

# **Between Second and Third World: North Korean Use of “Imagined Affinity” in the Socialist Globalization Project with Regard to Tanzania (1965–1970)**

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## **ABSTRACTS**

This paper examines the North Korean socialist globalization project with regard to Tanzania between 1965 and 1970. While several scholars have studied North Korean engagement in the Third World during the Cold War, there have been no detailed analyses of how North Korea instituted its relationships with socialist countries in Africa. The earlier period of North Korea-Tanzania relations demonstrates that, in the late 1960s, the former highlighted the rhetoric of anti-imperialist struggle and its experience of colonialism to institutionalize solidarity. This research uncovers the historical context of the North Korea-Tanzania solidarity, including the Sino-Soviet split and internal political struggles that caused a shift in North Korean foreign policy, which began focusing on establishing relations with the post-colonial and non-aligned countries as a response to domestic and international crises. This relationship projected the earlier trajectory of the North Korean endeavour in establishing an independent foreign policy and expanding connections with post-colonial countries under the double dynamics of decolonisation and the Cold War.

In diesem Beitrag wird das nordkoreanische Projekt der sozialistischen Globalisierung in Bezug auf Tansania zwischen 1965 und 1970 untersucht. Während mehrere Wissenschaftler das nordkoreanische Engagement in der Dritten Welt während des Kalten Krieges untersucht haben, gab es keine detaillierten Analysen darüber, wie Nordkorea seine Beziehungen zu sozialistischen Ländern in Afrika gestaltete. Die frühere Periode der Beziehungen zwischen Nordkorea und Tansania zeigt, dass Nordkorea in den späten 1960er Jahren die Rhetorik des antiimpe-

rialistischen Kampfes und seine Erfahrungen mit dem Kolonialismus hervorhob, um Solidarität zu institutionalisieren. Diese Untersuchung deckt den historischen Kontext der Solidarität zwischen Nordkorea und Tansania auf, einschließlich der chinesisch-sowjetischen Spaltung und der innenpolitischen Kämpfe, die einen Wandel in der nordkoreanischen Außenpolitik bewirkten, die sich nun auf die Aufnahme von Beziehungen zu postkolonialen und blockfreien Ländern konzentrierte, um auf interne und internationale Krisen zu reagieren. Diese Beziehungen waren eine Projektion der früheren Bemühungen Nordkoreas um eine unabhängige Außenpolitik und den Ausbau der Beziehungen zu postkolonialen Ländern unter der doppelten Dynamik der Entkolonialisierung und des Kalten Krieges.

## 1. Introduction: North Korea-Tanzania Solidarity in the Framework of the Socialist Globalization Project

Contrary to the contemporary image of North Korea as the “hermit kingdom”, Pyongyang had extensive networks with countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America during the period of the Cold War and decolonization. Although North Korea had maintained a close relationship exclusively with its socialist neighbours, namely the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, until the early 1950s, its foreign policy underwent several changes in the 1960s, particularly during the cleavage between its closest allies. During the Sino-Soviet split, North Korea preserved a relatively neutral position and sought diplomacy with socialist peripheries in Eastern Europe and newly independent countries in Asia and Africa, and after establishing diplomatic relations with the provisional government of Algeria and Guinea in 1958,<sup>1</sup> it expanded its network in Africa, where many states achieved independence in the early 1960s.

Tanganyika, today’s mainland Tanzania, gained independence from British rule in December 1961 under the leadership of Julius Nyerere and the Tanganyika Africa National Union (TANU). After unification with the People’s Republic of Zanzibar in 1964, on 29 October, the country was officially named the “United Republic of Tanzania”, and Nyerere was elected the first president. Diplomatic relations between North Korea and Tanzania were established on 13 January 1965, when a North Korean delegation visited Dar es Salaam.<sup>2</sup>

Following several meetings between ministers and the Vice-President in the following years, North Korea-Tanzania relations reached their first high point when Nyerere made his first state visit to Pyongyang from 22 to 25 June 1968.<sup>3</sup> In hindsight, however, this

1 Korean Central News Agency, Chosŏnjangangnyŏn’gam 1969 [Almanac of North Korea 1969], Pyongyang 1969, pp. 463–465.

2 Korean Central News Agency, Chosŏnjangangnyŏn’gam 1970 [Almanac of North Korea 1970], Pyongyang 1970, p. 446.

3 Kimilssŏngsusangkkesŏ ch’och’ŏngasin t’anjaniaryŏnhapkongwaguk taet’ongnyŏng p’yŏngyange toch’ak [President of the United Republic of Tanzania invited by Kim Il Sung arrived at Pyongyang], in: Rodong Shinmun, 23 June 1968.

summit between Julius Nyerere and Kim Il Sung only demonstrated a glimpse of the solidarity enjoyed between the two countries until the late 1980s.

This paper discusses how North Korea and Tanzania established their solidarity between 1965 and 1970, including the motivations of the actors as well as the historical development of their relations. North Korea used an “imagined affinity” to fortify the solidarity, which emphasizes the similar historical experience of colonial rule and the prevalent goal of anti-imperialist struggle. Although the two countries had not been historically entangled, highlighting common memories helped North Korea build an affinity with Tanzania. The North Korea-Tanzania connection should be interpreted from the transnational perspective, not only because the leaders of the two countries were influential in anti-imperialist struggles around the world but also because Dar es Salaam was a hub to expanding networks in post-colonial eastern and southern Africa, where several foreign press and transnational organisations established branch offices extending their networks in East Africa.<sup>4</sup>

Compared to the relationships with the Soviet Union, China, and socialist countries in Eastern Europe, the North Korean connections with post-colonial states in Africa have not been studied in depth.<sup>5</sup> Priya Lal also points out that the transnational exchanges led by smaller states like North Korea have been underestimated by scholars and interpreted as a mere imitation of actors like the Soviet Union and China.<sup>6</sup> Still, the post-colonial solidarities between socialist peripheries were significant for North Korea and other states in their efforts to overcome the rifts within the socialist bloc following the Sino-Soviet split and to reinforce the legitimacy of socialist regimes, both nationally – promoting the leader’s global prominence – and internationally – emphasizing internationalism in the history of socialism.

This chapter draws on the concept of the *socialist globalization project*,<sup>7</sup> primarily uncovering the relationship between the Socialist world, namely the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the decolonized states in Africa and Asia to envision the non-capitalist trajectories of globalization.<sup>8</sup> In this context, socialist states were central actors that co-

4 E. Burton, Hubs of Decolonization. African Liberation Movements and “Eastern” Connections in Cairo, Accra, and Dar es Salaam, in: L. Dallywater, C. Saunders, H. A. Fonseca, Southern African Liberation Movements and the Global Cold War ‘East’: Transnational Activism 1960–1990, Berlin 2019, pp. 47–51.

