

# Quizzes and Questionnaires: Learning to Play Democracy under US Occupation in Germany and Japan

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## ABSTRACTS

Die Umerziehung „der Japaner“ und „der Deutschen“ nach Kriegsende war nicht nur ein politisches oder pädagogisches, sondern auch ein kulturelles Unterfangen. Unmittelbar beeinflusst durch das Denken und die therapeutischen Methoden eher neuer akademischer Disziplinen wie der Sozialpsychologie, der Psychotherapie und der Anthropologie, wurde re-education (oder „reorientation“) als das Verlernen von (vermeintlich „pathologischen“) kulturellen oder Verhaltensmustern verstanden. Neben der Notwendigkeit, die Bildungseinrichtungen zu reformieren, wurde den Massenmedien eine zentrale Rolle zugewiesen, um diese alten totalitären Muster zu beseitigen und stattdessen die neuen liberal-demokratischen und kapitalistischen Werte zu vermitteln. Angesichts des Paradoxons, ganze Gesellschaften in Zeiten einer militärischen Besatzung von oben herab in liberalistischen Werten wie „Freiheit“, „Fair Play“ oder „Individualismus“ zu schulen, wurden Methoden der medialen „Partizipation“ als geeigneter, angemessener und „spielerischer“ Weg angesehen, den Menschen diese neuen Werte beizubringen. Zu diesen Methoden zählten insbesondere partizipative Rundfunkformate (z. B. Straßeninterviews und Quizshows) und von den Militärregierungen in Auftrag gegebene Meinungsumfragen, die von Zeitungsunternehmen oder neu gegründeten Meinungsforschungsinstituten in Japan und Deutschland durchgeführt wurden.

Re-educating “the Japanese” and “the Germans” after the war had ended was not merely a political or educational undertaking; it was also a cultural one. Directly influenced by the thought and therapeutic methods of rather new academic disciplines such as social psychology, psychotherapy, and anthropology, re-education (or “reorientation”) was understood as the unlearning of (allegedly “pathological”) cultural or behavioural patterns. Besides the necessity to reform educational institutions, the mass media was assigned a pivotal role in purging these

old totalitarian patterns, and instead teaching the new liberal-democratic and capitalist values. Acknowledging the paradox of training entire societies in liberalist values such as “freedom”, “fair play”, or “individualism” in times of a top-down military occupation, methods of mediated “participation” were considered an appropriate and “playful” way of training these new values. In particular, these methods included participatory broadcasting formats (e.g., street interviews and quiz shows) and opinion surveys commissioned by the military governments, conducted by newspaper companies or newly founded opinion research institutes in Japan and Germany.

## 1. Introduction

By the end of the 1940s, “to be questioned” had become a standard experience of the people in occupied Japan and Germany after WWII had finally ended in both countries. In Germany, by the beginning of the 1950s, thirteen million people in the American occupied zone alone had already filled in the *Fragebogen* (“questionnaire”) with its 131 questions, by which all Germans striving for employment or public office had to clarify their relationship to National Socialism as part of the Allied denazification campaign. At the same time, several thousands of Japanese had been summoned for questioning to G-2, the counter-intelligence section of GHQ in Japan, to give proof of their suitability for public office. By the beginning of the 1950s, people in Germany already had become *fragebogenkrank* (“questionnaire-sick”), as the German entertainer, musician, and popular radio quizmaster Just Scheu had sarcastically sung in his popular song *Der Fragebogen* (“The Questionnaire”, 1950).<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, even after the Allied government’s interest in denazification and demilitarization had faded in Germany as well as Japan due to the change of course in the re-education strategy in the context of the US anti-Communist containment policy in 1947, the questioning of the Japanese and the Germans in fact did not come to an end. Hundreds of public opinion polls and surveys, conducted or commissioned by the military government in order to validate the effectiveness of its re-education measurements, replaced the denazification/demilitarization questionnaires and interviews in the experience of the people in both countries. Furthermore, as if that wasn’t already enough, the radio audiences in Japan and Germany also became quiz-crazy towards the end of the 1940s, as these new entertainment programmes had been introduced in the course of the reorganization of broadcasting programmes as part of a milder form of re-education through mass media. In the 1950s, as a contemporary commentator in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ) cynically stated, the “interest of the Allies in the questionnaire game [...] had obviously subsided”, and “the Germans therefore had to console themselves with the manifold quizzes which were regularly posed to them on the radio and in magazines”.<sup>2</sup>

1 See W. Sollors, “Everybody gets Fragebogened sooner or later”: The Denazification Questionnaire as Cultural Text, in: *German Life and Letters* 71 (2018) 2, pp. 139–153.

2 N.N., *Fragebogen-Rekord*, in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 25 March 1950.

## 2. Planning for Re-education: The Role of Mass Media

Although the re-educative strategy is usually divided in a negative (punitive) and positive (affirmative) phase in both countries,<sup>3</sup> a look into the directives for the planning of the occupation reveals that “positive” ways of re-educating the people in occupied Germany and Japan through mass media actually had been envisioned as part of an all-encompassing strategy from the very beginning. The strong emphasis on mass media must be seen as continuity of the wartime propaganda designed by the Morale Divisions and Propaganda Department as well as the Office of War Information (OWI) and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), which had also used the radio amongst other media, such as leaflets or films, as propaganda means to destabilize the morale of the enemy.

In the case of Germany, directive 269/5 (1945/46), namely the “Long-range Policy Statement for German Re-education”, described the goal of Germany’s occupation as “a fundamental transformation of the German social structure” in order “to eliminate permanently the Nazi and militaristic elements”. Instead of imposing this change upon Germany, it was recommended that the “Germans themselves” need to be prompted “to carry through this change in a democratic direction”. The means to achieve this goal needed to go beyond a reform of “formal education in schools and universities” and should also include “programs of adult education through mass media and otherwise”.<sup>4</sup> In the case of Japan, directive SWNCC 162/2 (Reorientation of the Japanese) set the direction of re-education under US occupation. According to this document, the aim of re-education was to eradicate all feudalistic-authoritarian character traits among the Japanese, such as strong world-supremacist and racist-antiforeign tendencies. Similar to the case of Germany, all means available were to be used to achieve this goal, including “all appropriate media, including books, text books, periodicals, motion pictures, radio, lectures, discussion groups and the schools”.<sup>5</sup>

## 3. Quizzing the Germans: Audience Participation as Re-education

The division of the Office of Military Government for Germany, United States (OM-GUS) that was responsible for the reorganization of German broadcasting had developed out of the Psychological Warfare Branch (PWD/SHAEF), which had been responsible for the propaganda operations against enemy troops during the war. The personnel of the division was recruited from the British Political Warfare Executive (PWE), OSS, and OWI. In addition to the Radio Branch, the superordinate unit, the Information Control Division (later renamed into Information Services Division, ICD/ISD from hereon),

3 K. Gerund, Reeducation und Reorientation, 2020, [http://www.historisches-lexikon-bayerbns.de/Lexikon/Reeducation\\_und\\_Reorientation](http://www.historisches-lexikon-bayerbns.de/Lexikon/Reeducation_und_Reorientation); M. J. Mayo, The War of Words Continues: American Radio Guidance in Occupied Japan, in: T. W. Burkman (ed.), The Occupation of Japan: Arts and Culture, Norfolk, VA 1988, pp. 45–83.

4 The document can be found online at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945Berlinv01/d343>.

5 The document can be found online at: <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v08/d119>.

consisted of four more control branches, each responsible for press, film, theatre and music, and publications respectively. The first chief of ICD/ISD, Robert A. McClure, had already been the head of the Psychological Warfare Intelligence section of SHAEF during the war.

Compared to Japan, with the US military being the de facto only allied power involved in the occupation, the structural organization of the military government in Germany was far more complex. The allied occupation of sectorized Germany notwithstanding, the American sector was additionally divided into four regions (later becoming four of the German federal states) as part of the aim to decentralise state-power in Germany. Besides the main ICD/ISD division at the headquarters of OMGUS (replaced in 1949 by the US High Commissioner for Germany, HICOG) in Frankfurt, every region had its own regional ICD/ISD subdivision, including its own Radio Branch and Research Analysis Staffs (RAS)/Survey Analysis Sections (SAS). These divisions were responsible for the implementation of the re-education policy in Bavaria, Hessen, Württemberg-Baden, and Bremen respectively. Accordingly, each region also had its own radio station, namely Radio München, Radio Bremen, Radio Frankfurt, Radio Stuttgart, and RIAS for the American sector of Berlin.

