Occupied Imperial Women: Japanese Feminists Making the US "Liberation of Japanese Women" Their Own Cold War Propaganda

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ABSTRACTS

Am 25. August 1945, zehn Tage nach Kriegsende, rief Ichikawa Fusae (1893–1981) Feministinnen zusammen, um das Frauenwahlrecht und die amerikanische Besatzung Japans (1945–1952) zu diskutieren. Sie arbeiteten mit amerikanischen Frauen zusammen, was zu drastischen Gesetzesänderungen für Frauen in Japan führte. Die bisherige Forschung mit einem Fokus auf Besatzer und Besetzte hat den Eindruck erweckt, dass diese japanischen Frauen nur sekundäre Akteure in der Politikgestaltung waren. Durch die Analyse vernachlässigter Aspekte des umfangreichen aktivistischen Hintergrunds japanischer Feministinnen, ihrer überlegenen Haltung gegenüber den amerikanischen Besatzern und ihrer Anti-Prostitutions-Bemühungen argumentiert dieser Artikel nicht nur, dass die Nachkriegspolitik in Bezug auf japanische Frauen die kolonialen Vorstellungen japanischer Feministinnen aus der Vorkriegszeit repräsentierte, sondern auch, dass diese Feministinnen die "demokratische" amerikanische Vorherrschaft nutzten, um eine Politik umzusetzen, die ihre Wurzeln in den japanischen Frauenbewegungen seit den 1870er Jahren hatte. Indem sie die proklamierte "Befreiung der japanischen Frauen" seitens der US-Besatzer zu ihrer eigenen Propaganda machten, führten japanische Feministinnen die Schaffung einer bilateralen US-amerikanisch-japanischen Vorherrschaft im transpazifischen Kalten Krieg an.

On 25 August 1945, ten days after the defeat, Japanese feminists gathered to discuss suffrage and the US occupation of Japan (1945–1952). They worked with American women that resulted in drastic legal changes for Japanese women. Previous scholarship with an approach of occupier and occupied based on race has given the impression that these Japanese women were secondary actors in the policymaking. By analyzing overshadowed aspects of Japanese feminists' extensive activist backgrounds, their superior attitude towards the American occupi-

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ers, and their anti-prostitution efforts, this article not only argues that post-war policies relating to Japanese women represented Japanese feminists' prewar colonial notions but that these feminists took advantage of "democratic" American domination to implement policies rooted in Japanese feminist movements from the 1870s forward. Turning the US occupation's "liberation of Japanese women" into their own propaganda, Japanese feminists led the creation of bilateral US-Japan domination in the Cold War Pacific.

1. Introduction

"[S]how that Uncle Sugar's (combination of Uncle Sam and Sugar Daddy) boys and girls over here [in Japan] are really helping to educate Japanese women", wrote Marion P. Echols, head of the Public Relations Office of the US Army Forces, Pacific, in December 1946. Calling it "an excellent opportunity to 'sell' the occupation", Echols instructed Lt. Ethel Weed (1906–1975), women's information officer for Civil Information and Education (CIE), Supreme Commander of Allied Powers (SCAP), to add more paragraphs to an article she was drafting about Japanese women's progress after the granting of suffrage under the US occupation (1945–1952).[1] The topic of the raised status for Japanese women through the US occupation was a heavily publicized event labelled the "liberation of Japanese women", which became central to the US claim of a "workshop of democracy" in Japan. However, by August 1946, Cdr. Alfred R. Hussey Jr., special assistant to the chief of the Government Section of SCAP, had ordered that "[t]he formation of a women's block [*sic*] or the encouragement of a feminist movement in Japan must be avoided".[2] Scholars have criticized the false notion of the "liberation of Japanese women", which was actually used to paint the United States as "Uncle Sugar" – the benevolent, civilizing leader of the world – to sell American capitalism in competition with Soviet communism. Scholars further criticize Japanese feminists' supporting role in this imperialist propaganda effort, arguing that they assisted Americans in formulating policies for Japanese women based on Cold War middle-class American values. However, as this article shows, privileged Japanese feminists were capable of formulating their own "liberation" policies and even exploiting US propaganda for their own political agenda.
Japanese feminists initiated their post-war women's movement on 25 August 1945, only 10 days after Japan's surrender. Gathered in bombed-out Tokyo by the summons of suffragist leader Ichikawa Fusae (1893–1981), 72 feminists had successfully lobbied for women's suffrage to be part of post-war law by 11 October.[3] However, a day later, the press in Japan and abroad, ignoring the feminists' achievement, sensationally reported

1 M. P. Echols, 19 December 1946, Box 5247, Record Group 331, National Archives at College Park, MD.
2 A. Hussey, Memo Re the Emancipation of Women, 17 August 1946, 61-B-2-2, Reel 7, Alfred R. Hussey Papers, Microfilm, University of Michigan Asia Library, Ann Arbor, MI.
3 Ichikawa Fusae Kinenkai, Ichikawa Fusae to Fujin Sanseiken Undō: Ichikawa Fusae Seitan 100-nen Kinen [Ichikawa Fusae and the Women's Suffrage Movement: Ichikawa Fusae's 100th Anniversary of Birth], Tokyo 1992, pp. 49–50.

Gen. Douglas MacArthur's announcement claiming to liberate Japanese women by granting them suffrage – a gift crafted in an American workshop of democracy. Nonetheless, those 72 feminists became the nucleus of a de facto post-war women's policy alliance working with American women occupation members. This alliance, including Weed, brought about drastic legal changes, with new laws guaranteeing equality between Japanese women and men in marriage, education, and labour – rights even surpassing those of women in the United States.[4] Although the Japanese feminists were called "Weed's Girls", a closer examination of their backgrounds and their attitude towards the white American occupiers indicates that these Japanese feminists were more than nameless assistants of the American women.

First, my research on Japanese feminists' writings has revealed that Japanese feminists were the ones who formulated post-war policies related to Japanese women. The historiography of modern Japanese feminism confirms that most, if not all, post-war legal changes for Japanese women had been advocated by the same Japanese feminists since the 1910s.[5] Second, those writings show that Japanese feminists were much more educated and experienced activists than the majority of American occupiers, including those in the women's alliance. The Japanese feminists were upper-class and elite, even according to US standards of the 1940s, as many of them had been educated at prestigious American and British universities. Japanese feminists were also more experienced in the national and international women's movements than were the Americans in the women's alliance. They had had connections with prominent American feminists, including Jane Addams (1860–1935), Carrie Chapman Catt (1859–1947), and Alice Paul (1885–1977), since the 1920s. Third, the writings of these privileged feminists reveal that some believed that the occupiers – inexperienced and of lower socio-economic class – were unqualified to draft new laws and they were consequently rather condescending towards them. Some scholarship has suggested that these US-liberated Japanese feminists were "poster girls" for capitalist democracy in the US cultural battle against Soviet communism.[6] However, the history of modern Japanese feminism and the findings presented here indicate that, in a partial reversal of historical thinking, the US propaganda – and its motto of the "liberation of Japanese women" – actually served the Japanese feminists and their decades-long agendas.

