klautkes (allerdings unzureichend) beschriebenen „British Invasion", mit der die US-amerikanische Hegemonie im Bereich populärer Musikstile durch eine britische bzw. englische nachhaltig und mit weitreichenden Folgen ersetzt wurde oder der Akkreditierung des „Krautrock" in der britischen und amerikanischen Musikpresse (Simmeth). Klautkes Beitrag krankt leider an mangelhafter Kenntnis der musikalischen Grundlagen und Entwicklungen: Die be-

sondere Wirksamkeit der „Beat"-Musik auf amerikanische Musiker und Publikum resultierte eben gerade nicht aus ihrer Anspruchslosigkeit, sondern aus ihrer im Gegensatz zum Rock'n'Roll hybriden Finesse – nicht zufällig versuchten sich durchaus nicht nur die Beatles, sondern auch The Who, Kinks und Small Faces bereits um 1965 daran, Beat in „große" musikalische Formen – Rockopern – zu übersetzen und waren alles andere als „nur kurzfristig erfolgreich" (109f.).

Tatsächlich behandeln fast alle Beiträge Transfers, Verflechtungen und daraus resultierende Entwicklungen in mindestens zwei Ländern bzw. vergleichen diese miteinander. Eigenartig ist, dass gerade die beiden Schlüsselbeiträge dies nicht tun: Maases Beitrag zu Jugend, Populärkultur und Demokratisierung trägt zwar Westeuropa im Titel, fasst aber im Wesentlichen die früheren Arbeiten des Autors zur BRD zusammen – und folgt im Grunde der ansonsten im Band in Frage gestellten Amerikanisierungsthese. Auch Hüsers Aufsatz über das westdeutsche „Demokratiewunder" und transnationale Musikkultur konzentriert sich auf die BRD, allerdings mit informiertem Blick nach Frankreich und die von dort aus erfolgenden musikalischen und habituellen Transfers. Bedauerlich ist, dass das östliche Europa ausdrücklich unberücksichtigt bleibt. Ein Blick über den „Eisernen Vorhang" würde aber die in fast allen Beiträgen diagnostizierte „Westernisierung" als sicherlich zutreffendes, aber in globaler Perspektive zu relativierendes und als möglicherweise unzureichendes Modell erscheinen lassen.

Anders als viele jüngere Sammelwerke und Monographien versteht der Sammelband Populärkultur recht breit: Neben musikalischen Idiomen finden Comics, Filme, Fernsehen und Jugendzeitschriften sowie Kleidungs- und (häufig musik- und filmvermittelte) Verhaltensstile Berücksichtigung. Dies ist in sich völlig überzeugend, zumal sich bei der Lektüre aufschlussreiche Parallelen und Einsichten in die Entwicklungsdynamiken „populärer"" Kulturformen ergeben. So weisen einige Beiträge auf die Bedeutung von Konsekrationsinstanzen hin, die die Etablierung (und Kanonisierung) des je in Frage stehenden „Schunds" zu legitimen Kulturgütern und Kunstformen bewerkstelligten und damit auch ihre grenzüberschreitende Akzeptanz sicherstellten (Nonnenmacher über die „Formierung des Comic-Feldes … in Frankreich, Spanien und Argentinien", Ramos Arena und Schaefer über cineastischen Kultur- und Konzepttransfer in der BRD bzw. zwischen Italien, der DDR und Spanien, Simmeth über Krautrock). Es entstehen allerdings auch gewisse – in anderer Hinsicht aufschlussreiche – Probleme hinsichtlich der Eingrenzung, Einordnung und Historisierung der beschriebenen Kulturformen. Sowohl Nonnenmacher als auch Ramos Arena und Schaefer beschreiben ohne dies zu problematisieren Teilbereiche der jeweiligen kulturellen Erzeugnisse, die auf eine Trennung populär bleibender von in die Hochkultur kooptierten Formen zurückgehen: Sicherlich ist es von hohem Interesse, wie der italienische Neorealismus der 1940er und 1950er Jahre in den anders gearteten Realismen des klerikal-faschistischen Spanien oder der sozialistisch-realistischen DDR (Ramos Arena) sowie in kritisch-marxistischen Kreisen der BRD (Schaefer) rezipiert, diskutiert und angeeignet wurden. Deutlich wird hier, dass ein als relevant

