Portals of Globalization as *lieux de mémoire*[1]

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ABSTRACTS

When looking at global flows scholars have increasingly put emphasis on nodes and the exercise regulatory power at certain places that are central to the organization of the mobility of people, goods, capital, and cultural patterns. Some authors have even developed a whole theory around the notion of global cities, which may not only become the hubs of globalized capitalism but also the hotspots of current class confrontation. Such approaches are rather loosely and sometimes even only rhetorically related to interpretations of global processes, where the local and the global are the only poles remaining in a borderless world. There is no doubt that global processes play out at local level, but there is ample evidence that other spatial formats (both scales of territoriality and non-territorial ones) remain important as well, or even gain weight in the organization and control of global flows. What interests me in particular in this context, is the role and function of places where global flows arrive and depart, are channelled through, and leave their stamp not only in warehouses but also in the mindset of people. It seems to me a functionalist reductionism to see them only as command centres of capitalism. Instead, I propose to look at them as growing in numbers and variety, and to focus on their histories, which has left a cultural legacy and may explain the unevenness of our mental maps, when it comes to the remembrance of globalization and its effect on current global processes.

Forschungen über globale Ströme haben schon seit längerem die Rolle von Knoten in Netzwerken und die Möglichkeit betont, an bestimmten Orten, die zentral für die Mobilität von Menschen, Waren, Kapital und kulturellen Mustern sind, Regulierungsmacht auszuüben. Autoren wie Saskia Sassen haben daraus eine ganze Theorie um den Begriff der *Global Cities* entfaltet, die nicht nur Zentren des globalen Kapitalismus sind, sondern auch Brennpunkte der heutigen Klassenkonfrontation. Solche Ansätze sind eher lose und manchmal auch nur rhetorisch mit Interpretationen globaler Prozesse gekoppelt, in denen nur noch das Lokale und das Globale als Pole einer entgrenzten Welt übrigbleiben. Zweifellos äußern sich globale Prozesse auf der lokalen Ebene, aber es gibt eine breite Evidenz, dass andere Raumformate (sowohl Skalen des Territorialen wie nicht-territoriale) bedeutsam bleiben oder sogar an Gewicht in der Organisation und Kontrolle globaler Ströme gewinnen. Was den Autor dabei besonders interessiert, ist die Rolle und Funktion von Orten, an denen globale Ströme ankommen oder abgehen, durch die sie hindurch geleitet werden und an denen sie ihre Spuren nicht nur in den Warenlagern, sondern auch im Bewusstsein der Menschen hinterlassen. Ich halte es für einen funktionalistischen Reduktionismus, solche Orte nur als Kommandozentralen des Kapitalismus zu sehen (die dann oft in eurozentristischer Manier im Globalen Norden lokalisiert werden). Stattdessen schlage ich vor, sie in ihrer wachsenden Zahl und Varianz zu betrachten und sich auf ihre Geschichte zu konzentrieren, die ein kulturelles Erbe hinterlassen hat, das die Ungleichgewichtigkeit unserer Mental Maps erklärt, wenn es um die Erinnerung an die Globalisierung und deren Effekte auf heutige globale Prozesse geht.

Research on global flows has always put emphasis on nodes and the possibility to exercise regulatory power at certain places that are central to the organization of the mobility of people, goods, capital, and cultural patterns. Authors like Saskia Sassen have even developed a whole theory around the notion of global cities, which may not only become the hubs of globalized capitalism but also the hotspots of current class confrontation. Such approaches are rather loosely and sometimes even only rhetorically related to interpretations of global processes, where the local and the global are the only poles remaining in a borderless world. There is no doubt that global processes play out at local level, but there is ample evidence that other spatial formats (both scales of territoriality and non-territorial ones) remain important as well, or even gain weight in the organization and control of global flows. What interests me in particular in this context, is the role and function of places where global flows arrive and depart, are channelled through, and leave their stamp not only in warehouses but also in the mindset of people. It seems to me a functionalist reductionism to see them only as command centres of capitalism (often in a good old Western-centric perspective located in the Global North). Instead, I propose to look at them as growing in numbers and variety, and to focus on their histories, which has left a cultural legacy and may explain the unevenness of our mental maps when it comes to the remembrance of globalization and its effect on current global processes. This article, therefore, discusses in the first part the question of how globalization is remembered; in the second part, the necessary enlargement of Pierre Nora's concept of *lieux de mémoire* (sites of memory) is discussed, in order to conclude in the third part with a possible definition of portals of globalization and some facets of its history.

1. Global History and Global Historical Consciousness

It may seem presumptuous to reflect on the memory of globalization some 30 years after it became a central category of social theory, given that for some, it remains open to debate whether globalization is merely a genial turn of phrase, coined by social theorists who lack methodological rigour,[2] or a particularly perfidious project – whose attractiveness is already diminishing – of neoliberal elites.[3] But if we agree with most of the scholarship in the rapidly expanding field of global history, globalization is not such a recent phenomenon and has deep roots that stretches into the past. It is, therefore, interesting how and where such roots become important again and in which ways previous layers of globalization are remembered. What does the process of remembrance have to do with new transregional or global connections, established at places where previous actors had already built far-reaching networks?

While globalization that identified itself with deregulation, privatization, and the downsizing of welfare-state elements had found a strong opposition from the left in the alter-globalization movement of the early 2000s, right-wing populist movements currently grow on the basis of their open resistance to immigration and a nationalist agenda that finds broad support during elections; Donald Trump's "America First," the Polish and Hungarian governments' open conflict with EU immigration regulations, Marine Le Pen's Front National in France, and the Alternative für Deutschland in Germany are but a few examples of these political movements. There are good arguments to include Asian as well as African regimes into the global alliance of populist resistance and, in turn, to what is perceived as "globalization."[4] It does not mean that such populism from the right or its argumentation against the opening of borders is a completely new phenomenon; on the contrary, right-wing populism is more and more analysed as a reaction to the global condition, and it goes back at least to the end of World War II, as Federico Finchelstein has argued.[5]

Yet, despite the all too often heated polemics surrounding globalization, it can be argued that an upsurge in the discourse on the topic since the 1980s has generated some positives: it has increased our awareness of the global condition in which humanity lives, and it produced a far more nuanced understanding of global processes than what is suggested by the popular image of a "global village" with no boundaries. Still, too often, we pay

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2   The distinction established in the social sciences, some years ago, between hyper-globalizers, realists, and globalization sceptics (on this, see for example, D. Held et al., Debating Globalization, Cambridge 2005; D. Held and A. G. McGrew (eds.), Globalization Theory: Approaches and Controversies, Cambridge 2007) has in the interim proved too crude a system of classification, but it does make clear that despite the astounding speed at which this new paradigm took hold, there is a rather significant group of doubters. This scepticism extends to the concept's empirical foundations, its methodological usefulness, as well as theoretically to its explanatory and/or predictive value for past and present phenomena.

3   See, for example, U. Brand, Gegenhegemonie: Perspektiven globalisierungskritischer Strategien, Hamburg 2005.

4   J. Plagemann and A. Ufen, Spielarten des Populismus in Asien (=GIGA-Focus Asien, 7), Hamburg 2017; S. Booysen, Dominance and Decline. The ANC in the Time of Zuma, Johannesburg 2015.

5   F. Finchelstein, From Fascism to Populism in History, Oakland, CA 2017.

insufficient attention to the distinction between globalization as a key concept of an ideology, and the many quite different globalizations as an object of empirical research.[6] Although the two exist in close relational proximity, they are not identical and should not be conflated.