Previous scholarship has criticized the US occupation politics of women's liberation and the legislation drafted by the women's alliance as constituting an imperialist, middle-class feminist project of American Cold War expansionism.[7] However, that argument relies heavily on US military records and adopts a postcolonial view of occupier and occupied based on race and empire. As such, it has featured Japanese women as "guided" seconda-

4 B. N. Ramusack/S. Sievers, Women in Asia: Restoring Women to History, Bloomington 1999, p. 225.

5 See, e.g., V. Mackie, Feminism in Japan, Cambridge 2003.

6 M. Koikari, Pedagogy of Democracy: Feminism and the Cold War in the U.S. Occupation of Japan, Philadelphia 2008, p. 51.

7 For example, see Koikari, Pedagogy of Democracy; L. Yoneyama, Cold War Ruins: Transpacific Critique of American Justice and Japanese War Crimes, Durham 2016, pp. 81–110.

ry actors in the policy-making efforts and less imperialistic than the American women in the context of American expansionism. While sharing the critique of empire yet somewhat in contrast to previous scholarship, this article focuses on overshadowed Japanese women's own imperial subjectivity and their aggressive colonial past (and present).

Indeed, Japanese feminists' presumed secondary role in the liberation efforts was emphasized in previous scholarship. Pioneering scholar Susan Pharr states, "Cooperation with the American women in SCAP gave Japanese women a chance, for the first time in Japanese history, to have meaningful access to the policy making process."[8] Historian Sarah Kovner has claimed that "the American-written Japanese constitution granted women new freedoms" and "even as the Allied Occupation made some [Japanese] women victims [of sexual exploitation], it gave other, newly enfranchised women the tools to fight back."[9] In observing Japanese feminists' collective protest, sociologist Mire Koikari writes, "Empowered under the guidance of the CI&E, Japanese middle-class women fiercely protested the indiscriminate round-up [of Japanese women for the US military's venereal disease (VD) control]."[10] With the use of passive voice, these statements powerfully shape historical perceptions that Japanese women were merely supplemental actors in the US occupation.

This article offers a new and somewhat different interpretation of Japanese women during the US occupation and its central propaganda of the "liberation of Japanese women" by embedding the Japanese feminists' occupation-period gender politics in the modern Japanese feminist movement and its intricate relationship with Japanese imperialism. This approach suggests that it was the Japanese feminists, with their decades of activism, who most likely guided inexperienced middle-class Americans in formulating policies related to Japanese women. By formulating what were deemed progressive laws and in doing so behind the scenes, Japanese feminists granted Americans the opportunity to "save face" as the world's best civilizing force. Japanese feminists, by contesting prostitution between GIs and Japanese women and indiscriminate VD round-ups, claimed their own moral superiority – essential in establishing the division between superior and inferior in the occupied space – over the American occupiers.[11] These new perspectives could suggest that Japanese women were the primary, not the secondary, imperial agents of Cold War expansionism.

Rather than framing Japanese women's imperial subjectivity through a postcolonial approach – essentially a Eurocentric interpretation of colonialism – this article builds upon

8 S. Pharr, Bureaucratic Politics and Social Reform: The Women's Minors' Bureau in Occupied Japan, in: T. W. Burkman (ed.), The Occupation of Japan: Education and Social Reform; The Proceedings of a Symposium, the MacArthur Memorial, Old Dominion University, [and] the MacArthur Memorial Foundation, 16–18 October 1980, Norfolk 1982, pp. 401–423, at 418.

9 S. Kovner, Occupying Power: Sex Workers and Servicemen in Postwar Japan, Stanford 2012, pp. 99 and 16, respectively.

10 Koikari, Pedagogy of Democracy, p. 162.

11 For a study of morality in occupied space, see A. Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: Gender, Race, and Morality in Colonial Asia, in: M. di Leonardo (ed.), Gender at the Crossroads of Knowledge: Feminist Anthropology in the Postmodern Era, Berkeley 1991, pp. 51–101, at 85.

fundamental debates on Japanese women's imperialism by the leading Anpo (anti–Security Treaty movement of the late 1950s to the 1970s) generation feminists: poet Kōra Rumiko (b. 1932), historian Kanō Mikiyo (1940–2019), and journalist/activist Matsui Yayori (1934–2002). These feminists were keenly aware of Japan's unusual imperial status as Japan was subjected to unequal treaties with Euro-American powers while engaging in imperialism of its own by colonizing other Asian countries beginning in the late nineteenth century. They were critical of continuing Japanese neo-colonialism in the Cold War through the unequal US-Japan Security Treaty of 1951 (renewed in 1960 and 1970), which codified Japan's aid to US military aggressions in the Pacific, exemplified in the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Anpo feminists' criticism of Japan's role in those wars and subsequent economic boosts elucidate how the US occupation did not disrupt Japanese imperialism; rather, it enabled Japan to maintain imperial power in Asia.

The Anpo feminists were also well aware of Japanese women's unusual imperialist status and criticized how the "liberation of Japanese women" was realized at the expense of lower-class women and former colonial subjects. Kōra pointed out that post-war women's movements segregated lower-class women, farmers, outcasts, and *zainichi* (non-Japanese residents in Japan), which reflected how Japan's post-war economic recovery – stimulated by the Korean and Vietnam Wars – progressed at the expense of former Japanese colonies.[12] Similarly, Kanō noted that "the defeat was the turning point of Japanese women's changing perception towards the United States [for the better], but it did not change perceptions towards Koreans and Chinese [former colonial subjects as lesser]".[13] In observing other Asian women sex workers in contemporary Japan, Matsui questioned, "What price do other Asian women pay for the prosperity and daily comfort of so many Japanese women? How do we as Japanese women stand in relation to the thousands of Filipino hostesses working in Japanese bars [and GI bars]?"[14] By pointing out the inequality between "liberated" Japanese women and Asian women from former Japanese colonies, Anpo feminists demonstrate that Japanese women's imperialism has been unchanged since the 1890s. In light of such continuity, Japanese feminists were neo-colonial women who were "liberated" at the expense of lower-class women and former colonial subjects.

This article, in contrast to postcolonial interpretations that foreground the victim status of occupied Japanese women, further demonstrates that privileged Japanese feminists held imperialistic attitudes about their middle- to lower-class white American occupiers. By analysing Japanese feminists' backgrounds, their attitude towards the American occupiers, and their anti-prostitution efforts, this article not only argues that post-war policies relating to Japanese women represented Japanese feminists' colonial notions of gender, race, class, and sexuality but that these feminists took advantage of "democratic" American domination to implement policies rooted in Japanese feminist movements from the 1870s forward. To some extent, Japanese women were (and still are) imperial women be-

12 R. Kōra, Takamura Itsue to Beauvoir [Takamura Itsue and Beauvoir], Tokyo 1976, pp. 281–283.

13 M. Kanō, Sengo-shi to Gender [Post-war History and Gender], Tokyo 2005, p. 52.

14 Y. Matsui, interview by S. Buckley in: Id., Broken Silence: Voices of Japanese Feminism, Berkeley 1997, p. 136.

cause they turned the "liberation of Japanese women" into their own propaganda project in promoting Japan's re-emergence to neo-colonial power. In doing so, they led the creation of bilateral US-Japan domination in the Cold War Pacific at the expense of lower-class women and former Japanese colonial subjects, as well as their American occupiers.