verstandenes künstlerisches Konzept in seinem Verhältnis zur sozialen Realität in unterschiedlichen gesellschaftlichen Kontexten teils ähnlich, teils sehr unterschiedlich aufgenommen und eventuell weiterentwickelt wird: Nirgendwo findet sich ein einfacher Transfer, sondern eine je spezifische Aneignung und Kontextualisierung. Es handelt sich aber – ebenso wie im Falle der Comiczeitschrift Pilote oder den von Nonnenmacher erwähnten argentinischen und spanischen Werken – durchaus nicht um populäre Kultur: Während Comic-Autoren wie René Goscinny noch einen Brückenschlag zwischen gebildeten und ungebildeten Leserschaften intendierten, richtete sich die von Nonnenmacher beschriebene jüngere Generation sehr explizit an ein kritisches, gebildetes, tendenziell erwachsenes Publikum. Ähnliches gilt für das Verhältnis zwischen dem entstehenden europäischen Autorenkino und der Filmproduktion für ein Massenpublikum – die ebenfalls einen inhaltlichen und formalen Wandel durchlaufen, dessen Verhältnis zu den cineastischen und übrigen Avantgarden allerdings noch zu erforschen bleibt. Diese Lücke ist umso bedauerlicher, als für die „Kulturrevolution der langen 1960er" bereits häufig – und am Rande auch im vorliegenden Band (Marmetschke, S. 259) – die Überschneidung von populären und avantgardistischen kulturellen Modellen und Praktiken betont worden ist.

Deutlich wird nicht nur an diesen Beiträgen, dass die ältere These von einer eindimensionalen Amerikanisierung der westeuropäischen Kultur nicht zutrifft. Gerade für den Bereich der Comics und des Films wäre eher die Hypothese angebracht, dass die Kanonisierung dieser beiden Ausdrucksformen als europäische „Künste" gerade in impliziter und expliziter Abgrenzung von amerikanische Massenkultur – d. h. Disney und Hollywood – vollzogen wurde. Freilich wäre noch zu prüfen, welche Rückwirkungen europäische Film- und Comickunst auf amerikanische sub- und gegenkulturelle Konzepte gehabt haben. Überhaupt bleibt die sich konstituierende Gegenkultur – als Amalgam aus „Underground", kulturellen Avantgardes und Jugendkulturen – merkwürdig unterbelichtet, selbst im Beitrag Simmeths über den Krautrock, der sich – anders als die wichtige Monographie des Autors[1] – auf die britische und amerikanische Rezeption zentraler deutscher Bands der 1970er beschränkt. Diese erfolgte eben über Medien, die insofern eigentümlich waren, als sie zumindest teilweise als Underground- oder alternative Jugendzeitschriften angefangen, sich dann aber zu Konsekrationsinstanzen entwickelt haben und sich um eine Abgrenzung eines als authentisch apostrophierten Rock gegenüber dem industriellen Massenprodukt Pop bemühten. Solche Diversifizierungsprozesse werden in einigen Beiträgen erwähnt (Simmeth, Hüser bei der Gegenüberstellung von englischsprachigem Pop, deutschem Schlager und französischem Chanson, Nonnenmacher), aber nicht systematisch in den Blick genommen. Auch fehlt weitgehend der Hinweis, dass sich viele der erwähnten Jugendstile – Rocker, Mods, Hippies – ausdrücklich jener Vereinnahmung, die sich als Quelle und Methode der diagnostizierten Liberalisierung ausmachen ließe, durch periodische Neuerfindung zu entziehen versuchten, und zwar insbesondere dann, wenn sie sich selbst als nichtbürgerlich positionierten.[2]