5 S. Ryu, North Korean Engagement in Africa during the Cold War: A Survey of Recent Historiographical Analyses, in: Korea-Europe Review 2 (2022). For the transnational history of North Korea and the Soviet Union in the period of the Sino-Soviet Split, see B. Szalontai, Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet-DPRK Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism, 1953–1964, Washington D.C. 2005. For relations between North Korea and People’s Republic of China in the same period, see Z. Shen and Y. Xia, Misunderstood Friendship: Mao Zedong, Kim Il-Sung, and Sino-North Korean Relations, 1949–1976, New York 2018. For the contribution of East Germany to the reconstruction of the industrial city Hamhŭng, see R. Frank, Lessons from the Past: The First Wave of Developmental Assistance to North Korea and the German Reconstruction of Hamhŭng, in: Pacific Focus 23 (2008) 1, pp. 46–74.

6 P. Lal, Tanzanian Ujamaa in a World of Peripheral Socialisms, in: C. Jian, et al. (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Global Sixties: Between Protest and Nation-Building, Abingdon 2018, p. 368.

7 J. Mark, A. M. Kalinovsky, and S. Marung (eds.), Alternative Globalizations: Eastern Europe and the Postcolonial World, Bloomington 2020.

8 Ibid., pp. 3–4.

ordinated “a whole set of connections, interactions, trade links, and routes of circulation for ideas and people”.<sup>9</sup> While North Korea is geographically located in Asia, Pyongyang’s self-identification oscillated between ‘East’ and ‘South’ during the Cold War to facilitate its interactions both with socialist states in Eastern Europe and postcolonial states in Asia and Africa. Its adoption of “imagined affinity” could be understood as a part of its globalization project, since the shared narrative of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism was a feasible and practicable means to establish an extensive network with the postcolonial states, instead of exploiting underdeveloped countries through unequal relations of trade.

North Korean engagement in Africa had been comprehended as an effort to gain superiority in competition with South Korea during the Cold War when Kim Il Sung attempted to enter the United Nations as the sole legitimate state in the Korean peninsula.<sup>10</sup> Having the upper hand in the inter-Korean competition was crucial for North Korea to maintain international pressure for the withdrawal of the US military in South Korea. North Korea asked its “Third World” partners to support the proposal in the UN for the withdrawal.<sup>11</sup>

Benjamin R. Young, who conceptualizes the national identity of North Korea as “autonomous anti-colonialism” and argues that Third Worldism constituted the fundamental part of its national identity, significantly expands the understanding of North Korea’s relations with the Global South.<sup>12</sup> Along with the inter-Korean competition, Young asserts that North Korea envisaged a developmental model based on its central Juche ideology, highlighting a self-reliant economy and self-defence.<sup>13</sup> Other scholars have further contributed to the scholarship, analysing North Korea’s relations with right-wing authoritarian regimes in Africa<sup>14</sup> and its adoption of cultural diplomacy – Juche Study Groups for ideological education<sup>15</sup> and monuments constructed by Mansudae Overseas Projects to promote historical solidarity between North Korea and African countries.<sup>16</sup>

The earlier phase of North Korea-Tanzania relations, namely between 1965 and 1970, is historically significant for several reasons. First, Dar es Salaam was a “hub of decolonization” that sought potential partners in East and South Africa by supporting liberation

9 Ibid., p. 6.

10 B. R. Young, *Guns, Guerillas, and the Great Leader: North Korea and the Third World*, Stanford 2021, pp. 4–5.

11 Ibid., p. 75.

12 Young, *Guns, Guerillas, and the Great Leader*, pp. 4–5.

13 Ibid., pp. 5–7.

14 See B. Young, *The Struggle for Legitimacy: North Korea’s Relations with Africa, 1965–1992*, in: BAKS Papers 16 (2015), pp. 101–103; L. Choi and I. Jeong, *North Korea and Zimbabwe, 1978–1982: From the Strategic Alliance to the Symbolic Comradeship Between Kim Il Sung and Robert Mugabe*, in: *Cold War History* 17 (2017) 4, pp. 329–349.

15 See T. van der Hoog, *Microphone Revolution: North Korean Cultural Diplomacy During the Liberation of Southern Africa*, in: S. L. Lewis and C. Stolte (eds.), *The Lives of Cold War Afro-Asianism*, Amsterdam 2022, pp. 265–290; I. Dobrzeniecki, *Juche Ideology in Africa: Its Origins & Development*, in: *Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia* 32 (2019), pp. 117–137.

16 See T. van der Hoog, *Monuments of Power: The North Korean Origin of Nationalist Monuments in Namibia and Zimbabwe*, Leiden 2019; C. Park, *The Namibian Heroes Acre Created by North Korea’s Mansudae Art Studio*, in: *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* 26 (2021) 3, pp. 165–169, pp. 178–179.

movements, such as the South-West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) and the Liberation Front of Mozambique (*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*, FRELIMO).<sup>17</sup> Second, several institutions were established between the two countries, which helped further exchanges in the 1980s, particularly in the field of agriculture and rural development. This solidarity in the 1960s projected one example of what Adom Getachew called “anticolonial worldmaking”, which appropriated decolonization as a project to “create a domination-free and egalitarian international order”.<sup>18</sup>

Julius Nyerere was deeply engaged in the second phase of worldmaking by implementing the nationwide socialist project and envisaging the New International Economic Order (NIEO) as an alternative to unequal economic integration.<sup>19</sup> While North Korea also demonstrated its support of the NIEO in the 1980s,<sup>20</sup> the languages of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism shared between the two countries in the 1960s demonstrate that their solidarity was an earlier-period attempt at “worldmaking”.

### Sources and Methods

Due to the difficult – if not impossible – access to documents on high-level communications in the North Korean and Tanzanian archives, primary sources published in North Korea, South Korea, Tanzania, and Australia are examined. Newspaper reports from North Korean and Tanzanian pro-government media are valuable sources for understanding the two governments’ perspectives.

*Rodong Shinmun*, an official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Worker’s Party of Korea, intermittently reported Tanzania’s political circumstances and economic development as a part of its international news. The *Nationalist*, launched in April 1964 and published by the Mwananchi News Company, was a pro-government newspaper supporting the development of post-colonial Tanzania.<sup>21</sup> It did not include reports on North Korea as much as *Ngurumo*, the most popular Swahili tabloid, which received substantial financial support from North Korea by accepting paid content in the 1960s.<sup>22</sup> Since both newspapers were monitored by the authoritarian ruling parties and governments, a critical reading of these sources is required, focusing on the official discourses and rhetoric of the regimes.