2. Japanese Feminists' Backgrounds

In 1985, a journalist, Nishi Kiyoko (1907–1995), referred to Japanese feminists in the post-war women's alliance as "Weed's Brain", meaning Japanese feminists had actually formulated the women's liberation policies.[15] In an interview, Nishi asked Katō Shizue (1897–2001), a socialist and leading alliance member, how much influence Weed and other American women had in formulating the policies. Katō answered by using the metaphor of a tree, saying that while Weed took the final decisions (roots), Japanese women formulated the policies (branches and leaves).[16] In an absence of Japanese women's reports in SCAP records, Katō's post-occupation statement is a significant historical challenge to the prevailing view that Japanese feminists were merely assistants in policy-making. In fact, since the 1870s Japanese feminists had advocated for the same types of reforms that would become the hallmarks of occupation reform policies.[17] The key Japanese alliance members had been leaders of women's movements since the 1910s and active participants in the interwar international women's movements. By the 1930s, though antagonism existed among the future alliance members, the basic idea of women's liberation – suffrage, anti-prostitution laws, and labour protection – had been collaboratively set forth. This section investigates the leading Japanese post-war alliance members' pre-war backgrounds, which further support Katō's claim that Japanese feminists, not Americans, led the creation of the post-war liberation policies.

Despite being impoverished by the war, most Japanese feminists in the women's alliance were privileged, well educated, and well-travelled. Katō Shizue was from a wealthy family and graduated from Joshi Gakushūin, established as an aristocrat girls' school. Between 1919 and 1920, she lived in New York and studied at the Ballard School of the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA).[18] Ichikawa had earned teaching credentials and lived in the United States between 1921 and 1924. In New York, she studied at the American Socialist Party's Rand School of Social Science and took University of Columbia extension courses.[19] Fujita Taki (1898–1993), a Tsuda College professor who reformed women's higher education, was from an elite family and had lived in imperial territories in Okinawa and Port Arthur, where she became fluent in Chinese. After gra-

15 K. Nishi, Senryōka no Nihon Fujin Seisaku: Sono Rekishi to Shōgen [Japanese Women's Policies under the Occupation: The History and Testimonies], Tokyo 1985, p. 206.
16 S. Katō, interview by Nishi, ibid., 65–66.
17 Mackie, Feminism in Modern Japan, pp. 15–119.
18 S. Katō, Aru Josei Seijika no Hansei [A Female Politician's Half a Lifetime], Tokyo 1997, pp. 23, 45.
19 F. Ichikawa, Ichikawa Fusae Jiden: Senzen-hen [Autobiography of Ichikawa Fusae: Pre-war], Tokyo 1974, p. 115.

duating from Tsuda College, Fujita lived in the United States between 1920 and 1925, earning another bachelor's degree at Bryn Mawr, and again in 1935/36 for graduate study at Smith College.[20] Many members of YWCA of Japan – future women's alliance members – had studied abroad, among them Hoshino Ai (1884–1972) at Bryn Mawr and Columbia Teachers College, and Katō Taka (1887–1979), who had studied at the University of California, Berkeley, and the London School of Economics and later worked for the SCAP women's section in Niigata.[21] While the US occupation promoted an image of helpless Japanese women needing American guidance, the "Weed's Girls" were comprised of elites whose education exceeded that of the majority of their American occupiers.

In addition, the Japanese feminists were experienced activists. In 1911, Gauntlett Tsuneko (1873–1953) and Kubushiro Ochimi (1882–1972) of the Japan Women's Christian Temperance Union (JWCTU) started an anti-prostitution movement.[22] In 1916, feminists, including a socialist, Yamakawa Kikue (1890–1980), began fiercely debating motherhood protections, and Yamakawa published "Women's Special Demands" (1925), which formed the basis of the post-war package of legislation for women.[23] Ichikawa briefly worked for Japan's largest union, Yūaikai, in 1919, forming a lasting bond with labour activists such as Akamatsu Tsuneko (1897–1965), who worked on women's labour issues during the occupation.[24] Ichikawa had joined the suffrage movement in 1919 and eventually led the Women's Suffrage League of Japan (JWSL), working closely with Gauntlett, Kubushiro, and Katō Shizue. Katō Shizue herself instigated the birth control movement by establishing the Birth Control Institute, along with Yamakawa, in 1922.[25] Thus, feminists had been working towards their idea of liberation for decades.

Japanese feminists were also active in international women's movements. In Geneva in 1920, Gauntlett participated in the Eighth International Women's Suffrage Alliance (IWSA); in London in 1928, Kubushiro helped JWSL join IWSA.[26] In Vienna in 1923, Katō Taka gave an eloquent speech calling for protective legislation for women workers at the Third International Congress of Working Women.[27] In Honolulu starting in 1928, Ichikawa, Fujita, Gauntlett, and Katō Taka participated in the Pan-Pacific

20 S. Hastings, Women's Education and the World: Fujita Taki (1898–1993), in: Asia Bunka Kenkyū [Cultural Studies] 39 (2013), pp. 49–64, at pp. 50–53.

21 Notes on Hoshino Ai and Katō Taka, YWCA of Japan Records, Tokyo.

22 Y. Yanagizono, Sengo Kaikakuki ni okeru "Junketsu" no Seiritu: Nihon Kirisutokyō Fujin Kyōfūkai Kikanshi "Fujin Shinpō" wo Chūshin ni [The Establishment of *Junketsu* During Post-war Reforms: Centering on JWCTU Newsletters, "New Reports on Women"], https://www.hues.kyushu-u.ac.jp/education/student/pdf/2013/2HE12043P.pdf (accessed 10 October 2020).

23 B. Molony, Equality versus Difference: The Japanese Debates over "Motherhood Protection", 1915–1950, in: J. Hunter (ed.), Japanese Women Working, London 1993, pp. 122–148; M. Takeuchi, At the Crossroads of Equality versus Protection: American Occupationnaire Women and Socialist Feminism in US Occupied Japan, 1945–1952, in: Frontiers 38 (2017) 2, pp. 114–147, at 135.

24 Ichikawa, Jiden, p. 45.

25 S. Katō, Ai wa Jidai o Koete [A Love Transgresses Time], Tokyo 1988, p. 79.

26 M. Sato, Ganretto Tsuneko to Josei Sanseiken Undō [Gauntlett Tsuneko and Women's Suffrage Movement], in: Reitaku Daigaku Kiyō [Reitaku University Bulletin] (2002) 103, pp. 11–18, at 14; Ichikawa, Jiden, p. 162.

