

# **Europe in the Tropics? The Transfer of the Portuguese Royal Court to Brazil (1807/08) and the Adaptation of European Ideals in the New Imperial Capital**

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## **RESÜMEE**

Als napoleonische Truppen 1807 in Lissabon einmarschierten, segelte der portugiesische Monarch João (VI) samt 15.000 Personen im Gefolge gen Brasilien. Rio de Janeiro wurde zum Zentrum des portugiesischen Reiches, es kam zu einer „Umkehrung“ des Verhältnisses von Mutterland und Kolonie. Dieser Aufsatz beleuchtet zunächst die geopolitischen und kulturellen Voraussetzungen dafür, dass die portugiesische politische Elite mit relativer Leichtigkeit ihren Sitz in Europa zugunsten einer neuen Hauptstadt in den Tropen verlassen konnte. Danach werden auf der Basis von Polizeidokumenten jene Herrschaftspraktiken analysiert, die aus der Kolonialstadt eine imperiale Hauptstadt machen sollten. Hierbei fungierten europäische Verhältnisse als Vorbild. Deutlich wird aber auch, dass die in Europa geltenden Standards – je nach politischer Lage und ökonomischen Interessen – stark an die Begebenheiten in Brasilien angepasst werden konnten.

When Napoleon charged across Europe, he put in motion vast changes in the political, social and economic order. During the Napoleonic wars (1792–1815), a period that is often described as a “time of global crisis,” states and empires were radically altered and new borders were drawn.<sup>1</sup> However, not all European countries completely changed geographical shape and political order. Of all the states, Portugal managed not only to save

1 Christopher Bayly refers to the time between 1780 and 1820 as the time of the “first global crisis”, Ch. Bayly, *The Birth of the modern World, 1780–1914. Global Connections and Comparisons*, Oxford 2004, p. 91 and passim. This article is based on archival research conducted for my PhD dissertation on the transfer of the Portuguese Royal Court to Brazil, which was published in German in 2013: D. Gerstenberger, *Gouvernementalität im Zeichen der globalen Krise. Der Transfer des portugiesischen Königshofes nach Brasilien*, Köln/Weimar/Wien: Böhlau 2013. I would like to thank Karim Elawar for his assistance with the proofreading of an early version of this article.

its throne from Napoleonic usurpation (unlike its larger neighbor, Spain) but also kept together its multi-continental empire. How did the Portuguese resist these revolutionary changes? The answer lies – at least in part – in the willingness to create a “possible Europe” beyond the actual borders of Europe.

On the face of it, the situation seemed hopeless. Traditionally allied with Great Britain, Portugal ran into mischief as Napoleon Bonaparte intended to implement the “Continental Blockade” (November 21<sup>st</sup>, 1806) as his supreme weapon against his greatest enemy.<sup>2</sup> The Portuguese government could neither choose between British and French demands, nor could they resist them. As the summer and fall of 1807 wore on, “Portugal [got] caught like a shellfish in a tempest between the waves of England’s sea power and the rock of Napoleon’s armies,” as Alan K. Manchester put it.<sup>3</sup> When French troops under the command of General Andoche Junot marched against Lisbon in order to take over the Portuguese Crown in November 1807, the Portuguese Prince Regent, D. João, undertook the remarkable venture of transferring the entire Royal Court from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro. He took with him all of the state paraphernalia, the archives and the treasure, as well as the ministers of government and a large part of the ruling classes. All in all, some 15,000 people accompanied the monarch. In short, he transferred all that was needed for the creation of a new capital in the New World.<sup>4</sup> For the first and only time, a European colonial power moved its seat of government and thus its capital to a distant, peripheral territory. This solution to the “Napoleonic Problem” was, without any doubt, an extremely innovative one. It is commonly argued that the transfer of the seat of government equaled an inversion of the colonial relation: after 1808, Brazil turned into the center of the empire and Portugal was now its colony<sup>5</sup> or, as some contemporaries lamented, a “colony of the colony.”<sup>6</sup>

What is surprising at first glance is the willingness of the Portuguese Crown and the elites to leave Europe behind. In the face of the Napoleonic threat, their European roots and cultural ties seemed to not have held them back. Where does this remarkable disposition come from? In the first section of this paper, I shall explain the preconditions that made the transfer of the Portuguese court possible. More precisely, I propose to deal with the question of how the events of November 1807 were linked to a particular vision of the

2 A. K. Manchester, *The Transfer of the Court to Brazil*, in: H. H. Keith and S. F. Edwards (eds.), *Conflict and Continuity in Brazilian Society*, Columbia 1969, pp. 148-190.

3 A. K. Manchester, *British Pre-eminence in Brazil: Its Rise and Decline*, Chapel Hill 1933, p. 54.

4 For further details on the transfer see: F. de Paulo Leite Pinto, *A saída da família real portuguesa para o Brasil a 29 de Novembro de 1807*, Lisbon 1992; V. Alexandre, *Os sentidos do Império. Questão Nacional e Questão Colonial na Crise do Antigo Regime Português*, Porto 1993, pp. 167-180.

5 For early accounts of the “inversion”-theory see: S. Romero, *História da Literatura Brasileira*, Rio de Janeiro 1943 vol. III, *passim*; R. Garcia, *Ensaio da história poética e administrativa do Brasil*, Rio de Janeiro 1956, p. 282. For an historiographical overview on this theory see: J. M. Paschoal Guimarães, *A Historiografia e a Transferência da Corte portuguesa para o Brasil*, in: *Revista do Instituto Histórico Geográfico Brasileiro*, 168 (2007) 436, pp. 15-28, p. 20; A. Wehling, *Estado, Governo e administração no Brasil joanino*, in: *Revista do Instituto Histórico Geográfico Brasileiro*, 168 (2007) 436, pp. 75-92, p. 79-80.

6 Wilcken, *A Colony of a Colony. The Portuguese Royal Court in Brazil*, in: *Common Knowledge*, 11 (2005) 2, pp. 249-263.

European part of the empire as its “weak spot.” Leaving Europe behind, however, did not mean abandoning European ideals and norms. In fact, conceptions and ideals of European civilization and society played a crucial role in the construction of the new Portuguese capital in Brazil as soon as the monarch’s fleet arrived. Therefore, the second part of this paper will focus on the concrete measures undertaken by the authorities in order to construct an “adequate” center of the empire in the (former) colony. Some historians argue that following the court’s arrival, Rio de Janeiro was subject to a “Europeanization” or even “Re-Europeanization”<sup>7</sup> and that the project of establishing the Portuguese capital in the tropics also entailed the construction of an (alternative) “possible Europe.”<sup>8</sup> But what did “Europeanization” actually mean and how would it be achieved? The measures undertaken by the authorities were, as shall be argued in the second part, by no means always coherent or without contradictions but rather were characterized by conflicting tendencies. In any case, they were also characterized by the partial adaptation – but also rejection – of what was conceived as European.