Der Band wird seinem umfassenden Anspruch allerdings insofern gerecht, als neben Ergebnissen von Verfeinerungsbemühungen, wie sie Nadja Greer u. a. für die deutsche Popkritik beschrieben hat,[3] auch weniger sakrosankte Kulturgüter beschrieben werden: Maldener und Marmetschke thematisieren Mode als Ausdrucksform in Herangehensweisen, die sich vortrefflich ergänzen: Während Maldener sich auf die Rolle und Funktion nationaler Stereotypen in der Bewerbung von Kleidung in drei europäischen Jugendzeitschriften – und damit auf von Herstellern gewollte Signifizierungen – konzentriert, betont Marmetschke tatsächliche jugendliche Praktiken und den Umstand, dass Modetrends in den 1960ern nicht mehr von Modeschöpfern kreiert, sondern in je selektiver Rezeption „durch Jugendliche auf der Straße" (S. 252) geschaffen wurden – was dann wieder Ausdruck in neuen Bewerbungsformen fand. Auch Böhmers Beitrag über Halbstarke in der Schweiz geht auf Kleidung als Identifizierungs- und Habitusressource ein. An Hebdiges klassische Studie – die überraschenderweise von keinem Beitrag zitiert wird – erinnert ihre Feststellung, dass die Kleidungsstile jugendlicher Subkulturen aus einer eigentümlichen Mischung von unverzichtbaren standardisierten und individualisierten Elementen bestand – was gleichsam eine Brücke zwischen den vorher Genannten schlägt. Marmetschkes Beitrag ist im Übrigen der einzige, der auf die Infragestellung von Geschlechterrollen als besonderes Skandalon und Identifikationsangebot hinweist (S. 264).[4] Franke zeigt, wie und welche Fernsehproduktionen im Europa westlich der Blockgrenze international gehandelt und teilweise verändert wurden. Bedauerlich ist es allerdings, dass der Aufsatz nicht die Frage nach dem jeweils bedienten Publikumssegment stellt: Während die deutsche und niederländische Rudi Carell-Show und bestimmte Serien ein altersübergreifendes Massenpublikum anzusprechen vermochten, gehörte der Beat Club, der in den späten 1960ern sein ursprüngliches jugendliches Massenpublikum zugunsten distinguierter gymnasialer Eingeweihter einbüßte, eher in eine besondere Sparte von hochkulturellen Nischenprogrammen ähnlich den Formaten, die E-Musik boten.[5] Kabaum liefert eine Durchsicht von Schülerzeitungen als Quelle für eine eigenständige, sich von eigensinniger Begeisterung zu kritischer Distanz entwickelnden Wahrnehmung der USA durch deutsche Schülerinnen und Schüler. Der Beitrag ist nicht nur deshalb von Interesse, weil er die These der Amerikanisierung gleichsam aus der Perspektive „von unten" aushebelt und zeigt, dass die Sichtweisen der Nachwachsenden durchaus weder den Wünschen noch den Befürchtungen derer entsprachen, die eine Demoralisierung der Jugend durch amerikanischen Schund beklagten und eine reiche Quelle für soziokulturellen Wandel erschließt. Gleichzeitig zeigen sich zwei – sicherlich auch den Beschränkungen von Sammelbänden geschuldete – Mängel, die sich letztlich durch den ganzen Band ziehen: Die Beschränkung bzw. Konzentration auf den westlicheren deutschen Staat lässt diesen ähnlich wie in den Pionierarbeiten von Poiger und Siegfried[6] letztlich als einen Sonderfall erscheinen, der – so auch ausdrücklich im Beitrag von Maase – einer popkulturellen Auflockerung aus den USA und einer durch die spezifischen Verwendungsweisen seitens Jugendlicher

in Gang gesetzten habituellen und lebensweltlichen Liberalisierung bedurfte, damit das Wunder der Demokratisierung im westlichen Teil des ehemals nationalsozialistischen Deutschland gelingen konnte. Zwar erwähnen Beiträge wie die von Hüser, dass es Differenzen, aber auch Ähnlichkeiten jenseits des Rheins gegeben habe. Der Umstand, dass Gesellschaften wie die amerikanische, britische und französische, die in dieser Logik gar keiner Liberalisierung bedurft hätten, ebenfalls von der „"Kulturrevolution der langen 1960er" erfasst waren,[7] wird aber nicht systematisch in Untersuchung und Theoretisierung einbezogen.

In eine ähnliche Kerbe schlägt der Band, wenn der Herausgeber die apolitischen, soziokulturellen Rebellionen der Arbeiterjugend der frühen Jahre der artikulierten gymnasialen und studentischen Protestkultur gegenüberstellt – und ganz offensichtlich auf der Seite der Letzteren steht. Die Frage ist aber doch, in welchem Maße diese Politisierung und partizipative Eingliederung letztlich ein Disziplinierungsvorgang gewesen sind, der am Ende in der politischen Kastration von Selbstverwaltungsorganen wie den Schülervertretungen und Studierendenausschüssen nach der Aberkennung des „politischen Mandats" zu Partizipations- und Dienstleistungsinstituten resultierte. Auch die Rolle der über gewisse Zeiten kulturell hegemonialen systemkritischen Gegenkulturen, die sich in vielen der behandelten Länder entwickelten und die sich in hohem Maße über bestimmte Segmente populärer Kultur definierten, bleibt unterbelichtet.[8] Und im gleichen Zusammenhang: Es bleibt unhinterfragt, in welchem Maße die konstatierten Liberalisierungstendenzen – die in großem Maße zuerst mit dem Systemkonflikt, dann mit dem Übergang zur Entspannungspolitik verschränkt waren – eine Reaktion auf eine nationale und globale Situation waren, die – wie J. Suri vor einigen Jahren argumentiert hat – beiderseits der Blockgrenze als vorrevolutionäre Situation analysiert wurde.[9] Tatsächlich erscheint eine solche Perspektive nicht nur als unverzichtbar, sondern auch als möglich: Betrachtet man die jüngere Literatur zu populären Musikformen östlich der Blockgrenzen – insbesondere den wichtigen Sammelband von Risch –, so verdichtet sich der Verdacht, dass ein ähnlicher, über Musik und andere populäre Kulturformen vermittelter soziokultureller Wandel auch unter dem Staatssozialismus stattgefunden hat – nicht zuletzt, weil bestimmte Elemente wie Legitimationskrise elterlicher und staatlicher Gewalt, Zugang breiterer Schichten zu höherer Bildung sowie zu Freizeit und Geld unter teils umgekehrten sozialen Vorzeigen in West wie Ost prägend waren.[10]