27 T. Katō, Working Women in Japan: Address to the International Congress of Working Women (1924), quoted in:

Women's Conference; Jane Addams initially presided, and Gauntlett did so between 1934 and 1937.[28] In Düsseldorf in 1936, Fujita was a discussant at the International Study Conference for Workers Among Boys and Girls in Secondary Schools.[29] Amid growing international activism, by 1928 Ichikawa and Gauntlett, along with YWCA of Japan, had established the Geneva-based Joint Standing Committee of Women's International Organizations to communicate with women's organizations abroad.[30] The feminists also served in international organizations. In 1924, Katō Taka became director of the women's division of the International Labour Organization's (ILO) Japan branch. Among those working there under Katō were Ichikawa, Kubushiro, and Tanino Sesu (b. 1903), a state factory inspector who drafted post-war protective labour legislation for women.[31] In 1937, Katō Taka became the first Asian to serve as secretary of World YWCA in Geneva.[32] Despite the dominant perception that Japanese women's feminism was simply following Western feminism, Japanese feminists had travelled during the interwar years to correct at least some of those Orientalist notions.[33] Furthermore, Japanese feminists' anti-Western colonialism and anti-racist views had inspired anti-colonial movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, even though such attitudes contradicted their colonizer status with regard to other Asians.[34] Defying the US-created post-war image of submissive Japanese women, these international ties with women of various imperial powers signalled Japanese feminists' imperial status.

Through their international activism, Japanese feminists built strong ties with prominent American women activists and leftists in opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) on the grounds that the ERA would nullify protective legislation for women workers. That amendment, which called for absolute equality between women and men in the United States, had been proposed by Alice Paul (1885–1997) and the National Women's Party in 1923.[35] Since 1922, Katō Shizue had had a close relationship with the historian Mary Beard (1876–1958), a founding member of the Women's Trade Union League (WTUL) and a vocal opponent of ERA.[36] In 1924, Beard introduced Katō Shi-

M. Moynagh with N. Forestell (eds.), Documenting First Wave Feminisms: Vol. 1, Transnational Collaborations and Crosscurrents, Toronto 2012, pp. 344–347.

28 R. Yasutake, The Rise of Women's Internationalism in the Countries of the Asia-Pacific Region during the Interwar Years, from a Japanese Perspective, in: Women's History Review 20 (2011) 4, pp. 521–532, at 527.

29 Dassel Conference, June 1936, Box WEC07.01 1927–1937 Youth Conferences, World YWCA Archives, Geneva.

30 Ichikawa, Jiden, p. 912.

31 Ibid., p. 131.

32 R. Woodsmall to T. Katō, 20 January 1937, Box World's YWCA01.08 1936–1937 Staff, World YWCA Archives; Nihon YWCA 100-nenshi: Nenpyō [Japan YWCA 100-Year History: Timetables] 1905–2005, p. 94.

33 S. Katō interview in Nishi, Senryōka no Nihon, p. 57.

34 R. Yasutake, The First Wave of International Women's Movements from a Japanese Perspective: Western Outreach and Japanese Women Activists During the Interwar Years, in: Women's Studies International Forum 32 (2009) 1, pp. 13–20, at 13.

35 M. Takeuchi, At the Crossroads, pp. 124–129.

36 Ibid. See also C. Uemura, Mearī Bīado to Joseishi: Nihon Josei no Majikara o Hakkutu shita Beirekishika [Mary Beard and Women's History: An American Historian Who Excavated Japanese Women's True Power], Tokyo 2019, pp. 132–160.

zue to Carrie Chapman Catt of League of Women Voters, another leading anti-ERA.[37] In New York at YWCA Leadership Training between 1913 and 1915, Katō Taka, along with WTUL instructors, met her mentor, Mary Dingman (1875–1961), soon to be industrial secretary of World YWCA, who oversaw issues of women workers and became an international anti-ERA figure. Dingman worked with the ILO women's section in Geneva, while Katō Taka headed the ILO Japan women's section.[38] Another YWCA Leadership Training alum, Kawai Michi (1877–1953), along with various labour activists, assisted Jane Addams – an anti-ERA advocate – touring Japan in 1923.[39] Between 1921 and 1922, Ichikawa frequently visited Chicago's Hull House and WTUL – both central to Addams's activism – and forged friendships there.[40] Although Ichikawa developed a close relationship with Alice Paul, she did not support the ERA, so Paul contacted Ichikawa's friend, Fujita Taki, and in Geneva in 1936, Paul sought her support of the ERA. Fujita, however, had already allied with her anti-ERA American hosts there, Dingman and Ruth Woodsmall (1883–1963), secretary of World YWCA, who later became chief of the Women's Affairs Section of the Allied High Commission for Occupied Germany.[41] These ties further indicate that by the time Americans were trumpeting their "liberation of Japanese women", Japanese feminists were well aware of American women's struggles to attain gender equality, as well as of American class and race issues. They knew that the US government's idea of liberation was limited.

When these Japanese feminists joined the post-war women's alliance, they were seasoned activists. Some of them even had led the state mobilization of women for the war by cooperating with the Imperial government, because they saw doing so as an opportunity to prove women's ability and potentially secure a path to women's suffrage.[42] The leading American alliance members, though mostly of more humble backgrounds than their Japanese associates, nevertheless had impressive pre-war careers. Weed graduated from Western Reserve University and had been a publicist for the Women's City Club in Cleveland. Dr. Lulu Holmes, who worked on women's education reform, earned a PhD from Columbia Teachers College and was a dean of women at Washington State College. Capt. Eileen Donovan (1915–1996) of CIE, who assisted Holmes, had a master's degree from Boston Teachers College and was a former history teacher.[43] However, these

37 H. Hopper, A New Woman of Japan: A Political Biography of Kato Shidzue, Boulder 1996, p. 34.

38 Nihon YWCA 100-nenshi, p. 42. Documentations of Dingman at ILO Archives indicate her significant role in women's labour activism. See, for example, File World YWCA Dingman 1921 (D600/400), ILO Archives, Geneva.

39 M. Kawai et al., Jien Adamusu o Shinobi Heiwa o Kataru no Kai [A Meeting to Recollect Jane Addams and Talk about Peace], in: Fusen 6 (1932) 1, pp. 16–28, at 17.

40 Ichikawa, Jiden, pp. 106–110.

41 T. Fujita, Junēbu no Arisu Pōru: Nikki yori [Alice Paul in Geneva: From My Diary], in: Josei Tenbō (1936), quoted in: Fujita Taki Sensei no Ronshū to Omoide Sewanin-kai (ed.), Arigatō [Thank you], Tokyo 1993, pp. 39–44.

42 B. Molony, From "Mothers of Humanity" to "Assisting the Emperor": Gendered Belonging in the Wartime Rhetoric of Japanese Feminist Ichikawa Fusae, in: Pacific Historical Review 80 (2011) 1, pp. 1–27, at 20–21.

43 H. Peters, My Cousin, Ethel Weed: A Biography and Sourcebook, San Bernardino 2018; L. Holmes, Changes in Higher Education for Women in Japan, 1946–1948, in: Japan Association for University Women Bulletin 68 (1967), pp. 2–4, at 2; Eileen Donovan, 81, Former Ambassador, in: New York Times, 25 December 1996, Section B, p. 9.