### 1. The European mother country as the weak spot of the Portuguese Empire

The transfer of the Court in 1807/1808 cannot be analyzed without considering the structure of the Portuguese seaborne empire and especially the geopolitical outlook that developed out of the voyages of discovery since the fifteenth century. The Portuguese empire was the earliest and the longest-lived of the modern European colonial empires, spanning almost six centuries from the capture of Ceuta in 1415 to the handover of Macau in 1999. Despite ruling over territories in all parts of the world, the mother country itself has always been vulnerable: The small territory of Portugal at the edge of Europe has at all times been threatened by the more powerful neighbor Castile (later Spain) and was therefore considered weak and rather insufficient by the Portuguese themselves.

In fact, the idea of moving the Portuguese capital to the New World of America in order to achieve a better geopolitical foothold arose beginning in the late sixteenth century when Portugal was annexed by Castile (the Iberian “Union” lasted sixty years from 1580 to 1640). Since then, clerics and politicians repeatedly recommended the establishment of the capital of the Portuguese Empire in the New World.<sup>9</sup> In the seventeenth century, Jesuit António Vieira (1608–1697) promoted the image of Brazil as the biblical “Fifth Empire” (Dan 2; 7) and the “Promised Land.”<sup>10</sup> In his opinion, the transfer of the Court

7 F. C. Falcón and I. R. de Mattos, *O Processo de Independência no Rio de Janeiro*, in: C. G. Mota (ed.), 1822: *Dimensões*, São Paulo 1972, pp. 292–339, p. 293.

8 A. C. Marques dos Santos, *A Fundação de uma Europa Possível*, in: V. L. Bottrel Tostes and J. Neves Bittencourt (eds.), *D. João VI: Um Rei Aclamado na América*, Rio de Janeiro 2000, pp. 9–17.

9 J. H. Saraiva, *História concisa de Portugal*, Mem Martins 1993, p. 267; A. R. C. da Silva, *Inventando a Nação. Intelectuais Ilustrados e Estadistas Luso-brasileiros na Crise do Antigo Regime Português: 1750–1822*, São Paulo 2006, p. 191; M. L. Oliveira, *Aquele imenso Portugal: a transferência da Corte para o Brasil (séculos XVII–XVIII)*, in: L. V. de Oliveira and R. Ricupero (eds.), *A Abertura dos Portos*, São Paulo 2007, pp. 284–305; D. Magnoli, *O corpo da pátria: imaginação geográfica e política externa no Brasil (1808–1912)*, São Paulo 1997, p. 81.

10 M. de Lourdes Viana Lyra, *A utopia do poderoso império: Portugal e Brasil: Bastidores da política 1798–1822*, Rio

would be capable of renewing and strengthening the whole empire. In the eighteenth century, with the findings of gold and diamonds, the colony of Brazil definitely turned into the most important part of the Portuguese empire: the “crown jewel.” The diplomat Luís da Cunha (1696–1749) advised King João V (father of João VI) that it was time to take “people of both sexes” to the “well-populated continent of Brazil” where he would achieve the title of “Emperor of the West.” In da Cunha’s opinion, the most suitable place for the king’s residence was the city of Rio de Janeiro, which would soon become more opulent than Lisbon. According to him, Portugal was the “weak spot” of the Portuguese empire: the mother country could not survive without Brazil, whereas Brazil could survive perfectly well without Portugal.<sup>11</sup> After the great earthquake of 1755, which destroyed Lisbon and killed up to 100,000 people, the “almighty” minister Marquês de Pombal (1750–1782) also gave serious thought to a new capital in America.<sup>12</sup> The Portuguese historian A. H. Oliveira Marques summarized the importance of the American colony to the European mother country by explaining that from the late seventeenth century until 1822 (the year of Brazilian independence), Brazil was not only the centerpiece of the Portuguese colonial empire, but in fact the “essence of Portugal itself.”<sup>13</sup> On the economic level, it can be argued that Portugal indeed was a “monocolonial empire.”<sup>14</sup> Much of the state income depended on its possessions in America.<sup>15</sup> In the face of the “international convulsions” in the early nineteenth century<sup>16</sup>, the idea of moving the Portuguese capital to the New World of America was not only based on economic principles, but also, in large part, driven by geopolitical considerations.<sup>17</sup> The Portuguese diplomat in Berlin, Silvestre Pinheiro Ferreira, advised Prince Regent João in 1803 that it would be wise to seek “asylum” in his colonies because in Europe the “hydra”

de Janeiro 1994, p. 121. See also V. F. Muraro, *O Brasil de António Vieira. Cenário do Quinto Império*, in: *Brotéria. Cristianismo e cultura*, 156 (2003) 4, pp. 351–365; D. Alden, *Some Reflections on Antonio Vieira: Seventeenth-Century Troubleshooter and Troublemaker*, in: *Luso-Brazilian Review* 40 (2003), pp. 7–16; M. V. Jordán, *The Empire of the Future and the Chosen People: Father António Vieira and the Prophetic Tradition in the Hispanic World*, in: *Luso-Brazilian Review*, 40 (2003), pp. 45–57.

- 11 L. da Cunha, *Instruções Ineditas de D. Luís da Cunha e Marco António de Azevedo Coutinho*, Coimbra 1929, pp. 211–212. See also Silva, *Inventando a Nação*, p. 87.
- 12 D. Magnoli, *O Corpo da Pátria* (see footnote 9), p. 81; A. K. Manchester, *The Transfer of the Court* (see footnote 2), p. 174.
- 13 A. H. de Oliveira Marques, *Geschichte Portugals und des portugiesischen Weltreichs*, Stuttgart 2001, p. 335.
- 14 M. M. Lucas, *Organização do Império*, in: L. R. Torgal and J. L. Roque (eds.), *História de Portugal vol. 5: O Liberalismo (1807–1890)*, Lisbon [1993], pp. 285–311, p. 285.
- 15 There are some excellent works on Luso-Brazilian history which outline the importance of Brazil in the Portuguese colonial system especially in the 18<sup>th</sup> century and/or discuss the critical effects of the breakdown of it at the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, J. J. de Andrade Arruda, *O Brasil no comércio colonial*, São Paulo 1980; F. Novais, *Portugal e Brasil na crise do antigo sistema colonial (1777–1808)*. São Paulo 1979; J. M. Pedreira, *From Growth to Collapse: Portugal, Brazil, and the Breakdown of the Old Colonial System (1760–1830)*, in: *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 80 (2000) 4, pp. 839–864.
- 16 For a detailed account on the “vulnerable position” of Portugal at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> and the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century see V. Alexandre, *Os sentidos do império* (see footnote 4), chapter 1: “Um sistema vulnerável: o império face às convulsões internacionais”, pp. 93–165.
- 17 According to João Fragoso and Manolo Florentino, the idea of Brazil as centre of the empire has always been rooted in geopolitical rather than economic thoughts, J. Fragoso and M. Florentino, *O arcaísmo como projeto. Mercado Atlântico, Sociedade Agrária e Elite Mercantil no Rio de Janeiro (1790–1840)*, Rio de Janeiro 1993, p. 63.