Es ist dem Band allerdings hoch anzurechnen, dass er es insgesamt ermöglicht, solche weitergehenden Fragen zu stellen. Ebenfalls wichtig ist er zum einen dadurch, dass er nationale und europäische Selbstfindungsprozesse kultureller und subkultureller Akteure in den „langen 1960ern" in ihrer Rezeption amerikanischer und eigener kultureller Neuerungen aufzeigt. Zum anderen ist die Art und Weise richtungsweisend, in der Differenzen und Parallelen in transnationalen Transfers und Verschränkungen thematisiert werden. Besondere Hervorhebung – und weitere Erforschung – verdienen die Stereotypisierung vorgeblicher nationaler Eigenheiten in der kritisch-positiven Akkreditierung

von Verhaltens- und Äußerungsformen in der Werbung für Jugendmode (Maldener) oder der Kanonisierung deutscher experimenteller Rockmusik (Simmeth) und die Hinweise auf transnationale europäische Netzwerke (Ramos Arena, Schaefer), die erfolgreich – und auf Kosten von Massenwirksamkeit – die Deutungshoheit im Prozess der Kanonisierung und hochkulturellen Integration neuer kultureller Erzeugnisse beansprucht haben. Der Band zeigt schließlich überzeugend, wenn auch unvollständig, den Wert eines flexiblen Begriffs von Populärkultur und die Unverzichtbarkeit transnationaler Perspektiven für die Beschreibung und Analyse soziokulturellen und politischen Wandels unter der Bedingung zunehmender globaler Verflechtungen.

Anmerkungen

1 A. Simmeth, Krautrock transnational. Die Neuerfindung der Popmusik in der BRD, 1968–1978, Bielefeld 2016.
2 Vgl. nach wie vor D. Hebdige, Subculture. The Meaning of Style, London 1979.
3 N. Geer, Sophistication. Zwischen Denkstil und Pose, Göttingen 2012.
4 Vgl. dazu U. G. Poiger, Rock'n'Roll. Female Sexuality, and the Cold War Battle over German Identities, in: The Journal of Modern History 68 (1996), S. 577–616.
5 Vgl. M. G. Esch, „Wir haben keine Go-Go-Girls mehr". Der Beat Club als Quelle und Akteur in der Kanonisierung des Rock, in: A. Maldener/C. Zimmermann (Hrsg.), Let's historize it! Jugendmedien im 20. Jahrhundert, Göttingen 2018, S. 213–258.
6 U. Poiger, Jazz, Rock, and Rebels. Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany, Berkeley 2000.
7 A. Marwick, The Sixties. Social and Cultural Transformation in Britain, France, Italy and the United States, 1958–1974, Oxford 1999.
8 Maßgeblich ist hier vorläufig für die BRD S. Reichardt, Authentizität und Gemeinschaft. Linksalternatives Leben in den siebziger und frühen achtziger Jahren, Frankfurt a. M. 2014, für Frankreich J. Briggs, Sounds French. Globalization, Cultural Communities and Pop Music in France, 1958–1980, Oxford 2014.
9 J. Suri, Power and Protest. Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente, Cambridge, Mass. 2005.
10 W. J. Risch (ed.), Youth and Rock in the Soviet Bloc. Youth Cultures, Music, and the State in Russia and Eastern Europe, London 2015; vgl. meine Rez. in: H-Soz-Kult, 23.03.2018, <www.hsozkult.de/publicationreview/id/rezbuecher-24923>.

Duncan Bell: Reordering the World. Essays on Liberalism and Empire, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2016, 456 pp.