Americans' pre-war roles in national/international-level movements were quite limited in comparison to those of their Japanese counterparts. It would thus be misleading to suggest that the American women of the post-war alliance empowered and led the Japanese feminists. The Japanese feminists' pre-war backgrounds overwhelmingly indicate that they were the ones who led the alliance in formulating the post-war "liberation" policies. Furthermore, an analysis of the Japanese feminists' backgrounds negates the popular myth that Japanese women cooperated with American men because they were more democratic than Japanese men. Not only did the feminists doubt that the idealistic American democratic life did exist as promoted, they had experienced the same "democratizing" military forces' wartime air raids, which had destroyed their homes (including Ichikawa's) and their YWCA buildings and had devastated economic activity, contributing to acute food and material shortages.[44] Katō Shizue had to cultivate a vegetable garden to feed herself, and Fujita had to remake her Bryn Mawr regalia into *monpe* (wartime workpants).[45] What Japanese feminists' backgrounds indicate, however, is that they worked with the US military regime because they saw that the "liberation of Japanese women" could serve their decades-old agenda, just as Ichikawa had seen wartime cooperation with the Japanese government as leverage to gain women's suffrage. The fact that post-war laws related to Japanese women went beyond what SCAP authorities were willing to accept and exceeded the legal protections provided to American women meant that Japanese feminists successfully replaced the view of "liberation" defined by white American males with their own version, which they achieved by leading the American alliance members.

3. Japanese Feminists' Imperialistic Attitude towards White Occupiers

Although the occupation hierarchy called her an assistant, Katō Shizue considered herself a *hikōshiki komon*, or unofficial adviser to the American alliance members.[46] Katō's sense of superiority towards American women was not just about her pre-war activism. The leading Japanese feminists were the offspring of Imperial Japan. Growing up at the height of Japan's rapid industrialization between the 1890s and 1910s – a boom that outpaced the economic growth of Western nations – Japanese feminists' privileged status was not only hereditary but also owed to Japan's modernization and colonial expansion. That they learned English and studied in Britain and the Unites States also indicates Japan's unusual imperial position relative to Western powers. Nonetheless, these feminists' pre-war economic and social status, including the financial capacity to fund overseas travel and education and the necessary connections for meeting with in-

44 Ichikawa, Jiden, p. 608; Nihon YWCA 100-nenshi, pp. 110–112.

45 S. Katō, Aru Josei Seijika, p. 117; Y. Nishimura, Fuji ni Mukatte [Towards Mt. Fuji], in: Ichikawa Fusae to Iu Hito: 100-nin no Kaisō [The Person Called Ichikawa Fusae: Recollections of One Hundred People], Tokyo 1982, pp. 231–233, at 232.

46 S. Katō, Ai wa, pp. 127–128.

ternationally acclaimed feminists, indicate that Japanese feminists constituted a group of highly privileged women, more privileged even than middle-class white American women. Most American occupiers, on the other hand, were from middle- to lower-class backgrounds, with less education and little activism experience. Thus, there would seem to have been a contradicting power dynamic between these occupied Japanese feminists and the majority of the American occupiers. Unfortunately, documentation that would provide evidence of that power dynamic is almost non-existent in occupation records. The US censorship, along with the 1947 purge of feminist leader, Ichikawa Fusae (apparently due to her wartime cooperation with the state but reasons remain unclear), may have muted Japanese feminists' public expression of their true views about the occupiers. However, small yet vivid examples in feminists' post-occupation statements elucidate Japanese feminists' sense of superiority towards American occupiers, and that attitude was strikingly similar to the Western chauvinist attitude towards colonized peoples. This section examines the overlooked issues of class and status in examining the relationship between occupier and occupied to demonstrate how Japanese women maintained their pre-war imperial subjectivity in the "liberation of Japanese women" effort despite their being occupied women of color.

Although the US-controlled Japanese media buzzed with American women's sense of imperialism urging submissive Japanese women to learn from liberated American women, Japanese feminists' opinions of the American women occupiers show an inversion of this imperialistic attitude. Katō Shizue, Fujita Taki, and Takahashi [Tomita] Nobuko (1916–1990, Weed's administrative assistant) mentioned that their impression of Weed – commonly known to have led the post-war women's alliance – was that she was humble, nice, naïve, and always eager to learn about Japan and Japanese women. Katō mentioned that "although Miss. Weed was not a specialist of women's issues, she had to work them […] so she was studying hard."[47] Katō further commented that Weed did not object to any policies that Japanese feminists formulated, except one on civil servants' right to strike.[48] By saying that Weed was a non-specialist who did not contest the Japanese feminists' proposals, Katō implied Weed's passivity and highlighted her ignorance of Japanese women's history, suggesting Weed was unqualified to lead the Japanese feminists. Similarly, Takahashi, who later served as ambassador to Denmark, stated that "Weed was a humble person and she studied hard about Japan".[49] Fujita mentioned that "Weed was nice and naïve".[50] While "naïve" could be interpreted positively in Japanese, none of these Japanese feminists described their prominent American feminist friends in these indifferent terms. Japanese feminists did not consider Weed their leader; Ichikawa even said, "I didn't really listen [to Weed]."[51] Japanese feminists' descriptions of Weed were almost identical to the US-promoted image of Japanese women as humble, passive,

47 Katō interview in Nishi, Senryōka no Nihon, p. 60.
48 Ibid., p. 66.
49 N. Takahashi, interview by Nishi, in Nishi, Senryōka no Nihon, p. 71.
50 T. Fujita, interview by Nishi, in Ibid., p. 88.
51 Ichikawa Fusae, Kodama Katusko, and Itō Yasuko, Ichikawa Fusae shi ni Kiku – Watasi no Fujin Undō, Senzen

naïve, and eager to learn American democracy. The impressions of Weed reveal Japanese women's sense of superiority towards inexperienced American women occupiers.

Japanese feminists' imperialistic attitude towards American women occupiers can also be seen in how they equated American women's competency with their socio-economic class. For example, Fujita, after mentioning how alliance members Weed, Holmes, and Donovan had a thrifty lifestyle, stated that it was only "because of [the power and backing of] GHQ [SCAP], [that the American women occupiers] were able to do what they did [work with the Japanese feminists to formulate national policies]".[52] Fujita visited Holmes's residence in Pullman in 1949 and later wrote that the former occupation member "used to lead a sumptuous lifestyle in Tokyo". In 1949, however, Holmes, as a college professor, was living alone "in a frugal small apartment".[53] By describing the living situation of Holmes as a single professional woman, Fujita exposed the truth – that the leading American woman occupier's life contradicted the Cold War propaganda about the American Way of Life, which supposedly equalled an affluent white family with male breadwinner and female homemaker, living in a suburban house with modern kitchen, courtesy of American capitalist democracy. By comparing Holmes's meagre existence in Pullman with her grand lifestyle in Tokyo, Fujita also revealed that the celebrity-like American conquerors in US-occupied Japan were "nobodies" when they were back in the United States. By crediting the power of the military regime with the American women occupiers' elevated status, Fujita indicated that American women alliance members did not have the social pedigree or credentials to be creating national-level policies. Judging American women's ability based on economic living standards further indicates that privileged Japanese feminists considered themselves superior to American occupiers not only because of their extensive activism experience, but also their social class and economic status.