of Napoleon was about to destroy the old European dynasties.<sup>18</sup> In the same year, Rodrigo de Souza Coutinho, one of João's most influential ministers, stated that considering the precarious situation in Europe, the "only chance" the sovereign and his people had would be to transfer the seat of government to the vast and rich Brazil. From there, one could establish a "powerful empire" (*poderoso Imperio*) from which territories lost in Europe could easily be recaptured.<sup>19</sup> The basic argument used by him and other politicians was that the transfer of the court would be capable of renewing and strengthening the empire as a whole and thus – at least in theory – also contribute to a better situation for the Portuguese in Europe.<sup>20</sup>

To be sure, the transfer of the Portuguese Royal Court was a "dramatic and extraordinary" answer to the global crisis.<sup>21</sup> As the Napoleonic invasion provided the impetus to put into action the old plan of transferring the seat of government to Brazil, the transfer is a perfect example, firstly, of global crises setting free energy for innovative spatial concepts,<sup>22</sup> and secondly of innovative spatial concepts emerging smoothly from tradition. The venture would not have been possible if members of the Portuguese political elites had not repeatedly stated that leaving the cradle of the monarchy behind and transferring the seat of government to the rich New World would be an appropriate measure to create a "vast and powerful" empire.<sup>23</sup> This "utopia" was deeply rooted in the imagination of the politicians, whether they were members of the British or the French "parties" (*partido francês/partido inglês*), that is, whether they principally favored alliance either with the continental or the maritime power. In the debates preceding the departure, all ministers of state, despite their numerous differences of opinion, agreed on the policy that the "best" part of the Portuguese possessions should by no means be put at risk. They were all driven by a perspective that Ana Rosa Cloquet da Silva has called the "global vision of empire."<sup>24</sup> While sticking to the imperative of holding together the Portuguese possessions at all costs, none of them thought of the European part as the basis and center of political sovereignty – over the centuries this role had clearly been assigned to Brazil.<sup>25</sup> If it should be a principle of imperial elites to stick to the core in times of crisis

18 M. B. N. da Silva, *D. João VI. Príncipe e rei no Brasil*, Lisbon 2008, p. 9.

19 R. de Souza Coutinho, *Quadro da Situação Política da Europa*, Lissabon am 16. August 1803, in: P. Ângelo (ed.), *D. João VI, Príncipe e Rei vol. 1: A Retirada da Família Real para o Brasil (1807)*, Lisbon 1953, pp. 127-136, p. 131.

20 M. O. da Silva Dias, *A interiorização da metrópole*, in: C. G. Mota (ed.), *Dimensões 1822*, São Paulo 1972, pp. 160-184, p. 167.

21 K. Schultz, *Royal Authority, Empire and the Critique of Colonialism: Political Discourse in Rio de Janeiro (1808–1821)*, p. 7.

22 "Critical junctures of globalisation" (like the one Portugal faced when the Napoleonic army approached) do not only indicate specific problems, but also produce specific resources for social and cultural action and can ultimately lead to new spatial concepts, U. Engel and M. Middell, *Bruchzonen der Globalisierung, globale Krisen und Territorialitätsregimes – Kategorien einer Globalgeschichtsschreibung*, in: *Comparativ*, 5 (2005) 6, pp. 5-38.

23 M. Viana Lyra, *A utopia do poderoso império: Portugal e Brasil: Bastidores da política 1798–1822*, Rio de Janeiro 1994; K. Maxwell, *The Generation of the 1790s and the Idea of a Luso-Brazilian Empire*, in: D. Alden (ed.), *Colonial Roots of Modern Brazil*, Berkeley 1973, pp. 107-146.

24 A. R. C. da Silva, *Inventando a Nação* (see footnote 9), p. 181f.

25 Edward Said established the thesis that imperialism is in large parts driven by geopolitical imagination: E. Said, *Orientalism*, New York 1979. Since then, many historians and political scientists have referred to the power of

and to abandon the peripheries if necessary,<sup>26</sup> this certainly holds true for the Portuguese empire, as well – except for the peculiarity that the (imagined) center was not the mother country, Portugal, but the colony, Brazil. The relocation and renegotiation of oppositions and boundaries that characterized the European colonial project in general allowed Europeans, in this specific case, to forego Europe itself.<sup>27</sup>

When João and his courtiers reached their final destination in March 1808, the Portuguese hopes and dreams came, at least partly, true: Brazil turned into a safe haven for the beleaguered Portuguese monarchy,<sup>28</sup> and within a few years the city of Rio de Janeiro was turned into a “Tropical Versailles.”<sup>29</sup> For the emigrated Prince Regent and the ruling elites, the new spatial order with the capital in the tropics worked out so well that, after the Congress of Vienna in 1815, when general peace was achieved and Napoleon banished, they refused to return to Lisbon (contrary to the promise the monarch had made when he left) and preferred to stay in Rio instead. This provoked heated debates on both sides of the Atlantic; the location of the sovereign was what the statesman Silvestre Pinheiro Ferreira called the decade’s great “question of state.”<sup>30</sup> The two main reasons for the decision to stay were the fear of the emergence of an independence movement in Brazil should the Royal Court be removed (some Spanish colonies had meanwhile declared independence), and the danger of general political turmoil in Europe (“terrifying” notices about expanding liberal movements were numerous).<sup>31</sup> All in all, Europe at that time was seen as (and surely was) a dangerous place for an absolute (non-constitutional) monarch whereas Brazil served as a “fortress of absolutism,” as Maria Odila Silva Dias has put it.<sup>32</sup> Moreover, the ministers of state were convinced of the wisdom of the policy of taking advantage of the riches “in which this fortunate and opulent country [Brazil] abounds.”<sup>33</sup> In December 1815, João ended the colonial status of Brazil by proclaiming the “United

discourses in the construction of empires and states. See, for instance: G. Ó Tuathail and J. Agnew, *Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy*, in: *Political Geography*, 11 (1992) 2, pp. 190-204; S. Dalby, *Imperialism, Domination, Culture: The continued relevance of Critical Geopolitics*, in: *Geopolitics*, 3 (2008) 3, pp. 413-436.

26 J. Osterhammel, *Die Verwandlung der Welt. Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts*, Munich 2009, p. 608.

