

Border Regimes, Freedom of Movement, and Globalization: The Hungarian and Czechoslovak Cases*

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ABSTRACTS

The paper examines the impact of globalization on the border regimes of two state socialist countries. It is hypothesized that the flow of people across borders accelerated with growing contacts and that the global nature of this process was primarily reflected in the increase in movement between the Eastern and Western blocs rather than within the Soviet sphere of influence or in second-to-third world interactions. After examining the theoretical and historical background of the topic, differences in this mobility are shown by comparing the cases of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The study is mainly based on secondary sources but also refers to the author's previous extensive research. A statistical analysis shows that globalization only affected the two countries in its entirety after 1988/89, that is, after the fall of the communist regimes. In the case of Hungary, however, a slight increase in the number and proportion of trips to and from the West is already observable from the early 1980s. Although previous scholarship has emphasized that human rights issues were crucial in the partial opening of the borders, this paper highlights the primacy of economic aspects.

In dem Beitrag werden die Auswirkungen der Globalisierung auf die Grenzregime zweier staatssozialistischer Länder untersucht. Es wird die These aufgestellt, dass sich der grenzüberschreitende Personenverkehr mit den zunehmenden Kontakten vergrößert hat und dass sich der globale Charakter dieses Prozesses in erster Linie in der Zunahme der Bewegungen zwischen

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dem Ost- und dem Westblock und weniger innerhalb der sowjetischen Einflussphäre oder in den Interaktionen zwischen der Zweiten und der Dritten Welt niedergeschlagen hat.

Nach einer Untersuchung des theoretischen und historischen Hintergrunds des Themas werden die Unterschiede in dieser Mobilität anhand eines Vergleichs der Fälle Ungarn und Tschechoslowakei aufgezeigt. Die Studie stützt sich hauptsächlich auf Sekundärquellen, bezieht sich aber auch auf frühere umfangreiche Forschungen des Autors. Eine statistische Analyse zeigt, dass die Globalisierung die beiden untersuchten Länder erst nach 1988/89, also nach dem Fall der kommunistischen Regime, in vollem Umfang erfasst hat. Im Falle Ungarns ist jedoch bereits seit Anfang der 1980er Jahre ein leichter Anstieg der Zahl und des Anteils der Reisen in den und aus dem Westen zu beobachten. Während die bisherige Forschung betont hat, dass Menschenrechtsfragen bei der teilweisen Öffnung der Grenzen ausschlaggebend waren, wird in diesem Beitrag die erstrangige Bedeutung wirtschaftlicher Aspekte hervorgehoben.

1. Introduction

The international context has emerged with economic relations, loans. This is an existing issue because it is part of the general international perception of the Hungarian People's Republic today that there is no special problem with human rights, there is freedom of travel, there is no official repression for better or for worse.

So said János Kádár, General Secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) to members of the Political Committee on 1 July 1986.¹ Freedom of travel was an important element of the image of the country, and Kádár directly linked it with (Western) loans – imposing travel restrictions would have significantly reduced the country's ability to get new loans, which could have led to bankruptcy. Hungary was heavily dependent on Western European and North American loans and, consequently, was forced to liberalize its border regime. The case was different in Czechoslovakia, where – due to a significantly smaller indebtedness – freedom of travel was not an important topic for the communist leadership.

Although Czechoslovakia was generally considered to be more developed and had a population roughly one and a half times that of Hungary, the number of Czechoslovaks and Hungarians travelling abroad in 1986 was almost the same. Moreover, the number of people heading towards the West from Hungary was almost twice as high as its northern neighbour, even though Czechoslovakia had a much longer common border with Western European states. Given that this was still some three years before the regime change, in a rapidly globalizing world, these differences need explanation. In this paper, “West” refers to the territories of the developed, non-socialist states, that is, the so-called “first world”, while “East” means the former state socialist countries – the “second world”. At the same time, within the statistical analysis, available data for the West contains travels

to and from the “third world”. However, movement to and from third world countries was nonsignificant.

As movement of people is one of the key indicators of globalization, this paper examines the relationship between globalization, freedom of travel, and border regimes in Hungary and Czechoslovakia in the twentieth century, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. Besides indebtedness, what other factors contributed to the difference between the two countries in the numbers of people making international trips? Were economic or political considerations more important, as communist regimes had strictly restricted the right to travel in the Stalinist period, and liberalization was developing at a completely different pace? When did globalization start to manifest in the international tourism data of the two countries and how did it affect their border regimes?

It seems reasonable to hypothesize that globalization has a measurable impact on cross-border mobility. Restrictions are lifted, closed borders are opened, strict border controls are significantly relaxed, and mobility, which had been artificially blocked, increases sharply. However, the actual impact of globalization on cross-border mobility and border regimes can only be demonstrated after a consideration of the context in which an outline of the theoretical background is as necessary as a description of the situation. Without this background, the different developments in the two countries in question are hard to understand.

2. Theoretical Background

Globalization is a common social science concept today. Beyond everyday interpretations, such as “global village”, “westernization”, “McDonaldization”, and “Americanization”, globalization has three important characteristics, according to Béla Tomka: it involves intensifying links/interactions among different parts of the world, growing interdependence, and a widespread awareness of these processes.² Globalization did not follow a straight line in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries but rather came in waves. The deepening of international economic, cultural, and other relations was interrupted by contradictory trends, during which state borders once again became more difficult to cross; that is, territorialization occurred.

Territorialization is a dynamic concept expressing change, suitable for describing historical processes, while territoriality, which has a similar meaning, is a static, geographical term. In other words, increasing territoriality is expressed by territorialization, and decreasing territoriality is characterized by deterritorialization.³ “Place” becomes “territory”

2 B. Tomka, Globalizáció: jelentés és definíció [Globalization: Meaning and Definition], *HistGlob Working Paper 10* (2023), pp. 32–33, <https://globtort.biblu-szeged.hu/histglobwp10/> (accessed 19 January 2024).

3 Territoriality, according to Bencsik, is the ambition of individuals, communities of various sizes, and states to maintain control over persons and resources within a space enclosed by borders, especially along those borders, to create and enforce rules, and to defend and maintain the separation between the space within the demarcated borders and the outside world. See P. Bencsik, *Territorializálódás és globalizáció: Historiográfiai át-*

when a dividing line – or border – separates it.⁴ Therefore, borders shape territoriality. However, as Charles Maier points it out, the organization and control of space *within* borders is also an important aspect of this term. It includes a wide range of actions, such as exploiting resources, building roads and railways, and administrating people and the territory (with censuses, taxation, legislation, and cadastral regime).⁵ These two elements – the borders and the bordered territory – may develop in opposite directions; one of them is territorializing, and the other is deterritorializing. Here, though, only the role of borders and their (de)territorialization is considered.