Since the term's coinage in the late 1980s, historians have recognized that globalization has a history (in fact, several different histories), and as this realization has grown, so too has discussion on global-history approaches to that history.[7] What the two debates – the one disputing the quasi-natural character of globalization in the name of either leftist criticism towards neoliberal deregulation, and the other insisting on the multiple roots of current global processes – have in common, is the fundamental doubt in an ideology of globalization being the hidden hand behind everything that happens in today's world and against which policy cannot do a lot. Such a mystification of the global has been increasingly deconstructed over the past years, from various angles of political and academic discourses, and has led scholars to interrogate the historicity of globalization(s). Following the question of how historical globalization(s) is (are), the question immediately arises as to how former variants of global processes are remembered and what effect this remembrance may have.

These discussions, in turn, have raised the question whether the history of globalization, like that of nationalism and nation states, can be used to identify sites of memory that can structure collective memory and, thus, support ongoing changes in collective representations of the past. Charles Maier, taking stock of the twentieth century, juxtaposes two chronological perspectives in such processes of the formation of collective memory: "structural narratives" and "moral narratives." The former, the purview of historians and social scientists, demarcate economic developments or large-scale institutional change. The latter offers a moral assessment of an era and is by no means solely (or even primarily) the purview of historians. Using the twentieth century as an example, Maier tries to convey the difficulties of relating the structural narrative to the moral one, that is, the twentieth century as "a time span in which a complex set of institutional changes takes place" to the twentieth century as an epoch of moral atrocities.[8] Sites of memory, in this context, are the product of historical cultures within which academic historiographies have a role, but they are by far not alone in defining what is important to whom. Sites of

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6   Some authors conclude from this distinction that the term globalization should be reserved to characterize a certain ideological formation (often also described as neoliberal), while others argue for the use of the plural, hence to speak of globalizations, in order to make the difference clear. See, for example, A. Epple, Globalisierung/en. Version 1.0, in: Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte, http://docupedia.de/zg/Globalisierung; J. Osterhammel, Globalisierungen, in: ibid., Die Flughöhe der Adler. Historische Essays zur globalen Gegenwart, München 2017, p. 31.

7   In fact, the literature on globalization has exploded. For an early overview focused largely on American historiography, see P. Manning, Navigating World History: Historians Create a Global Past, New York 2003, and more recently M. Lang, Histories of Globalization(s), in: P. Duara, V. Murthy and A. Sartori (eds.), A Companion to Global Historical Thought, Malden 2014, pp. 399–411.

8   C. Maier, Consigning the 20th Century to History: Alternative Narratives for the Modern Era, in: The American Historical Review, 105 (June 2000) 3, pp. 807–831, here 812.

national memory have emerged as a result of interaction between state authorities, civil society, academia, tourist industries, and many other actors during the long process of formation and stabilization of national communities.[9] An amazingly rich literature has taken stock of many such processes that led to catalogues of well-known sites of memory, such as described in Nora's seven-volumes-long list of French *lieux de mémoire*, which became the archetype and theoretical model for similarly complex inventories of what had been important for national communities.

These impressive catalogues lead to the question of whether the national can be remembered but the global or the transregional cannot. Is the reason for scepticism towards global sites of memory simply the lack of an (already?) well-constituted cosmopolitan community that finds expression of its common sense of belonging in places, allegories, symbols, and the like? Or does the structure of global connectedness not necessarily fit at all with the idea of sites of (collective) memory, since there is no formation of a collective actor of the global in sight?

The perspective of multiple world pasts – all "simultaneously present, colliding, interacting and intermixing" to produce a collage of contemporary histories, advocated by Michael Geyer and Charles Bright[10] – requires a careful consideration of the structural narratives, as well as the moral narratives that have hitherto determined the assessment of the twentieth century. One structural narrative has focused on the rise of the nation state as the organizational form best suited for advancing democracy, industrialization, and a mass memory culture; but with this narrative, little is gained by focusing on the twentieth century, given that neither nation states' origin nor their decomposition correspond with the temporal boundaries of that century. In fact, a fixation on the twentieth century obscures from view what Maier defines as "one of the most fundamental sociopolitical trends of modern world development, namely, the emergence, ascendency, and subsequent crisis of what is best labelled 'territoriality'." Territoriality, Maier explains, means "the properties, including power, provided by the control of bordered political space, which until recently at least created the framework for national and often ethnic identity." [11] The consideration of a slowly evolving era of territoriality as a starting point for analysing the twentieth century, helps, first of all, to historicize the nation state and nationalist tendencies that have touched and influenced almost every sphere of society.[12] Moreover, it points to territoriality as an important but not the only dimension of long-term spatialization processes, which also include, for instance, the evolution of empires[13]

9   E. François, K. Konczal, R. Traba and S. Troebst (eds.), Geschichtspolitik in Europa seit 1989 – Deutschland, Frankreich und Polen im internationalen Vergleich, Göttingen 2012.

10   M. Geyer and C. Bright, World History in a Global Age, in: The American Historical Review, 100 (1995) 4, pp. 1034–1060, here 1043.

11   C. Maier, Consigning the 20th Century (fn. 8) p. 807.

12   For the comparison of various national perspectives on memory cultures, see S. Berger and J. Seiffert (eds.), Erinnerungsorte: Chancen, Grenzen und Perspektiven eines Erfolgskonzeptes in den Kulturwissenschaften. Was ist ein Erinnerungsort und wie entsteht er?, Essen 2014.

13   F. Hadler and M. Mesenhöller (eds.), Vergangene Grösse und Ohnmacht in Ostmitteleuropa. Repräsentationen imperialer Erfahrung in der Historiographie seit 1918, Leipzig 2007.

and city states, and thus frees us from earlier unproductive comparisons of local and global tendencies.

The recommendation that research on global history prioritizes spatiality and spatially anchored structures of politics in societies, also results in a different periodization. If we apply this perspective, neither Eric Hobsbawm's concept of a short twentieth century corresponding to the rise and fall of socialism,[14] nor Giovanni Arrighi's idea of a long twentieth century defined by the rise of capitalism is the result.[15] In fact, a focus on territoriality/spatiality[16] invites us not only to rethink the periodization of the last two centuries (with a deep caesura towards the emergence of the global condition in the midst of the nineteenth century, which gave territorialization a new framework), but also the relationship between nation states and empires, which is more complex than the traditional from-empire-to-nation narrative suggests.[17] Prior to the 1860s, the national organization of political space could only be observed in some parts of the world, while at the same time, the first transnational constellations had slowly begun to emerge.[18] As we can conclude from these few hints to a much more complex story of the historical change of spatial formats and spatial orders, it is not as easy as especially social scientists often imagine that the global and the transnational follow the national with historical distance; on the contrary, since the late eighteenth century, nationalization, transformation of empires, and the emergence of an international space and sphere of transnational interaction historically went hand in hand with converging trends (due to mutual learning processes across the globe) and effects that have increased heterogeneity, inequality, and power asymmetries in the world.