Reviewed by
Anthony Pagden, Los Angeles

Empire has for long been a divisive topic. Perhaps no more so than today when, with the possible exception of China, empires are no more (although "Imperialism" most often "indirect" or "informal" lingers on). In the two decades or so a war has been waged in academic circles over the complicity of liberalism in the formation, development, and justification of the European empires of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Most of this is condemnatory, most, too, is written in the high-minded tone of those who have somehow cleansed themselves of the sins of their fathers. Very little offer, or have any interest in offering, a balanced view of what "empire" and "liberalism" might be thought to mean; still less provide any sustained analysis of the intricacies of the

very real involvement of the one with the other. One that does, and in many ways the subtlest and the most original is the work of Duncan Bell.

The author's latest book brings together a selection of the essays he has written on the subject over the past decade, with a new, powerful, introductory chapter that sets out the present state of the debate over the possible significance of the complicity of liberalism with empire, and a "coda" which seeks to find a middle ground between "ignoring this tainted history or rejecting liberalism altogether". In between we have twelve chapters some of these are dedicated to particular themes, some to individual thinkers. The wryly entitled "Escape Velocity" explores the theorists of empire's perennial recourse to historical examples, and above all, the manner in which British imperialists – liberal and otherwise – viewed the ancient Roman world. Rome provided a compelling model for a multi-cultural polity supposedly dedicated to the progress and the improvement of all its citizen. But it was also the paradigmatic example not only of the virtuous rise, but also of the eventual, inevitably ignoble, decline and fall, a reminder of what, no matter how optimistic the new British imperialists might be that their empire had gone far beyond the Roman in both scope and achievements, awaited all empires. "The Idea of a Patriot Queen?" explores the role which the relationship between "constitutional patriotism" (a phrase borrowed from the German political theorist, Dorf Steinberger) and the semi-sacred "imaginary"- a concept of which Bell offers a very telling analysis - of the Victorian monarchy, played in the transformation of what Bell calls a "complex mosaic of political regions, social institutions and juridical forms" into "a unified and homogenous political space". "Imagined Spaces" and "The Project for a New Anglo-Century", examine the different, often conflicting, aspects of an ideology which would have welded together the "Anglo-Saxon" settler communities of South-Africa, Canada, Australia and New Zealand into a "Greater Britain (the subject of Bell's previous book) – a world -wide community of English-speakers which, in some of the more far-reaching fantasies would one day one include the United States. Part III is dedicated to the most significant British liberal theorists of empire. Some are well-known: John Stuart Mill, J. R. Seeley, Herbert Spencer J. A. Hobson and L. T. Hobhouse; others, at least in this context, the federalist E.A Freeman, for instance, the historian J.A. Froude, and the Hegelian T.H. Green, far less so.

The most powerful sections of the book are concerned with Bell's ultimately devastating, if cautious, demolition of the argument that liberalism was, always and everywhere, an ideology in the service the British imperialists' ambitions to subjugate, and ultimately transform, the "uncivilized" peoples of the world. Liberalism, in Bell's words, has become "the metacategory of Western political discourse", and it now "haunts Western political thought and practice" as no other political theory does or, possibly ever has done. That seems unquestionable. What exactly liberalism is, however, is far from obvious. Bell's searching, subtle and highly erudite analysis in Chapter 3 of the various kinds, and varieties of liberalism leaves the reader to wonder, as it has clearly left him, whether

"liberalism" really is still a useful "category of political analysis".

Useful or not, however, it is now clearly inescapable and Bell offers two highly persuasive criticisms of much of the literature on liberalism, and the ways it has been cast as the intellectual hand- maiden of empire. The first focuses on what he calls "The Tyranny of Canon". The link which a number of contemporary historians have established between liberalism as a political philosophy and the ideologies and practices of modern imperialism, has been made possible only by narrowing the definition of liberalism to the beliefs supposedly held by a very small number of thinkers (most prominently Locke, Rousseau, Mill, Henry Maine), and often to an even smaller sample of their works. But this canon has been largely constructed – and constructed in the twentieth century - to prove the claim that modern imperialism, and above all the idea of the "civilizing mission" in all its various variations, was in effect the ideological offspring of the liberal imagination. In doing so, it ignores the fact that the vast majority – if not all - self-professed "liberals" were highly ambiguous about empire. Many who have been excluded from the canon -most notably Auguste Comte and his innumerable followers – were wholly opposed to it. (The history of liberalism's complicity with empire in France, Germany, Spain or Iatly looks, of course, very different.)