After rebuilding the broadcasting infrastructure in the conquered territories, which had often been deactivated or even destroyed by German troops in retreat, the psychological warfare divisions of the US military instantly started transmitting its own radio programme in occupied territories. In the first weeks following the war, broadcasting included news programmes or announcements by the military government or the programme of *Voice of America* (VOA), whereas the entertainment programme was for the most part taken over from other stations, such as Radio Luxemburg, which had been used to broadcast the radio programme of the PWD already since October 1944, after Luxemburg had been liberated by US troops. Usually headed by German-speaking military personnel, the Radio Branches of ICD/ICS soon began to re-hire German staff, and by June 1946 “they had found enough qualified, politically acceptable employees that ICD staff members could be limited to supervisory positions while Germans ran the stations”.<sup>6</sup>

Besides news or political content, entertainment (such as literature or comedy, special programmes for women or children, or popular music) was a core part of the reformed radio programme. It was already in the fall of 1945 that “ICD shifted its emphasis”, away from the punitive re-education of promoting collective guilt, continuing “its missionary work against Nazism” but adding “communication programs that fostered democracy and, increasingly, the ‘American Way of Life’”<sup>7</sup> The impetus to enlarge the share of entertainment, however, did not come from ICD alone. Anton Hofbauer, German former chief of the entertainment section of *Hessischer Rundfunk*, argues that “given the overdoses of educational programs due to the political developments and the necessi-

6 R. L. Merritt, *Democracy Imposed: U.S. Occupation Policy and the German Public, 1945–1949*, New Haven 1995, p. 298.

7 *Ibid.*, p. 295.

ties of the times as well as the influence of the American organs of surveillance” on the one hand, and “the steadily growing tiredness of the audience towards spoken content, especially of those that go beyond that of mere information” on the other hand, radio producers on the German side considered it overdue to “meet the demand of the listeners for entertainment”.<sup>8</sup>

Around 1947, in the context of the change of course in re-education policy in line with America’s Cold War anti-Communist containment policy, another shift occurred in the media policy that Merritt and Merritt have described as “democratization to anticommunism”.<sup>9</sup> Hartenian summarizes this shift in the case of Germany as follows:

*From the start United States occupation forces planned to use the media in two ways. Anti-Nazi Germans were to be allowed to use the newly established media to engage in this “re-education” while at the same time the US Military Government was to employ the media to disseminate propaganda to the occupied population. [...] Yet within a year and a half American media policy in Germany underwent a dramatic transformation. From its initial antifascist goals American propaganda and media control became singularly focused on the propagation of anticommunism and the American way of life.*<sup>10</sup>

In an internal memo dated 21 February 1947 from the head of ICD’s Content Analysis Branch, O.J. Brandes to Charles Lewis of the Radio Branch, this strategy was clarified as “exploit(ing) differences of opinion and interest between the Communist Parties of various countries” and giving “fair play” to the “failure and/or shortcomings of denazification in Eastern Zone,” coupled with a “heavy play” to those “progressive features of American civilization” that should “serve as models for the Germans”.<sup>11</sup> With regard to the broadcasting programme, the introduction of quiz shows must be considered a key moment of this strategy to promote “progressive features of American civilization”, with this new type of radio entertainment quickly becoming one of the most popular entertainment programmes in almost any radio station across the American and the British occupied zone.

Despite its global popularity, the radio quiz in Western Germany under US occupation still is an astonishingly under-researched topic of post-war media history.<sup>12</sup> Other than the continuously growing amount of existing studies on radio content in occupied Japan, particularly regarding audience-participation programmes (see below), existing

8 M. Crone, Das Quiz London–Frankfurt: Ein Paradigma der Hörfunkunterhaltung im Hessischen Rundfunk, in: Studienkreis Rundfunk und Geschichte 14 (1988) 1, pp. 11–19, at 11.

9 A. J. Merritt/R. L. Merritt (eds.), Public Opinion in Occupied Germany: The OMGUS Surveys, 1945–1949, Urbana 1970, p. 50.

10 L. Hartenian, The Role of Media in Democratizing Germany: United States Occupation Policy 1945–1949, in: Central European History 20 (1987) 2, pp. 145–190, at 145.

11 Quoted in *ibid.*, pp. 164–165.

12 See G. Hallenberger, Vom Quiz zur Game Show: Geschichte und Entwicklung der Wettbewerbsspiele des bundesrepublikanischen Fernsehens, in: H. D. Erlinger/H.-F. Foltin/H. Kreuzer (eds.), Unterhaltung, Werbung und Zielgruppenprogramme, München 1994, pp. 25–67; G. Hallenberger/J. Kaps (eds.), Hätten Sie’s gewusst? Die Quizsendungen und Game Shows des Deutschen Fernsehens, Marburg 1991.

studies in the field of German post-war broadcasting history for the most part deal with the denazification of media outlets in general or the federal and legal reorganization of the formerly state-controlled German broadcasting system,<sup>13</sup> and only to a lesser degree with the subject of re-education through radio content.<sup>14</sup>

It is difficult to find hard evidence to trace the exact route with regard to how quiz shows became such an integral part of the re-educative effort in the post-war period. All available evidence allows for the educated guess that radio programmes were introduced via informal and personal channels in Germany as well as Japan, and not necessarily as part of an orchestrated larger grand scheme. That quiz shows became such an integral part of the programme in the first place, however, is hardly surprising, since the quiz show had been a very popular audience-participation radio programme in the USA already since around the late 1930s. Moreover, quizzes were considered an ideal tool to present the American Way of Life to the German and Japanese listeners, since it was aimed at a much “broader, less political conception of ‘the people’” than previous audience-participation formats, such as the “man-on-the-street” interviews or “town hall meeting” and “radio round tables”, paying attention to “‘the Great American Average,’ a concept increasingly common in ad campaigns, the new science of public opinion polling, and the Fireside Chats of Roosevelt”.<sup>15</sup> The quiz, thereby, represented an apolitical and consumerist radio format that “gestured both vaguely and insistently toward the centrality of ‘the people’ in the national experience of radio listening”.<sup>16</sup> Via the radio quiz “the people” would hear themselves, thus hear the “language from the street” of “average people”, but in a much more controlled and non-political setting. Moreover, the radio quizzes of the time represented clearly demarcated gendered roles, with women either being depicted as housewives or attractive talents and actors, while their male counterparts were the breadwinners, holders of public offices, or intellectuals, depending on the specific format.

In the German case, most of the quiz shows were not just one-to-one adaptations of Anglo-American shows. Except for RIAS’ *Wer fragt gewinnt* (“Who asks wins”) and Radio Frankfurt’s *Doppelt oder Nichts* (“Double or Nothing”), which were based on MBS’s *Twenty Questions* and CBS/NBC’s *Take it or leave it* respectively, many of the radio quizzes in Germany were original programmes. Giving three examples, I would like to discuss the various types and specific designs of quiz shows that were broadcasted in post-war Germany. Although it was generically based on American and British models of the radio quiz, Germany’s first post-war quiz programme, *Schnelldenker-Turnier* (“Quick Thinker’s Tournament”), which was designed by Peter von Zahn (an editor at Radio Hamburg)

13 See H. Bausch, *Rundfunkpolitik nach 1945* (= *Rundfunk in Deutschland*, vol. 3, part 1), München 1980; A. Kutsch, *Rundfunk unter alliierter Besatzung*, in: J. Wilke (ed.), *Mediengeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Köln 1999, pp. 59–90; Hartenian, *Role of Media*.