Japanese feminists' imperialistic attitudes were also directed towards the larger population of lower-class, less-educated white occupiers. This was exemplified in Katō Shizue's candid statement of her superiority to a white enlistee, belonging to a group largely consisting of high-school graduates from lower-class rural families. Katō wrote that she was shocked to discover her stepdaughter and this white enlistee at her residence. Katō furiously said to the enlistee, "Whose permission you got to be with my daughter? […] You have to leave now. I won't give my permission." Katō then asked for the enlistee's superior's name, and after he left, she told her daughter not to see him again because her marriage potential would be "damaged".[54] By speaking English to the enlistee, Katō demonstrated that she was not an ordinary Japanese but educated and upper class. Asking his superior's name meant that Katō instantly identified his lower-ranking status and connoted that she was connected to the upper strata of SCAP, thus putting the enlistee in

kara Sengo e [Asking Ichikawa – My Women's Movement, from Pre-war to Post-war], in: Rekishi Hyōron [History Review] 347 (March) 1979, pp. 2–25, at 13.

52 Fujita interview in Nishi, Senryōka no Nihon, pp. 88–89.

53 T. Fujita, Zoku Wagamichi: Kokoro no Deai [A Sequel to My Way: Heartfelt Encounters], Tokyo 1988, p. 24.

54 Katō, Aru Josei Seijika, pp. 130–131.

his place, which she viewed as lower than hers. The question also signalled that a lower-ranking GI was inadequate to partner with the daughter of, in Katō's words, a "respectable household".[55] Katō's concern might have been about race, but the more important issue was her privileged family status. The white American GI, even with his presumed racial superiority, conqueror status, and economic wealth relative to the impoverished Japanese, had lower status in Katō's view. Her insolent attitude towards a young white man of lower socio-economic status represents the privileged Japanese feminists' sense of superiority towards the majority of the American occupiers.

John Dower argues that one of the major contradictions in the American "workshop of democracy" in Japan was that Americans constituted an inviolate privileged caste while preaching equality.[56] Even more contradictory was that Japanese feminists saw themselves as a privileged caste, with their prestigious education, language skills, and connections with more elite Americans, not just because of their abilities but also because of Japan's colonial expansion, which established their pre-war class and status. Fujita confirmed such a sense of privilege by saying,

> *I didn't have to go to GHQ* [SCAP] [to report my work, unlike other Japanese]. […]. *We learned in American schools and could speak English freely, so* [SCAP authorities] *might have thought that [they] didn't need to put pressure on us*.[57]

Contrary to the popular notion of defeated Japanese admiring Americans, Japanese feminists projected an attitude of superiority towards American occupiers they considered lower class, which signalled feminists' sustained imperial subjectivity even in their impoverished occupied status.

4. "Liberation" as Japanese Feminist Propaganda

Of all the "liberation" policies, the most contested was the one concerning prostitution. Some 70,000 to 150,000 women (and men) went to work as prostitutes for GIs, and this issue extended well beyond the end of occupation, persisting under the US-Japan Security Treaty that allows the stationing of American troops in Japan to this day. The US government banned Japanese licensed prostitution facilities, including the "special comfort facilities" for GIs, in 1946, after negative publicity in the United States had tarnished the image of the American "workshop of democracy" in Japan. However, prostitution was never prohibited during the occupation. US military authorities considered GIs' sexual interactions with Japanese women to be recreational activity that would release stress and tension, which increased when the Korean War began in 1950.[58] For Japanese officials,

55 Ibid., p. 130.
56 J. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, New York 1999, p. 211.
57 Fujita interview in Nishi, Senryōka no Nihon, p. 86.
58 See, e.g., Maj. Gen. R. Parker, Chief of Chaplains, US Army, Sex and Soldiers, in: Cornet 32 (1952), pp. 103–106, at 103.

keeping prostitutes on the street was also convenient, because they saw prostitutes, like their "special comfort women" prepared for GIs, as a buffer between "good" Japanese women and American GIs to protect upper- to middle-class women from failing to become mothers of Yamato race – the cult of Japanese racial supremacy. To control VD among GIs, the US government ordered SCAP to conduct indiscriminate round-ups of Japanese women who were seen as VD carriers.[59] However, in December 1945, Japanese feminists in the women's alliance called for laws against prostitution as a part of the "liberation of Japanese women" and opposed the inhumane round-ups. Indeed, establishing an anti-prostitution law had been one of the oldest agendas of modern Japanese feminists, especially given that Westerners had been calling the Japanese system of prostitution the symbol of the country's backwardness since the 1870s.[60]

As scholars point out, the post-war anti-prostitution effort had a historical antecedent. Two members of the post-war alliance, Gauntlett and Kubushiro, were long-time anti-prostitution activists.[61] As part of their *junketsu* (purity, meaning chastity) movement, the Japanese feminists had utilized the "French system" – the basis of European and American purity movements – which proclaimed the need for public morality to protect "innocent" women and the health of the population, especially soldiers, who were essential in modern empire building.[62] And because the phonetics of *junketsu* also means purity of blood, concerns over the Yamato race had also been critical. In the post-war period, feminists called for the regulation of prostitutes to stop "that kind of women" from engaging in their *shūgyō* (vulgar deed).[63] Despite the feminists' call to end the indiscriminate round-ups, some scholars have pointed out these women's compliance with American Cold War middle-class respectability.[64] Japanese feminists protested that innocent women were being mistaken for prostitutes and that VD inspections exposing the genital area were compromising those women's potential for marriage. The anti-prostitution effort indeed validated American respectability and the Japanese government's class-based division of good and bad women. Scholars have thus considered Japanese feminists' anti-prostitution work an uncritical embrace of Western imperialistic values, including those of the American Cold War, on top of Japanese imperialism; this view makes the feminists appear apolitical, especially inasmuch as they were occupied women of colour.

59 M. Takeuchi, "Pan-Pan Girls" Performing and Resisting Neocolonialism(s) in the Pacific Theater: U.S Military Prostitution in Occupied Japan, 1945–1952, in: M. Höhn/Seungsook Moon (eds.), Over There: Living with the U.S. Military Empire from World War Two to the Present, Durham 2010, pp. 78–108.

60 S. Sievers, Flowers in Salt: The Beginnings of Feminist Consciousness in Modern Japan, Stanford 1983, pp. 87–113.

61 S. Garon, Molding Japanese Minds: The State in Everyday Life, Princeton 1998, pp. 98–100; Y. Fujime, Japanese Feminism and Commercialized Sex: The Union of Militarism and Prohibitionism, in: Social Science Journal Japan 9 (2006) 1, pp. 33–50; Kovner, Occupying Power, pp. 100–102.

62 A. Corbin, Commercial Sexuality in Nineteenth-Century France: A System of Images and Regulations, in: C. Gallagher/T. Laqueur (eds.), The Making of the Modern Body: Sexuality and Society in the Nineteenth Century, K. Streip (trans.), Berkeley 1987, pp. 209–219.

63 T. Uyemura, Baishōfu no Inai Sekai o [Towards the World without (Happy) Hookers], in: Fujin Kōron (Women's Review) (April), March 1953, pp. 44–47, at 45.