It is important to clarify the relationship between globalization and territorialization. Part of the political science literature takes globalization to have shaken up the state-centred international system. In this view, globalization restricts (or undermines) territorial sovereignty by loosening the territorial constraints of power. In other words, globalization causes deterritorialization. Another part of the literature points out that the relationship between these two phenomena is more complex than that. According to Saskia Sassen, for example, territoriality only transforms during globalization. For example, states themselves have actively contributed to economic globalization, so the existence of territorial states and globalization cannot be seen as mutually exclusive phenomena. Several scholars think that, in fact, globalization reshapes territoriality, resulting in *reterritorialization*.⁶

If we reduce the meaning of territoriality to the role of borders – without examining the role of the bordered territory – we can see that the early phases of globalization go hand-in-hand with deterritorialization, as the importance of borders decreases, passport-free zones are created, and border checks are weakened or even discontinued. Later, when global challenges start to threaten states, border controls are extended again – both legally and spatially.⁷ In an era of deglobalization, the role of borders and border surveillance usually increases, causing *reterritorialization*.

tekintés [Territorialization and Globalization: A Historiographical Overview], in: *Korall* 22 (2021) 85, pp. 5–25. Other scholars interpret it differently and more narrowly. Some, such as Komlosy, regard territoriality just as the delimitation (Abgrenzung) of (nation) states, while others, like Maier, believe that the exploitation of a region's economic, transport, and other assets is also involved (so scholars should research both borders and the bordered territory). A. Komlosy, *Grenzen: Räumliche und soziale Trennlinien im Zeitenlauf*, Wien 2018, p. 13; C. Maier, *Consigning the Twentieth Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era*, in: *American Historical Review* 105 (2000) 3, pp. 808, 814–822.

4 R. D. Sack, *Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History*, Cambridge, UK 1986, pp. 5–21.

5 C. Maier, *Once within Borders: Territories of Power, Wealth, and Belonging since 1500*, Cambridge, MA 2016.

6 S. Sassen, *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization*, New York 1996, pp. 1–32; N. Brenner, *Globalisation as Reterritorialisation: The Rescaling of Urban Governance in the European Union*, in: *Urban Studies* 36 (1999) 3, pp. 431–441.

7 S. Franke, *Introduction: Border Research in a Global Perspective*, in: *Comparativ. Zeitschrift für Globalgeschichte und vergleichende Gesellschaftsforschung* 17 (2007) 4, pp. 10–12. This applies also to the first wave of modern globalization, when border checks started to proliferate long before World War I due to the increasing wave of intercontinental emigration. See S. Conrad, *Globalisation and the Nation in Imperial Germany*, Cambridge, UK 2010, pp. 19, 70, 160–162, 184–189; MNL OL K150 (General documents of the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior, 1867–1945) V-20-3609.

Another key concept of this paper is that of the *border regime*, referring to all those measures that persons and products crossing state borders could encounter through the actions of the authorities. This definition encompasses all the elements of border surveillance but also incorporates certain elements of passport administration as well as the implementation of other legal stipulations not forming part of border surveillance (e.g., customs regulations, procedures applicable in case of petty offences, and court cases).

Mark Salter described two “worlds of travel” (i.e., border regimes), distinguishing between the European and colonial regimes in the nineteenth century. However, Eastern Europe was left out of his analysis.⁸ Inside twentieth-century Europe, it is more appropriate to distinguish two other border regimes, the Eastern and the Western. Basically, the latter model is permissive, whereas the first one is restrictive. States adopting the Western model are mostly open societies whose interests lie in maintaining open borders. They do not limit *their own* citizens with respect to their temporary or more permanent foreign travels; in fact, they are even willing to forgo passport requirements.

Up until the very recent past, an important feature of the Western border surveillance regime was that it had a law enforcement and not a military nature. This is also an expression of the idea that the main function of the border regime is identification, registration, and control – that is, security but not *state* security. Therefore, states belonging to this regime recognize the rights of free movement, free settlement, and emigration (they tend to recognize human rights in general, albeit with some remarkable exceptions, such as Nazi Germany, which maintained most elements of the Western border regime for Aryan Germans, but discriminated against Jews and “vagrants”, harshly violating basic human rights in this respect). At the same time, most states following the Western regime restrict immigration – a mobility measure thus directed against foreigners and not their own citizens.⁹

The Eastern model was represented primarily by the Soviet Union.¹⁰ Although this also recognizes the challenge of external threats, its main concern is to control its own population. This is the origin of its restrictive nature. Accordingly, the fundamental intention of the Eastern border regime is not to restrict or block immigration but to maintain its own population and labour force – in other words, to prevent emigration. This often leads to the system not trusting its own citizens and restricting their foreign travel, even as tourists, rather than risking losing them because they fail to return.

In cases of still greater mistrust, the state system may even go as far as restricting and strictly controlling the movement of its population within the country (using internal passports). People are then unable to even approach the border, let alone attempt an escape. Hence, the Eastern regime does not recognize the right to free movement (and fails to respect the entire system of human rights in general). The societies that so emerge

8 M.B. Salter, *Rights of Passage: The Passport in International Relations*, Boulder 2003, p. 20.

9 P. Bencsik, *Border Regimes in Twentieth Century Europe*, Abingdon 2022, pp. 34–38, 50–52, 59–62, 74–78, 120–121.

10 During the nineteenth century, other Eastern empires like the Ottoman, the Japanese, and the Chinese belonged to this regime. After the communists assumed power in Beijing, China returned to this model.

become closed and take on an authoritarian or dictatorial nature. They see the movement both of their own population and of foreign populations as a threat, thus treating the issue as a state security issue of primary importance. Thus, they guard their borders heavily and implement border surveillance regimes of a military nature.¹¹

Before examining the impact of globalization on border regimes, the periodization should be clarified. There is a general agreement in the literature that there was a wave of globalization between the 1870s and 1914. The interwar period was an age of deglobalization. However, scholars disagree in the case of the post-war period. Göran Therborn thinks that the new wave of globalization had started already in 1945, followed immediately by another one from the 1980s. Jan Aart Scholte goes even further, arguing that globalization has been a continuous trend since 1850.¹² Probably the most convincing theory, however, is that globalization restarted only in the 1970s, after the oil crisis.