14 See U. M. Bausch, *Die Kulturpolitik der US-Amerikanischen Information Control Division in Württemberg-Baden von 1945 bis 1949: Zwischen militärischem Funktionalismus und schwäbischem Obrigkeitsdenken*, Stuttgart 1992; R. Bolz, *Rundfunk und Literatur unter amerikanischer Kontrolle: Das Programmangebot von Radio München, 1945–1949*, Wiesbaden 1991; E. Lersch, *Rundfunk in Stuttgart, 1934–1949*, Stuttgart 1990.

15 J. Loviglio, *Radio’s Intimate Public: Network Broadcasting and Mass-Mediated Democracy*, Minneapolis: 2005, p. 53.

16 *Ibid.*, p. 54.

and hosted by Hans Gertberg, the programme had been adapted to the “German taste”. According to von Zahn, quiz shows merely featuring knowledge-based questions were allegedly disliked in Germany, hence the radio station decided to include “combination plays and skill questions”, in order to appeal to the “proclivity of the Germans to tinker”.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, the quiz also featured a prize-money, something still rather rare for the radio quizzes of the time.

Another very unique programme was the *London-Frankfurt Quiz*, a co-production of the BBC and Radio Frankfurt. In this show, which was very popular in Germany at the time, fixed teams from Great Britain and Germany competed against each other. The initiative for this quiz show originally came from the BBC, with the intention to “build bridges between two nations estranged by the war”.<sup>18</sup> With its mix of knowledge-based questions and riddles, it was particularly the anti-elitist aspect of the quiz that made it so popular among the listeners. The programme was

*not a demonstration of condensed knowledge; rather it could show that even the ‘clever minds’ had knowledge gaps. [...] In any case, as the listeners’ letters indicate, it was not only academics and members of the educated middle class who were interested in the show, but [...] all strata of the population.*<sup>19</sup>

Audience participation in both the *Schnelldenker-Turnier* and the *London-Frankfurt Quiz* were restricted to sending in questions to the radio station, an opportunity that many listeners apparently made full use of. Moreover, quiz shows were often re-enacted in private, as the many letters from listeners sent to the station seem to confirm.<sup>20</sup>

By contrast, two other quiz programmes already featured direct audience participation, namely the aforementioned show *Doppelt oder Nichts* (“Double or Nothing”) on Radio Frankfurt, which was hosted by Just Scheu and was recorded at large public venues, with the contestants coming from the audience. In this show, the contestants had the chance to either take the prize money after answering a question correctly, or leave it in favour of potentially winning a larger prize by answering also the next question. Another quiz show hosted by Just Scheu was a radio lottery called *Wer hört gewinnt* (“Whoever listens wins”), which had been broadcasted on NWDR (Nordwestdeutscher Rundfunk) since 1948. On this programme, the listeners were to send in the right answers to musical, verbal, or sound riddles via postcard, for which they had to pay a fee. In the show, the winner was drawn from the postcards featuring the correct answer. With ten per cent of the intake being the first winner’s prize money, this quiz show featured a rather large reward. Nevertheless, the larger share of the income from the sale of lottery tickets was donated to the *Deutsche Hilfsgemeinschaft*.<sup>21</sup> Despite the show’s standard not being very high from the beginning, it seemingly had further declined over the years. In 1951, a

17 N.N., Juckpulver fürs Gehirn, in: Der Spiegel, no. 52, 23 December 1948.

18 R. Rudolf, Zwanzig Jahre und ein Ende, in: Frankfurter Rundschau, 9 December 1967.

19 Crone, Das Quiz London–Frankfurt, pp. 14, 16–17.

20 Ibid.

21 N.N., Doppelt oder nichts, in: Der Spiegel, no. 33, 14 August 1948.

commentator of the high-brow weekly newspaper *Die Zeit* severely criticized the show for normalising the “average taste” of the people, since the standard of the questions had already been lowered to a level that even the “jacketed baboons in Hagenbeck [Zoo] were able to send in correct answers”.<sup>22</sup>

By the end of the 1940s, quiz shows had become so popular that people re-enacted quiz shows at their homes or that they turned into very popular public events at cultural venues, such as the Housewives’ Quiz at Frankfurt’s *Palmengarten* or as part of the screening of a spy movie at Frankfurt’s cinema *Filmpalast*.<sup>23</sup> In 1954, according to a report in the weekly magazine *Die Zeit* on the latest statistical results from the audience research divisions of various broadcasting stations, “*Bunte Abende* and quiz shows, followed by news and radio plays, were ranking highest in the preferences of the listeners”.<sup>24</sup>

#### 4. Questioning the Germans: Public Opinion Polls as Re-education

Until September 1949, the Surveys Analysis Section/Research Analysis Staff of the Intelligence Branch of ICD/ISD had produced at least 72 surveys and public opinion reports. The first report dealt with radio listening in Germany, researching the radio listening habits of the people in occupied Germany. Subsequent surveys dealt with socio-economic issues, i.e. the lack of housing or food, family income, inflation, or the standard of living, and the prevalent ideological and political attitudes, particularly towards National Socialism or the military government and its occupation policies.<sup>25</sup> The analysts of the military government were particularly interested in the consistent significance of a rather positive attitude towards National Socialism, which was still considered by at least a third of the respondents as something that was basically a good idea but only badly executed. The report identified worsening living conditions and a generally negative outlook on the future, together with a growing disappointment in the policies of the occupation as potential causes for this trend.<sup>26</sup> In response to this result, six subsequent surveys were conducted in 1947 alone to further clarify this diagnosis.

It was also around this time that attitudes towards Communism and the Soviet Union were frequently surveyed, which was part of what could be described as a shift within

22 N.N., Just scheut sich nicht, in: *Die Zeit*, no. 15, 12 April 1951.

23 N.N., Muntere Hausfrauen, in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 29 March 1940; N.N., Spionagefilm-Quiz, in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 13. September 1950.

24 N.N., Bestseller des Funks, in: *Die Zeit*, no. 44, 4 November 1954.

25 See Merritt/Merritt, *Public Opinion in Occupied Germany*; A. J. Merritt/R. L. Merritt (eds.), *Public Opinion in Semisovereign Germany: The HICOG Surveys, 1949–1955*, Urbana 1980; Merritt, *Democracy Imposed*; U. Gerhardt, *Denken der Demokratie: Die Soziologie im atlantischen Transfer des Besatzungsregimes: Vier Abhandlungen*, Stuttgart 2007; H. Braun, *Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung als Selbstvergegenwärtigung und Evaluation der amerikanischen Besatzungsherrschaft*, in: H. Braun/U. Gerhardt/E. Holtmann (eds.), *Die lange Stunde Null: Gelenkter sozialer Wandel in Westdeutschland nach 1945*, Baden-Baden 2007, pp. 205–226; A. Kutsch, *Einstellungen zum Nationalsozialismus in der Nachkriegszeit: Ein Beitrag zu den Anfängen der Meinungsforschung in den Westlichen Besatzungszonen*, in: *Publizistik* 40 (1995), pp. 415–447.

26 Gerhardt, *Denken der Demokratie*, p. 194.



re-education policies from “democratization to anticommunism”.<sup>27</sup> As the Cold War with the Soviet Union became a priority of US foreign policy, the ICD/ICS focused on Germany as “the first battlefront of psychological warfare between the U.S. and the USSR”.<sup>28</sup> In the course of the organizational change of the military government from OMGUS to HICOG (1949–1955), the director of the Reactions Analysis Staff was replaced by Leo Crespi, a psychologist with a PhD from Princeton University. In the second phase, the division conducted another 214 survey reports under the direction of Crespi. In these surveys, besides more general surveys on attitudes towards democracy and the political situation in Germany, particularly the East-West conflict and related issues clearly dominated the agenda, dealing with topics such as rearmament, the defence contribution of Western Germany, the Berlin Conference in 1954, or nuclear armament. Besides conducting surveys, methodological training of German staff and external researchers was considered another important task of the division. In the first phase of the OMGUS surveys, almost exclusively American personnel conducted survey research, with German staff being hired merely as pre-testers, interviewers, and only in the final phase of the early period also as research analysts, due to a lack of training in advanced polling methods and statistics on the German side.<sup>29</sup> An important catalyst for the dissemination of statistical as well as polling methods was a conference entitled “Empirical Social Research: Opinion Polling and Market Research, Methods and Problems” at Weinheim, co-organized in 1951 by Crespi and the *Institut zur Förderung Öffentlicher Angelegenheiten* (“Institute for the Promotion of Public Affairs”), which had been established under the aegis of the ICD. The conference was attended by 12 participants from the US, mostly personnel of the military government, and by 120 participants from Germany, most of them social scientists or representatives of the newly founded private opinion polling institutes. Theodor W. Adorno, who attended the conference as one of the keynote speakers, emphasized in his address the specific “democratic potential” of public opinion research in a democratic society.