64 See, e.g., Koikari, Pedagogy of Democracy, pp. 162, 173–174.

However, rather than merely accepting imperialist ideologies, the Japanese feminists' anti-prostitution work showcased their primary imperialist, leading role in building the new US-Japan bilateral empire in the Pacific under the banner of "liberation of Japanese women". Despite contradicting male authorities' prostitution policies, the modern Japanese feminists' strategy to promote their political agenda to the Japanese government as "civilized" coincided with American Cold War racial politics to further enforce the Security Treaty. In 1951, John Foster Dulles (1880–1959), special ambassador for President Truman, discussed with a British SCAP representative about creating the socio-cultural "off-shore defense pact" to prevent Japan from allying with communist China on the basis of "Oriental identity".[65] Dulles suggested exploiting the Japanese presumption of racial superiority (the Yamato race) over "Asiatic mainland masses" by encouraging the "social prestige" of being associated with "an elite Anglo-Saxon club" – the new, US-dominated capitalist imperial powers.[66] Similarly, the modern Japanese feminists since the 1870s – taking advantage of Western ideologies equating women's status with the level of civilization – had pushed feminist reforms as a pathway for Meiji Japan (1868–1912) to realize its slogans "civilization and enlightenment" and "catch up with the West" and to abrogate unequal treaties. To push their agendas, feminists decried Japanese women's "backwards" status and advocated for attaining the higher civilized status of Western women. They did so despite knowing about Western women's struggles for gender equality and despite being aware of Western imperial aggression, especially the Opium Wars.[67] This sort of self-Orientalizing discourse was proof that Japanese feminists took advantage of Japan's semi-colonized status (as a result of unequal treaties imposed by Western powers) and Western ideology about women and civilization to promote feminist reforms to a government eager to be seen as "civilized" by Western powers to join the imperialist club. Therefore, despite being anti-government or leftist, modern Japanese feminism was intricately intertwined with Japan's empire building. Japanese feminists were imperial women, not because of their birth in Imperial Japan or their "middle-class" status, but because their reforms equated raising the status of women with raising Japan's semi-colonial status to that of a primary imperialist power on a par with Western nations.

In the post-war years, Japanese feminists pushed anti-prostitution as a way to prove America as "Uncle Sugar" and Japan's readiness to join the elite Anglo-Saxon club, by taking advantage of Japan's occupied/semi-colonized status and the US "liberation of Japanese women", which linked Japanese women's "liberated" status to the benefits of American democracy and the level of Japan's democratization. Those two countries' post-war images were the key to establish bilateral empire-building or the off-shore defence pact in the Pacific. This section re-examines the feminists' post-war anti-prostitution

65 US Department of State, F. Aandahl (ed.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific (in two parts), Vol. VI, part 1, Washington, DC 1951, p. 826.

66 Ibid.

67 This feminist strategy is highlighted in Sievers, Flowers in Salt.

efforts to demonstrate their leading imperialist roles in creating the sense of an off-shore US-Japan bilateral empire by manipulating American Cold War propaganda, exploiting the war-torn Japanese male authorities' desire to catch up with the West once again, and being dismissive towards lower-class Japanese women and former colonial subjects, as well as American occupiers – all under the banner of "liberation of Japanese women".

Although previously dismissed as feminists irresponsibly casting blame on GIs for creating a demand for prostitution, a 1952 anti-prostitution appeal that Uyemura Tamaki (1890–1982) directed toward the wife of Supreme Commander Matthew Ridgway (1895–1993, MacArthur's replacement) showed the feminists' ability to manipulate the American Cold War ideologies. In challenging Americans with extraterritoriality, the plea exemplified Japanese feminists' strategy of using their higher socio-economic and educational backgrounds to undermine the moral authority of the occupiers. Accordingly, Uyemura, a Western-educated pastor and the first Japanese civilian to meet with President Truman after the war, emerged as the forerunner of women leaders and of the anti-prostitution movement. Around the time of Uyemura's appeal, Japanese feminists formed the Committee for the Promotion of the Establishment of Legislation Banning Prostitution (CPELBP). Kubushiro served as chair, while Uyemura and Kamichika Ichiko (1888–1981), soon to be a socialist member of the Diet, served as vice-chairs.[68] Uyemura's appeal arose from the feminists' collective effort to outlaw prostitution. Originally published in *Fujin Kōron* (Women's Review), a monthly magazine, the feminists' anti-prostitution appeal aimed at upper- and middle-class women. However, publishing this piece on the censored topic of GIs' prostitution issues at the highly sensitive time of the occupation's imminent end meant that they also aimed their appeal at the US government (and the subjugated Japanese government); the timing of the appeal signalled that the feminists were taking advantage of their occupied status under US media control. The CPELBP had chosen Uyemura as a new representative because of her impeccable credentials in terms of the new Cold War American Way of Life; she would thus have greater impact when challenging the morality of the American troops. The appeal also took advantage of the US claim of being "Uncle Sugar" who liberated Japanese women, by arguing that the GIs' prostitution activities were harming such an image.

The occupiers perceived the feminists' strategy to be significant, as can be seen in the reactions of American media such as the New York Times, which called Uyemura's appeal the "the most critical attack on the morals of the American garrison made publicly by any Japanese since the 1945 surrender" on 21 April 1952. Its article headlined "G.I. Brothel Ban in Japan Is Asked: Woman Leader in Letter to Mrs. Ridgway Attacks the Morality of U.S. Troops." In the appeal, Uyemura requested that Mrs. Ridgway speak to the general about prohibiting GIs' use of Japanese brothels and "isolat[ing] immoral United States troops".[69] Instead of focusing on this appeal, however, the New York Times dedicated

68 Fujime, Japanese Feminism, p. 41.

69 T. Uyemura, Ridgway Fujin e: Panpan ni Atarashii Michi wo Hiraku Tameni wa [To Mrs. Ridgway: To Open a New Path to Pan-Pan Girls], in: Fujin Kōron (May), April 1952, pp. 36-40.

one-quarter of its article to Uyemura's background. She was a member of the National Public Safety Commission (which supervised the police), a Wellesley College and University of Edinburgh graduate, the daughter of a famous Methodist minister and a pastor herself, chair of YWCA of Japan, and vice-chair of the World YWCA. It is apparent that the New York Times called Uyemura's appeal the "most critical attack" because her background of social privilege and education, as well as her Protestant pedigree, exceeded the Cold War's culturally valued qualifications of average Americans. Such criticism coming from someone educated in Great Britain was also significant when the United States was claiming to replace Britain as the world's best civilizing force. Uyemura's background gave her appeal gravitas, especially in the Cold War context, in contesting the premise of "Uncle Sugar's boys and girls" democratizing Japan. It demonstrated the feminists' ability to publicly subvert American moral authority – the foundation of the occupation – at a time when that authority was about to be institutionalized by the US-Japan Security Treaty, defining Japan's semi-permanent subjugation to the United States.