Digitalized documents are accessible in the National Archives of Australia, including a collection of savingsgrams and memoranda on Tanzanian relations with North Korea, primarily in the 1960s. These records include the Australian diplomat’s personal opinions on attached Tanzanian newspaper articles and interpretations of the current North Korea-Tanzania relations with advice toward South Korea for engagement. In addition,

17 Burton, *Hubs of Decolonization*, pp. 47–51.

18 A. Getachew, *Worldmaking after Empire: The Rise and Fall of Self-determination*, Princeton 2019, p. 2.

19 *Ibid.*, pp. 8–9, pp. 151–160.

20 Saeroun Kukchegyöngjeilssöüi Suribün Söngsuktoen Yogu [Establishing New International Economic Order is a mature demand], in: *Rodong Shinmun*, 6 January 1981.

21 Roberts, *Revolutionary State-Making in Dar es Salaam*, p. 208.

22 *Ibid.*, pp. 207–208.

several North Korean official sources investigate the North Korean comprehension of international politics in the 1960s. For example, later volumes of *Chosŏnjŏnsa* (Complete History of Chosŏn) discuss the North Korean foreign policy as a part of socialist nation-building history. *Chosŏnjungangnyŏn'gam* (the Almanac of North Korea) published by the Korean Central News Agency since 1949, also provides an update of North Korean foreign relations and summits between Kim Il Sung and foreign leaders.

The following section discusses the historical context in which North Korea became interested in establishing its socialist globalization project to develop contacts with post-colonial countries, especially Tanzania. Then, the paper investigates the North Korean method of using the language of anti-imperialist struggle and historical proximity in the earlier phase of its relationship with Tanzania. This is followed by an analysis of the Tanzanian perception of North Korea and whether this resonates with North Korea's identification with the historical and ongoing struggle against colonialism and imperialism. The last section summarizes the trajectory of North Korea-Tanzania relations in the late 1960s and briefly discusses how their relations shifted in the later period.

## 2. North Korean Crises in the 1960s: The Sino-Soviet Split and Gapsan Faction Incident

Since its independence from Japan in 1945, North Korea had not expanded its international relations beyond the socialist bloc until the mid-1950s and maintained close relationships only with the Soviet Union and China. Thus, the Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s had repercussions for North Korea's international position. As the relationship between the Soviet Union and China deteriorated, North Korea decided to adopt a neutral position between the two and reinforced its relations with the non-aligned countries.<sup>23</sup> Eungseo Kim asserts that the Sino-Soviet confrontation gave North Korea an opportunity to be more autonomous, and the government resultantly applied the idea of 'self-reliance' to its international policy.<sup>24</sup>

The confrontation between the two socialist superpowers also had an impact on Tanzania, as they competed for influence over the newly independent country. Julius Nyerere founded TANU in 1954 and called for socialism and self-reliance (*kujitegemea*) in the Arusha Declaration of 5 February 1967, where he envisaged Tanzania as a society based on the principles of *ujamaa*, literally meaning "familyhood", but generally represented

23 North Korea took a pro-Chinese stance after its exit from the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in 1962, but its relations with China deteriorated when Mao demonstrated his reluctance to support North Vietnam in 1965. See S. Lee, 1960nyŏndae Chungban Pukhan-Chungguk Kaldŭnggwa Pukhanŭi Chajunosŏn [Sino-North Korean Conflicts and North Korean Self-reliant Diplomacy Line], in: Pukhanhagyŏn'gu 3 (2007) 2, pp. 149–171.

24 E. Kim, 1960nyŏndae Chungban Pukhanŭi Chajuoegyonosŏn Ch'aet'aegae Kwanhan Yŏn'gu [Study on the Decision of North Korea's Self-Reliance Foreign Policy in the mid-1960s], in: Journal of World Politics 16 (2012), pp. 278–279.

his peculiar application of “African Socialism”.<sup>25</sup> According to Getachew, Nyerere’s argument for self-reliance did not refer to the country’s exit from the global economy but rather its priority to overcome dependency on the colonial economy and abolish hierarchical economic relations.<sup>26</sup> Nyerere’s pursuit of African socialism put the peasant and rural village central to the transformation, where these areas were nationalized and turned into *ujamaa villages* – cooperative villages where collective farming could secure self-reliance and equality for peasants and villagers.<sup>27</sup> At first, his ambition to construct a socialist country based on the idea of self-reliance received much attention from many parts of the world, including the Soviet Union and China.<sup>28</sup>

In addition to the Sino-Soviet split, the Soviet Union’s pressure on North Korea to become a full member of the CMEA and join the socialist division of labour had further consequences on North Korea’s emphasis on self-reliance. Although Pyongyang did not perceive the CMEA negatively until 1961, it presumably departed from the organization in July 1962, along with Albania, the People’s Republic of China, and North Vietnam, following Khrushchev’s pursuit of the socialist division of labour. Ah Reum Park contends that Kim Il Sung could not abolish the concentration on heavy industry, which had remained a core principle since the end of the Korean War.<sup>29</sup>

This heavy industry-first principle was clearly emphasized by Kim Il Sung in the course of quashing the August Faction Incident and remonstrating against the engagement of the Soviet Union and China in 1956. North Korea openly excoriated the Soviet Union as revisionist and imperialist due to its coerced enlisting in CMEA. Kim Il Sung emphasized self-support and “rebirth through one’s own efforts” (*Charyōkkaengsaeng*) instead of relying on patron states like the Soviet Union and China.<sup>30</sup> Although North Korea experienced economic hardships in the mid-1960s, in order to retain its principle of self-reliance, it did not request support from its neighbours.

Likewise, North Korea confirmed its policy of self-support and self-reliance in the Second Conference of the Workers’ Party of Korea in October 1966. After the party published a lengthy editorial in the newspaper and the monthly periodical *Let Us Defend Independency*<sup>31</sup>, Kim Il Sung publicly criticized the Soviet Union for its revisionism and dogmatism and China for “leftist opportunism” in his speech entitled “The Present Situation and the Tasks of Our Party”.<sup>32</sup> Although North Korea took a pro-Chinese stance

25 L. Schneider, Freedom and Unfreedom in Rural Development: Julius Nyerere, Ujamaa Vijijini, and Villagization, in: Canadian Journal of African Studies/La Revue canadienne des études africaines 38 (2004) 2, p. 348.