From the point of view of the Eastern border regime, the post-war period was one of deglobalization, as territorialization increased to an unprecedented extent under Stalin. The new wave of globalization coincided with the period Charles Maier describes as “crises of the territorial regimes” (1965–1990); however, as he notes, the “nations of the West” were to “remain enchanted with this [territorialization] model through the 1950s” and those in the communist world “until the 1980s”. After that, the era of post-territoriality began with a transitional period, whose outcome is still unclear.¹³

3. The Interwar and Post-war Years: Deglobalization and Territorialization Processes

The outbreak of World War I put an immediate end to the first wave of globalization. Before 1914, most parts of Europe (except Russia and the Balkans) constituted a passport-free area where travel was free, although passengers may have passed certain checks at the borders. The compulsory use of passports and visas was introduced in the first months of the war. Emigration was banned. Everyone believed that these measures were only temporary, but the pre-war mobility conditions did not return.¹⁴

According to Andrea Chandler, border regimes become more rigorous for four primary reasons. First, the emergence of a new state inevitably leads to higher levels of internal violence until the population gradually becomes loyal to it. Based on another theory, Hirschman’s Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Model,¹⁵ it can be suggested that before loyalty

11 Bencsik, *Border Regimes*, pp. 38–40, 52–59, 78–86, 112–115, 121–123.

12 G. Therborn, *Globalizations: Dimensions, Historical Waves, Regional Effects, Normative Governance*, in: *International Sociology* 15 (2000) 2, pp. 151–179; J. A. Scholte, *Globalization: A Critical Introduction*, Houndmills 2005, pp. 85–120.

13 C. Maier, *Transformations of Territoriality 1600–2000*, in: G. Budde, S. Conrad, and O. Janz (eds.), *Transnationale Geschichte: Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien*, Göttingen, 2010, pp. 39, 47–55, quote on 47.

14 J. Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State*, Cambridge, UK 2000, pp. 111–117.

15 For the original theory, see A. O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States*, Cambridge, MA 1970.

to the (new) state is reached, a certain level of state violence is maintained, including through stricter border controls to prevent “exit” (emigration). Chandler’s second reason is the influence of the international environment. Wars, of course, always result in a more stringent border regime. Besides external threats, we should note that a territorializing international environment also makes border regimes stricter, while during globalization, they become more open. Chandler’s third reason is the ethnic composition of the state; a state is more likely to maintain a closed border regime if it has many different nationalities. This is particularly pertinent if the minority lives near the border and is involved in a secession movement (i.e., it wants to [re]join its mother nation across the border), when the border may be closed with exceptional rigour. The fourth factor is the development of bureaucracy, which is not important here.¹⁶

Among Chandler’s reasons, the international environment is the most important. In times of deglobalization and with significant international tensions – both global and regional and regardless of whether these are armed conflicts or only “cold” or “frozen” wars – border regimes become stricter. Although the emergence of new states does indeed imply stricter border regimes, this is not necessarily true in the era of globalization (e.g. the dissolution of Czechoslovakia). In this sense, it is not surprising that regime changes and border changes are not always accompanied by territorialization. When a regime change occurs in an era of globalization as during the westernization of the border regime, there need not be territorialization. The outcome will also tend to be different during a wave of democratization and during a reverse wave. In other words, anti-democratic regime changes result in stricter border regimes, while democratic regime changes do not cause territorialization.¹⁷

Although the Habsburg Monarchy and, consequently, the entire territory of post-1918 Hungary and Czechoslovakia were part of the Western border regime before 1914, a transitional zone was formed there in the interwar period and started to take on some of the characteristics of the Eastern border regime. The border regime of this transitional zone became militarized and restrictive. Ethnic tensions in the borderland resulted in strictly watched borders, with regular border closures and visa wars. It was the combination of territorial losses and shifts from democratic to dictatorial regimes, together with wars and a hostile international environment, that resulted in an accelerating territorialization and shift to the Eastern border regime.

Eastern European borders were generally sealed after WW I – or at least, this was attempted – because of real and alleged enemy spies, armed smugglers, and other illegal crossers. Border guards were often involved in armed confrontations, not only with people crossing illegally but also with the border policing authorities of the neighbouring state. Contraband reached such an extent in Hungary that leaders of the textile industry

16 A. Chandler, *Institutions of Isolation: Border Controls in the Soviet Union and its Successor States, 1917–1993*, Montreal 1998, pp. 20–24.

17 P. Bencsik, *Political Transformations and Territorialization: The Case of Twentieth-Century Hungary*, *HistGlob Working Paper 6* (2022), pp. 21–23, <https://globtort.bibl.u-szeged.hu/histglobwp06/> (accessed 19 January 2024).

even suggested that borders be fortified using barbed wire and “Spanish riders”.¹⁸ This suggestion is reminiscent of the Iron Curtain built after the Second World War. Thus, territorialization was on the increase, in stark contrast to West Europe, where visa waivers were common, including between neighbours, and a small passport-free area was even created among the Benelux states.

After the Second World War, when the Red Army liberated – and occupied – the states of East Central Europe, the ensuing rapid Sovietization came along with an “easternization” of their border regimes. The militarization of border surveillance was completed, and border guards became part of the state security services (*Státní bezpečnost* in Czechoslovakia and *Államvédelmi Hatóság* in Hungary). Foreign travel was now primarily an issue of state security. Only persons whose travel was in the interest of the state were allowed to cross the border; all foreign travel was authorized by the narrowest party leadership, and emigration was banned almost completely.¹⁹ It should be noted that until the mid-1950s, travel within the Soviet Bloc was similarly restricted.

In order to prevent people from crossing the borders – legally or illegally – small border traffic was abolished, dual holdings were exchanged, and illegal border crossing was severely criminalized. The politically most sensitive border sections, those with the West and Yugoslavia, received special attention. Besides the “Iron Curtain” – barbed wire fences and minefields – fifteen-kilometre-wide border zones and 500- to 2,000-meter-wide border strips were created. Movement inside border zones was severely limited, with all “unreliable elements” displaced, while entry into border strips was forbidden, with the sole exception of border guards. Their number was significantly increased, and they were ordered to fire on anyone moving in the prohibited area.²⁰

Although Hungary and Czechoslovakia came very close to fully adopting the Soviet model, the process was reversed in both countries after Stalin’s death, and the transition zone between the two border regimes was slowly re-established. Khrushchev’s 1953 “New Course” that guided economic and social reforms did not affect border regimes – and were anyway soon revoked, except in Hungary where backlash occurred only in early 1955. Still, Hungary became much more reform-oriented, contrary to the dogmatic German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Czechoslovakia. Thus, the Eastern Bloc “grew apart”, with some countries like Poland and Hungary turning to more liberal and softer

18 P. Bencsik, The New Borders as Local Economic Possibility? The Case of post-1920 Hungary, in: *European Review of History* 27 (2020) 6, pp. 766–777. Spanish riders (or *chevaux de frise*) are defensive anti-cavalry, and, later, anti-tank obstacles, made of wood or iron.