The larger share of the surveys conducted by the Research Analysis Section of ICD/ICS were commissioned to private opinion polling institutes, such as the *Institut für Demoskopie in Allensbach* (IfD; “Allensbach Institute for Public Opinion Polling”) or to the *Deutsches Institut für Volksumfragen* (DIVO; “German Institute for Public Opinion Polls”), which had been established under the guidance of ICD in 1951.<sup>30</sup> Both institutes did not only conduct political opinion polls but were also active in the field of market research. It was not until the second election of the German Bundestag in 1953 that

27 Merritt/Merritt, Public Opinion in Occupied Germany, p. 50.

28 C. S. Goldstein, A Strategic Failure: American Information Control Policy in Occupied Iraq, in: Military Review March/April 2008, pp. 58–65, MilitaryReview\_20080430\_art010.pdf; A. F. Levy, Promoting Democracy and Denazification: American Policymaking and German Public Opinion, in: Diplomacy & Statecraft 26 (2015) 4, pp. 614–635.

29 Gerhardt, Denken der Demokratie, p. 224.

30 J. Weyer, Westdeutsche Soziologie 1945–1960: Deutsche Kontinuitäten und nordamerikanischer Einfluss, in: Soziologische Schriften 41, Berlin 1984, p. 316.

opinion polls began to play a role in the political sphere in Germany, with the first psephological forecasts predicting the outcome of the election being produced and publicly debated for the first time.<sup>31</sup> In fact, Chancellor Adenauer's CDU had been the first party in Germany to exclusively contract a public opinion polling institute, the IfD, for political consultancy in the first half of the 1950s. Besides IfD and DIVO, two other private opinion survey and market research institutes had been founded in the 1940s – namely EMNID (*Erforschung der öffentlichen Meinung, Marktforschung, Nachrichten, Informationen und Dienstleistungen*; engl. “Public opinion research, market research, news, information and services”), which was founded already in 1945 in Bielefeld in the British zone and Infratest (Munich), which emerged out of the audience-research division of NWDR when it was discontinued in 1947.

As mentioned above, the reason for Germans to be continuously questioned by the military government did not merely lie in the concern of the occupiers to look into the minds of the former enemy or to evaluate the efficiency and effect of the re-education efforts. Oscar W. Riegel, in his *Report on a Survey of Public Opinion Research and Training in West Germany* to the Department of State in 1950, explicitly emphasized that to have the experience to be able to express an opinion and to be aware about diverging opinions would help to build and maintain a strong resiliency towards dictatorship.<sup>32</sup> Opinion polling, in the view of the military government, was thus considered an important method of re-education. Leo P. Crespi, who became the director of the Reactions Analysis Section in 1948, most accurately described the dual re-educative function of public opinion polling in a foreword to Anna J. and Richard L. Merritt's publication *Public Opinion in Semisovereign Germany*:

*It was the hope of those of us engaged in public opinion research in Germany during the OMGUS and HICOG years that this enterprise would not only be of value to the guidance of American policy, but would also contribute to the development of German democracy. This hope was based on the conviction that polling and authoritarianism do not mix well. When people begin to learn that their opinions are important and begin to like giving their opinions and finding out what their fellows are thinking, it becomes more difficult for a government to force arbitrary measures on the populace. Moreover, the experiences of being polled and of reading about public opinion issues of the day helps to build the interest in political participation that was at so low an ebb in postwar Germany and what is so fundamental to the success of democracy.<sup>33</sup>*

Needless to say, the medium through which the people should “read about public opinion” was the German daily press. As an exemplary analysis of the reporting of the *Frank-*

31 E. P. Neumann, *Tage der Entscheidung*, in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 1 September 1953; Id., *Wie wird die Wahl ausfallen?*, in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 3 September 1953.

32 O. W. Riegel, *Report on a Survey of Public Opinion Research and Training in West Germany*, June–September, 1950. Submitted to the Department of State, Washington, DC, Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann Papers, Piazzogna.

33 L. P. Crespi, *Foreword*, in: Merritt/Merritt (eds.), *Public Opinion in Semisovereign Germany*, pp. xxiii–xxv, at xxiv (emphasis added).

*furter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ) vividly illustrates, the results of polls had become news themselves already towards the end of the 1940s. The reporting of results of non-confidential surveys conducted by the research analysis branches of ICD/ICS notwithstanding, an endless stream of newspapers articles on opinion surveys conducted by the newly founded private opinion and market research institutes informed the Germans not only about their own political and ideological majority views, but also about the most recent consumerist tastes and economic trends. Amongst the survey results reported in the FAZ in the period of 1949–1952 (articles about 19 EMNID surveys and 36 IfD surveys in total) were broad topics such as the national demand for shoes (EMNID, 5 December 1949), the attitudes towards Adenauer’s administration (EMNID, 7 January 1950), remilitarization (EMNID, 23 January 1950, 5 September 1951, and 9 October 1951), values and character attributes of the desired partner (EMNID, 8 February 1950), faith in god (IfD, 23 March 1950), the H-bomb and fear of the end of the world (IfD, 1 April 1950), the German preference for brown bread (IfD, 6 November 1950), the required family income (IfD, 9 February 1952), women’s equality (EMNID, 12 August 1952), the dissemination of TV sets (EMNID, 10 October 1952), the daily routine of the Germans (EMNID, 29 October 1952), or the general interest in politics (EMIND, 15 November 1952).

One of the most frequently reported and also heatedly discussed topics were the OMGUS/HICOG’s surveys regarding the persisting National Socialist tendencies as well as the changing attitudes towards Communism and the Soviet Union amongst the Germans. Until the beginning of the 1950s, these surveys mostly confirmed that nationalistic or National-Socialist tendencies were on the decline in Germany. Starting from the beginning of the 1950s, however, both anti-American and anti-Communist views seem to have been on the rise, according to reports on actual surveys in the FAZ. Nevertheless, this appears to be a paradoxical situation only at first glance. Needless to say, the growing anti-Soviet attitudes were also a result of the active interference of the ICD/ISD in German public opinion, who conducted and published surveys presenting anti-Communist attitudes of the Germans or forced licensed newspapers to publish content compatible with the new direction of US foreign policy focussing on building up Germany as a bulwark against Communism in Europe.<sup>34</sup> At the same time, anti-American views were in part also the result of a growing national self-consciousness and strive for self-determination in Germany, expressed in open criticism of the US occupation in public discourse.<sup>35</sup> In an article entitled “They want Peace and Freedom: What Germans think about Themselves”, presenting the latest results of opinion polls on political issues conducted by IfD, it is argued that “placid, farsighted, and sober judgment does not flourish on occupied land” and that according to the poll, “60 per cent of the surveyed Germans think that a real German thrive for freedom could only prosper in the clean air of unrestricted German independence”. Accordingly, it is argued, “there must be better recipes for the

34 See Goldstein, *A Strategic Failure*.

35 See Levy, *Promoting Democracy*.

‘pacification’ of a nation than seizing its sovereignty”.<sup>36</sup> Erich P. Neumann, director of the polling institute IfD, became a frequent commentator on political topics in the conservative *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* since the beginning of the 1950s. Particularly the topic of the allegedly enduring National-Socialist tendencies, as they were presented by the surveys of the military government, seem to have been a stumbling block in Germany’s path towards self-determination in Neumann’s view. A widely debated report in the *New York Times* (NYT) in January 1953 on the results of the latest HICOG survey entitled “A Year-End Survey of Rightist and Nationalist Sentiments in West Germany” added even more fuel to the fire of what could be described as an ongoing “Cold War” of opinion surveys. According to the report in the NYT on the results of the survey, the old ideologies were on the rise in Germany. It is important to add that the reported survey was conducted right after the openly National-Socialist *Sozialistische Reichspartei* had eventually been banned by the German Federal Constitutional Court. Nevertheless, Neumann weighed in again in a column in the FAZ on 21 January 1953, arguing that the report in the NYT was very likely published merely for “fomenting purposes” by the military government in order to influence public opinion in Germany, in fact being an “anti-German” interpretation of the surveys by the newspaper.<sup>37</sup>