Bell's second criticism is that the very notion of a "liberal imperialism", "implies commonalties and coherence, where the political thought of the nineteenth century was marked by dissonance and diversity". At the very least, "liberalism" is, and has been throughout its entire history – whether you think that that begins in the seventeenth or in the nineteenth century - in a constant state of re-invention. Liberals such as Mill, although they undoubtedly believed that empire could provide benefits not only to the empire builders but also to their subject peoples at certain moments in history, were also highly critical of it at others.

We may not be able, or willing, to deny the involvement of liberalism with the European conception and pursuit of empire, nor the multiply injustices that, over time, those empires have inflicted on their subjects peoples; but as Bell concludes liberalism "contained resources to both justify empire (of various kinds) and to launch stinging criticisms of it". To fail "to creatively engage with liberalism, joining the conflict between its tessellated factions", in particular now that liberalism, however understood, "virtually monopolizes political theory and practice in Angloworld [sic]" – and not only there - amounts to an abrogation of an intellectual duty.

Michael Ignatieff / Stefan Roch: Academic Freedom. The Global Challenge, Budapest: CEU Press 2018, 161 S.

Rezensiert von
Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, Leipzig

Zum Auftakt des Buches, das die Vorträge einer Tagung zum Thema an der Central European University wiedergibt, betont der Rektor der CEU, Michael Ignatieff,

dass eine starke Demokratie Institutionen braucht, die ausreichend unabhängig sind um Mehrheitsentscheide auszubalancieren und Minderheiten in ihren Meinungen und Rechten zu schützen (S. 8). Das sind neben den staatspolitischen Institutionen im engeren Sinne wie Parlamenten und Parteien, Militär und Polizei auch solche des Rechts- und des Bildungswesens, die Medien, heute auch NGOs aber auch Gewerkschaften, Kirchen oder ökonomische Organisationen. Deren relative Autonomie macht, wie man terminologisch hinzufügen sollte, das Republikanische einer wahren Demokratie in ihrer meritokratisch und hierarchisch organisierten Gewaltenteilung aus. Personale Repräsentanten haben dabei Entscheidungsbefugnisse, die anzuerkennen sind. Das demokratische Element bleibt auf die Wahl des Personals, verfassungsmäßige Abstimmungen und freie Rede und Kritik begrenzt. Populistische Tendenzen ‚demokratistischer' Gleichschaltung republikanischer Institutionen gefährden dagegen gerade ‚im Namen' einer Mehrheit des Volkes (oder dann auch der Studierenden, der Arbeiter, der zukünftigen Generationen oder der ganzen Welt) die Teilung von Einfluss, Macht und Verantwortung in ihren zeitlichen und institutionellen Begrenzungen. Daher ist ein bloß formaler Umgang mit guten Wörtern wie „Demokratie", „Autonomie" und „Freiheit" häufig selbst schon das Problem, gerade im üblichen intuitiven Kontrast zu „Staat", früher auch „Establishment" und „Hierarchie". Die Feinde einer liberalen, pluralen und demokratischen Republik berufen sich am Ende auf denselben ‚demokratischen Mehrheitswillen' wie die naiven Verteidiger einer Demokratie als Herrschaft des Volkes über sich selbst.

Für Joan Wallach Scott aus Princeton, der zweiten wichtigen Teilnehmerin am Diskurs, kann es dementsprechend eine „illiberale Demokratie" gar nicht geben. Der Ausdruck sei ein Oxymoron (S. 20). Sie orientiert sich eben damit an der formalen Intuition, nach der nur ‚gute' politische Verfassungen „demokratisch" heißen dürfen. Sie meint in ihrem Beitrag außerdem, dass private Universitäten die akademische Freiheit und ein ‚critical thinking' besser sicherstellen könnten als staatliche (S. 22), und zwar aufgrund ihrer größeren institutionellen Autonomie. Liviu Matei, Vizerektor und Provost (Kanzler) der CEU, unterscheidet diese (auf S. 30f) von der Freiheit akademischer Forschung, Lehre und Meinungsäußerung und weist mit Recht darauf hin, dass am Ende alle Universitäten den Staat als Rahmen brauchen. Trotz der Hinweise auf Immanuel Kant (S. 20), Wilhelm von Humboldt (S. 12) blendet Scott dagegen partiell unter Berufung auf John Dewey (S. 16) aus, dass das Bildungswesen in Frankreich und dann auch in Deutschland nur durch staatliche Organisationshilfe aus der Abhängigkeit von Kirchen und religiösen Glaubensgemeinschaften gelöst wurde. Erst viel später geschah das auch in anglophonen Ländern. Für die Gegenwart scheinen Matei in Singapur (S. 35) und Myanmar (S. 31) und C. R. Stimpson (New York University und Abu Dhabi) in der Entwicklung des Bildungswesens der arabischen Halbinsel (S. 65, 74) interessante Parallelen wahrzunehmen.