19 J. Rychlík, Cestování do ciziny v habsburské monarchii a v Československu: Pasová, vízová a vystěhovalecká politika 1848–1989 [Travelling Abroad in the Habsburg Monarchy and Czechoslovakia: Passports, Visas, and Emigration Policy, 1848–1989], Praha 2007, pp. 26–53.

20 T. Jílek et al., Železná opona: Československá státní hranice od Jáchymova po Bratislavu 1948–1989 [Iron Curtain: The Czechoslovak State Border from Jáchymov to Bratislava, 1948–1989], Praha 2006; F. N. Schubert, Hungarian Borderlands: From the Habsburg Empire to the Axis Alliance, the Warsaw Pact and the European Union, London 2011, pp. 50–69; T. Mašková and V. Ripka, Železná opona v Československu: Usmrcení na československých státních hranicích v letech 1948–1989 [The Iron Curtain in Czechoslovakia: Deaths at the Czechoslovak State Border, 1948–1989], Prague 2015, pp. 24–46, 53–59; Bencsik, *Border Regimes*, pp. 97–104.

regimes.²¹ A second reforming drive, again from the Soviets, came in 1955 and directly affected border regimes.

As a kind of “intra-bloc transnationalization”, the intention was to open the borders between communist states with visa waivers, the reintroduction of small border traffic, and special inserts attached to ID that would substitute for passports.²² These Soviet demands were also welcomed differently; Poland and Hungary were more willing to take action, with the Hungarian reforms being especially radical. The Iron Curtain was dismantled, the Southern border zone was eliminated, and even trips to the West became possible. These changes contributed to the outbreak of the 1956 Revolution. In other words, border regime reforms spilt over into attempted political regime change; deterritorialization was accompanied by democratization. It was unsurprising, therefore, that border regime reforms were ended after the suppression of the revolution – not only in Hungary, but also in the whole bloc.²³ Something similar occurred in Czechoslovakia during and after the Prague Spring. There, it was political reform that preceded border reform which was also withdrawn after the military intervention.

The tightening of the border regime in Hungary after 1956, however, was only temporary, while the Czechoslovak leadership maintained a strict border policy until 1989. And not only were the two countries growing apart politically, but their economic preferences were also different. Hungary was much more dependent on foreign trade, Western loans, and technology imports than her northern neighbour, which was more willing to cooperate with the Soviet Bloc countries.

It can be concluded that during the period of deglobalization, the border regime of East Central Europe – a transitional zone between the two basic systems – changed more often and to a greater extent than the Western or Eastern regimes. This “adaptability” makes the region particularly interesting when examining the impact of globalization on border regimes.

4. Globalization and the Movement of People

Recently, many scholars have argued that a kind of “red” or “alternative” globalization took place in the Soviet Bloc from at least the 1960s. This view is supported by, among other things, the significant increase in contact between the second and the third worlds.²⁴ This is a topic that has been rather neglected in the past, and these studies have

21 A. C. Janos, *East Central Europe in the Modern World: The Politics of the Borderlands from Pre- to Postcommunism*, Stanford 2000, pp. 288–324.

22 As the issuance of passports remained a highly sensitive area of state security, travel to friendly countries was to be handled by other means.

23 Bencsik, *Border Regimes*, pp. 95–96, 100–105, 112–113; Rychlík, *Cestování do ciziny*, pp. 53–83.

24 O. Sanchez-Sibony, *Red Globalization: The Political Economy of the Soviet Cold War from Stalin to Khrushchev*, Cambridge, UK 2014; J. Mark, A. Kalinovsky, and S. Marung (eds.), *Alternative Globalizations: Eastern Europe and the Postcolonial World*, Bloomington 2020; J. Mark and P. Betts (eds.), *Socialism Goes Global: The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the Age of Decolonization*, Oxford 2022.

significantly broadened our knowledge of the political, economic, scientific, and other relations between socialist and developing countries. Nevertheless, there are contrary views.

According to Béla Tomka, it is questionable whether the second-to-third world contacts can be considered an alternative globalization because they did not lead to sufficiently large-scale changes in the four major areas of globalization – foreign trade, capital flows, information flows, or the movement of people. Regarding mobility, for example, the available data do not suggest that significant numbers of people travelled to the Global South (or vice versa). The number of journeys made from the bloc was negligible and limited mostly to the political, economic, and cultural elites, along with a few thousand guest workers and students.²⁵ Larger numbers could travel inside the bloc, but even there only from the 1960s onwards, when the number of inbound and outbound travellers reached 10 per cent of the population – more precisely, in 1964 in Hungary and probably a year earlier in Czechoslovakia.²⁶

Alena Alamgir and Christina Schwenkel argue for an alternative globalization.²⁷ They focus on the long-term movement of people (for education and work) from the South (especially Vietnam) to the Eastern Bloc. Their arguments are not always convincing, however, for several reasons. First, the numbers of Vietnamese students and workers were relatively low. Even totalled up over more than three decades, only 0.5 per cent of the Vietnamese population took part in this exchange. The GDR received the largest number of Vietnamese workers, but they accounted for less than 1 per cent of the working population there, while guest workers in West Europe made up 10 per cent of the workforce. Of course, workers also came from other countries, but it seems that Vietnamese arrived only in four countries (the Soviet Union, GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria), while others, like Hungary, preferred to receive Cubans (other third world countries played an even more marginal role in the numbers of workers sent to Eastern Europe). Second, the authors misunderstand the notion of “solidarity” voiced by the Eastern Bloc, which was largely a propagandistic cover for raw power interests. In fact, the main aim

25 B. Tomka, *Globalizáció Kelet-Közép-Európában a második világháború után: narratívák és ellennarratívák* [Globalization in East Central Europe after the Second World War: Narratives and Counter-narratives], Pécs 2023, pp. 64–66, 76–77.