## 5. Quizzing the Japanese: Audience Participation as Re-education

Slightly diverging from the organization of the military government in the American zone in Germany, the unit responsible for conducting surveys within the Cultural Information & Education Section (CIE) of GHG/SCAP (General Headquarter / Supreme Commander of Allied Powers) in Japan, Public Opinion and Sociological Research (PO&SR), was a division itself, whereas the Radio Branch, responsible for the reorganization of radio broadcasting, was a subdivision of the Information Division (ID). In Japan, similarly to Germany, the radio was singled out as the “major vehicle” for re-educating the Japanese from the very beginning, because it had the greatest range to re-educate “the masses” with a penetration rate of more than 50 per cent already in 1944, and because it was “immediately available”.<sup>38</sup> Accordingly, it was not by accident that a radio-man, namely Colonel Ken Dyke, former vice president of the promotion and research section at NBC, became the first chief of CIE.<sup>39</sup> Moreover, the fact that CIE was located in the same building as NHK, Japan’s national broadcasting station, further demonstrates the importance that was put on the radio as a vehicle for the cultural re-

36 N.N., Sie wollen Frieden und Freiheit – Die Deutschen über sich selbst, in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 18 January 1950.

37 E. P. Neumann, Die Amerikaner und der Nationalsozialismus, in: *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 21 January 1953.

38 J. H. Jung, Playing with New Rules: Radio Quiz Shows and the Reorientation of the Japanese Under the US Occupation, 1945–1952, in: *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* 34 (2014) 4, pp. 568–585, at 569; Mayo, *The War of Words Continues*.

39 *Ibid.*, p. 13.

education of the Japanese.<sup>40</sup> Other than in sectorised Germany, the military government in Japan took a more centralised approach to reforming the broadcasting system, not only by keeping most of the existing Japanese radio personnel but also by subjecting the entire activities of NHK, from production to broadcasting, to a very strict guidance of its Radio Branch.<sup>41</sup>

With the shift from the punitive re-education of “war guilt” programmes (aired in the first months of the occupation)<sup>42</sup> and as part of the shift towards “more positive aspects of democratization” in 1947,<sup>43</sup> various audience-participation programmes were introduced under the guidance of the Radio Branch’s first chief William V. Roth and Frank Shōzō Baba, a Japanese-American (*nisei*) and former staff member of OWI and Voice of America.<sup>44</sup>

In an activity report published by CIE in February 1946, the double objective behind the introduction of audience-participation programmes, particularly those featuring the “public voice” of the people, was to “give the *average Japanese* citizen the opportunity to *express his opinion* on current problems and *demonstrate* to the listening audience the fact that Japan at last has *freedom of thought and speech* on the air”.<sup>45</sup> One of the most popular formats in the early beginning of broadcasting was *Gaitō rokuon* (“Street Recording”), which started in September 1945 and was modelled after the man-on-the-street-interviews, a very popular audience-participation programme aired on US radio networks already since the 1930s. While the interview was recorded in a recording vehicle parked next to the street in the beginning, the interviews were recorded right on the street since May 1946, after the CIE had advised NHK to do so in order to achieve “both, a visual and audible demonstration of freedom of thought and speech”. However, as Ota has correctly observed, despite CIE’s aim being “to provide a showcase of democracy”, this

*showcase encouraging the Japanese to foster grassroots discussion was a neatly-sanitised one in the sense that interviewees could never take the initiative to bring up a topic, but only discussed what CIE regarded as vital in terms of teaching democracy.*<sup>46</sup>

The other audience-participation programme introduced by CIE at the end of 1945 was *Hōsō tōronkai* (Radio Round Table). This programme was also carefully designed to “reflect” public opinion, by either selecting discussants to represent pro, con, and neutral viewpoints in the roundtable discussions, or by ensuring that all participants were inde-

40 S. Un Kim, Performing Democracy: Audience Participation in Postwar Broadcasting, in: *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 46 (2020) 1, pp. 61–89.

41 Jung, *Playing with New Rules*, p. 596.

42 Mayo, *The War of Words Continues*; S. Smulyan, *Popular Ideologies: Mass Culture at Mid-Century*, Philadelphia 2010.

43 Jung, *Playing with New Rules*, p. 569.

44 See K. Ishii, *Nihon ni hōsō wo tsukutta otoko: Frank Baba monogatari* [The Man who Brought Broadcasting to Japan: The Story of Frank Baba], Tōkyō 1998.

45 Quoted in N. Ota, *The Voiceful Voiceless: Rethinking the Inclusion of the Public Voice in Radio Interview Programs in Occupied Japan*, in: *Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television* 39 (2019) 3, pp. 584–601, at 586 (emphasis added).

46 *Ibid.*, pp. 587–588.

pendent of any political or social organization.<sup>47</sup> At the recorded events, the audience was encouraged to voice their opinions and ask questions, so that “the participating audience” would “learn how to debate in a ‘democratic’ society”.<sup>48</sup> The third audience-participation programme to be introduced in January 1946 was the Amateur’s Singing Contest *Shirōto Nodo jiman ongakukai*, which was, other than the former two formats, not based on an existing radio programme from the US but a programme originally designed by the staff of NHK. Just like *Gaitō rokuon*, the programme was to reflect the “public voice” of the average man on the street by turning the radio into a stage for ordinary amateur singers. Maruyama Tetsuo, producer at NHK and designer of *Nodo jiman* described the programme as a “union of the microphone and the people”, based on the “simplicity and fairness of the idea that anyone who comes to the station can get an audition”.<sup>49</sup>

Needless to say, there were certain limitations to the idea of free speech and fairness, especially after the change of course in the re-education policy after 1947. Criticism of the ideological narrowness of these programmes was coming either from the labour unions, who wanted labour songs to be allowed on *Nodo jiman*, as well as the political left, which demanded to be equally included on the podiums of *Hōsō tōronkai*. Accordingly, the goal of these programmes “was not merely to prompt free speech, but in fact also to discipline audience members toward certain norms of behaviour”.<sup>50</sup>

In a certain sense, quiz shows were considered an ideal format for this kind of sanitized audience participation, thus becoming one of the most important vehicles for promoting an idea of liberal democracy that was tightly connected to the American Way of Life. Before the advent of commercial radio broadcasting in 1951, three very popular quiz shows were aired on NHK.<sup>51</sup> Japan’s first post-war quiz show, *Hanashi no izumi* (“Fountain of Knowledge”), started in December 1946. Based on NBC’s *Information Please*, the quiz featured a panel of four regular experts with one alternating guest, who was to answer questions sent in by listeners. Despite participation from the audience being restricted to the submission of questions, the show “embodied basic principles of the genre by putting the contestants in direct opposition to each other and in intellectual competition”, while the listeners “indirectly participated in the competition by challenging the contestants with their questions” and receiving “cash rewards for winning with their imagined competitions with contestants”.<sup>52</sup> The show was an instant success; NHK received more than 10,000 letters weekly sent in from listeners.

Prompted by the success of *Hanashi no izumi*, NHK in November 1947 started to broadcast another quiz programme called *Nijū no tobira* (“Twenty Gates”), which was mod-

47 Un Kim, *Performing Democracy*, pp. 67, 69.

48 *Ibid.*, p. 68.

49 *Ibid.*, p. 69.

50 *Ibid.*, p. 72.

51 As already mentioned, research on the introduction of the radio quiz is by far more extensive than research on the German case. Ji Hee Jung has elaborately analysed quiz programmes on Japanese radio and their relation to the re-education effort in great detail, and I will paraphrase from his meticulously researched study from here on (Jung, *Playing with New Rules*).