27 G. Prakash, Introduction, in Idem (ed.), *After Colonialism, Imperial Histories and Postcolonial Displacements*, Princeton 1995, pp. 3-4 as cited in K. Schultz, *Tropical Versailles: Empire, Monarchy, and the Portuguese Royal Court in Rio de Janeiro, 1808–1821*, New York 2001, p. 80. For the relativity of centres and peripheries, see also A. J. R. Russell-Wood, *Centers and peripheries in the Luso-Brazilian World, 1500–1808*, in: Ch. Daniels (ed.), *Negotiated empires. Centers and peripheries in the Americas, 1500–1820*, New York et al 2002, pp. 105-142.

28 K. Schultz, *Tropical Versailles* (see footnote 27), p. 29.

29 The term “Tropical Versailles” was first used by Manuel de Oliveira Lima in 1908 and again by the above cited US-American historian Kirsten Schultz, see M. de Oliveira Lima, *D. João VI. no Brasil, Rio de Janeiro 2006* [first published 1908].

30 K. Schultz, *Tropical Versailles* (see footnote 27), p. 196-197.

31 For a detailed overview on the discussions, if the monarch should stay or leave, see Silva, *Inventando a Nação*, pp. 247-287; V. Alexandre, *Os Sentidos do Império* (see footnote 4), especially the chapter “Uma alternativa para o Império (1815–1820)”, pp. 329-372.

32 M. O. Silva Dias, *The Establishment of the Royal Court in Brazil*, in: A. J. R. Russell-Wood (ed.), *From Colony to Nation. Essays on the Independence of Brazil*, Baltimore and London 1975, pp. 89-108, p. 96.

33 Decree of November 24, 1913, as cited in: J. M. Pereira da Silva, *História da fundação do império brasileiro* (7 volumes) vol. 3, Paris 1864–1868, pp. 348-359.

Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and the Algarve.” Technically, Brazil was now a coequal part of a European state – or, perhaps, Portugal was part of an American state. Prince Regent D. João (VI) continued to rule from Brazil as a legitimate monarch until he was forced to return to Portugal in 1821. His son Pedro (I), who stayed in Rio de Janeiro, declared independence in September 1822, and it was only then that the empire broke apart.

## 2. European ideals and the construction of a new capital in the tropics

As Brazilian historian Afonso Carlos Marques dos Santos has pointed out, the transfer of the court was not only a geopolitical project. Once put into motion, it also involved a “civilizing mission.” According to him, Rio de Janeiro, the new seat of government and center of power *par excellence*, was transformed into a “huge laboratory of civilization.”<sup>34</sup> The metamorphosis from a colonial capital<sup>35</sup> into the capital of the empire first of all required a new state apparatus that was modeled off of the former European capital: The Crown immediately established duplicates of the government institutions still existing in Lisbon.<sup>36</sup> Due to steady immigration, the population of Rio de Janeiro almost doubled from about 60,000 inhabitants in 1808 to about 113,000 inhabitants in 1821,<sup>37</sup> to mention just one of the greater structural alterations during the process of the “metropolitanization of the colony.”<sup>38</sup> In the following part, it is my intention to demonstrate how European ideals and principles came into play in this laboratory. I shall examine some of the measures concerning aesthetics and social engineering in a close reading of police documents of the time. As part of the analysis, I want to address the following questions: What and who was perceived as European? How were European ideals adapted and implemented and when and why did certain ideals and notions change?

Following the court’s arrival and during the following years (from 1808 to 1821), the city of Rio de Janeiro became subject to various changes in regard to social and cultural organization: in order to project an image of royal power and notions of order, enlightenment and progress, European standards had to be implemented. As many scholars have pointed out, one of the most important institutions for the establishment of modern statehood in the eighteenth century was the police.<sup>39</sup> The same seems to hold true for empires. In fact, one of the first things the Portuguese Monarch did when he arrived in

34 A. C. Marques dos Santos, *A Fundação de uma Europa Possível* (see footnote 8), p. 10.

35 From 1763 on, Rio de Janeiro had been the capital of the Viceroyalty of Brazil and thus seat of the Viceroy.

36 See R. Barman, *Brazil. The Forging of a Nation, 1798–1852*, Stanford 1988, p. 46f; A. C. Delgado Martins, *Governança e Arquivos: D. João VI no Brasil*, Lisbon 2007, p. 120f; A. K. Manchester, *The Growth of Bureaucracy in Brazil, 1808–1821*, in: *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 4 (1972) 1, pp. 77–83, p. 79; A. Wehling, *Estado, Governo e administração no Brasil joanino*, in: *Revista do Instituto Histórico Geográfico Brasileiro*, 168 (2007) 436, pp. 75–92.

37 M. de Almeida Abreu, *A evolução urbana do Rio de Janeiro*, Rio de Janeiro 1987, p. 39; M. B. Nizza da Silva, *A Gazeta do Rio de Janeiro (1808–1822): Cultura e Sociedade*, Rio de Janeiro 2007, p. 31.

38 M. O. Silva Dias, *The Establishment of the Royal Court in Brazil* (see footnote 32), p. 97.

39 See, among many others, M. Foucault, *Sicherheit, Territorium, Bevölkerung. Geschichte der Gouvernementalität*, Frankfurt am Main 2006, pp. 449–519; W. Reinhard, Wolfgang, *Geschichte der Staatsgewalt. Eine vergleichende Verfassungsgeschichte Europas von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*, München 1999, especially pp. 363–366.

Rio de Janeiro in 1808 was to establish a Police Intendancy modeled off of the Lisbon Police, which in turn had been modeled off of the French policing system.<sup>40</sup> The police chief (*intendente geral da policia*), Paulo Fernandes Vianna (1808–1821), subsequently became known as the “chief civilizer” of the urban area as it was he who initiated all “civilizing measures” concerning infrastructure, social engineering, and urban development.<sup>41</sup> Consistent with colonial administrative practice, his office combined legislative, executive, and judicial powers. Being one of the closest counselors of Prince Regent João and, thus, in a sense representing the authority of the absolute monarch, the police chief became one of the most important builders and custodians of the new order in the city. Under Vianna’s rule, Rio was reconstructed and made more “glamorous” so it could fulfill its role as the new seat of the Royal Court and compete with the capitals of other European states and empires.<sup>42</sup>

One of the police chief’s first concerns was the aesthetics of the new capital. In 1809, he determined that the wooden lattices (or window shutters), a relic of Arab architecture that formerly prevailed in Portugal, had to disappear from the residential buildings of the center of the city. The “ugly lattices” were seen as gothic, deformed and unhealthy. According to the police chief, they were nothing but evidence of the “lacking civilization of the inhabitants.” The respective police decree read that, “having elevated this city to the highest hierarchy of court of Brazil,” it was no longer possible to maintain “old customs that could be tolerated only when Brazil was reputed to be a colony.” The explicit aim of the removal of supposedly colonial attributes was to make Rio de Janeiro “more beautiful in the eyes of strangers.”<sup>43</sup> Quite a few inhabitants complained about this measure because the window shutters had not been for nothing, but rather had served to protect the houses’ interior from the tropical sun. However, the complaints of those who could not afford other protective installations (such as “civilized” glass windows) were useless: in this specific case, the aesthetics of the new capital seemed to have been more important than the well-being of some residents. As the window shutters were symbols of Arab colonialism, it is quite evident (even if not explicitly stated) that the signs of “non-civilization” were equated with “non-European.”