26 The Czechoslovak statistical data for this period is incomplete. See P. Bencsik, *Kelet és Nyugat között: Államhatárok, úti okmányok és határátlépés Magyarországon és Csehszlovákiában (1945–1989)* [Between East and West: State Borders, Travel Documents, and Border Crossing in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, 1945–1989], Budapest 2019, pp. 414–417.

27 A. Alamgir, *Mobility: Education and Labour*, in: Mark and Betts (eds.), *Socialism Goes Global*, pp. 290–317; A. Alamgir and C. Schwenkel, *From Socialist Assistance to National Self-Interest: Vietnamese Labor Migration into CMEA Countries*, in: Mark, Kalinovsky, and Marung (eds.), *Alternative Globalizations*, pp. 100–124.

For information on Hungarian and Czechoslovak experts in the third world, see Z. Ginelli, *Hungarian Experts in Nkrumah's Ghana: Decolonization and Semiperipheral Postcoloniality in Socialist Hungary*, in: E. Szakács (ed.), *Refractions of Socialist Solidarity*, in: *Mezosfera* 5 (2018), <http://mezosfera.org/hungarian-experts-in-nkrumahs-ghana/> (accessed 19 January 2024); Zs. Bódy, *Opening up to the “Third World” or Taking a Detour to the “West”? The Hungarian Presence in Algeria from the 1960s to the 1980s*, *HistGlob Working Paper 4* (2021), <http://globtort.bibl.u-zegeed.hu/histglobwp04/> (accessed 19 January 2024); P. Muehlenbeck, *Czechoslovakia in Africa, 1945–1968*, Houndmills 2016.

of the Soviet Bloc was to spread world revolution.²⁸ Third, the relationship between the East and the South is better understood in the context of the Cold War and decolonization. Overall, therefore, these relations are probably understood as, at best, an *incipient* alternative globalization, which was then swept aside by the “real” globalization.

I think that we can only talk about a real globalization of East Central Europe if the movement of people between the second and the *first* world was substantial (i.e., involving the core of the world economy). This can be illustrated by examining two factors: the proportion of people travelling to and from the West within all international trips, and the dynamics of westbound travels, referring to the volume of these travels compared to the previous year (see Figures 1–4, pp. 184–186).

The data shows that the impact of globalization was only felt after a significant delay in the Eastern Bloc – not in the 1970s, but a decade later. What is more, the proportion of people travelling to the West from Hungary fell below 10 per cent in 1974, the first time since 1958 (Figure 1). This was a consequence of the increase of Eastern destinations following the introduction of the “red passport” in 1972. In Czechoslovakia, the proportion of people travelling to the West rose to a particularly high level during the Prague Spring (20 per cent in 1968, 25 per cent in 1969), only to fall back to 5 per cent following the introduction of restrictions, somewhat delayed, during the “normalization” period. As a harbinger of the approaching globalization, the share of trips to the West from Hungary in 1982 climbed back above 10 per cent of all outgoing tourists, while in Czechoslovakia this figure exceeded 8 per cent for the first time since 1969, albeit for two years only. The proportion of trips to the West started to increase dramatically only shortly before the peaceful revolutions: in 1988 in Hungary (with the introduction of the world passport) and a year later in Czechoslovakia. In both countries, the number of people travelling to non-socialist countries more than tripled compared to the previous year, but even then, this still only accounted for around 30 per cent of all outbound trips.

Inbound travels from capitalist countries (Figure 2) also entailed political risks for the state-socialist countries (such as incoming Western spies, diversionists, or the more generalized danger of “imperialist loosening propaganda”). Thus, with the proportion of Western visitors to Hungary rising steadily to over 15 per cent of all visitors in the first half of the 1960s, restrictions were imposed (in contrast to Western *exits*, the absolute numbers of people coming from capitalist countries did not fall, though – only their proportions fell below 15 per cent).

In Czechoslovakia, the period of the Prague Spring stands out again, with the proportion of arrivals from the West reaching 20 per cent in 1965 and 25 per cent in 1969. The “normalization” regime wanted to reduce this high rate, which could only be achieved by opening the border to East Germans and Poles, who later arrived in their millions. This draws attention to the fact that the ratio of incoming Western tourists was often distorted by fluctuations in the number of trips within the Eastern Bloc.

After a steady growth from 1979 in Hungary, the proportion of arrivals from the West skyrocketed in 1982 to over 25 per cent, a level never seen before, where it remained for a sustained period, exceeding 30 per cent in 1988 and 1989. This may be regarded as a “precursor phenomenon” of the approaching globalization – again, occurring from 1982 – but only in Hungary. The Kádár regime pursued a more liberal policy and was probably more dependent on hard currency brought into the country by Western tourists than Czechoslovakia, which maintained a policy of closure during almost the entire period of “normalization”. Not only did the total *share* of inbound Westerners stagnate, but also their gross numbers.

The situation was similar in the dynamics of travel to the West (Figure 3). Sustained annual growth of over 20 per cent in Hungary was recorded between 1960 and 1964, which frightened the political elite. Severe restrictions for travel to the West were thus introduced. A similar growth dynamic can be seen in Czechoslovakia between 1966 and 1969, after which the state introduced even more severe restrictions.

The annual growth of Western tourist arrivals in Hungary was rapid between 1959 and 1965 (by an average of 45 per cent per year), largely because of starting from a very low base (Figure 4). We also see a slight upsurge at the turn of the 1970s, followed by a moderate, almost sustained increase from 1978 onwards that averaged some 16 per cent annually. As mentioned above, the number of Western tourists remained virtually stagnant in Czechoslovakia from 1968 to 1987, with an average annual increase of less than 3 per cent (when it was 13 per cent in Hungary).

Overall, the data on tourist flows between the first and second worlds show that the late 1980s (i.e., the fall of the state-socialist system) brought the real turning point in both countries, while the forerunners of globalization can be traced only from 1982 and only in Hungary. Another finding is that *before* the effects of globalization were felt in the state-socialist countries, political factors had caused huge fluctuations in the numbers and proportions of people moving between the first and second world. These abrupt changes in the border regime policy can be observed mainly in the 1960s.²⁹

5. Political Reasons for More Open Borders During the New Wave of Globalization

As we have seen, a kind of “intra-bloc deterritorialization” contributed to the opening of the borders between Soviet satellite states already in progress from the mid-1950s. The “growing apart” of the bloc continued with alleged Western subversion tactics called “imperialist loosening”. This fear was not unfounded: there were real attempts from the 1960s to westernize the Eastern Bloc countries using various methods, such as popular-

29 For a more detailed statistical analysis, including data from Poland and Yugoslavia, see P. Bencsik, *Nemzetközi utazások és Kelet-Közép-Európa globalizációja, 1953–1989* [International Travels and the Globalization in East Central Europe, 1953–1989], HistGlob Working Paper 9 (2023), <https://globtort.bibl.u-szeged.hu/histglobwp09/> (accessed 19 January 2024).

izing rock and roll (and the Western lifestyle in general) – and also by promoting inter-bloc travel (in both directions).