52 *Ibid.*, p. 571.

elled after WVTR's *Twenty Questions*. The design of this programme was very similar to *Hanashi no izumi*, featuring a panel of regular guest experts as well. Questions were also mailed in by listeners, who received a cash prize if their questions stumped the experts. The very first show to feature "normal" Japanese people as contestants on a quiz show was *Watashi wa dare deshō* ("Who am I?"), a programme first broadcasted in January 1949, modelled after MBC's *What's My Name*. *Watashi wa dare deshō* was more of a "guessing game", in which the contestants had to identify the names of famous figures from various categories, receiving 10 Yen in prize money for each correct answer.<sup>53</sup> Apparently, the instant cash reward obviously offended some listeners in the beginning, according to letters sent to the radio station from the audience in response to the new format. However, according to commentator Hijikata Masami, listeners quickly got "trained into it" within the first year of broadcasting.<sup>54</sup> Similar to Germany, the quiz game deeply penetrated into the everyday life of the people, either by being "re-played" in schools, at local events, and as a parlour game at the workplace or private gatherings.<sup>55</sup>

In the eyes of occupation officials, radio quizzes featuring panels of intellectuals, experts, and other popular figures counteracted the "feudalistic fear of loss of face", since the contestants on the panel were facing the real danger of losing their face under the eyes of the listeners, who themselves "had nothing to risk or lose by virtually participating in the competition".<sup>56</sup> According to F. B. Huggins, the chief of the Radio Unit who supervised the production of the first quiz show in Japan, this kind of audience-participation programme in particular contributed significantly to the re-education efforts of the occupation:

*In giving the Japanese people a weekly half hour of information and entertainment, you have in my humble opinion, contributed to the rebuilding of a democratic Japan. What the concrete effects of this program which could never have been presented in militaristic Japan are, can probably never be measured. But I'm sure that you have done much to destroy feudalistic fear of loss of face and accelerated the rebirth of freedom of speech and thought.*<sup>57</sup>

According to a survey conducted by NHK from 1951, quiz shows were amongst the most popular radio broadcasts, with two of them ranking third and fifth of all programmes and listener ratings of more than 60 per cent.<sup>58</sup> Apparently, the peculiar popularity of the quiz show, and thus also its effectiveness for the re-education purpose, lies in the participatory and "sports-like ludic" character of the format.<sup>59</sup> One the one hand, by indirectly

53 Ibid., p. 577.

54 Quoted in *ibid.*

55 Ibid., pp. 575, 576.

56 Ibid., p. 574.

57 Quoted in J. H. Jung, *Radio Broadcasting and the Politics of Mass Culture in Transwar Japan*, PhD thesis, UC San Diego, 2010, p. 156.

58 T. Furu, *Ninki bangumi wo kentō suru (jō)*, in: *Hōsō bunka* 6 (1951) 10, p. 15.

59 S. Wada et al., *Zadankai "kuizu" bangumi no miryoku wo kentō suru*, in: *Hōsō bunka* 7 (1952) 5, p. 23.



competing with the participants on the show, the audience partook in a “simulated” competition with the contestants on the show, either by sending in difficult questions to stomp the experts on the panel or by sympathizing or competing with other “normal” people on the show, as soon as they had been included in formats such as *Watashi wa dare deshō*. On the other hand, the popularity of the quiz prompted the audience to mimic or “re-play” the game in schools or public events. In an extended discussion of the radio quiz, Furu Takeo, staff-member of NHK’s Opinion Research Department, described the peculiar appeal of the quiz show in Japan by referring to Herta Herzog’s famous study of the American quiz show *Professor Quiz*:

*Drawing on Herzog’s study, Furu demonstrated that Watashi wa dare deshō maintained the proper balance among the four appeals of an intellectual quiz show: competitive appeal, educational appeal, self-rating appeal and sporting appeal. Furu observed that commoner’s participation as actual contestants significantly increased the competitive and self-rating appeal, in Herzog’s terms [...]. Furu noted that “as the [knowledge] level between contestants and listeners came closer” it sharpened “the sense of rivalry” that listeners felt towards the contestants.<sup>60</sup>*

According to Jung, while the quiz show itself simulates “the idea that individuals could acquire wealth and fame by proving their ability through a supposedly fair competition”, listeners “willingly and actively participated in such a simulation by identifying and competing with the contestants” as well.<sup>61</sup>

## 6. Questioning the Japanese: Public Opinion Polls as Re-education

It was only after psychiatrist Florence Powdermaker, member of SCAP’s visiting expert programme to Japan in 1948, had explicitly recommended the expansion of social research on Japan that PO&SR was upgraded to a full division from its previous status as a small branch of the then dissolved Analysis and Research Division.<sup>62</sup> Other than the much larger Research and Analysis Branch (R&A) of the Civil intelligence section (CIS), which produced classified weekly situation reports for internal use based on information collected by counterintelligence units or taken from press pieces, summarizing and analysing cultural and psychological trends or threats to the occupational goals, PO&SR was using purely academic methods, namely questionnaire-based surveys, field research, and opinion polls. Cultural anthropologist John C. Pelzel was appointed the division’s first chief, with anthropologist Herbert Passin becoming his deputy. In 1949, anthropologist John W. Bennett replaced Pelzel, who left Japan to take up a position at Harvard University. Passin and Bennett were close friends and knew each other already from their

60 Ibid., p. 578.

61 Ibid., pp. 578–579.

62 Cf. J. A. Miller, *The Public Opinion and Sociological Research Division: Attempting to Understand the Japanese during the American Occupation*, Albany 2012, p. 17.



time at the Midwest Domestic Intelligence Branch of OWI, where they both were involved in research on propaganda and morale.<sup>63</sup> Very similar to its German counterpart, the tasks of the unit were to (a) conduct research on Japanese social organization and public attitudes regarding the occupation and the rehabilitation programme, (b) provide training and technical guidance and surveillance of Japanese government public opinion research agencies, and (c) maintain liaison with private and academic Japanese research and polling organizations as well the other staff sections of GHQ/SCAP in the planning of research.<sup>64</sup> On average, the PO&SR division was staffed with four to five US military and non-military staff members and around 50 Japanese co-workers. Most of the staff members from the US were specialists trained in sociology or anthropology, including a small number of second-generation Japanese-American staff members (*nisei*). Two of them were Tsuchiyama Tamie and Iwao Ishino, who had both been trained in survey and fieldwork methods at the Japanese internment camp at Poston.<sup>65</sup>

After its upgrade to division status in 1948, PO&SR conducted or commissioned 32 attitude and opinion surveys and produced over 30 memoranda and sociological studies for distribution within SCAP by the end of the occupation. Many of the surveys were devoted to single topics and issues related to occupational reforms, such as prostitution, land reform, financial reforms, marriage, the status of women, the population problem, school reforms, and international relations. Most of the 32 surveys related to political issues or recent social trends were conducted in collaboration with private opinion polling institutes, such as newspaper publishers (Asahi, Mainichi, Yomiuri), news agencies (Jiji), or semi-public bodies, such as the *Yoron chōsa kyōgikai* (“Public Opinion Research Association”; funded in 1947). With regard to the dissemination of statistical and polling methods, the *Yoron chōsa kyōgikai* became a venue for the training of Japanese professionals and intellectual exchange between the staff of PO&SR and their professional and academic counterparts on the Japanese side.