26 Getachew, Worldmaking after Empire, pp. 154–155.

27 P. Lal, African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania: Between the Village and the World, Cambridge 2015, p. 3.

28 J. Friedman, Ripe for Revolution: Building Socialism in the Third World, Cambridge 2021, pp. 125–126.

29 A. Park, 1962nyōn Pukhanūi ‘Sahoejuūi Kukchebunōp’ It’al Punsōk [Analysis of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s departure from the ‘International Socialist Division of Labor’ in 1962], in: Critical Studies on Modern Korean History 45 (2021), p. 457.

30 A. Agov, The East Asian Frontier of the Socialist World: North Korea in the 1950s, in: Journal of American-East Asian Relations 24 (2017), p. 168.

31 Chajusōngūl onghohaja [Let Us Defend Independency], Kūlloja, August 1966.

32 K. Ryoo, International Environment and Domestic Political Change in North Korea from 1961 to 1967: How

after its exit from the CMEA, Kim Il Sung was eventually dissatisfied with China's decision not to engage in the Vietnam War and continue with the radicalism adopted in the Cultural Revolution in the mid-1960s. He also perceived the American engagement in the Vietnam War as a serious threat, believing that North Korea should be prepared to protect itself against the aggression of the imperialists.<sup>33</sup>

The external threat was intertwined with the internal political circumstances, namely, the Gapsan Faction Incident in 1967. Several high-ranking members of the Workers' Party, including Pak Geumcheol and Ri Hyosoon, challenged Kim Il Sung's policies of prioritizing heavy industry and national defence over light industry and consumer goods and criticized the leader's personality cult.<sup>34</sup> Recent studies of this incident have contended that the Gapsan Faction was purged because it opposed the succession plan that prioritized Kim Il Sung's family members, including Kim Young-Ju, the younger brother of Kim Il Sung, who had been internally appointed.<sup>35</sup> On the other hand, Kihl-jae Ryoo analyses external threats as another major cause of the purge and establishment of the Monolithic Ideological System as a pre-emptive measure, which ruled out potential challenges against Kim Il Sung's power and authority.<sup>36</sup> This incident marked a significant turning point in North Korean history, as Kim Il Sung consolidated absolute sovereignty and later institutionalized the Monolithic Leader system with the enactment of the Socialist Constitution in 1972.

North Korean historiography also demonstrates the Sino-Soviet split as a turning point in its foreign policy. According to Volume 30 of the official history, international circumstances were advantageous for North Korea's autonomous unification of the Korean Peninsula and socialist development, even though the revisionism and dogmatism within the socialist internationalist movement hindered the solidarity between socialist countries.<sup>37</sup> Its perception of the global circumstances was remarkably changed in the next volume, which describes the period between October 1966 and the Fifth Party Congress in November 1970 and analyses socialist countries as ununited and unable to cooperate due to internal differences in ideas. The author adds that "this global situation foments obstacles to the development of world revolution and causes repercussions for

Threat Perception Funneled down into the Monolithic Ideological System, in: *Review of North Korean Studies* 20 (2017) 1, p. 199.

33 Ibid., p. 202.

34 J. Person, The 1967 Purge of the Gapsan Faction and Establishment of the Monolithic Ideological System, in: North Korean International Documentation Project E-Dossier 15, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-1967-purge-the-gapsan-faction-and-establishment-the-monolithic-ideological-system> (accessed 15 December 2022).

35 Ibid.; M. Moon, Puk'anüi Kapsan'pa Sukch'önggwa T'rhöngmyöngjönt'ongt'üi Kulch'öl [The Purge of the Gapsan Faction and the Distorted 'Revolutionary Tradition' in North Korea], in: *Critical History Review* 139 (2022), pp. 349–354.

36 Ryoo, *International Environment and Domestic Political Change in North Korea*, pp. 208–209.

37 Institute of History at the Academy of Social Science, Chosönjönsa 30 [Complete History of Chosön 30], Pyongyang 1982, p. 19.

our revolution and development”.<sup>38</sup> This difference in tone describing the international circumstances implies that North Korea perceived the late 1960s as a moment of crisis within the socialist world. As a result, it became more interested in self-reliance and its relationship with the non-aligned countries.<sup>39</sup>

In order to overcome the crisis within the socialist world, the confrontation between its closest allies, and the internal political circumstances, North Korea adopted a new foreign policy prioritizing the anti-imperialist struggle as a way to achieve unification and cooperation among socialist countries and internationalist movements.<sup>40</sup> Therefore, it expanded its network of post-colonial and non-aligned countries to stretch the fronts of the global anti-imperialist struggle and protect those countries from the imperialists. The shift in foreign policy implies North Korea adapted its “Third Worldism” – its “global commitment to anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism” – to its national identity so as to underscore its membership within the global anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggle.<sup>41</sup> Although only a few articles mention the geopolitical significance of Tanzania from the North Korean perspective,<sup>42</sup> North Korea’s anti-colonial solidarity with Tanzania was not only significant due to Kim Il Sung’s close relationship with Julius Nyerere, then Tanzanian President and a prominent anti-colonial thinker, but also because of the significance of Dar es Salaam. North Korea’s connection with Tanzania provided an opportunity to raise its image as well as the prominence of Kim Il Sung, whom North Korean national media introduced as the leader of the Third World and the global anti-imperialist struggle.

### 3. North Korea’s Use of “Imagined Affinity” in Establishing Solidarity with Tanzania

North Korea utilized its experience of anti-colonial struggles against Japan and anti-imperialist struggles against the US to enhance solidarity with Tanzania. In order to forge their relations, North Korea made use of different methods, mainly at the official level. This included not only formal meetings between the government officials but also the publication of messages of solidarity in the newspapers and establishing friendship associations to facilitate the exchange. Although a variety of methods were employed for this, they all clearly shared the North Korean self-identification as a leader of the anti-imperialist struggle. Therefore, this section describes North Korea’s adoption of dif-

38 Institute of History at the Academy of Social Science, Chosŏnjŏnsa 31 [Complete History of Chosŏn 31], Pyongyang 1982, p. 14.

39 E. Kim, 1960nyŏndae Chungban Pukhanŭi Chajuoeogyonosŏn Ch’aet’aegae Kwanhan Yŏn’gu, p. 274.

40 Chosŏnjŏnsa 31, pp. 514–515.

41 Young, Guns, Guerillas, and the Great Leader, p. 4.

42 Tycho van der Hoog introduces Tanzania as an exemplary field of North Korean developmental aid in Africa. See T. van der Hoog, On the Success and Failure of North Korean Development Aid in Africa, in: Y. Kim (ed.), NKEF Policy and Research Paper Series, Washington D.C. 2022, pp. 31–42.

ferent ways of strengthening its ties with Tanzania and investigates how the idea of anti-imperialism was embedded within these activities.