As discussions on global-history approaches in the twentieth century have taken on greater significance in historical scholarship, so too has its periodization. This interest, however, has not by any means changed the "moral narratives" of the twentieth century. According to the dominant moral narrative, the twentieth century was a "dark century" defined by unimaginable crimes, genocide, world wars, and the (potential) self-destruc-

14   See E. Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914–1991, New York 1994.

15   See G. Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times, London 1994.

16   For a more detailed discussion of synchronous changes in many parts of the world, see Geyer and Bright, World History in a Global Age (fn. 10); U. Engel and M. Middell, Bruchzonen der Globalisierung, globale Krisen und Territorialitätsregime – Kategorien einer Globalgeschichtsschreibung, in: Comparativ 15 (2005) 5/6, pp. 5–38; M. Middell and K. Naumann, Global History and the Spatial Turn: From the Impact of Area Studies to the Study of Critical Juncures of Globalization, in: Journal of Global History, 5 (2010) 1, pp. 149–170, pp. 163–169.

17   C. Maier, The Cold War as an Era of Imperial Rivalry, in: Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War: Issues, Interpretations, Periodizations, ed. S. Pons and F. Romero, London 2005, pp. 13–20.

18   For a more detailed discussion, see C. Maier, Transformations of Territoriality 1600–2000 Space, Place, Territory, in: G. Budde, S. Conrad and O. Janz (eds.), Transnationale Geschichte: Themen, Tendenzen und Theorien, Göttingen 2006, pp. 32–55. On the emergence of an increasingly dense network of international organizations, see A. Iriye, Global Community: The Role of international Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World, Los Angeles 2002; on the various dimensions of transnational history and connections, see K.K. Patel, Nach der Nationalfixiertheit. Perspektiven einer transnationalen Geschichte, Berlin 2004. For an attempt to integrate territorialization and transnationalization in an historical account of a larger region, see: F. Hadler and M. Middell (eds.), Handbuch einer transnationalen Geschichte Ostmitteleuropas, Band I: Von der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts bis zum Ersten Weltkrieg, Göttingen 2017.

tion of entire civilizations or even the world. A second moral narrative of the twentieth century emphasizes the rise of consumerism,[19] technological innovation, and expanding prosperity, bringing to mind modernization theory with its emphasis on progress. Maier argues that these moral narratives could remain unaffected by the rise of a global world order. The established Western narratives of catastrophe and progress are, however, confronted by new moral designs, such as Eastern European narratives of twofold victimization (under National Socialism and Soviet imperialism), advanced by politicians in that region,[20] or various moral narratives emphasizing the victimization of colonial subjects under imperial rule. Yet, such predictions about future moral narratives remain risky, since they presuppose a relatively homogenous development of global historical awareness, just as the pleas for new structural narratives assume a homogenous, international academic community.

However, speculation about how future generations across the globe may remember the twentieth century need not be the only perspective of the problem; instead of seeing "globalization" as a natural process, we may think of it as a bundle of projects promoted by multiple actors, or speak of globalizations in the plural, and one could take this idea even further, i.e. seeing these globalizations as the product of a vast array of political globalization projects. These political projects are based on different world views, but what they have in common is that they advance hierarchies of power and interpretation. The various world narratives, upon which these globalization projects are based, claim universal validity, and yet they are profoundly shaped by particularism. The construction of memory and identity is a part of these world narratives and of the globalization projects based on those narratives, just as, conversely, efforts at attaining a particular position in the world necessitate new narratives of the past. Correspondingly, the history of historiography becomes interesting because of the multitudinous forces driving global history,[21] which are understood as the expression of various global projects.[22] This history of writing global history is somehow connected to a possible, albeit not yet worked out history of memory sites of globalization and the related processes of remembering earlier global connections.

19   See P.N. Stearns, Consumerism in World History, New York 2006. For a more critical view of consumerism, see F. Trentmann, Beyond Consumerism: New Historical Perspectives on Consumption, in: Journal of Contemporary History, 39 (2004) 3, pp. 373–401; id. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook on the History of Consumption, Oxford 2012.
20   S. Troebst, Diktaturerinnerung und Geschichtskultur im östlichen und südlichen Europa. Ein Vergleich der Vergleiche, Leipzig 2010; S. Troebst and S. Baumgartl (eds.), Postdiktatorische Geschichtskulturen im Süden und Osten Europas. Bestandsaufnahme und Forschungsperspektiven, Göttingen 2010.
21   S. Beckert and D. Sachsenmaier, Global History, Globally, forthcoming 2018; G. Rillo, La globalisation de l'Histoire globale, in: RHMC 54 (2007) 4, pp. 23–33; G. Balachandran, Claiming Histories beyond the Nations: Situating Global History, in: Indian Economic and Social History Review, 49 (2012) 2, pp. 247–72.
22   M. Middell and L. Roura, Transnational Challenges to National History Writing, New York 2013.

2. A Necessary Enlargement for the Concept of Sites of Memory

A history of globalization's sites of memory encounters the same fundamental problem as global history in general, namely that it would have no obvious point of orientation in a cohesive social group or in a recognizable time frame. This dilemma is by no means entirely new, having previously arisen in methodological debates concerning a history of national sites of memory. Nora acknowledged that one motivation for a history of cultural remembrance in France was to preserve and restore a cohesive national memory, that is a memory of "France in the singular."[23] The project on *lieux de mémoire*, directed by Nora, evolved over the course of its seven volumes, composed of 127 diverse essays by leading French historians. The series has lent itself to multiple reworkings, as evidenced by the two American attempts at its translation.[24] However, in its original form, the goal was to realize a close link between the themes of commemoration and those of place: "The sole purpose of the undertaking in its original form was to achieve a close link between a general problematique of memory with the particular theme of 'places'."[25] In both Maier's study of historical narrative types and the French project (at first, most likely unintended in the latter), a flexibility arises, since "places" can be connected to a spatial order that adheres to certain spatial formats, such as the national organizational pattern, i.e. clearly demarcated exteriority and interiority; the integration of interior spaces through appropriate administrative structures; the development of political participation by all citizens; the removal of internal economic barriers; the invention of a shared history, and, in many cases, enforced monolingualism.

"Places," however, can also form the building blocks of different spatial political orders. They remain a constant – existing before the constitution of the nation and after its weakening by the emergence of regional, supranational, and transregional relations of loyalty – and can, thus, be integrated into completely different spatial constellations and narratives.

In the French memory project, the flexibility of the concept of place expands even further; according to their quasi-metaphorical definition, places of memory include museums, monuments, archives, legends, symbols, institutions of education and knowledge production, as well as symbols, such as emblems, flags, and hymns. "This assortment of places," Nora opined, "is filled with rather chaotic exuberance and richness." Thus, the national unity of France "lies in the highly symbolic meaning that composed and illuminated the entity called 'France'."[26] Yet, given the project's implicit origins in a perceived threat to the unity of France, it could possibly lead to a reworking of the building blocks of national mythology, and hence changes in the structures of remembrance. For example, following the French revolution, the self-described "patriot" and builder

23   P. Nora, General Introduction in Rethinking France, vol. 1, Chicago 2001, p. viii.
24   L.B. Kritzman (ed.), Realms of Memory 3 vols., New York, 1996–98; D.P. Jordan (ed.), Rethinking France, 4 vols., Chicago 2001–2004.
25   P. Nora, General Introduction, in: Rethinking France, vol. 1 (fn. 23) p. xx.
26   Ibid.