One of the most heatedly debated issues between CIE and the Japanese government was the establishment of a national institute for public opinion research in Japan. Shortly after the war had ended, the Japanese government had already established an Opinion Survey Department (*Yoron chōsa-ka*) of the Cabinet Office under the control of CIE in January 1946. However, only half a year later CIE prohibited any kind of public opinion research to be conducted by the government itself, since it feared that polls could be misused for propagandistic purposes. Instead, CIE actively supported the establishment of opinion survey institutions in the private sector, namely at the large newspaper publishers or the national news agencies. Nevertheless, requests from both the Japanese parliament and the government to reconsider the establishment of a Japanese national institute for opinion surveys never subsided in the following years, and in 1949 the US

63 Ibid., pp. 26–27.

64 Ibid., p. 35.

65 See L. R. Hirabayashi, *The Politics of Fieldwork: Research in an American Concentration Camp*, Tucson 1999; D. H. Price, *Anthropological Intelligence: The Deployment and Neglect of American Anthropology in the Second World War*, Durham 2008.

military government eventually gave in and supported the establishment of the *Kokuritsu yoron chōsa-jo* (National Public Opinion Research Institute; NPORI) under the guidance of CIE.<sup>66</sup> This step was based on the strategic shift towards conceding more self-determinacy to the Japanese government, with the ultimate goal of bringing the occupation to an end in the context of the looming war in Korea.<sup>67</sup> Ironically, it was prolific wartime propaganda researcher and race theorist Koyama Eizō who was appointed as the first director of NPORI.<sup>68</sup>

Similarly to the attitude towards public opinion in occupied Germany, the activities of the new institute were continuously under the surveillance of the CIE, which “included negative controls to prevent the abuse of polling for thought control purposes, and active cooperation in technical improvement of the research”.<sup>69</sup> Since the establishment of NPORI, “most of the attitude surveys requested by SCAP agencies were handled in the field for the Division by the Institute”.<sup>70</sup> Yet again, this illustrates the fundamental paradox of re-education, since according to an internal memo, “while encouraging accurate and unbiased opinion polling by Japanese organizations, the GHQ (via the Japanese government’s opinion research agencies) simultaneously reserved the right to vet polls whose content or research materials might be ‘politically misused’ (*seijiteki ni akuyō sareru*)”.<sup>71</sup> The surveys conducted by NPORI in the period of its brief existence focussed on relatively specific social issues of current concern, ranging from public hygiene (1950), education (1950), women’s civic consciousness (1951), agricultural cooperatives (1952), tuberculosis (1953), to political consciousness (1953).<sup>72</sup> Moreover, from the beginnings of the 1950s, the Cabinet Office also published the Public Opinion Annuals (*Yoron chōsa nenkan*), in which it publicized the compiled results of surveys conducted by private organizations, universities, and local governments. According to Morris-Suzuki, it was through “the constant conducting and publicizing of opinion polls” that “the flow of ideas into the ‘mainstream’” was reinforced.<sup>73</sup> Put differently, it was the quantified and averaged answers to “intriguing questions” such as “Do you have a driver’s license?” or “What images come into your mind when you hear the words ‘polling booth?’” that a group called “the Japanese” developed a unique “national character” that was tightly connected to a democratic and consumerist “American Way of Life”.

66 Similar to the reorganization of NHK, NPORI was designed to be a non-partisan, autonomous public opinion data-collecting agency, answerable to the Prime Minister and overseen by a board of governors.

67 Miller, *The Public Opinion*, pp. 38–40.

68 See T. Morris-Suzuki, *Ethnic Engineering: Scientific Racism and Public Opinion Surveys in Midcentury Japan*, in: *Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique* 8 (2000) 2, pp. 499–529; T. Satō, *Yoron to Seron: Nihon-Teki Min’i No Keifugaku* [Public Opinion and Popular Sentiments: A Genealogy of Public Opinion in Japan], *Tōkyō* 2008; F. Schäfer, *Public Opinion and the Press: Transnational Contexts of Early Media and Communication Studies in Prewar Japan, 1918–1937*, in: *Social Science Japan Journal* 14 (2011), pp. 21–38.

69 J. W. Bennett, *Social and Attitudinal Research in Japan: The Work of SCAP’s Public Opinion and Sociological Research Division*, in: *University of Manila Journal of East Asiatic Studies* 2 (1952), pp. 21–33, at 22.

70 *Ibid.*

71 GHQ/SCAP memo quoted in Morris-Suzuki, *Ethnic Engineering*, p. 417.

72 *Ibid.*, p. 518.

73 *Ibid.*, pp. 518–519.

As with the case of Germany, the press played an important role in publicizing and disseminating the results of an endless current of surveys and polls. Besides the surveys by PO&SR, NPORI, NHK, or the national news agencies, almost all of the main newspaper outlets also conducted hundreds of opinion surveys themselves. *Mainichi shinbun* founded its own polling division already in September 1945, conducting Japan's first post-war opinion poll related to the reform of the electoral procedure for the election of Tōkyō's governor.<sup>74</sup> *Asahi shinbun* and *Yomiuri shinbun* quickly followed by establishing their own opinion polling divisions in November 1945 and January 1946 respectively. In November 1945, *Asahi shinbun* conducted the first survey regarding the support for the current government in March 1946, namely the Yoshida cabinet. In the period from 5 August 1945–31 December 1952, Japan's two largest newspapers published 147 (*Yomiuri shinbun*) and 149 (*Asahi shinbun*) newspaper articles containing the word "public opinion survey". Whereas the *Asahi* almost exclusively published results of surveys regarding political issues (support rate for the current cabinet, political and social reforms, political scandals, such as the Hirano Incident, or the US-Japan peace treaty), *Yomiuri* also conducted surveys regarding the changes in cultural everyday life of the people (such as the abolition of Omnium, general living conditions, television broadcasting, movie-going, reading habits, radio listening) next to political issues (support rates, attitudes towards the occupation, support for the emperor system, attitudes towards the JCP). In an accompanying commentary to *Mainichi's* first poll, the publishers of the paper were eager to emphasize their own importance for the re-education effort, stating that "to conduct unsolicited opinion surveys regarding urgent problems of the nation" would "set spurs to the democratization of newly born Japan".<sup>75</sup> Koyama Eizō had put forth a much more pragmatic and commercial view regarding the future role of public opinion surveys in 1946, stating that "until recently, news were mainly reports on actual events (in the sense of "something has happened"), but today, newspaper publishers have understood that reports regarding public opinion will attract the larger attention of their readers".<sup>76</sup> Public opinion, to rephrase Koyama's remark, had not only acquired news value but also a commercial one. Opinions had turned into a commodity of the newspaper, something to be consumed by its readers.

## 7. Discussion

In October 1949, an article appeared in the *Asahi shinbun* that perfectly epitomizes the specific characteristics and also the ideological narrowness of re-education through audience-participation programmes and the continuous questioning through polls. During the recording of a radio round table (*Hōsō tōron-kaï*) on the sensationally phrased

74 N.N. Honsha yoron chōsa – Daiikikai kadai: chiji kōsen, dai-tasu ha chokusetsu senkyo, in: *Mainichi shinbun*, 12 November 1945.

75 Ibid.

76 E. Koyama, *Yoron Chōsa Gaiyō* [An Introduction into Public Opinion Polling], Tōkyō 1946, p. 10.

topic “Do newspapers tell the truth?”, persistent heckling from the audience compelled the recording team of NHK to eventually stop their recording. Three discussants participated in the debate, the editor of the *Tōkyō shinbun*, a leading politician of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), and the aforementioned director of NPORI, Koyama Eizō. The host of the debate was the popular quizmaster of the radio quiz *Nijū no tobira*, Fujiwara Shōichi. The obviously orchestrated tumultuous interruption from the audience occurred whenever any other person than the JCP representative took the floor on the podium. This kind of unsolicited “participation” from the audience in fact was an “uncontrollable feature” of not only political round table debates but of almost any not fully scripted participation format, giving the staff of NHK a “hard time” protecting these programmes “from aberrant participants”.<sup>77</sup> Man-on-the-street interviews (*Gaitō rokuon*), for instance, were frequently used by members of the left-wing spectrum as an amplifier for their “unwanted” political views. Despite participation from the audience being certainly welcome, this only applied when it came from the desired ideological (non-Communist) camp. In the remaining paragraphs, I would like to discuss “what” (American-style capitalist liberal democracy) and “how” (re-education qua therapeutic and collective unlearning and learning through play) the audience participation programmes and opinion polls contributed to the re-education efforts in Germany and Japan.