The right to free movement became part of the drive for human rights, and recognition of these was often considered a motive for opening the borders: “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country”, concluded the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on 10 December 1948.³⁰ The Soviet Union and its satellite states³¹ did not sign the declaration, so they did not recognize the right of free travel (Soviets restricted movement even inside the country with internal passports). Of course, no Eastern Bloc states were among the signatories of the European Convention on Human Rights, whose Protocol no. 4. similarly stated that “[e]veryone shall be free to leave any country, including his own”.³² We should note here that emigration was regarded as a human right, but immigration was not.

The globalization of human rights began by elaborating a new socialist doctrine of human rights.³³ At the same time, even the Soviet Bloc states started to sign up to new human rights declarations, like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the United Nations in December 1966. Communist states signed the covenant between 1967 and 1969, although ratification was postponed to the 1970s. Article 12 stated that “[e]veryone shall be free to leave any country, including his own”, and “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country”.³⁴

A similar, albeit somewhat milder stipulation was included in the Helsinki Declaration, adopted at the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE, August 1975), which was in fact, a charter for globalization, as it promoted tourism and all kinds of human contacts, including the exchange of people and information: “The participating States [...] [m]ake it their aim to facilitate freer movement and contacts individually and collectively, whether privately or officially.”³⁵

This wording was the result of a request by the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). For tactical reasons, the Bonn government persuaded other Western countries that a policy of small steps would be better than demanding total freedom of movement.³⁶ This con-

30 United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights> (accessed 19 January 2024).

31 Among satellite states, only Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia (the latter just excommunicated from the bloc) were members of the UN in 1948, and all abstained in the voting.

32 The Convention was signed on 4 November 1950. However, Protocol no. 4. was signed only in 1963. No Eastern state was among the members of the Council of Europe before 1989, and, therefore, they could not sign the convention or the protocol. However, they had no intention of doing so. Council of Europe, https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Archives_1950_Convention_ENG.pdf and <https://rm.coe.int/168006b65c> (both accessed 19 January 2024).

33 M. Kopeček, The Socialist Conception of Human Rights and its Dissident Critique: Hungary and Czechoslovakia, 1960s–1980s, in: *East Central Europe* 46 (2019) pp. 264–271.

34 United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights> (accessed 19 January 2024).

35 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Final Act of the CSCE, <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/5/c/39501.pdf> (accessed 19 January 2024).

36 P. Hakkarainen, From Linkage to Freer Movement: The FRG and the Nexus between Western CSCE Preparations

tributed to the underestimation of the role of *freer* movement, as more general human rights issues in the Helsinki Declaration (freedom of assembly, association, and the press) are generally considered the more important factor in the collapse of the Eastern Bloc.³⁷ Others have argued that most of the dissident groups were formed before Helsinki anyway (except in Czechoslovakia), and that their role in the fall of communism was negligible.³⁸ Contrary to Helsinki, at least four countries (Czechoslovakia, GDR, the Soviet Union, and Poland) successfully repressed their dissident movements before 1982.³⁹ When Charter '77 was proclaimed in Czechoslovakia, the text contained the following:

*Also generally contravened is point 2 of article 12 of the first pact [the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights], which guarantees citizens the right to leave their country freely, [but] under the pretext of 'protecting national security' (point 3), this right is subject to various impermissible conditions.*⁴⁰

At this time, the interpretation of human rights started to differ in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia, with the reversion to the statist and collectivist view in the latter, albeit without a full-fledged re-Stalinization of the theory.⁴¹ Also important was that leaders in Prague and East Berlin had a long tradition of non-compliance with the law, so they again refused to respect their human rights commitments. They were convinced that the West would not risk the results of détente, and they considered human rights issues to be an internal affair.⁴²

Reform-oriented states like Hungary liberalized their border regimes relatively quickly in the 1970s. Globalization thus affected these countries significantly, with more and more Western tourists entering, while many Yugoslavs, Hungarians, and Poles could travel to Western Europe and see the difference between the West and the East for themselves. A significant breakthrough was the conclusion of an agreement on visa-free travel between Austria and Poland (in 1972, suspended during 1981–1988), and especially between Austria and Hungary (1978), which were neighbouring countries.

and Deutschlandpolitik, 1969–72, in: A. Wenger, V. Mastny, and C. Nuenlist (eds.), *Origins of the European Security System: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965–75*, London 2008, pp. 172–178.

37 D. Thomas, *The Helsinki Effect? International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism*, Princeton, 2001; see also C.P. Peterson, *Globalizing Human Rights: Private Citizens, the Soviet Union, and the West*, Abingdon 2012.

38 R. Brier, *Beyond the 'Helsinki Effect': East European Dissent and the Western Left in the 'Long 1970s'*, in: P. Villaurume, R. Mariager, and H. Porsdam (eds.), *The 'Long 1970s': Human Rights, East-West Détente and Transnational Relations*, Abingdon 2016, pp. 71–72.

39 D. Selvage, *The Limits of Repression: Soviet Bloc Security Services vs. Transnational Helsinki Networks, 1976–1986*, in: N. Badalassi and S. B. Snyder (eds.), *The CSCE and the End of the Cold War: Diplomacy, Societies and Human Rights, 1972–1990*, New York 2019, pp. 212–213.

40 Z. Veselý, *Dějiny české politiky v dokumentech [History of Czech Politics in Documents]*, Praha 2005, p. 648.

41 Kopeček, *The Socialist Conception of Human Rights*, pp. 271–275.

42 T. Vilímek, *Vnímání helsinského procesu v ČSSR a NDR ze strany moci, opozice a obyvatelstva [Perception of the Helsinki Process in Czechoslovakia and the GDR by the Authorities, the Opposition, and the Population]*, in: Z. Kárník and M. Kopeček (ed.), *Bolševizmus, komunismus a radikální socialismus v Československu [Bolshevism, Communism, and Radical Socialism in Czechoslovakia]*, vol. 5, Prague 2005, p. 277.