40 The Intendência Geral da Polícia was established on April 5, 1808, the Police Chief (Intendente Geral da Polícia) was nominated on May 10, 1808, R. Macedo, Paulo Fernandes Viana. *Administração do Primeiro Intendente-Geral da Polícia*, Rio de Janeiro 1956, p. 22.

41 For general information about the Intendência Geral da Polícia see M. B. Nizza da Silva, *A Intendência-Geral da Polícia: 1808–1821*, in: *Acervo*, 1 (1986) 2, pp. 187-204, p. 187; J. C. Pinheiro, *Paulo Fernandes Vianna e a Polícia de seu Tempo*. *Memória apresentada ao Instituto Histórico Geographico Brasileiro*, in: *Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro*, 39 (1876) 2, pp. 65-77; L. Gonçalves dos Santos, *Memórias para servir a História do Reino do Brasil vol. 1*, Rio de Janeiro 1943, p. 251; Th. H. Holloway, *Policing Rio de Janeiro. Repression and resistance in a 19th-century city*, Stanford 1993, p. 32; F. A. Cotta, *Polícia para quem precisa*, in: *Revista de História da Biblioteca Nacional*, 14 (2006), pp. 64-68.

42 K. Schultz, *Tropical Versailles* (see footnote 27), especially chapter four “The New City of Rio de Janeiro: Reconstructing the Portuguese Royal Court”, pp. 101-149.

43 “Edital” by Paulo Fernandes Vianna, Rio de Janeiro, June 11, 1809, *Arquivo Nacional do Rio de Janeiro* (hereafter: ANRJ) *Polícia da Corte Cód. 323 vol. 1*, pp. 88-89. See also M. B. N. da Silva, *Intendência-Geral da Polícia* (see footnote 41), p. 200; J. C. Pinheiro, *Paulo Fernandes e a Polícia de seu Tempo* (see footnote 41), p. 73-76.



Some other (attempted) adaptations of European standards were inspired by both aesthetic and pragmatic considerations. As the police chief stated in 1811, the streets of Rio had to be broader and better paved because “in all countries”, this was a sign of “good police.” Broader streets would be advantageous for commerce, as well. From Vianna’s point of view, the streets in their current condition were only fit for the “passage of animals,” not for proper coach traffic. The police chief was well aware, however, that the proposed measures of enlarging the streets would “not yet” please all inhabitants of the city.<sup>44</sup> Some of them would suffer loss of property, and as some other documents reveal, the residents were frequently ordered to help with the construction by providing their own (or their slave’s) manpower.<sup>45</sup> The expression “not yet” is highly revealing. It underlines Vianna’s assumption that European norms were both superior and would eventually come to be accepted in Rio de Janeiro (and Brazil).<sup>46</sup> The improvement of the city’s illumination (*iluminação da Cidade*) also was “very important for its vigilance and safety.” By comparing Rio de Janeiro with Lisbon, Vianna lamented the scarcity of skilled workers and iron foundries for the production of street lamps, a situation that in his opinion would not change in the foreseeable future.<sup>47</sup> The issue of the street lamps serves as an example of the perception, or more precisely the *construction* of deficiency: the absence of iron street lamps was repeatedly indicated as a problem, yet no attempt was made to search for alternatives. The illumination of the city remained poor in the eyes of Vianna until at least 1819.<sup>48</sup>

Besides improving the infrastructure, safety and security and guaranteeing the aesthetics, one of the most important concerns of the government was to increase immigration to Brazil. In order to extract the riches of the “vast continent” of Brazil and to increase the utility of the soil, there had to be *more people*. Therefore, the monarch issued a decree that allowed “all foreigners regardless of their religion” to settle down in Brazil on equal terms as Portuguese vassals.<sup>49</sup> In reality, the immigration policy was not as liberal. Rather, Paulo Fernandes Vianna pursued the goal of “whitening and ennobling” the population of Brazil. Therefore, he tried to attract people from Portugal and the Azores, offering favorable conditions in Brazil by providing new settlers with land, tools, financial support (subsidies for the first two years were granted by the government) and the payment for the passage from Europe to America.<sup>50</sup> He especially sought the transfer of experts and skilled

44 Police intendant Paulo Fernandes Vianna to the minister of interior, Conde de Aguiar, Rio de Janeiro, September 4, 1811, ANRJ Polícia da Corte Cód. 323 vol. 3, p. 69v.

45 Police intendant Paulo Fernandes Vianna to Lieutenant João da Silva e Almeida, Rio de Janeiro, May 1, 1808, ANRJ Polícia da Corte Códice 318, pp. 9-9v.

46 As Dipesh Chakrabarty has prominently argued, historicism and the notion of the “not yet” was particularly prevalent in the 19th century, D. Chakrabarty, *Provincialising Europe*, Princeton 2000, p. 8.

47 Police intendant Paulo Fernandes Vianna to the minister of foreign affairs and war, Conde de Linhares, Rio de Janeiro July 16, 1811, ANRJ Polícia da Corte Códice 323 vol. 3, p. 59.

48 Police intendant Paulo Fernandes Vianna to the minister of interior, Tomás António Villanova Portugal, Rio de Janeiro, November 3, 1819, Polícia da Corte Cód. 323 vol. 5, p. 147. See also “Livro de registro de receitas e despesas da iluminação da cidade do Rio de Janeiro, compreendidos entre os anos de 1808 e 1813”, Rio de Janeiro [1808–1813], ANRJ Polícia da Corte Códice 391, pp. 3-28.