Pierre-François Palloy reminted the stones and iron chains of the Bastille and offered them for sale as souvenirs. Rather than commemorating the building's history, his souvenirs commemorated its destruction and the birth of a French Republic, which was well-anchored in the history of metropolitan France, but much less so in its imperial and colonial histories.[27]

In contrast to the French project, the large-scale project of German sites of memory, initiated by Étienne François and Hagen Schulze, does not start from the premise of unity; the history of Central Europe, characterized by upheavals, divisions, and caesuras, does not support such a narrative. Instead, their study focuses on competing collective memories, the interplay between regional and national memory, and the interaction with neighbouring peoples and victims of German expansionism.[28] Other authors have traced the memory cultures of other European countries, and this had added urgency to the question of whether there are or will be European sites of memory, when the European Community becomes a cultural community in need of a shared memory culture.[29]

Studies on the memory cultures of the United States (US) and of other non-European cultures have contributed to the debate on the extent to which colonial and postcolonial status can be adequately represented;[30] they have made the issue of addressing American self-representation as an immigrant community or "melting pot" more urgent,[31] and even more strongly than in the intra-European context, they have drawn attention to transatlantic interdependencies.[32]

However, the difficulties of such a sweeping agenda are considerable, and so, at this point in time, we are seeing the emergence of individual studies, such as David Armitage's book reflecting on the global character of the US Declaration of Independence – the first American history of the declaration to venture a global-history approach. In three loosely

27   H.-J. Lüsebrink and R. Reichardt, Die "Bastille": Zur Symbolgeschichte von Herrschaft und Freiheit, Frankfurt a.M. 1990. On the contradictory character of the Third Republic's relationship with the colonial legacy, see for example L. Dubois, La république métissée: Citizenship, Colonialism, and the Borders of French History, in: S. Howe (ed.), New Imperial Histories Reader, London 2010, pp. 422–434, as well as J.A. Boittin and T. Stovall, "Who is French?" in: French Historical Studies, 33 (2010) 3, pp. 349–356. On Germany: L. Förster, Postkoloniale Erinnerungslandschaften. Wie Deutsche und Herero in Namibia des Kriegs von 1904 gedenken, Frankfurt, New York 2010. Addressing the colonial dimension of historical culture across Europe: U. Fenske, D. Groth, K.-M. Guse and B.P. Kuhn (eds.), Kolonialismus und Dekolonisation in nationalen Geschichtskulturen und Erinnerungspolitiken in Europa, Frankfurt am Main 2015.

28   F. Hartog, Régimes d'historicité. Présentisme et expériences du temps, Paris 2003 discusses these various dimensions under his notion of regimes of historicity, and addresses similar concerns with the many layers of remembrance.

29   S. Troebst. Transnationale Erinnerungsorte: Nord- und südeuropäische Perspektiven, Berlin 2009; C. Kühberger (ed.), Europäische Geschichtskultur – Europäische Geschichtspolitik. Vom Erfinden, Entdecken, Erarbeiten der Bedeutung von Erinnerung und Geschichte für das Verständnis und Selbstverständnis Europas, Innsbruck 2009; A. Assmann and S. Conrad, Memory in a Global Age: Discourses, Practices and Trajectories. Basingstoke 2010; P. de Boer et al. (eds.), Europäische Erinnerungsorte, Bd. 1: Mythen und Grundbegriffe des europäischen Selbstverständnisses; Bd. 2: Das Haus Europa; Bd. 3: Europa und die Welt, Munich 2012.

30   M. Diawara, B. Lategan and J. Rüsen (eds.), Historical Memory in Africa. Dealing with the Past, Reaching for the Future in an Intercultural Context, Oxford 2010.

31   J. Kempf, Entre le regard et la trace: Pour les lieux de mémoire aux États-Unis, in: Annales de l'université de Savoie, 18 (1995), pp. 13–22.

32   M. Meigs, Optimism at Armageddon: Voices of American Participants in the First World War, London 1997.

connected essays, he considers the world in the declaration, the declaration in the world, and the world of declarations. As Armitage notes, "no single document is so bound up with what it means to be American" as the declaration and, yet, even its earliest material form points to its international character. The printer of the first version, John Dunlop, was a native Irishman; the paper he used for most copies was Dutch paper that had been brought from England, and the raw materials of the silver inkwell, in which the signers dipped their pens, most likely came from Peru or Mexico.[33]

Yet, it was as a model for other declarations of independence in North America, Africa, and Eastern Europe that it transcended the national space and became a site of memory for other states. Beginning in the late eighteenth century, a host of states chose to follow the path forged by the declaration, writing similar declarations in order to gain foreign recognition of their (often violent) struggle for legal independence. As Armitage makes clear, the US Declaration of Independence was, in actuality, a declaration of interdependence.[34]

The global prominence of the declaration can also be explained by its strategic importance for modern world history. It marked the transition from a world of empires to one of states with a national agenda (albeit to this day, some of the most successful nation states pursue imperialist policies and hold control over places and spaces outside the metropolis, where people do not have a full spectrum of rights).[35] The authors of such a declaration were primarily concerned with outlining the process of state formation to the world beyond their borders, not nation-building at home. The model proved so successful that by the second half of the twentieth century, nation states claiming exclusive, internal political and legal jurisdiction over its citizenry (with a few exceptions) defined the world political order. The dissolution of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia in the 1990s, marked a continuation of this process, and the various nationalist movements that emerged in the wake of the collapse, viewed the declaration as a source of legitimation for their cause.[36] But this new wave of nationalism and nation-building happened in a different context: while, during the Cold War, such processes happened under the umbrella of two powerful blocs competing with each other and, therefore, supporting sovereignty as a tool against the expansion of the other side, the post-1989 attempts to nationalize pieces of the former transnational entities worked against the tide of growing deterritorialization caused by the search for a new world order and capitalist expansion into new areas.[37]

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33   D. Armitage, The Declaration of Independence: A Global History, Cambridge, MA 2007, here p. 12.

34   Ibid, p. 30.

35   C. Charle, La crise des sociétés impériales: Allemagne, France, Grande-Bretagne 1900–1940: Essai d'histoire comparée, Paris 2001; C. Maier, Among Empires, American Ascendancy and its Predecessors, Cambridge 2006 ; J. Burbank and F. Cooper, Empires in World History. Power and the Politics of Difference, Princeton 2010; A.L. Stoler, Duress: Imperial Durabilities in Our Times, Durham 2016.

36   See the list of declarations of independence between 1776–1993 in: D. Armitage, The Declaration (fn. 33), pp. 145–156.

37   On the understanding of globalization as a dialectics of de- and reterritorialization in new political geography, see G. O'Tuathail and T. Luke, Present at the (Dis)integration: Deterritorialisation and Reterritorialisation in the

Works on the history of human rights, which likewise identify the universalization of concepts and practices as the basis for the development of a global historical consciousness, have pointed in the same direction.[38] While they have been the product of political conflict at certain places with a particular nationalizing agenda, they became a sort of world heritage and allowed people in many different situations to refer to them. One could attribute a similar global historical consciousness to Léopold Senghor, a founder of the Négritude movement and advocate of Africa's participation in the francophone world. Senghor, a native of Senegal, argued that his country's participation in a postcolonial francophone world did not represent its continued subjugation by its former colonial master; rather, it announced to the world Africa's right to participate in developing an idea of French civilization over which France no longer exercised sole stewardship.[39] Moving beyond sharp distinctions between metropole and periphery, and the diffusionist model of cultural contact, a growing number of scholars are rethinking how culture travels. Instead of a unidirectional flow from core to periphery, these studies posit a multidirectional circulation, whereby ideas and cultural practices are transformed, appropriated, and adapted, as they travelled between metropole and colonial societies, and later between metropole and postcolonial societies, as well as between societies in the colonized world or the Global South.[40] This process of cultural transfer provides the building blocks for a history of global sites of memory.[41] The tango can exemplify how cultural transfer and cross-cultural transfers were accompanied by appropriation, modification, and reinterpretation. Its transfer to Paris, Berlin, and beyond at the beginning of the twentieth century entailed more than a geographic move: it also involved a social and cultural transfer. In removing it from its original context – the working-class neighbourhoods of Buenos Aires – its disseminators adapted it for European consumption, so that the dance took on new styles, forms, and traditions.[42] Today, the tango is on the agenda of every national or international dance festival.[43]