Austria made several efforts to make the border more open: Vienna aimed for more border stations and faster passport checks, as well as to reopen for small border traffic, although the latter did not materialize. In exchange, Austria financed the modernization of Hungarian tourist facilities and border crossing stations with a 300-million-dollar loan. Austria also aimed at improving its relations with Czechoslovakia, but there were serious tensions between the parties over human rights issues.⁴³ Travel from Czechoslovakia to the West was restricted even in the mid-1980s, and dissidents again advocated for the freedom to travel abroad. In the GDR, more and more people applied for emigration as a direct consequence of the CSCE process.⁴⁴

Border regime reforms promoted other political reforms – unsurprisingly, Poland and Hungary were the pioneers of the regime change in 1989. A bold move in border regime reforms, the 1988 introduction of the world passport resulted in massive Hungarian shopping tourism in Austria. The number of Hungarians travelling to Austria multiplied fivefold in 1988. Again, for the second time after 1956, these reforms contributed to the destabilization of the entire political system. Thus, one might conclude, the dismantling of the Iron Curtain in the summer of 1989 was only a logical consequence of the world passport. At the same time, as news about the removal of the Iron Curtain reached the GDR, an enormous flood of refugees poured out, not only to Hungary but also to Czechoslovakia. After Hungary decided to open its borders to East Germans, letting them in through Austria, the political regime of the GDR collapsed within weeks. With the regime change, East Central Europe not only shifted towards democracy but also returned to the Western border regime.⁴⁵

6. Economic Reasons for More Open Borders During the New Wave of Globalization

Radical economic reforms were proposed in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary from the turn of the 1960s under the motto of “market socialism”, although in the case of Czechoslovakia, these ended after the intervention against the Prague Spring. The main feature of the post-1968 economic reforms was an increasing integration into the world economy.⁴⁶ Détente made it possible, and the oil crisis made it necessary for Western economies to gain a foothold in Eastern markets. According to Besnik Pula, this gave

43 M. Graf, *Opening of the Austrian-Hungarian Border Revisited: How European Détente Contributed to Overcoming the “Iron Curtain”*, in: B. Blumenau, J. M. Hanhimäki, and B. Zanchetta (eds.), *New Perspectives on the End of Cold War: Unexpected Transformations?*, Abingdon 2018, pp. 143–147; M. Graf, *European Détente and the CSCE: Austria and the East-Central European Theatre in the 1970s and 1980s*, in: N. Badalassi and S. B. Snyder (eds.), *The CSCE and the end of the Cold War: Diplomacy, Societies and Human Rights, 1972–1990*, New York 2019, pp. 253–264.

44 Vilímek, *Vnímání helsinského procesu*, pp. 290–293.

45 Bencsik, *Political Transformations and Territorialization*, pp. 19–20, 24; Graf, *European Détente and the CSCE*, p. 265.

46 B. Pula, *Globalization under and after Socialism: The Evolution of Transnational Capital in Central and Eastern Europe*, Stanford 2018, pp. 67–73.

rise to three models of socialist “protoglobalization”, in which Hungary (and Poland) followed a path of import-led growth, while Czechoslovakia became one of the “Comecon integrationists”. Thus, Hungary established much wider contacts with Western firms than did Czechoslovakia, and it became more dependent on the world market.⁴⁷

As a result of this dependency, Hungary had a much greater need for hard currency than its northern neighbour, which resulted, among other things, in the reception of Western tourists as a preferred industry: “We are trying to get as many people as possible to travel to the country, to have foreign exchange revenues”, stated prime minister Ferenc Münich as early as 1961.⁴⁸ Hardline communist leaders often complained that Hungarian tourists and workers from socialist countries were being “squeezed out” from hotels and restaurants because of the richer Western tourists paying with hard currency.⁴⁹

Of course, there were financial constraints on travel to the West; communists did not want to waste hard-earned Western currency by allowing too many individual tourist trips. In Czechoslovakia, it was determined that up to 20 per cent of the hard currency gained from tourism could be used to pay for supplies for those travelling to the West.⁵⁰ A fixed quota of this type did not exist in Hungary, but still, there was an attempt to reduce hard currency “losses” by limiting the number of Western trips (e.g., to once a year from 1982). Meanwhile, for financial reasons, the Eastern Bloc countries were unable to ensure the smooth flow of tourists, even among themselves. Not only the supply of hard currency but also the supplies of Hungarian forints and Czechoslovak koruna were hampered in the 1980s, when traffic had already increased considerably.⁵¹

The new wave of globalization is usually connected to the beginning of the oil crisis in 1973. From this time, political and economic factors increasingly pushed state-socialist countries towards more liberal border regimes. Planned economies were exhausted, the Eastern Bloc’s products were not competitive on the world market, and there was a growing demand for trade with the West and Western loans to boost struggling economies and maintain the standard of living. Eastern states, including even the oil-exporting Soviet Union, had huge economic problems after 1973 (inflation, sharp deterioration in the terms of trade, huge budget deficit etc.), so they were in dire need of loans. Western banks were willing to lend, especially because “petrodollars” were flooding the financial sector. In the early 1980s, cheap loans became more expensive, and indebtedness became a serious issue.⁵²

Under these circumstances, Western loans could become a kind of weapon, and human right issues resurfaced as a precondition for new loans. During the Madrid follow-up

47 The third way of protoglobalization was Romania’s “Stalinist globalization”. Pula, *Globalization under and after Socialism*, pp. 78–97.

48 MNL OL M-KS 288. f. 5/221. őe.

49 G. Reháč, *Idegenforgalom és politika a 70-es évek fordulóján* [Tourism and Politics at the Turn of the 1970s], in: *Sic Itur ad Astra*, 17 (2005) 1–2, pp. 321–325.