49 A. K. Manchester, *British Pre-eminence* (see footnote 3), p. 75.

50 Police intendant Paulo Fernandes Vianna to the minister of overseas, Conde de Gálveas, Rio de Janeiro, February

laborers from Europe to improve agriculture and advance the manufacturing industry.<sup>51</sup> What at that time was called “good police” (*boa polícia*), was directly linked to the new status of Brazil: *because* the Monarch now resided in Brazil, the police chief wrote in 1810, the country urgently needed “better police” and “more perfect” agriculture. By attracting “unfortunate” peasants from Europe and offering them “more favorable” livelihoods in the New World, the police chief sought to make a “useful” deal and serve the monarch in “all parts” of the Empire.<sup>52</sup> As becomes evident in quite a few sources, it was Vianna’s explicit plan to “improve” the agriculture and to “increase the white population” of the provinces of Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and São Paulo.<sup>53</sup> The “great utility” (*maior utilidade*) particularly ascribed to the Azorean immigrants is frequently mentioned in the police documents.<sup>54</sup> Remarkably, during these years there is no evidence of any attempt by the authorities to make use of the expertise of Brazilian natives. In other cases, they did consult indigenous people and used their knowledge about the environment and the jungle, for instance when it came to hunting runaway slaves.<sup>55</sup> Concerning farming matters, however, Portuguese authorities acted as if the soil in Europe was similar to the soil in the tropics and as if only European experts were able to improve Brazilian agriculture. In other words, the immigration policy was obviously driven by the belief of the superiority of European agriculture.

In culture and especially higher education, Europe also continued to serve as the example. Despite the fact that the monarch now resided in Brazil, there was no effort to establish a university. In contrast to the Spanish possessions, and due to the educational policy of the Portuguese Crown that sought to centralize the production of knowledge, no university existed in Brazil during the entire colonial period.<sup>56</sup> Coimbra in Portugal remained the “intellectual center” of the Portuguese world, while the former colony re-

25, 1811, ANRJ Polícia da Corte Cód. 323 vol. 3, pp. 22v-23; Idem to the minister of interior, Villanova Portugal, Rio de Janeiro, April 26, 1820, ANRJ Polícia da Corte Cód. 323 vol. 5, p. 182v.

51 Police intendant Paulo Fernandes Vianna to the minister of the interior, Fernando Jozé de Portugal, Rio de Janeiro, October 8, 1808, ANRJ Diversos GIF 6J – 78, Polícia da Corte 1808, without pagination.

52 Police intendant Paulo Fernandes Vianna to the adjutant of the Intendência Geral da Polícia, Jerônimo Francisco Lobo, Rio de Janeiro, December 29, 1810, ANRJ Polícia da Corte, Códice 323 vol. 2, pp. 52-53. See also K. Schultz, *Tropical Versailles* (see footnote 27), p. 84.

53 Police intendant Paulo Fernandes Vianna to the minister of overseas, Conde de Gálveas, Rio de Janeiro, February 25, 1811, ANRJ Polícia da Corte Códice 323 vol. 3, pp. 22v-23.

54 Police intendant Paulo Fernandes Vianna to the minister of the interior, Villanova Portugal, Rio de Janeiro, April 26, 1820, ANRJ Polícia da Corte Códice 323 vol. 5, p. 182v.

55 The groups of slave hunters were usually mixed groups and consisted of negros forros (“freed negroes”), “mulattoes” and indios, Police intendant Paulo Fernandes Vianna to the minister of foreign affairs and war, Conde de Linhares, Rio de Janeiro, December 19, 1810, ANRJ Polícia da Corte código 323, vol. 2, pp. 38v-39. Upon returning a runaway to an owner, the hunters received a fee of 8\$000 réis in 1836, see M. Karasch, *Slave life in Rio 1808–1850*, Princeton 1987, p. 315.

56 José Murilo de Carvalho sees the territorial integration of Brazil as a result of this educational policy: “I am arguing that the presence in Brazil by the time of independence of an elite that by the place and content of training, by career pattern and occupational experience, constituted a closely united group of people, ideologically homogeneous, statist oriented, and practical in government matters, was a basic factor in the maintenance of the unity of the former colony and in the adoption of a centralized monarchical system”, J. M. de Carvalho, *Political Elites and State Building. The Case of Nineteenth-Century Brazil*, in: *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 24 (1982) 3, pp. 378-399, p. 390.

mained peripheral in this respect. Sons of wealthy families still had to cross the Atlantic to pursue higher education.<sup>57</sup> As it was the intent of the police chief to also increase the number of educated persons in Brazil, he supported parents who could not pay for the passage of their children. In September 1819, he asked the government to comply with a letter of request by a mother who could not afford her son's journey and stay in Coimbra. According to Vianna, who assured the government that he had gathered "all available information" about him, the boy Jozé Vilela de Barros showed "good behavior" and was thus worth the patronage of the Crown. In the police chief's eyes, the state could profit from "talents like him" after his return to Brazil.<sup>58</sup> Here, too, the orientation of the ruling elites in Rio de Janeiro towards European intellectual standards in the construction of Brazilian society is evident.

However obvious the attempts of "Europeanizing" and "whitening" Brazilian society might have been – not all Europeans were welcome. While the war against Napoleon raged in Europe, the French were persecuted for being *qua nationality* "subversive elements" and for fostering revolution in Brazil. The police chief's explicit plan, as he stated in 1811, was to "purge" the Brazilian soil of the "French race," which he viewed as "very dangerous."<sup>59</sup> The French may have been European, but for the time being they could not be part of the process of Brazilian civilization for political reasons. The situation radically changed after the Congress of Vienna in 1815, when peace was restored in Europe. The authorities initiated what became known as the "French Cultural Mission"; more than a dozen French artisans and artists were to make Rio still "more glamorous" and to bring "high culture" to the former colony. Men, such as the painter Jean Baptiste Debret and the architect Auguste Montigny, came to the new capital and provided the Crown with a vision of civilization, progress, and order inspired by French neoclassicism.<sup>60</sup> Jeffrey Needell has explained the "French Cultural Mission" with the "linkage between state and culture" assumed by the monarch and his government; for the Portuguese or "Brazilian" elites, the French culture was "simply the most advanced example of a civilization they considered universal."<sup>61</sup> This reveals an important pattern in the construction of the new capital: Europeanizing measures were by no means inflexible imperatives but depended on contingent political matters and thus were subject to – sometimes radical

57 A. J. R. Russell-Wood, *Centers and Peripheries* (see footnote 27), p. 138; R. Barman, *The Forging of a Nation* (see footnote 36), p. 44.

58 Police intendant Paulo Fernandes Vianna to the minister of state, Villanova Portugal, Rio de Janeiro, September 1, 1819, ANRJ Polícia da Corte Cód. 323 vol. 5, p. 138.

59 Police intendant Paulo Fernandes Vianna to the minister of foreign affairs and war, Conde de Linhares, Rio de Janeiro, July 30, 1811, ANRJ Polícia da Corte Cód. 323 vol. 3, pp. 60-60v.