First, after the initiation of official diplomatic ties in January 1965, several high-level meetings were held in Pyongyang and Dar es Salaam. Tanzania sent a delegation led by Second Vice-President Rashidi M. Kawawa to Pyongyang from 17 to 22 November 1965, during which the representatives signed a scientific and technical cooperation agreement and a trade agreement – North Korea was to buy sisal, hides, and cotton and Tanzania to purchase manufactured goods.<sup>43</sup> This visit was reciprocated by Vice President Kang Ryang Wuk going to Dar es Salaam in July 1966.<sup>44</sup> Although Kang's visit became controversial in Tanzania due to his over-emphasis on anti-Americanism (see below, next section), North Korea-Tanzania relations turned became settled two years later when President Nyerere visited North Korea.

Nyerere arrived in Pyongyang on 22 June 1968, after completing his second visit to China. Kim Il Sung gladly received his first goodwill mission at the airport, and more than 200,000 Pyongyang people gathered on the streets to welcome the Tanzanian guests.<sup>45</sup> During the welcoming speech, Kim Il Sung referred to the two countries' shared experience of the prolonged oppression of imperialists and current endeavours to establish a new society.<sup>46</sup> He added that these could facilitate mutual understanding and cooperation between them. The speeches of Kang visiting Dar es Salaam in 1966 were little different in that he emphasized the "common struggle against imperialism and colonialism for peace, national independence, and social progress".<sup>47</sup>

This does not mean that Nyerere had only reacted to the anti-imperialist discourses. In fact, beyond the struggle for liberation and unification, he praised the rapid post-war economic development of North Korea.<sup>48</sup> Since Nyerere's visit occurred only a year after the Arusha Declaration, Nyerere demonstrated a huge interest in the socialist reforms of the agricultural industry. This provided North Korea with further opportunities to cooperate with Tanzania in the agricultural sector, which were realized later in the 1970s and 1980s.

Further to the high-level talks, which were one-off events, North Korean newspapers constantly published articles on the independence and development of Tanzania from the early 1960s. These demonstrate that North Korea had a strong interest in Tanzania

43 National Archives of Australia (hereafter NAA): A1838, 154/11/91, Inward Savingram, Department of External Affairs, Canberra, 2 December 1965.

44 Warm Welcome, in: *The Nationalist*, 3 July 1968.

45 Kkūnūl su Ōmnūn Ch'insōnūi Nyudaewa Chōnt'ujōktan'gyōrūi Shiwi [Unbreakable Solidarity of Friendship And Militant Unity], in: *Rodong Shinmun*, 23 June 1968.

46 Taet'ongnyōng Kakhaūi uri Nara Pangmunūn tu Nara Inmindūlgane Maejōjin Ch'insōnūi Myōngbaekhan Siwiro Toenda [The Visit of Your Excellency Clearly Demonstrates the Friendship Between the People of Two Countries], in: *Rodong Shinmun*, 23 June 1968.

47 NAA: A1838, 154/11/91, Memorandum from Australian High Commission to the Department of External Affairs, Canberra, 9 July 1966.

48 Kimilsōngsusangūi Ryōngdomit'e Kwigugesō Talsōnghān Kyōngt'anhalmanhan Palchōnesō T'anjanja Inmindūrūn Manūn'gōsūl Paeulgōshida [Tanzanian People Will Learn a Lot from the Development of Your Country Under the Guidance of Premier Kim Il Sung], in: *Rodong Shinmun*, 25 June 1968.

and attempted to identify commonalities by referring to the history of colonialism. For instance, *Rodong Shinmun* published an editorial entitled “New Step Of The Friendship-Cooperation Relationship Between the People of Joseon (North Korea) and Tanzania” to commemorate diplomatic relations on 16 January 1965.<sup>49</sup> The editorial noted that the two countries were geographically distant, but they were closely connected by their positions in the past and the shared present purpose and struggle against imperialism and colonialism to fortify national independence. This resonates with another editorial welcoming Kawawa in November, which praised the Tanzanian endeavour for ruling out engagement with the West and its commitment to support the national liberation movements of Mozambique, Angola, and Portuguese Guinea (today’s Guinea-Bissau).<sup>50</sup> In fact, North Korea’s use of a shared history was not unusual in the socialist globalization projects in the 1960s. Zhou Enlai, the first Premier of the People’s Republic of China, referred to the admiral Zheng He’s voyages to East Africa in the early Ming period to demonstrate the historicity of the connection between China and East Africa.<sup>51</sup> He also mentioned the *Maji Maji War* during the colonial period as a similar experience to the Chinese anti-imperialist struggle when he visited Dar es Salaam in 1965.<sup>52</sup> The idea of “imagined affinities” was sometimes reciprocated by African intellectuals, where Ethiopian journalists mentioned the experience of Italian Fascism that was shared between Yugoslavia and Ethiopia when Tito visited Ethiopia.<sup>53</sup> North Korea managed to establish close contact with Tanzania using the imagined affinities of the two countries’ common experiences of anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggles, which made it different from other globalization projects in which the Soviet Union and China acted as socialist patrons and invested extensive financial resources in foreign aid to develop ties with the postcolonial state in the South. Although North Korea provided agricultural aid in Tanzania in the 1980s, their cooperation in the 1960s was primarily built upon the rhetoric of anti-imperialist struggle.

The language of a shared anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggle was repeated in articles on Tanzania. Due to the spatial constraint of newspapers, these articles encapsulated the timeline by choosing certain critical historical incidents that best demonstrated the simi-

49 Chosŏn T’anjania Inmin Kanūi Ch’insŏn Hyŏpcho Kwan’gyeūi Saeroun Tan’gye [New Step of the Friendship-Cooperation Relationship Between the People of Joseon (North Korea) and Tanzania], in: *Rodong Shinmun*, 16 January 1965.

50 Chosŏn Inminūn T’anjania Inmin’gwaūi Ch’insŏnūl Kwijunghi Yŏgigo Itta [North Korean People Value the Friendship with Tanzanian people], in: *Rodong Shinmun*, 16 November 1965.

51 J. Monson, *Africa’s Freedom Railway: How a Chinese Development Project Changed Lives and Livelihoods in Tanzania*, Bloomington 2009, p. 6. Jeremy Friedman points out that Zhou did not pay much attention to the ujamaa scheme, particularly compared to the Tanzanian struggle against imperialism, which was mentioned five times during his speech in 1968. See Friedman, *Ripe for Revolution*, pp. 126–127.