The tango is, of course, by no means the only example of cultural transfer; a long list of such transfers could be given here. However, the point is not to provide an arbitrary

New World (Dis)order, in: Annals of the Association of American Geographers (1994), pp. 381–398; N. Brenner, Beyond State-Centrism? Space, Territoriality, and Geographical Scale in Globalization Studies, in: Theory and Society 28 (1999), pp. 39–71; J. Agnew, Sovereignty Regimes: Territoriality and State Authority in Contemporary World Politics, in: Annals of the Association of American Geographers 95 (2005), H. 2, pp. 437–461.

38 L. Hunt, Inventing Human Rights: A History, New York 2007; M.R. Ishay, The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era, Berkeley 2004.

39 J. Riesz, Léopold Sédar Senghor und der afrikanische Aufbruch im 20. Jahrhundert, Wuppertal 2006.

40 S. Schaffer et al. (eds.), The Brokered World. Go-Betweens and Global Intelligence, 1770–1820, Sagamore Beach 2009; M. Middell (ed.), Cultural Transfer, Encounters and Connections in the Global 18th Century, Leipzig 2014.

41 T. Adam (ed.), Intercultural Transfers and the Making of the Modern World, 1800–2000. Sources and Contexts, Basingstoke 2011; P.Y. Saunier, Transnational History, London 2013; M. Middell, The Intercultural Transfer Paradigm in its Transnational and Transregional Setting, in: Yearbook of Transnational History 1 (2018) (forthcoming).

42 K. Lange, Tango in Paris und Berlin: Eine Transnationale Geschichte der Metropolkultur um 1900, Göttingen 2015.

43 For more on the dance's global transfer, see K. Maase, Grenzenloses Vergnügen: Der Aufstieg der Massenkultur 1850–1970, Frankfurt am Main 1997; C. Apprill, Le tango argentin en France, Paris 1998; R. Pelinski (ed.), El tango nómade: Ensayos sobre la díaspora el tango, Buenos Aires 2000.

inventory of these transfers but rather to highlight the extent to which (potential) transnational and global sites of remembrance surround us. Such a history would have to start by putting the many groups migrating across the globe centre stage. For these displaced communities, remembrance is an expression of their transnational or even global existence.[44]

The structural narrative – returning once again to Maier's category – offers sufficient material and stimulus for precisely mapping a global memory landscape because it highlights entanglements and universal projects that fundamentally challenge the "territoriality" of our view of history. But has globalization already created a global turn in historical consciousness? Put differently, has global literacy increased as a result of globalization? Recent studies suggest the answer is no.[45] Even though academic historiography has in recent years expressed harsh criticism of Eurocentric approaches to the past, this bias has persisted in media-transmitted history. A recent study based on an online survey of persons from 100 countries concluded:

> *There is a strong convergence of historical perceptions in different parts of the world, and a number of events can indeed be called part of a global memory. This global 'canon' of events is comprised mainly of acts of political violence, like wars and revolutions. Yet world regions are very unevenly represented in world memory, and the only region to be mentioned by more than one third of the population on every continent is Europe. Additionally, many of the mentioned events that took place in other parts of the world also included Western powers on foreign soil, or are connected with the foreign policy of the United States during and after the Cold War. Africa, and even more so Latin America and Oceania hardly feature on the memory maps of our sample of the world population.*[46]

While this study seemingly validates Maier's conclusion about the persistence of moral narratives that stem from Western European societies,[47] it is possible that the increas-

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44   K.J. Bade et al., Enzyklopädie Migration in Europa: Vom 17. Jahrhundert bis zur Gegenwart, Paderborn 2007; C. Harzig and D. Hoerder, What is Migration History?, Cambridge 2009. The list of books and articles on migration issues is fast expanding and addresses – often under the term of diaspora – more and more cultural dimensions as well. The contribution to the emergence of a global historical consciousness remains, however, so far understudied.

45   I. Volkmer, News in Public Memory: An International Study of Media Memories across Generations, New York 2006; J.W. Pennbaker, D. Páez and J.C. Deschamps, The Social Psychology of History: Defining the Most Important Events of the Last 10, 100, and 1000 Years, in: Psicologia Política 32 (2006), pp. 15–32; H. Schuman and A.D. Corning, Collective Knowledge of Public Events: The Soviet Era from the Great Purge to Glasnost, in: American Journal of Sociology, 105 (2000), pp. 913–56; A. D. Corning, Comparing Iraq to Vietnam. Recognition, Recall, and the Nature of Cohort Effects, in: Public Opinion Quarterly, 70 (2006), pp. 78–87.

46   V. Andorfer et. al., How Global are Our Memories? An Empirical Approach Using an Online Survey, in: Comparativ, 18 (2008) 2, pp. 99–115.

47   In contrast to Western Europe, Canada, the US, and Australia have not only been always "diverse" and "migrant societies" but have insisted on this fact for a long time already, developing national memories that were mainly racial ones. The extent to which that has shifted in these societies in the last decades is much more dramatic than what we see in Western Europe. It is not necessarily, or at least not exclusively about increased diversity, as they have always been "diverse," but it is about a new "politics of difference" that has emerged.

ingly diverse and intercultural background of students and of the general public will lead sooner rather than later to changes in how history is taught in classrooms and in seminars.[48] In short, diversity could result in a broadening of the curriculum's perspective to take into account postcolonial realities.[49] At the same time, sites of memory that refer to the presence of Europeans (and especially those connected to the colonial past) have been disputed, as the #RhodesMustFall campaign in 2015/2016 in Cape Town, South Africa, has shown dramatically.

3. Portals of Globalization

Globalization, most historians would now agree,[50] began before the formation of nation states. Historical analysis, in fact, has shown that a simple trajectory from national regulation to global governance, advanced by many in the 1990s, misrepresents the timeline of globalization.[51] While historians agree that globalization predates the emergence of the nation state, pinpointing a single date of origin remains a topic of contention. Some authors speak of "archaic" globalization, that is, globalizing events and developments from the time of the earliest civilizations.[52] However, most historians associate the era of globalization with the Age of Discovery; Jürgen Osterhammel and Niels P. Petersson explain:

> *Throughout earlier periods of history, there were repeated attempts at globalization that always broke off at some point. Therefore, we can view these events as the prehistory of globalization. We agree with Immanuel Wallerstein insofar as we interpret a new globalization initiative that began around 1500 with the emergence of the Portuguese and Spanish colonial empires as the beginning of a basically irreversible process of worldwide integration.*[53]

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48   L. Hunt, Writing History in the Global Era, New York 2014.

49   M. Riekenberg (ed.), Geschichts- und Politikunterricht zeitgemäß? Fragen und Bemerkungen aus der Sicht der Regionalwissenschaften, Leipzig 2005; H. Schissler and Y.N. Soysal (eds.), The Nation, Europe, and the World: Textbooks and Curricula in Transition, New York 2005; J. Forster and S. Popp (eds.), Curriculum Weltgeschichte. Globale Zugänge für den Geschichtsunterricht, Schwalbach 2003; M. Herren, P.Manning, P.C. McCarty, M. Middell, and E. Vanhaute, Potentials and Challenges of Global Studies for the 21st Century, 2014.