60 K. Schultz, *Tropical Versailles* (see footnote 27), p. 104. For information on the "French Mission" see also: F. Alambert, *Portugal e Brasil na crise das artes: da Abertura dos Portos à Missão Francesa*, in: L. V. de Oliveira and R. Ricupero (eds.), *A Abertura dos Portos*, São Paulo 2007, pp. 148-165. J. N. Bittencourt, *Iluminando a Colônia para a Corte. O Museu Real e Missão Francesa como marcos exemplares da política de administração portuguesa no Brasil*, in: Vera Lúcia Bottrel Tostes and José Neves Bittencourt (eds.), *D. João VI: Um Rei Aclamado na América*, Rio de Janeiro 2000, pp. 114-122.

61 J. D. Needell, *The domestic civilizing mission. The cultural role of the State in Brazil, 1808-1930*, in: *Luso-Brazilian review*, 36 (1999) 1, pp. 1-18, p. 2.

– changes. It is possible to state that the conception of “Europeanness” could, and did, drastically alter from one moment to another, for instance by first rejecting and then including French culture as part of “Europeanness.”

The attempt to make the city of Rio de Janeiro “more glamorous” included both striving for an “adequate” racial composition of Brazilian society and also attempting to impose the “right” behavior on the people within the urban area. A major problem the police chief faced from the beginning was the “homens vadios,” the vagabonds in the streets of Rio, that is, men moving in public space without an apparent destination. A “vadio” was defined as a man without master, occupation, or home.<sup>62</sup> The explicit goal of the police, as Vianna described it in 1809, was to “eliminate the vagabonds” (*sendo dos cuidados da Polícia expurgar os vadios*).<sup>63</sup> These people were perceived as a threat because they interfered with the “good order” and “glamour” of Rio de Janeiro. The undirected, uncontrolled movement was to be stopped especially in the capital city, which explicitly served as a role model for the rest of the territory. Of course, vagabonds had been persecuted in Brazil before the arrival of the monarch in 1808, and, to be sure, the negative attitude towards vagrants had been a general Western European phenomenon since the fifteenth century.<sup>64</sup> In Portugal, for instance, vagrancy was considered contrary to public well-being and described as a crime in the “orders of the kingdom” in the eighteenth century.<sup>65</sup> This notion was also transferred to the Portuguese colonies. From the day the monarch stepped onto the city’s soil, the persecution became much more severe, and the reason was clear: the capital of an empire could not afford vagabonds in its streets, for they smudged the fame not only of the city but also of the empire. Thus, one can state that the establishment of the Court in the New World and the transformation of Rio from a peripheral, colonial town into a metropolis and center of politics coincided with a more negative attitude towards movement of individuals in urban space in general, and the so-called vagabonds in particular.

The paradoxical situation in Brazil was that the authorities could not live with the vagabonds, but they could not live without them either. Their work force was needed to protect and fortify the Brazilian borders against invaders coming from Spanish dominions. So-called “recruitment” became a common practice. It meant capturing vagabonds in the streets of Rio, deporting them and compelling them into military service. In 1811, the minister of state, Conde de Linhares, instructed the police to capture 400 vagabonds because the troops in the Extreme South of Brazil needed reinforcement to secure (and expand) the territory against Spanish rivals. In his reply, police chief Vianna, who was

62 A. C. de Almeida Santos, *Vadios e política de povoamento na América portuguesa na segunda metade do século XVIII*, in: *Estudos Ibero-Americanos*, 27 (2001) 2, pp. 7-30, p. 25.

63 Police intendant Paulo Fernandes Vianna to José Constantino Lobo Botelho, Rio de Janeiro, May 9, 1809, ANRJ *Polícia da Corte Cód.* 323 vol. 1, p. 43.

64 L. Lucassen, Leo, *Eternal Vagrants? State Formation, Migration, and Travelling Groups in Western-Europe, 1350–1914*, in: L. Lucassen and J. Lucassen (eds.), *Migration, Migration History, History. Old Paradigms and New Perspectives*, Bern et al 2005, pp. 225-251, p. 230.

65 A. C. de Almeida Santos, *Vadios e política de povoamento* (see footnote 62), p. 7.

a native of Rio de Janeiro (but had studied in Coimbra, Portugal), suggested that the minister of state, who was a native of Portugal, had very limited knowledge of the social structure of the new capital. In one night, he respectfully reported that 132 men actually had been captured, but only 15 of them turned out to be “real” vagabonds and thus fit for recruitment – all the others were men who had strolled the streets of the city without a license (*licença*), but who eventually could prove they had a legitimate occupation.<sup>66</sup> This incident shows the paradox in the enforcement of European norms and laws: at times they were enforced not for the sake of “civilization” but because the state was actually in need of people who *infringed* these rules, as trespassers could be forced into military service.

The best example of the limits of the project of constructing a European capital is perhaps the handling of African slavery. The most striking difference between the old court in Lisbon and the new one in Rio was the fact that half of the population of the new court consisted of enslaved persons. Yet, slavery since the eighteenth century was an exclusively colonial practice, that is, it actually meant the *opposite* of “Europeanness” or “civilization.” It was a practice associated with backwardness, and in Portugal itself, slavery had been abolished as early as 1761. If making Rio de Janeiro into a metropolitan court meant breaking with a colonial past, then the use of slave labor would have to be forgone.<sup>67</sup> Due to the fact that the whole economic and social system in Brazil was dependent on slavery, however, there was no way to abolish this institution without destroying the whole monarchy. The presence of African slaves in Brazil remained a fact until 1888.<sup>68</sup> Thus, making the new, metropolitan city of Rio also required the tolerance of old, *unmetropolitan* and certainly *non-European* practices. As Kirsten Schultz has argued, the only way of dealing with this contradiction was to “metropolitanize” slavery. According to her, this task was most important for the maintenance of the *Ancien Régime* in the tropics.<sup>69</sup> The police intendant and other royal officials believed that slavery could become courtly and fashionable if the slaves’ presence in the city was carefully controlled.<sup>70</sup> Besides eliminating “capoeira-rounds” (*rodas de capoeira*), an Afro-Brazilian art form which combines martial arts, music and dance<sup>71</sup> and extinguishing the *quilombos* (settlements of freed slaves and fugitives that were considered a “danger” to “public tranquility”<sup>72</sup>), the officials tried to implement more rigid rules concerning the slave’s mobil-

66 Paulo Fernandes Vianna to the minister of foreign affairs and war, Conde de Linhares, Rio de Janeiro, July 3, 1811, ANRJ Polícia da Corte Cód. 323 vol. 3, p. 57.

67 K. Schultz, *Tropical Versailles* (see footnote 27), p. 121.

68 *Ibid.*, p. 128.

69 K. Schultz, *Perfeita civilização: a transferência da corte, a escravidão e o desejo de metropolizar uma capital colonial*. Rio de Janeiro, 1808–1821, in: *Tempo* 12 (2008) 24, pp. 5–27.

70 L. Mezan Algranti, *Slave crimes: The use of Police Power to Control the Slave Population of Rio de Janeiro*, in: *Luso-Brazilian Review*, 25 (1988) 1, pp. 27–48, p. 28.