Es ist daher nicht der Staat als Staat und nicht einmal die Regierung als Regierung welche, wie in der NS-Zeit oder heute in

der Türkei Erdogans (S. 55 ff), die akademische Freiheit durch politisch motivierte Säuberungen gefährden oder wie in China alle langfristigen Entwicklungen der akademischen Forschung und Lehre politischen Vorgaben unterordnen (S. 33). Auch Bücherverbrennungen und Druckverbote (S. 45) gehen zum Beispiel in Indien und Pakistan, wie Nirmala Rao (Asian University for Women, Chittagong, Bangladesh) ausführt, eher auf gesellschaftliche Mächte und selbsterklärte Verletzungen religiöser Gefühle einer Mehrheit zurück als auf politische bzw. staatliche Institutionen an sich.

Die ‚innere' Gefährdung der akademischen Freiheit durch eine politische Korrektheit von Mehrheitsgefühlen bei Studierenden und Lehrenden steht dann im Mittelpunkt der Beiträge und Stellungnahmen eines zweiten Teils (ab S. 77). Er beginnt mit einem Beitrag von J. R. Cole (vormaliger Provost an der Columbia University), der an die Geschichte selbstorganisierter Meinungsrepression an US-amerikanischen Universitäten nach 1917 (gegen Kritiker des Kriegseintritts der USA) und nach 1945 (gegen wirkliche und vermeintliche Kommunisten) erinnert. Der Logiker John Etchemendy, langjähriger Provost der Stanford University spricht von intellektuellen Monokulturen (S. 84) und meint eine ‚linke' political correctness. Die Politikwissenschaftlerin Allison Stanger (S. 85ff.) beklagt die körperlichen Angriffe auf sie im Zuge eines studentischen Protests in Middlebury. Diese sind natürlich absolut zu verurteilen. Das Recht, dass auch Leute im akademischen Rahmen reden dürfen, welche problematische Thesen vertreten, gehört zusammen mit der Pflicht erst einmal zuzuhören sicher zum Kern dessen, was unter den Titel „akademische Freiheit" fällt. Das gilt auch dann, wenn Charles Murray, den Studierende Stangers eingeladen hatten, selbst akademisch nicht allzu vorsichtig vorgeht und die statistische Evidenz für eine ‚Erblichkeit' von Intelligenz relativ unmittelbar politisch deutet, indem er entsprechende Emanzipationsprogramme infrage stellt. Dennoch ist es schon ein wesentlicher Schritt zu weit in die Richtung bloßer Betroffenheitsrhetorik, im Internet zu schreiben „shutting down speech is an invitation to violence" (im Buch liest sich das schon schwächer) und jede Kritik an der Einladung Murrays gleichzusetzen mit der Unterstützung von Gewalt. Der Lärm der studentischen Zuhörerschaft ist eben manchmal nur werbewirksamer Kampf um öffentliche Aufmerksamkeit. Das war auch im Fall der politischen Aktivisten als Sprecher für Menschen mit Behinderungen so, welche zusammen mit kirchlichen Gruppen den utilitaristischen Philosophen Peter Singer 2015, mit seinen Thesen zur Euthanasie und seinem Vergleich von ‚Bewusstsein' und ‚Lebensrecht' von Menschenaffen und Säuglingen bzw. Kindern mit (geistigen) ‚Behinderungen', in Deutschland nicht zu Wort kommen lassen wollten.

Akademische Freiheit besteht zwar gerade in den Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaften in der Tat darin, öffentliche oder private, politische oder religiöse Meinungen von Mehrheiten oder Minderheiten in einer Art geschütztem Diskurs inhaltlich auf den Prüfstand zu stellen und ggf. als Vorurteile zu brandmarken. Im Buch wird dazu auf den interessanten Fall des Wissenschaftsphilosophen Jehuda Elkana angespielt, der als früherer Rektor der CEU

das Selbstbild der gender studies infrage stellte und entsprechend umstritten war (S.19). Redefreiheit ist also kein zusätzliches akademisches Privileg, sondern systemische Voraussetzung gerade für die Geistes-, Staats- und Gesellschaftwissenschaften weit fundamentaler als für die eher technischen Natur- und Formalwissenschaften der Mathematik und Physik bis zu den Ingenieurwissenschaften und der Medizin. Aber die Universitäten leben dabei nicht in einem politikfreien Raum. Das zeigen im Grunde alle Beiträge dieses kleinen Bändchens – und erst recht ihr hochschulpolitischer Hintergrund, die Vertreibung der CEU von Budapest nach Wien.