50   The intention here is not to overlook Bruce Mazlish's concept of a new global history, which focuses on the processes that have given shape to the globalized world of the present. Mazlish posits a qualitative change in the linkage between peoples, brought about by our growing awareness of threats against which the territorial state cannot protect us (e.g. military threats such as nuclear weapons and environmental threats such as ozone holes and climate change). Yet, his approach does not focus solely on the present; instead, the development of these factors of globalization is traced over the long-term. See B. Mazlish, The New Global History, London 2006; see also www.newglobalhistory.org.

51   For a very good overview, see J. Osterhammel and N.P. Petersson, Geschichte der Globalisierung. Dimensionen, Prozesse, Epochen, München 2003.

52   C. A. Bayly, 'Archaic' and 'Modern' Globalization in the Eurasian and African Arena, c. 1750–1850, in: A.G. Hopkins (ed.), Globalization in World History, London 2002, pp. 47–73.

53   J. Osterhammel and N.P. Petersson, Globalization: A Short History, Dona Geyer (trans.) Princeton, NJ 2005, p. 28.

Still, other theories for the periodization of globalization should be taken into consideration. For example, Janet Abu-Lughod argues that the modern world system grew out of a thirteenth-century world trade system dominated by China and the Islamic Middle East.[54] In advancing this theory, she contends that Wallerstein underestimated the historic strengths of Asian and Arab economies. Other authors insist on even longer continuities.[55]

Each of these proposed temporal frames for globalization, of course, also has implications for how we remember this supposed global past. Decisions about periodization are never neutral and often include implicit value judgments and hierarchies. Thus, as many authors acknowledge, their proposed periodization for globalization was an effort to move beyond the dominant Eurocentric representations of the past, even if such representations no longer explicitly devalue other cultures as "people without history."

What counts more for a global-history approach to sites of memory, is that global history cannot be identified with any particular spatial order; rather, the focal point of global history must be an analysis of the relationship between various constellations of global currents and networks on the one hand, and the political organization of space that is created to control the flow of people, goods, and ideas on the other. Thus, this approach also addresses the relationship between global interdependencies and the transformation, renegotiation, and making anew of different spatial orders. In analysing these arenas of contact, the category of "portals of globalization" seems very useful to me, as argued already on other occasions.[56] For centuries, the development of global contacts was not uniform; instead, it was concentrated in hubs that encompassed all modes of transactions: trade relations, intellectual discussions with foreigners, military conflicts, religious proselytization and conversion, book markets, and the circulation of notions of luxury. It was at these hubs that the global context crystallized.

We can gain insights into the formation of past global networks by comparing them with contemporary regions, which only recently have been exposed to the effects of globalization and, thus, where the negotiation of cross-cultural communication remains in flux. In the present-day context, this cross-cultural negotiation is best exemplified by contact between foreign investors, representing transregional or transnational enterprises and the mayors of relatively small communities. To alleviate conflict, the expertise of consulting firms specializing in cross-cultural exchange is leaned on today. In the age of proto-industrialization, local distributors had fulfilled this function, and in the age of nationalism, state bureaucrats had been the moderators of cross-cultural encounters. But in the context of extensive global-market connections, the challenge remains to master, in a very short period of time, cultural techniques that developed over centuries (at least in part) within portals of globalization, and then applying that knowledge effectively.

54 J. Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250–1350, Oxford 1989.
55 J.R. McNeill and W.H. McNeill, The Human Web: A Bird's-Eye View of World History, New York 2003; D. Christian, Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History, Berkeley 2004; F. Spier, The Structure of Big History: From the Big Bang until Today, Amsterdam 1996.
56 Middell and Naumann, Global History and the Spatial Turn (fn. 16).

The definition of portals of globalization includes both physical locations and infrastructures, such as harbours, shipyards, warehouses, and markets, as well as institutions and political abstractions, such as citizenship rights and contractual enforcement by courts. From the standpoint of the men and women who lived and traded through such portals of globalization, these places can be seen as hubs of entrepreneurship, job markets, and even religious and political safe havens. On the other hand, they were also important sites of regulation and control, which included exclusionary practices and forced displacement.

Portals of globalization, thus, have a twofold significance for building a global memory culture. They are the places where the patterns of behaviour, institutions, social constellations, and cultural configurations that have relevance for subsequent globalizing impulses emerged. As such, they can be used to measure the scope and depth of the global experience. For present-day regions that only now are experiencing the effects of globalization, they inspire imitation as a historically successful model, or rejection as a threat to a territorialized understanding of identity. But irrespective of the reaction, portals of globalization connect the past and present experience of global networks and consequently invite exploration of their transformation into global *lieux de mémoire*.

In their book The Human Web, John McNeill and William McNeill highlight the long history of human webs of communication and interchange, in which port cities and relay stations on transcontinental routes (e.g. the Silk Road) served as crossroads of information, people, goods, and disease.[57] They can be seen as the first of several relevant types of portals of globalization. These port cities and trade hubs, although distinguishable from one another, exhibit important similarities in terms of the social groups involved in trade, communication, and transport.[58] As a rule, these groups were linked to cities shaped by an emerging cosmopolitanism; in a study of residents of Mediterranean port cities in the age of steam navigation, Malte Fuhrmann revealed in an exemplary way a culture of cosmopolitanism defined by contradictory social interactions, that is, interethnic sociability and confrontations.[59]

The web of social relations in port cities marks the point of intersection between research on portals of globalization and that on diasporic communities.[60] Hamburg and Bremen became transit sites for transoceanic emigration in the nineteenth century. With

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57   See McNeill and McNeill, The Human Web (fn. 55).

58   M. Haneda (ed.), Asian Port Cities 1600–1800. Local and Foreign Cultural Interactions, Singapore 2008; A. Mah, Port Cities and Global Legacies. Urban Identity, Waterfront Work, and Radicalism, Basingstoke 2014; B. Beaven, K. Bell and R. James (eds.), Port Towns and Urban Cultures: International Histories of the Waterfront, c. 1700–2000, London 2016; M. Maruschke, Portals of Globalization. Mumbai's Free Ports and Free Zones, c. 1833–2015, Leipzig Diss. Phil. 2016.

59   M. Fuhrmann, Meeresanrainer – Weltbürger? Zum Verhältnis von hafenstädtischer Gesellschaft und Kosmopolitismus, in: M. Fuhrmann and L. Amenda (eds.), Hafenstädte: Mobilität, Migration, Globalisierung, Leipzig 2007, pp. 12–26.