52 The *Maji-Maji War* (1905–1907) was a rebellion of Africans in southern German East Africa (today’s Tanzania), against various forces including German colonial officials, Arab administrators, and other colonial settlers and missionaries. See T. Sunseri, *The Maji-Maji War, 1905–1907*, in: *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of African History* (2022), <https://oxfordre.com/africanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277734-e-154> (accessed 19 May 2022).

53 P. Betts and R. Vučetić, *Culture*, in: J. Mark and P. Betts (eds.), *Socialism Goes Global: The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the Age of Decolonisation*, Oxford 2022, p. 157.

larity between the two countries. The article “Tanzania, Moving Forward with Banners of Anti-Imperial Struggle Flying,” published after the establishment of diplomatic relations, described Tanzania’s past – including the histories of Tanganyika’s and Zanzibar’s independence – along with its socialist reforms and its decision – highly valued – to accept refugees from Mozambique.<sup>54</sup>

The *Rodong Shinmun* editorial on the day of Nyerere’s arrival in 1968 stated that the people of North Korea and Tanzania were geographically distant but had both suffered from colonization in the past and had the common denominator of a struggle against imperialism and colonialism.<sup>55</sup> A few days before Nyerere’s visit to Pyongyang, the newspaper also published a half-page article on the history of Tanzania, from European Colonialism’s oppression to the country’s nation-building process after independence in 1961.<sup>56</sup> The article mentioned the *Maji-Maji war* as a prominent example of how Tanzanians fought against colonialists and emphasized that the anti-colonial struggle did not end in the 1960s, even after the independence of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, due to the permanent threat of imperialists. These reports highlighted Tanzania’s experience of colonial oppression, anti-colonial struggle, and post-independence socialist reform – issues that rationalized North Korea’s pursuit of solidarity with a socialist country in East Africa.

The two countries institutionalized their partnership in 1969 with the establishment of the Korea-Tanzania Friendship Association. The language of anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism was conspicuously reiterated during the inaugural meeting at the Chollima House of Culture on 21 November 1969. Kim Gwan Sop, acting chair of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, particularly advocated the anti-imperialist struggle for the consolidation of national independence and clarified that the Association would “struggle against imperialism headed by U.S. imperialism and its lackeys”.<sup>57</sup> Tanzanian Ambassador Salim Ahmed Salim responded that his country’s people supported the North Korean endeavour for national unification and admired their “patriotism coupled with internationalism”.<sup>58</sup> The Association thus repeated what North Korea stressed in developing its relationship with Tanzania.

To summarize, North Korea used the language of anti-imperialist struggle and a shared history of colonialism to highlight its connections with Tanzania. In other words, the historical proximity of North Korea to Tanzania was the central aspect of its socialist globalization project there rather than its identity as a socialist country that had achieved successful industrialization in a short period of time after the Korean War, which had devastated its economic base. This identification can be read in two different ways. As

54 Panje T’ujaengūi Kich’irūl Nomni Tūlgo Chōnjinhānūn T’anjania [Tanzania, Moving Forward with Banners of Anti-Imperial Struggle Flying], in: *Rodong Shinmun*, 16 January 1965.

55 Ch’insōnūi Sajōl, Kwijungan Sonnim [Envoy of Friendship, a Valuable Guest], *Rodong Shinmun*, 22 June 1968.

56 Panjejaribūi Killo Naganūn T’anjania [Tanzania on the Route to Anti-Imperialism and Self-Reliance], in: *Rodong Shinmun*, 22 June 1968.

57 Korea-Tanzania Friendship Association Inaugurated, in: *The Pyongyang Times*, 1 December 1969.

58 Ibid.

mentioned in several newspaper articles, the memory of anti-colonial struggle and the ongoing anti-imperialist struggle were major achievements of North Korea that it used to promote its image and position itself as a global leader (i.e. of anti-imperialism). At the same time, however, the identification can be comprehended as North Korean “victimhood nationalism” based on the sense of “historical backwardness, national humiliation, and wounded national pride”, which incorporated socialism with authoritarianism and rapid modernization.<sup>59</sup> This identification could be intertwined with North Korean *Juche* ideology, usually translated as “self-reliance”, providing the nationalist elites of the newly independent countries with sources for connection to their own political and financial struggles caused by long-established colonialism and imperialism.<sup>60</sup>

#### 4. North Korea in the Eyes of Tanzanians: “True Socialist Revolutionaries”

While North Korea used self-identification to justify its relations and historical proximity to Tanzania, Tanzanian acknowledgment of this and solidarity response should be examined from its own perspective. Despite the North Korean effort to build close ties, according to memoranda in 1966, there were disagreements regarding Tanzania’s support of North Korea’s anti-imperialist struggle and, particularly, anti-US sentiment. Condemnation of the United Nations as a threat to North Korea became a controversial issue in Tanzanian newspapers in 1966. The Australian Commission detailed this incident in memoranda.

When North Korean Vice-President Kang Ryang Wuk visited Tanzania in 1966, the Tanzanian *Standard* published an editorial, “Abuses”, on 29 June 1966, arguing that some foreign missions had misused diplomatic privileges to denounce their rivals, which eventually interrupted the relationships between Tanzania and the third parties.<sup>61</sup> The editorial continues:

*[T]he latest breach comes from the North Korean mission in Dar es Salaam. It is in the form of an attack on American “aggressors” in South Korea. The statement was misleading, for it ignored the fact that the Korean War was fought by a United Nations force and that the U.S. troops still in the country are there only as part of a United Nations force surrounding the Korean issue, but it must be remembered that Tanzania as a member of the United Nations contributes to the maintenance of the U.N. “police” force and cannot condone any suggestion that it is there for purposes of aggression.*

This argument was soon refuted by the “Pressman’s Commentary” in *the Nationalist*, denouncing the *Standard*’s editorial as “a cold-warrior in disguise”. This article denounced

59 J. Lim, *Global Easts: Remembering, Imagining, Mobilizing*, New York 2022, pp. 276–278.

60 *Ibid.*, p. 278.