Uyemura indeed highlighted her Cold War moral superiority by directing her appeal to the wife of the Supreme Commander, the woman of the highest strata in the military regime in the occupied space. Mrs. Ridgway, or Mary Princess Anthony Long (1918–1997), was the third wife of General Ridgway and was twenty-three years his junior.[70] She was supposed to epitomize the propagated Cold War middle-class respectability and the happy homemaker image that embodied the affluent, capitalist American Way of Life that American democracy would supposedly bestow on the Japanese people. Uyemura's appeal began by comparing her to nineteenth-century critic John Ruskin's ideal of the perfect woman, beautiful and full of Christian morality. She then validated America as a benevolent civilizer rooted in Christianity.[71] Uyemura next posed a series of questions, as reported in the New York Times:

> *Do you happen to know of the great number of American soldiers patronizing Japanese prostitutes? Step in to Tachikawa for one instance. You will see hundreds and thousands of women lining up on the streets.* […] [A]*t Iwakuni* […] *many Japanese children worked as procurers.*[72]

By posing questions in this manner, Uyemura intended to establish herself as an expert and moral authority on the topic of GIs' sexual activity with Japanese women, which involved children. Framing this in the form of questions was meant to highlight the ignorance of the Supreme Commander's wife concerning the daily "immoral" conduct of her husband's troops. Even if the general's wife had been aware of it, by posing a question Uyemura exposed the fact that neither Mrs. Ridgway nor the US military had done anything to discourage the GIs' prostitution activities. Uyemura adopted the stance that, according to her understanding of American and British Protestant middle-class re-

70 Service for Gen. Ridgway's Widow, in: Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, 23 July 1997, p. 30.
71 Uyemura, Ridgway Fujin, p. 36.
72 New York Times, 21 April 1952, p. 2.

spectability, they should properly consider prostitution problematic. By writing an open appeal to the third and much younger wife of the Supreme Commander, rather than to Ridgway himself, Uyemura could also bring public attention to the commander's private life, which contradicted the American Way of Life, as his two previous wives had through divorce lost their "happy homemaker" positions that American democracy was supposed to guarantee. Uyemura challenged the moral superiority of American troops by questioning the morality and respectability of the highest authority, the Supreme Commander couple. Instead of American troops bringing democracy and affluent capitalist lifestyles, as claimed by the US government, Uyemura argued that Japanese women were turning into prostitutes and children were becoming pimps because American troops were, in her words, "corrupting Japanese morals" and the military authority was not moral enough to care.[73] She urged the US authorities to support the anti-prostitution effort, if the US government wanted to retain its highly publicized image as "Uncle Sugar" to Japanese women.

As the formal end of occupation approached, with the Japanese government able to enact new laws, feminists concurrently worked on passing the anti-prostitution law using the same modern feminist strategy. Given Japan's semi-colonial status under the new unequal Security Treaty, feminists claimed an anti-prostitution law would be proof of the "liberation of Japanese women" and Japan's civilized status, thus allowing Japan to gain full membership in the "elite Anglo-Saxon club". The CPELBP members argued that "the civilized countries of the world have all prohibited prostitution, and Japan is the only one that lags behind".[74] Scholars criticize the statement as false and "lip service to new global norms".[75] However, Japanese feminists' misleading statements about the western conditions had precisely been their strategy to pressure the Japanese government so eager to "catch up with the West".

CPELBP vice-chair Kamichika employed this strategy in the House of Councillors. On 25 July 1955, in a fifth attempt to pass an anti-prostitution bill, Kamichika repeatedly stated, "Prostitution violates women's rights and *junketsu*; therefore, it should be eradicated in a contemporary civilized nation." In the explicitly gendered, racialized, and class-segregated colonial language of *junketsu*, Kamichika alluded to the US workshop of democracy by arguing that prostitution should not be allowed among Japan's "liberated" women in democratized Japan. Continuing with a neo-colonial vision, she argued that "as Japan has gained independence and devotes itself for reconstruction as a democratic nation, to permit this dark, feudalistic existence [prostitution] is not only a contradiction, but also an obstacle to being equal to other democratic countries and to hold an honourable status in the international society when we join the United Nations in the future."[76] By regulating prostitution, Kamichika claimed, Japan could "catch up with

73 Ibid.
74 Fujime, Japanese Feminism, p. 43.
75 Ibid.; Kovner, Occupying Power, p. 118 (quote).
76 Proceedings of the House of Councillors, Session 22, Judicial Affairs Committee, No. 7, 21 June 1955, Tokyo.

the West". Kamichika's view of civilized and democratic nations referred to Western imperial countries, the "elite Anglo-Saxon club". Membership in the United Nations, dominated by those countries, would signal Japan's admission to the club. Although the anti-prostitution legislation was defeated in 1955, Kamichika and the CPELBP succeeded in swaying public opinion. The legislation was passed a year later in response to the overwhelming public criticism towards the bill's earlier defeat, thus proving the feminists' leadership and ability to sway the masses and male politicians.[77] The feminists' anti-prostitution efforts demonstrated their remaking of the occupiers' "liberation of Japanese women" into their own imperialist propaganda, which was used to appeal Japan's re-emergence – the proof of becoming equal to the US-dominated capitalist imperial powers. Thus, the anti-prostitution efforts exposed the feminists' leading role in creating a sense of US-Japan "off-shore defense pact" at the expense of lower-class Japanese women, former colonial subjects, and even lower-class American occupiers, by exploiting the Yamato Japanese feeling of "social prestige" of being associated with the elite Anglo-Saxons.

5. Conclusion

Although the US government intended the "liberation of Japanese women" to serve as Cold War propaganda, Japanese feminists replaced it by something based on their own ideas of women's liberation that had been gestating since the 1870s. Upending the image that Americans imposed 'democratic' ideology on occupied women of color, the re-examination of the anti-prostitution effort shows that the "liberation" policies were in fact based on privileged Japanese feminists' own imperial agenda, which effectively implied a disdain not only for lower-class Japanese women and former colonial subjects but also for middle- to lower-class class white American occupiers. Previous scholarship has portrayed Japanese feminists as secondary actors of the US occupation. However, by placing their post-war anti-prostitution efforts in the context of broader modern Japanese feminist movements, including Anpo, the same sources that the previous scholarship used reveal Japanese feminists' powerful roles in the women's liberation Cold War propaganda. This approach leads to a reinterpretation – that the Japanese feminists guided the American women occupiers in formulating "liberation" reforms and, with those reforms, Japanese feminists granted the United States a chance to portray itself as the benevolent "Uncle Sugar". In doing so, Japanese feminists were able to push their liberation policies and "market" them as proof of America being the world's civilizing leader in the Cold War, and of Japan's democratization and hence its readiness to emerge from defeat and join the elite Anglo-Saxon club. This feminist-led construction of post-war images that promoted America's overseas role and Japan's swift transformation were key to building the US-Japan bilateral empire in the Cold War Pacific, especially for justifying the US-Japan Security Treaty military aggressions as democratic rescue missions from Soviet

77 Y. Morosawa, Onna no Sengo-shi [Women's Post-war History], Tokyo 1971, p. 82.

communism. Through the "liberation of Japanese women", Japanese feminists may have aimed at transforming their own image – from colonial aggressors to "liberated women" – while disguising their continued [neo-]colonial status.