50 Rychlík, *Cestování do ciziny*, p. 65.

51 Bencsik, *Border Regimes*, pp. 101, 106, 112.

52 Pula, *Globalization under and after Socialism*, pp. 76–77.

meeting of the CSCE, the dire need for Western loans forced the USSR and the other Soviet Bloc states to make concessions on human rights issues. Another factor was the resurgent military rivalry, which led the Soviets to seek military détente and, therefore, further concessions.⁵³ Basically, the less debt a country had, the worse was its human rights situation, including the right to free movement. One of the reasons why Czechoslovakia (and Romania) maintained a stricter border regime was their lower levels of indebtedness.⁵⁴

In the case of the GDR, the billion-mark West German loan was an “investment to perforate the Iron Curtain”. Secret negotiations were carried out in the 1980s to ensure “freer movement in return for cash”, resulting in a humanizing of the border regime – dismantling the automated shooting devices at the intra-German border, letting more Western tourists go to the GDR, buying out tens of thousands of East German dissidents – yet the Bonn government still could not persuade East Berlin to reduce the age of citizens allowed to travel to the FRG. Nevertheless, the GDR was forced to allow more and more people to emigrate.⁵⁵ Western financial blackmailing techniques were working, especially in the long run, forcing the East to respect human rights, including the right to travel abroad.

Another factor was the Co-operation in the Field of Economics, of Science and Technology, and of the Environment agreed in Helsinki in 1975, which strengthened the technological dependence of the Eastern Bloc.⁵⁶ Csaba Békés considers that the second basket of the Helsinki conference – the growing economic ties between the two blocs – was much more important in undermining communist rule in East Central Europe than the third basket, the human rights issues: “We can argue that economic cooperation, originally seen in the East as a vehicle for consolidating Soviet Bloc economies, especially by transfer of developed technologies, became a catalyst in the process of the destabilization of the Communist systems by the end of the 1980s”, he concludes.⁵⁷

By the early 1980s, Hungary (and Poland) had fallen into a so-called debt trap. In 1982, Hungary joined the IMF to avoid insolvency, and austerity measures were imposed on the country. The worst payment crisis took place in 1987, and one of the IMF’s demands was democratization, the importance of which was recognized by the party reformers themselves. At first, however, they were not thinking of a “Western-style democracy”. In order to make austerities more acceptable, the political system was liberalized, which

53 Selvage, *The Limits of Repression*, pp. 214–220.

54 J. Mark et al., 1989: *A Global History of Eastern Europe*, Cambridge, UK 2019, p. 42.

55 S. Kieninger, *Freer Movement in Return for Cash: Franz Josef Strauß, Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski, and the Milliardenkredit for the GDR, 1983–1984*, in: Blumenau, Hanhimäki, and Zanchetta (eds.), *New Perspectives on the End of Cold War*, pp. 118–122, 125–130.

56 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, *Final Act of the CSCE*, <https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/5/c/39501.pdf> (accessed 19 January 2024).

57 C. Békés, *Hungary’s Cold War: International Relations from the End of World War II to the Fall of the Soviet Union*, Chapel Hill 2022, p. 259. This view is supported by arguments of other scholars; see the works of Robert Brier, Douglas Selvage, and Tomáš Vilímek, cited above.

later resulted in demonstrations and the formation of opposition forces.⁵⁸ Another billion-mark loan from the FRG in 1987, this time for Hungary, possibly contributed to the opening of the Hungarian border to East German refugees two years later.⁵⁹ The debt trap and the IMF intervention contributed to the political transition and radical border regime reforms.

7. Conclusion

Hungary and Czechoslovakia belonged to the Western border regime before 1914 and to the Eastern one between 1945 and 1955. During the interwar years and from the mid-1950s, along with other states in East Central Europe, they formed a special transitional zone, borrowing elements from both regimes. Both deglobalization and globalization had a greater impact on the border regime of this area than on the Western or Eastern regimes proper.

In the early 1980s, after a long period of territorialization between 1914 and the early 1960s and following a transnationalization within the bloc, the first signs of a developing globalization of the Eastern border regime appeared. Although contacts between the Global South and the Eastern Bloc also intensified, the thesis of the alternative globalization is not well supported by empirical data. In fact, the movement of people was much more significant between the first and second worlds, even before the new wave of globalization had started. While the proportion of travellers to and from the Global South never reached 1 per cent, those going to the West exceeded 5 per cent in most cases and as much as 20 per cent in periods of reform.

Against this background, though, Hungary and Czechoslovakia evolved in opposite directions. Border traffic data displays that the proportion and the dynamics of Western visits started to grow in the early 1980s in Hungary, showing that the Kádár regime had opened its border to the West. However, Czechoslovakia insisted on a restrictive policy until the fall of the state-socialist system. The statistics clearly show that 1988/89 marked a decisive turning point, when the movement of people, one of the most important indicators of globalization, really accelerated in both countries.


Regarding the factors that shaped the openness of the borders, until the turn of the 1980s, only internal or intra-bloc impacts can be traced. Global challenges left the Eastern Bloc untouched during this period. Economic factors like (hard) currency shortages limited the freedom of travel, but political decisions were much more important. From the early 1980s, global impacts reached Hungary, but Czechoslovakia remained closed. In this second, global stage, economic factors were decisive in the borders opening. In other words, the human rights campaign of actors from Western Europe and the North

58 F. Bartel, *The Power of Omission: The IMF and the Democratic Transitions in Poland and Hungary*, in: Blumenau, Hanhimäki, and Zanchetta (eds.), *New Perspectives on the End of Cold War*, pp. 203–208.

59 Graf, *Opening of the Austrian-Hungarian Border*, pp. 148–152.


Atlantic region had a marginal effect for some years after Helsinki, but financial and economic dependency quickly forced Hungary (and Poland) to launch reforms of their border regimes.

Figure 1. Proportion of travellers to the West of all journeys abroad from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, 1959–1989 (per cent).




Source: Magyar Statisztikai Évkönyv [Hungarian Statistical Yearbook], Budapest 1960–1990; Statistická ročenka Československé Socialistické Republiky [Statistical Yearbook of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic], Prague 1958–1989.

Figure 2. Proportion of travellers from the West of all foreign tourists to Hungary and Czechoslovakia, 1959–1989 (per cent).




Source: Magyar Statisztikai Évkönyv, Budapest 1960–1990; Statistická ročenka Československé Socialistické Republiky, Prague 1958–1989.

Figure 3. Indexed number of travellers to the West from Hungary and Czechoslovakia, 1959–1989 (previous year = 100).



Source: Magyar Statisztikai Évkönyv, Budapest 1960–1990; Statistická ročenka Československé Socialistické Republiky, Prague 1958–1989.

Figure 4. Indexed number of travellers from the West to Hungary and Czechoslovakia, 1959–1989 (previous year = 100).



Source: Magyar Statisztikai Évkönyv, Budapest 1960–1990; Statistická ročenka Československé Socialistické Republiky, Prague 1961–1989.