One of the intellectual sources for understanding re-education as a process of “unlearning” and “learning” can be found in stage models developed in social psychology and group psychology already in the 1930s. Social psychologist Kurt Lewin, who was a key member in various think tanks developing strategies for the re-education of the former enemies after the war would have ended, described the process of re-educating a whole nation in psychotherapeutic terms as the necessary steps of unfreezing, moving, and freezing (or unlearning, relearning, and consolidation) of behavioural and mental patterns. According to his widely read contributions, the aim of re-education was to “change” the “group atmosphere from autocracy [...] to democracy”.<sup>78</sup> However, since even “extensive first-hand experience” would “not automatically create correct concepts”,<sup>79</sup> re-education would have to take place as the spontaneous, “voluntary acceptance” of new values and behavioral patterns,<sup>80</sup> namely through the mimetic function of play and roleplaying. Thereby, the “group members” would be “convinced of democracy and learn to play their role in democracy as leaders or followers”.<sup>81</sup> Mass media, as we have seen, was considered the most important instrument for the re-education of the nation (reaching far beyond the scope of the educational system). Besides popular music or Hollywood movies, it was particularly the imagined or simulated participation in quiz shows and opinion polls, which allowed for the playful and performative training of new behaviours and values by

77 Un Kim, *Performing Democracy*, pp. 72–73.

78 K. Lewin, *The Special Case of Germany*, in: *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 7 (1943) 4, p. 561.

79 K. Lewin, *Resolving Social Conflicts: Selected Papers on Group Dynamics*, New York 1948 [1943], p. 61.

80 *Ibid.*, p. 65.

81 Lewin, *The Special Case of Germany*, p. 561.

an entire nation. As will be shown, the dissemination of capitalist liberal democracy as the “American Way of Life” through quizzes and polls, Hollywood movies, or American popular music alike shifted the aim of re-education from the “punitive” implantation of collective guilt towards the “playful” propagation of the “positive” values of Consumerism and Americanism, and thus the development of a collective amnesia concerning the memories of the war and the construction of the collective narrative of a “zero hour” in both countries.<sup>82</sup>

I am writing “playful”, because quizzes and questionnaires can be both understood as therapeutic types of play or role-play in the Lewinian sense. Playing games, and this is also the reason why play therapy has become an important method in psychosocial therapy and psychoanalysis,<sup>83</sup> allows the patient to create and play out model situations and master reality in an experimental setting, as in a kind of emotional laboratory. Although “to play” means to step “out of ‘real’ life into a temporary sphere of activity”, it can still be conducted with “great seriousness”.<sup>84</sup> According to Roger Caillois, despite play defining a “second reality”, namely an activity which is essentially “free”, it is yet still “governed by rules”.<sup>85</sup> Play is ontologically ambivalent, playing games is a human practice located in-between determination (rules) and indetermination (freedom) and reality and fiction (simulation, make-believe). If we refer to Roger Caillois’ typology of play as *agon*, *mimicry*, *alea*, and *illinx*, particularly the former two types of play, namely competition and role-playing or simulative make-believe, are relevant ludic forms prevalent in quizzes and questionnaires.<sup>86</sup> Both are forms of “re-educative play”, if we want to phrase it this way, enabling a collective mass-therapy qua unlearning/learning behavioural and cultural patterns through ludic make-believe and/or competition in a “second”, or “mass-mediated” reality.

In the case of quiz shows, re-educative play refers to the imagined participation of the listener as *Tertius gaudens* (Georg Simmel), namely what Herta Herzog described as the “competitive appeal” between listener and the contestant on the show and the empathetic observation of the “sporting appeal” between the contestant and the quiz and questions. Audience-participation programmes such as quiz shows do not only enable the experience of a competition between the self and the contestants, but also the identification with the contestants, especially since quiz shows also started to include the “common man” as participants. Furthermore, public opinion surveys are re-educative play in a sense that they “simulate” political participation by translating “a given conflict

82 U. Gerhardt, *Soziologie der Stunde Null: Zur Gesellschaftskonzeption des amerikanischen Besatzungsregimes in Deutschland 1944–1945/1946*, Frankfurt am Main 2005; C. Gluck, *The “Long Postwar”: Japan and Germany in Common and in Contrast*, in: E. Schlant/T. Rimer (eds.), *Legacies and Ambiguities: Postwar Fiction and Culture in West Germany and Japan*, Washington DC 1991, pp. 63–78.

83 E. Homburger [Erikson], *Configurations in Play – Clinical Notes*, in: *The Psychoanalytic Quarterly* 6 (1937) 2, pp. 139–214. Lutz Dammbeck impressively revealed the relationship between re-education and quiz and game shows in a cinematic discourse analysis in his documentary “Overgames” (2015).

84 J. Huizinga, *Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture*, Boston 1955, p. 13.

85 R. Caillois, *Man, Play, and Games*, Urbana 2001, pp. 9–10.

86 *Ibid.*

or problem into a (circuit of) question/answer game”, thereby imposing “the illusion that a public opinion [...] is simply the sum of a number of individual opinions”, as Jean Baudrillard has asserted.<sup>87</sup> Moreover, as we have seen, with the results of public opinion surveys being publicized in mass media, public opinion became news itself, thus being both “the medium and the message” at the same time.<sup>88</sup> Thereby, it was also possible for the military government to intervene into the simulation of democracy. Whereas the people were given the impression that they were actually listened to (when participating in a poll) and that their opinions were being heard (through the publication of the results), it was also possible to exclude unwanted “radical” expressions from the political spectrum that could potentially turn into a hindrance to the project of re-educating the people towards pro-Americanism and anti-Communism, especially after the change of course in 1947.

As we have seen, although the aim of re-education in both cases was defined as to unlearn the obsolete feudalist and/or totalitarian norms and values, with the shift towards educating the Germans and the Japanese towards anti-Communism and the American Way of Life, the values of liberal democracy (individualism, fair play, egalitarianism) were “spiced up” with capitalist values. This was particularly the case with quiz shows, a game of “rule-based competition” and the “gratification and prestige of the winner”.<sup>89</sup> In this sense, the quiz show is a perfect simulation game of the “American-style capitalist liberal democracy”. According to Jung, one is able to see “the connection between quiz show and the occupation’s reorientation project” when one acknowledges that the quiz show represents a very “specific mode of participation” that is related to the “peculiar form of democracy preferred by the occupation”, namely an “idealized image of American liberal capitalist society represented in opposition to the Communist system”.<sup>90</sup> This way “they simulated, whether consciously or not, the idea that individuals could acquire wealth and fame by proving their ability through a supposedly fair competition. Listeners also willingly and actively participated in such a simulation by identifying and competing with contestants”.<sup>91</sup>

Besides learning the capitalist values of the American Way of Life, both the quiz show and public opinion research also contributed to the standardization and normalization of the idea of the socio-cultural identity of “the Japanese” or “the German”. Ideologically, both audience-participation programmes and public opinion polling were based on the idea of the “common man”. Quiz shows and public opinion surveys thus trained the Japanese and the Germans in the “ideology of the common man”, i.e. the imagination of belonging to and being heard as the “common German” or “common Japanese”. Thereby, quizzes and surveys helped to construct “a normative and extremely narrow

87 J. Baudrillard, *Symbolic Exchange and Death*, London 1993, pp. 65–66.

88 *Ibid.*

89 Y. Niwa, Yoshiyuki, *Kuizu Bangumi No Tanjō*, in: S. Ishita/H. Ogawa (eds.), *Kuizu Bunka No Shakaigaku [A Sociology of Quiz Culture]*, Kyōto 2003, pp. 75–103.

90 Jung, *Playing with New Rules*, p. 570.

91 *Ibid.*, p. 578.

definition of what being average means” – in other words, “the ideology of the common man produced an interpretation of normalcy that heavily favored dominant cultural formations and discouraged marginality and difference”.<sup>92</sup> Accordingly, the term common “man” needs to be taken literally, since the construct of the common man did not only exclude the non-Japanese or non-German ethnic minorities but was also based on clearly demarcated gender roles and stereotypes of the period of the economic miracle, namely the woman as the consuming housewife and the man as the producing breadwinner.<sup>93</sup>

92 O. Hoerschelmann, *Rules of the Game: Quiz Shows and American Culture*, Albany 2006, p. 50.

93 S. Yoshimi, *Television and Nationalism: Historical Change in the National Domestic TV Formation of Postwar Japan*, in: *European Journal of Cultural Studies* 6 (2003) 4, pp. 459–487.