Max Webers Frage wie (politisch) ‚wertfrei' gerade das Wissen der Gesellschafts- und Geschichtswissenschaften sein kann und wie mit der freien, gerade auch politischen, Meinungsäußerung an Universitäten umzugehen ist, wie zurückhaltend sich also zumindest das Lehrpersonal trotz aller grundsätzlichen Liberalität zu verhalten hat, ist aber ganz offenbar noch nicht endgültig beantwortet. Im Büchlein steht am Ende dazu wenig Neues. Tagung und Sammelband stellen ohnehin eher eine Art letzten Appell an das politische Ungarn dar: Die Central European University wird als liberal, mit offenen Ohren auch für rechtskonservative Positionen, also keineswegs linkspopulistisch ausgerichtet dargestellt. Auf die Meinung anderer Sprecher ungarischer Institutionen (vgl. z. B. S. 133ff.) wird explizit Wert gelegt.

Nach der Lektüre des Buches – gerade auch des Festvortrags von Mario Vargas Llosa und seiner Laudatio auf Sir Karl Poppers Verteidigung einer Offenen Gesellschaft gegen alle ihre vermeintlichen und wirklichen Feinde (S. 141ff.) – erhält man insgesamt den Eindruck, es werde heute irgendwie weltweit alles schlechter; auch die akademische Freiheit sei nicht mehr das, was sie schon einmal war. Solche Sonntagsreden hörte man früher von der Kanzel in der Kirche, zur Erbauung oder zur Gewissenserforschung, im appellativen Modus klassischer Rhetorik. Ich liebe diese lateinische Tradition geradezu, zumal der Sinn des Wortes „Professor" als ‚Bekenner' über das lateinische „profiteor" mit dem des Märtyrers (griechisch: „martyr") zusammenfällt. All das zeigt, dass sich die Welt am Ende langsamer als befürchtet bewegt: Die Form bekennender Predigt ist ja so alt wie die Lehren Quintilians – und häufig auch der Inhalt. Ein schönes Beispiel eines solchen erhobenen Zeigefingers liefert dazu ein lateinlehrerhafter Künstler, der am römischen Limes beim Städtchen Kipfenberg im Altmühltal auf steinernen Stelen vor uns ausbreitet, was seit der Zeit des Gymnasiums an Sprüchen in seinem wie unserem Kopf so rumort – oder später aufgrund von Zeitungslektüre im fortgeführten Halbschlaf zu Cicero, Seneca oder Marc Aurel neu hinzugekommen ist. Noch der Fahnen-Spruch, dass sogar ‚introverts' demonstrieren, der in Budapest die CEU unterstützen sollte, wie das Internet dokumentiert, ist am Ende kaum mehr ein Witz: Gerade Autisten demonstrieren heutzutage auf allen Ebenen und machen sich in allen Medien wichtig. Höchst bedauerlich ist nur, dass Budapest mit der Vertreibung der CEU unbedingt beweisen möchte, dass Zentraleuropa geistig weiter im Westen liegt.

Die gesamte Lage wirkt leicht hoffnungslos, weil es am Ende niemand wirklich ernst meint – außer, wenn es um sich

selbst geht. Dem ist wohl bloß mit selbstbezüglicher Ironie beizukommen, zumal nur eigene Erfahrungen die Konventionen eines Ondit hinter sich lassen. So steht in einem Brief des Kultusministers des Freistaats Bayern an mich ebenso lapidar wie kryptisch: „Ich werde Sie nicht berufen", nämlich an die LMU München. Ähnliches geschah mir in Niedersachen im Januar 1988 (Osnabrück), später auch in Hessen (Frankfurt a. M.). Die hiesige Intervention in die ‚Freiheit der Wissenschaft', über die ich damit scheinbar selbst lamentiere, besteht freilich nach einem nicht nur in diesem Land geradezu klassischen Verfahren darin, dass Kollegen (und manchmal auch Studierende) an den universitären Gremien und damit an der institutionellen Autonomie vorbei von ihren Kontakten zu den staatlichen Stellen Gebrauch machen, in privaten Universitäten dann eben zum Provost oder Rektor.

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