60   To cite only a few examples: W. Gungwu and N. Chiu-Keong (eds.), Maritime China in Transition 1750–1850, Wiesbaden 2004; A. McKeown, Chinese Migrant Networks and Cultural Change: Peru, Chicago, Hawaii 1900–1936, Chicago 2001; K. Friedland (eds.), Maritime Aspects of Migration, Köln 1989. For a general overview, see W. Gungwu (ed.), Global History and Migrations, Boulder, CO 1997.

hinterlands that extended beyond German-speaking territories into Eastern Europe, an estimated five million people in these two cities boarded ships bound for overseas destinations between 1871–1914. These crossings, however, were not unidirectional, as many Europeans subsequently returned to Europe.[61] As places of arrival and departure, and as sites for the transport of goods, port cities became portals of globalization, exercising influence on food culture, clothing styles, work processes, and forms of sociability. For example, Hong Kong, from which six million Chinese emigrated between 1866–1939, had a similar function in this respect as its Northern and Western European counterparts.[62] Moreover African sites of the slave trade, and African and South Asian railway hubs also acted as portals of globalization.[63]

However, any idealized representation of port cities as places of peaceful coexistence and multicultural diversity, should be viewed with a healthy dose of scepticism. The slave trade; the dubious tactics employed by companies offering overseas ship passages to migrants; the high rate of crime in port cities; xenophobic policies,[64] and outbreaks of contagious diseases were also defining features of port cities as global gateways.[65] Constant conflicts over access, high entry fees, and brutal gatekeepers were as present in these portals as cosmopolitan attitudes were.

In addition to being hubs for global trade networks, port cities were also gateways to the various spatial orders to which the hinterlands belonged.[66] This brings us to a second type of portal, the metropolitan centre of empires and territorial states, which in some cases developed into national centres in the nineteenth century. Such metropolitan centres additionally served important administrative and institutional functions, particularly in the area of knowledge collection about distant countries and cultures. For example, institutions were established that mapped the world,[67] studied foreign languages, advanced comparative anthropology, and systemized this knowledge to advance the interests of the metropolitan centre. The origins of many of these institutions can be traced, in part, to the curiosity cabinets kept by earlier generations of inhabitants of these cities. As centres of larger empires, these metropoles also became hubs of anti-imperial political movements, as recent research has shown in greater detail.[68]

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61   M. Wyman, Round-Trips to America: The Immigration Return to Europe 1880–1930, Ithaca, NY 1993.

62   R. Skeldon (ed.), Emigration from Hong Kong: Tendencies and Impacts, Hong Kong 1995.

63   For excellent case studies, see R. Law, Ouidah: The Social History of a West African Slaving Port, 1727–1892, Athens 2004; G. Castryck (ed.), From Railway Juncture to Portal of Globalization: Making Globalization Work in African and South Asian Railway Towns, Comparativ, 25 (2015) 4, p. 7–16.

64   L. Amenda, "Einfallstore": Hafenstädte, Migration und Kontrolle 1890–1930, in: L. Amenda and M. Fuhrmann (eds.), Hafenstädte: Mobilität, Migration, Globalisierung, Leipzig 2007, pp. 27–36.

65   M. J. Echenberg, Plague Ports: The Global Urban Impact of Bubonic Plague 1894–1901, New York 2007.

66   T. Lane, Liverpool: Gateway of Empire, London 1987.

67   M. Mann, Mapping the Country: European Geography and the Cartographical Construction of India, 1760–1790, in: Science, Technology and Society 8 (2003), pp. 25–46.

68   J.A. Boitin, Colonial Metropolis. The Urban Grounds of Feminism and Anti-Imperialism in Interwar Paris, Lincoln 2010; M. Goebel, Anti-Imperial Metropolis. Interwar Paris and the Seeds of Third World Nationalism, New York 2015.

For years, it was assumed that scientific knowledge originated in Western Europe, and it was then transmitted to non-European countries via colonization; eventually, through this process of diffusion, local intellectuals had accumulated sufficient knowledge to establish indigenous centres of knowledge production.[69] Such Eurocentric diffusionism – challenged in recent years by a growing number of historians – typically results from fragmentary research on non-Western parts of the world, or the deliberate suppression of non-European experiences from the history of globalization. The British Museum and the Louvre are by no means the only portals of globalization; rather, these museums' collections of colonial artefacts, acquired by plundering imperial powers, represent a particular globalization project. The Forbidden City in Beijing, the Buddhist and Hindu temples of Borobudur and Prambanan in Indonesia, and Machu Picchu in Peru are also portals of globalization. They represent only a few examples of non-European portals; portals of globalization with their connections to state and religious institutions aimed at creating cultural cohesiveness and to modern (scientific) forms of conceptualising and visualising the past, are ubiquitous.

Higher-education institutions concerned with the dissemination of knowledge and the development of research capacity through global cooperation are often linked to these portals. Thus, Ralf Dahrendorf could describe the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) as an institution with global reach; this descriptor could also be applied to other similar institutions in continental Europe, such as the École nationale d'administration (ENA) in France and the Deutsche Hochschule für Politik, an institution that flourished during the Weimar Republic. These sites have become global *lieux de mémoire* – emblazoned in the memory of British and Continental European students, as well as that of young scholars from the Caribbean, India, and Africa. As a portal of globalization, LSE acquired a certain functional diversity at the end of the nineteenth century: "LSE was not and could not have been the British or the National School of Economics. Its base was London, and its home the world."[70] It is no coincidence that this famous college is located at the heart of London, in close proximity to important institutions of the former British Empire, or that it has strong ties to British foreign policy, as well as close contacts with other cultural institutions, such as the British Museum and the world of finance. LSE's consistently high percentage of foreign students and instructors makes it a seemingly global institution, although there are clearly limits. As Dahrendorf acknowledged, "The School never aimed at a baseless internationalism; it is easier to be cosmopolitan for those who have passports;" yet still, he claimed, "LSE has made a major contribution to combating one of the plagues of the twentieth century, the plague of narrow and often aggressive nationalism."[71]

69   K. Raj, Relocating Modern Science: Circulation and the Construction of Knowledge in South Asia and Europe, 1650–1900, Houndmills 2007. In addition to academic institutions, the author also focuses on informal sites of information exchange, such as coffee houses and clubs.

70   R. Dahrendorf, LSE: A History of the London School of Economics and Political Science 1895–1995, Oxford 1995, p. 518.

71   Ibid., p. 519.

The case of LSE reveals how portals such as London bore the physical and psychological imprint of an imperial history.[72] This history is reflected in the architecture, in imperial bureaucracies, as well as in the constant mobility flows to and from the former colonies.[73] It is visible in the lush colossal buildings of imperial power and in the riches of a world-wide economy that flowed to the centre from the periphery.[74] But this history also marks imperial metropolises as portals and sites of memory for anti-imperialist movements and decolonization.[75] Imperial metropolises and their archives may also be paths to gaining official recognition of a pre-national identity for native groups, and specific locations may be sites of commemoration for ancestors, who remain otherwise undocumented in written accounts.[76] This history is also manifested in the traces of bloody oppression and in the days set aside to commemorate past outbreaks of racism. The mass demonstration of tens of thousands of unarmed Algerians on the streets of Paris on 17 October 1961 is but one example of the countless instances of racial conflict that defined such portals. Against the backdrop of the Algerian War and escalating racial tensions in France, the French National Police attacked a mass demonstration of roughly 30,000 pro-National Liberation Front Algerians. The death toll exceeded that of Bloody Sunday (on 30 January 1972), when British forces shot and killed 14 Irish protestors in Londonderry.[77] Thus, portals of globalization are also sites at which oppositional forces in transnational conflicts are concentrated in large numbers.

A third type of portals of globalization, touched on only briefly here, has less to do with commercial networks and the imperial past, and more to do with the advent of global events, such as world exhibitions, major international sports festivals, and the establishment of international organizations.[78] Here, too, we can easily identify an overlap between the different types of portals, given that London and Paris were among the pioneers of the exhibition movement of the nineteenth century;[79] it was soon followed by

72   J. Schneer, London 1900: The Imperial Metropolis, New Haven 1999.

73   For an example out of the burgeoning literature on the impact of empire on metropoles and the many traces of this past in architecture, see: F. Driver and D. Gilbert (eds.), Imperial Cities: Landscape, Display and Identity, Manchester; New York 1999.