61 Abuses, in: *Standard*, 29 June 1966, attached to NAA: A1838, 154/11/91, Memorandum from Australian High Commission, Dar es Salaam, to the Department of External Affairs, Canberra, 13 July 1966.

the editorial as accusing North Korea of triggering anti-US sentiment.<sup>62</sup> It particularly criticized the attitude of pretending to be non-aligned. According to the relevant memorandum, the State House approved the publication of this Pressman's Commentary.<sup>63</sup> Although the *Nationalist* sided with North Korea's denunciation of the US, it reported that Kang's state visit was relatively unsuccessful. Two memoranda, written on 29 July and 9 November 1966, even suggested that South Korea seek to make up with Tanzania since the Tanzanians were annoyed with North Korea's anti-US propaganda, which had resulted in their reluctance to participate in the joint communique after Kang's visit.<sup>64</sup> According to this report, Nyerere even refused to allow Kang to hold his scheduled press conference before leaving Dar es Salaam. This incident indicates that Tanzanians did not fully accept North Korea's self-identification when it might threaten their own relations with the West.

Despite the reportedly damaged relationship, Nyerere's state visit to Pyongyang in June 1968 revealed strong solidarity.<sup>65</sup> From the beginning, the Tanzanian president explained that he had come to North Korea to look and listen to how North Korea had achieved its development even under the threat of external imperialism. Along with the shared experience of the permanent threat of imperialism, Nyerere also referred to the speech of Kim Il Sung to highlight the similarity in the socialism of the two countries.

Nyerere asserted the shared emphasis of North Korean and Tanzanian socialism on economic self-reliance, which connected them as friends and comrades.<sup>66</sup> The *Nationalist* report, "Socialism is not Abstract", also quoted Nyerere as proclaiming that "Socialism is not something abstract, a thing which is good in any idealistic sense" since "Socialism is good because it is people-centred", with the Tanzanian president connecting his rural development projects to the words of Kim Il Sung: "Fertilisers mean rice, and rice means socialism."<sup>67</sup> While anti-colonialism was not the central topic of his state visit, editorial comment on the *Nationalist* mentioned China, (North) Korea, and Tanzania as "friends and comrades in arms [who] march along in the struggle for socialism against colonialism, neo-colonialism, and imperialism".<sup>68</sup>

Another memorandum, on 10 September 1968, also delineated how North Korea and Tanzania were developing a reciprocal relationship, as against Tanzania's initially passive

62 Cold-warrior in disguise, in: *The Nationalist*, 1 July 1966.

63 NAA: A1838, 154/11/91, Memorandum from Australian High Commission, Dar es Salaam, to the Department of External Affairs, Canberra, 13 July 1966.

64 Ibid.

65 NAA: A1838, 154/11/91, Memorandum from Australian High Commission, Dar es Salaam, to the Department of External Affairs, Canberra, 1 August 1968. This memorandum mentions that North Korea agreed to supply £60,000 worth of machine tools and building materials to Tanzania in January 1967.

66 T'anjanianmin'gwa Chosŏnmin'ūn Kongdong'ui T'ujaengesŏ Pŏsūrosŏ, Tongjirosŏ Ap'ūro Chŏnjinhāl Kōsida [People of Tanzania and North Korea Will Advance Forward as Friends and Comrades in Common Struggles], in: Minju Choson, 24 June 1968.

67 Socialism is not Abstract, in: *The Nationalist*, 25 June 1968.

68 Welcome Back Home, Mwalimu, in: *The Nationalist*, 26 June 1968.

role.<sup>69</sup> The memorandum did not consider the growing relations between Tanzania, on the one hand, and North Vietnam and North Korea, on the other, to be significant, but it did provide reasons for why these Asian countries attracted Tanzania.

First, it evaluated that the Asian countries had envisaged “the problems and have found some of the answers to difficulties which Tanzania either faces or may face in the future”.<sup>70</sup> Second, Nyerere’s interest in North Korea, according to the memorandum, was founded on his comprehension of North Korea’s achievements, which had prompted him to take North Korea as a model from which he drew inspiration when shaping the Arusha Declaration. Third, Nyerere regarded Tanzania’s relations with North Korea as equal – free from dominance – unlike the “implied inferiority” in its relations with China. Finally, Nyerere was aware of the universal characteristics of the anti-colonial and anti-imperial struggle for freedom, from where the urgency of solidarity could be derived.<sup>71</sup>

After the summit, Nyerere sent indigenous Tanzanian animals as gifts to Kim Il Sung for the hospitality North Koreans had provided during his stay in Pyongyang.<sup>72</sup> Salim Ahmed Salim, the newly appointed Tanzanian Ambassador to North Korea, mentioned that the gifts, 47 animals and 17 species of birds, were “living symbols” of friendship and solidarity between the two countries. According to the *Pyongyang Times*, these animals were kept in Pyongyang Zoo, where North Korean people could feel the “friendship cherished by the people of Tanzania”.<sup>73</sup>

North Korea’s language of anti-imperialist struggle not only targeted Tanzanian officials but also reached some Tanzanian individuals. For instance, one of the foreign visitors’ comments in the guestbook of the Fatherland Liberation War Museum (today’s Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum) in Pyongyang was made by a Tanzanian journalist, according to the *Pyongyang Times*, who, after visiting the museum, which demonstrates the North Korean readings of the Korean War, commented that Koreans should fight against the US imperialists and South Korean puppets to rule out imperialism and achieve unification under Kim Il Sung’s leadership.<sup>74</sup> North Korea’s influence on Tanzania was further extended when the TANU Youth League invited experts to “instill in its youth the concept of a true social revolution”.<sup>75</sup> North Korea’s delegation of seven experts was dispatched to Tanzania in November 1968, not to transfer technical know-how but to inspire young people to work as the vanguard of national reconstruction. Emphasizing its first invitation to an external delegation of experts to teach revolutionary ideas, the *Nationalist*, introduced North Korea as “one of the few nations that are

69 NAA: A1838, 154/11/91, Memorandum from Australian High Commission, Dar es Salaam, to the Department of External Affairs, Canberra, 10 September 1968.

70 Ibid.

71 Ibid.

72 Kimilsŏngdongjikke Tŭrinŭn T’anjaniaryŏnhapkonghwagung Chullŏsŭ K’ei Nierere Taet’ongnyŏngŭi Sŏnmulchŏndalmoimi Issŏtta [A Meeting Held to Convey the Gifts of Julius K. Nyerere, the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, to Premier Kim Il Sung], in: Rodong Shinmun, 2 July 1969.

73 President JULIUS K. NYERERE Sends Gift to Premier KIM IL SUNG, in: The *Pyongyang Times*, 14 July 1969.

74 Visitors’ Book in War Memorial, in: The *Pyongyang Times*, 9 February 1967.

75 Koreans to Advise TYL on True Socialism, in: The *Nationalist*, 12 November 1968.

well advanced on the path of socialism”.<sup>76</sup> This implies that the governing party, which was supported by *the Nationalist*, was also attracted to North Korean people, who were described as disciplined and committed to the development of the state.