71 *Ibid.*, pp. 27–29; Macedo, Paulo Fernandes Vianna (see footnote 40), pp. 54–56.

72 Police intendant Paulo Fernandes Vianna to the minister of foreign affairs and war, Conde de Linhares, Rio de Janeiro, May 2, 1809, ANRJ Polícia da Corte Códice 323 vol. 1, pp. 34–34v. For the construction of quilombos as “criminalized space”, see for instance: A. Campos, *Do quilombo à favela. A produção do “espaço criminalizado” no Rio de Janeiro*, Rio de Janeiro 2005.

ity in the streets as well as social segregation. Dom João's government no longer tolerated gatherings at public squares, and police persecution eliminated many African dances in the public space.<sup>73</sup> Especially during symbolically charged religious feast days and ceremonies crucial to the monarchy and state (such as court mourning), it was imperative that the slaves did not practice *capoeira* or commit other "disorders" (*desordens*).<sup>74</sup> As many of the sources reveal, it was an intensification of colonialism and an intensification of "othering" that made the "new city" of Rio de Janeiro imperial in nature.<sup>75</sup> It is in the very paradoxical attitude towards slavery that the limits of the Europeanization and civilizing mission become most evident.

### 3. Conclusions

Since the sixteenth century, respective Portuguese rulers, politicians, and clerics considered the European part of the Portuguese Empire weak and insufficient. However, the project of the creation of a "powerful empire" in Brazil was by no means linked to striving after a completely different, "non-European" empire. Rather, the transfer of the Royal Court from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro in 1807/1808 also meant the transfer of the concepts of "good order" and "good government" from the Old to the New World. Yet, "Europe" or "Europeanness" were categories hardly ever used by Portuguese authorities. During the construction of the new capital, they rather referred to overarching categories such as "civilization" or to specific European sub-groups such as "Portuguese," "Azorian" or "French." Nevertheless, one can easily detect European principles in the process of "civilizing" the Brazilian society, which were, however, by no means implemented en bloc, but in very different ways and for different reasons.

The adaptation of some of these principles seems to have occurred as a "natural" or "logical" consequence of the transfer; that is, they seem to have been adapted almost unconsciously. The measures undertaken concerning aesthetics and security, for instance, aimed to make Rio de Janeiro as "civilized" as any European capital. The police chief used European societies and cultures as role models. The streets had to be broadened because this was a sign for "good police" in "all countries" (on the European continent); the "ugly" lattices had to be removed because they befitted only a colony (not a mother country); more street lamps needed to be established because Lisbon had plenty; and society and agriculture needed to be improved by white European settlers because only they were considered apt to till a field. These measures were hardly ever questioned, but were seen as steps towards universally valid ideals that were to be achieved in the future.

73 M. C. Karasch, Rio de Janeiro: From Colonial Town to Imperial Capital, in: R. Ross and G. Telkamp (eds.), *Colonial Cities: Essays on Urbanism in a Colonial Context. Comparative studies in overseas history 5*, Dordrecht 1985, pp. 123-150, p. 131.

74 Police intendant Paulo Fernandes Vianna to colonel José Maria Rebello de Andrade Vasconcelos e Souza, Rio de Janeiro, April 6, 1816, ANRJ Polícia da Corte código 327 vol. 1, p. 67.

75 K. Schultz, *Tropical Versailles* (see footnote 27), p. 131.

Some other principles and measures were not unconsciously adapted, but restricted by and actively designed for the *local* political, social and economic needs and thus subject to changes. Whereas the “French Race” was considered “dangerous” as long as the war against Napoleon was going on in Europe, the image of the French changed from one day to the next after the Congress of Vienna. In other words, *who* was considered an ideal European and *what* was conceived as the European ideal heavily depended on (political) circumstances. In some cases, the implementation of (more rigid) European standards and rules did not only, or not even primarily, serve the higher aspiration to “civilization” but above all the economic interests of the state: after all, trespassers could be used for military or public service. Finally, the institution of slavery brought to light the very paradox of civilization and Europeanization. Due to the fact that the Brazilian society and economy was “compromised” by slavery<sup>76</sup>, the only expedient the Portuguese authorities saw just was the intensification of old colonial practices.

In fact, there hardly was a “possible Europe” to be found or founded in the tropics. At least in the eyes of the Portuguese who remained in Portugal, Brazil was not and could never be European. The Europeanization of the colony, seen from the European perspective, remained an illusion. When the liberal revolution broke out in Portugal in August 1820, members of the Portuguese elites demanded that the king return to the “legitimate” metropolis of the Portuguese Empire, that is the European “cradle of the Monarchy.” In this context, Manoel Fernandes Thomaz, one of the leading Portuguese liberals, called Brazil a “land of monkeys, bananas and of small negroes caught on the shores of Africa” (*terra de macacos, de negrinhos apanhados na costa da Africa, e de bananas*)<sup>77</sup>. Portuguese journalists, now making full use of the new liberty of the press, repeatedly wrote about Brazil as the “land of Negroes, mulattos, goats and mestizos.” Obviously, Europeans referred to the ethnic diversity of Brazil as the most important feature and at the same time as the most evident proof of the lack of civilization.<sup>78</sup> In fact, the Portuguese king complied with the demand and returned to Lisbon in 1821. The Portuguese historian, Nuno Gonçalo Monteiro, found that all the members of the high nobility that had accompanied the monarch to Brazil returned en bloc as well and that the amalgamation of Brazilian and Portuguese aristocracy during the stay of the Court in Brazil was virtually nul.<sup>79</sup> If after 1808 Brazil had been equated with the “good order” of absolutism and Europe with revolutionary changes and liberalism, the monarch and large parts of the elites in 1821 were ready to face the changes and to opt for Europe all the same. Ultimately, it seems “original” European roots mattered to them.

76 J. L. Ribeiro Fragoso and M. Florentino, *O arcaísmo como projeto. Mercado Atlântico, Sociedade Agrária e Elite Mercantil no Rio de Janeiro (1790–1840)*, Rio de Janeiro 1993, p. 88; E. Viotti da Costa, *Political Emancipation of Brazil*, A. J. R. Russell-Wood (ed.), *From Colony to Nation. Essays on the Independence of Brazil*, Baltimore and London 1975, pp. 43–88, p. 65.

77 Cf. L. Bethell, *The independence of Brazil*, in: *Idem, The independence of Latin America*, Cambridge et al. 1987, pp. 155–194, p. 181.

78 I. Lustosa, *Insultos impressos. A guerra dos jornalistas na Independência (1821–1823)*, São Paulo 2000, p. 40.

79 N. G. Monteiro, *Elites e Poder. Entre o Antigo Regime e o Liberalismo*, Lisbon 2003.