74   C. Hall and S.O. Rose (eds.), At Home with the Empire. Metropolitan Culture and the Imperial World, Cambridge; New York 2006.

75   M. Matera, Black London. The Imperial Metropolis and Decolonization in the Twentieth Century, Oakland 2015. On black students in Moscow, see C. Katsakioris. Les étudiants de pays arabes formés en Union soviétique pendant la guerre froide, 1956–1991, in: Revue européenne des migrations internationales 32 (2016) 2, pp. 13–38.

76   C.-P. Thrush, Indigenous London. Native Travelers at the Heart of Empire, New Haven 2017.

77   J. House and N. MacMaster, Paris 1961: Algerians, State Terror, and Memory, Oxford 2006.

78   As an early example of such an international organization and its effect on global consciousness: V. Huber, The Unification of the Globe by Disease? The International Sanitary Conferences on Cholera, 1851–1894, in: Historical Journal, 49 (2006) 2, pp. 453–476.

79   World exhibitions have already attracted a lot of scholarly attention, and the effect of such international gatherings on the perception of global connectedness is well studied: W. Kaiser, Vive la France! Vive la République? The Cultural Construction of French Identity at the World Exhibitions in Paris, 1855–1900, in: National Identities, 1 (1999) 3, pp. 227–244; A. v. Plato, Präsentierte Geschichte: Ausstellungskultur und Massenpublikum im Frankreich des 19. Jahrhunderts, Frankfurt a.M. 2001; N. Levell, Oriental Visions: Exhibitions, Travel and Collecting in the Victorian Age, London 2001; M. Gaillard, Les Expositions universelles de 1855 à 1937, Paris 2003; W. Kaiser, Cultural Transfer of Free Trade at the World Exhibitions, 1851–1862, in: Journal of Modern History 77 (2005), H.

places like Istanbul, Melbourne, or Sydney.[80] Global mental maps of radio listeners and television viewers in the twentieth century shifted though, as locales not yet firmly anchored in such mapping became the hosts of world championships and Olympic Games (e.g. the 1956 Summer Olympic Games in Melbourne).[81]

The competition to host such international events also points to the role of memory for portals of globalization. Since the nineteenth century, cities have increasingly called upon their past global histories in order to reinvent themselves as *lieux de mémoire*,[82] blending the structural narratives advanced by professional historians with the moral narratives advanced in popular culture.[83] In this endeavour, some evoke the metaphor of "gateway to the world;" others call upon the image of "a bridge to the East," and a third group define themselves as at the crossroads of medieval trade routes, so as to emphasize the longevity and primacy of their project. In vying for contracts or bids, cities promote both their past global histories and their attributes as a modern global city, that is, air-transportation capacity, accommodation options for international tourists, the level of revenue of large banks and international business enterprises, and the size of the catchment area from which potential consumers might be drawn.[84] Over the past 20 years, this process went east and south, as examples from Beijing to Rio de Janeiro and South Africa to Qatar demonstrate. The resulting discussions about hosting mega-events and development has added a new facet to the ongoing debate about what portals of globalization might be good for.[85] Whether these locales, as Sassen has postulated, are at the centre of a new, global city system,[86] or are merely part of the continuing history of portals of globalization, is worth the joint study of sociologists and historians.

A global history that does not wish to follow the diachronic approach of modernization theory, in which the various parts of the world move along a conveyer belt towards one

3, pp. 563–590; V. Ogle, Die Kolonisierung der Zeit: Repräsentationen französischer Kolonien auf den Pariser Weltausstellungen von 1889 und 1900, in: Historische Anthropologie 13 (2005) 3, pp. 376–395.

80   Z. Çelik, Displaying the Orient. Architecture of Islam at Nineteenth-Century World's Fairs, Berkeley; Los Angeles; Oxford 1992; R. W. Rydell and N.E. Gwinn (eds.), Fair Representations: World's Fairs and the Modern World, Amsterdam 1994; A.C.T. Geppert, J. Coffey and T. Lau (eds.), International Exhibitions, Expositions Universelles and World's Fairs, 1851–2005: A Bibliography, Berlin 2006.

81   B. Keys, The 1956 Melbourne Olympic Games and the Postwar International Order, in: C. Fink, F. Hadler and T. Schramm (eds), 1956. European and Global Perspectives, Leipzig 2006, pp. 283–308. Again, the Olympic Games has recently been a subject of increasing research, especially by social scientists accompanying bids of hosting cities, and relating them to the formation of global rankings of cities: Olympia: 100 Years of History, 1886–1986, London 1986; S. Cornelissen, The Geopolitics of Global Aspiration: Sport Mega-Events and Emerging Powers, in: The International Journal of the History of Sport, 27 (2010) 16–18, pp. 3008–3025; J. Grix (ed.) Leveraging Legacies from Sports Mega-Events: Concepts and Cases, Basingstoke 2014.

82   T. Barringer and T.F. Lynn (eds.), Colonialism and the Object: Empire, Material Culture and the Museum, London 1998.

83   Mah, Port Cities (fn. 58).

84   S. Sassen, The Global City. New York, London, Tokyo, Princeton 2001.

85   S. Cornelissen, More than a Sporting Chance? Appraising the Sport for Development Legacy of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, in: Third World Quarterly, 32, 3 (2011), pp. 503–529.

86   See the different perspectives in S. Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights. From Medieval to Global Assemblages, Princeton 2006, and J.L. Abu-Lughod, New York, Chicago, Los Angeles. America's Global Cities, Minneapolis, London 1999.

modernity (equated with Western-style economic, political, and cultural forms and, thus, legitimizing the domination of the West/North over the rest of the world), calls for an approach that has, as its focal point, the synchronous, yet polycentric, interpenetration of multiple modernities. Christopher Bayly has proposed the concept of "global crises" to describe such synchronous and polycentric relationships, in which global interactions intensify and lead to violent clashes.[87] The sociologist Neil Brenner, building on the work of David Harvey, has attributed these eruptions of social conflicts to dialectically intertwined processes of territorialization and deterritorialization.[88] At certain critical junctures of globalization, these conflicts converge into the emergence of a new spatial order. Portals of globalization are places where such crises can be seen very early on at the horizon, but also where the conflicts are fought in a particular explicit way.

Portals of globalization play a vital role in global processes of synchronization, in that they serve as hubs for global entanglements of all kinds, facilitate the emergence of cultural techniques and knowledge in dealing with global interconnections, and they provide information on the way in which other societies are dealing with similar challenges. Consequently, they increase awareness that the economic, political, and cultural challenges faced at home are in fact global phenomena. Thus, portals of globalization provide a theoretical frame for understanding the difference between the earliest manifestations of globalization and more recent developments. At the same time, these portals serve to organize the memory of a global experience. It seems, therefore, a promising endeavour to use the concept of portals of globalization to connect the investigation of sites of memory with the research framework of global history.

87   C. Bayly, Die Geburt der modernen Welt: Eine Globalgeschichte (1780–1914), Frankfurt a. M. 2006.
88   N. Brenner, Beyond State-Centrism? Space, Territoriality, and Geographical Scale in Globalization Studies, in: Theory and Society 28 (1999), pp. 39–78.