According to the contemporary sources, North Korea was acknowledged by Nyerere and other Tanzanian politicians as a genuine fighter against permanent colonialism and imperialism with which Tanzania could build a relationship and become a partner in solidarity between socialist countries. Rather than financial aid or construction project – like the Chinese TAZARA Railway project – North Korea-Tanzania solidarity was built on the rhetoric of anti-imperialism. Nyerere also indicated his keen interest in North Korea’s rapid agricultural development after the Japanese colonial rule and the Korean War.

As noted, North Korean identification as an anti-American revolutionary was not always appreciated in Tanzania. Still, the two countries established a close relationship and Tanzanian political officials recognized the North Korean endeavour – as triumphant or as a victim – in the struggle against US imperialism. It should also be noted that the first Tanzanian president revisited North Korea in 1981 and 1985 – even after North Korea’s economic development and industrialization had become much slower than that of South Korea.

## **5. Conclusion: The North Korean Socialist Globalization Project in Regard to Tanzania in the 1960s and the Shifts in the 1970s and 1980s**

Between 1965 and 1970, North Korea used the language of anti-imperialism and shared experiences to help establish a close relationship with Tanzania. This solidarity was not only built on meetings between high-level officials but also developed through a series of efforts by North Korea to emphasize it against the omnipresent threat of imperialists and to praise Tanzanians’ achievement of independence and socialist reform. Unable to deploy major financial resources, North Korea’s socialist globalization project in the 1960s was primarily shaped around the rhetoric of anti-imperialist struggle and “imagined affinity” to realize extensive networks with non-capitalist states in the decolonized world. This study of the North Korea-Tanzania connection provides a pertinent example of the shift within North Korean foreign policy in the late 1960s. The confrontation between the Soviet Union and China prompted North Korea to take a relatively independent path in its international relations, particularly after 1966 when Kim Il Sung declared “independent diplomacy” as the country’s official foreign policy, denouncing both of its closest allies.

The North Korean socialist globalization project in regard to Tanzania also temporarily overlapped with the internal crisis of the Gapsan Faction Incident, where several high-ranking party officials challenged Kim Il Sung’s power and the succession plan. While Kim Il Sung consolidated stronger authority after this incident domestically, North Ko-

rea required a trustworthy companion to provide mutual support for independence as well as Kim Il Sung’s anti-imperialism and anti-Americanism aiming at the eventual socialist unification of the Korean Peninsula. Tanzania was one of the destinations of North Korean diplomacy during this period and soon emerged as an African core in North Korea’s “imagined geography”.<sup>77</sup>

At the same time, Julius Nyerere reportedly found North Korea to be an appropriate partner of solidarity both because of North Korea’s development as a model of the Arusha Declaration and also due to the global nature of the colonial and imperial threat. The latter demonstrates that Tanzania’s identification of North Korea corresponded to North Korea’s self-identification, which thus connected two distant leaders of countries without previous relations. Nyerere came to consider North Korea a more significant comrade than China, and North Korea’s identification was, in fact, a crucial tool in its participation in competing socialist globalization projects in Africa during the Cold War period. As Boga Thura Manatsha comments, Nyerere even inspired Seretse Khama, President of Botswana, to establish a friendship with Kim Il Sung, even though the two leaders were following different ideological paths.<sup>78</sup> This hints that contacts with other countries in Africa followed the North Korean engagement in Tanzania and in the non-aligned movement more broadly, which later accepted North Korea as a full member in 1975.

In the 1970s and 1980s, North Korea placed more importance on financial and technical aid in its relationship with Tanzania than it had in the 1960s. For instance, in October 1973, the South Korean embassy reported that North Korea granted 3,000 tons of cement and 5,000 tons of steel bars worth USD 200,000 in total.<sup>79</sup> From 1975, several North Korean experts were dispatched to Morogoro, 200 kilometres west of Dar es Salaam, to advise on agricultural and food production.<sup>80</sup> Originally named the “Dakawa Rice Irrigation Project”, this project could only be implemented in 1980, five years later, after gaining loans from the African Development Bank, Tanzania Investment Bank, and the Tanzanian government.<sup>81</sup> Following a meeting of agricultural ministers from non-aligned countries in Pyongyang, this project was developed into an agreement between North Korea and Tanzania wherein the former provided the latter with experts to support irrigation farming and agricultural development.<sup>82</sup> North Korean experts eventu-

77 Kim Il Sung ordered the establishment of agricultural science institutes in Guinea and Tanzania for West and East African countries, respectively, after the Symposium on Non-Aligned and Other Developing Countries on Increasing Food and Agricultural Production hosted in Pyongyang in August 1981. C. Ok, Naengjŏn’gi Pukhanŭi Sangsang Chiriwa ‘Pyŏngyang Sŏnŏn’ [Pyongyang Declarations: Imaginative Geography of North Korea during the Cold War], in: *Journal of Peace and Unification Studies* 12 (2020) 1, pp. 23–26.

78 B. T. Manatsha, Geopolitical Implications of President Seretse Khama’s 1976 State Visit to North Korea, in: *Botswana Notes and Records* 50 (2018), p. 143.

79 South Korean Diplomatic Archives: 6029, 725.1TZ, D-0014, 33, Pukhan-T’anjania Kwan’gye [North Korea-Tanzania Relations] 1973, Memorandum from the Korean Ambassador to Kenya to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 29 October 1973.

80 South Korean Diplomatic Archives: 25290, 725.1, Pukhan-T’anjania Kwan’gye [North Korea-Tanzania Relations] 1985-86, Memorandum from the Korean Ambassador to Kenya to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 30 June 1985.

81 Ibid.

82 DPRK irrigation experts coming, in: *Daily News*, 10 September 1981.

ally established the *Cheollima Agricultural Science Institute*, but in 1982, the project was suddenly concluded.<sup>83</sup> Although the basic idea of anti-imperialist struggle persisted, it is striking that North Korea decided to finance these aids despite its continuing economic stagnation, which had begun in the late 1960s.

As noted in the introduction, this study not only provides a rare picture of North Korea-Tanzania relations but also demonstrates the dynamics of North Korean socialist globalization projects, which used “imagined affinity” to develop ties with ex-colonies, such as Tanzania. The paper has not expanded its discussion to the broader ramifications of North Korea-Tanzania relations, such as the former’s engagement in various other southern African liberation movements. In this regard, it might be considered an essential starting point to study North Korea as an active player rather than a mere beneficiary or an agent of socialist globalization projects during the period of decolonization and the Cold War.